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ANNUAL STATEMENT

OF THE

TRADE AND NAVIGATION

OF

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FOR

1909-1910.

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

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REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

109277

COLONIAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE;

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND INDEX.

00109277

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
11 *July* 1861.

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH

Martis, 5° die Martii, 1861.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed on Colonial Military Expenditure, to Inquire and Report whether any and what Alterations may be advantageously adopted in regard to the Defence of the British Dependencies, and the Proportions of Cost of such Defence as now defrayed from Imperial and Colonial Funds respectively.

Mercurii, 13° die Martii, 1861.

Committee nominated of—

General Peel.
Mr. Ellice.
Sir George Grey.
Lord Stanley.
Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Childers.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Thomas George Baring.
Mr. Adderley.
Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Baxter.
[redacted]sh.
Mr. FitzGerald.
Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Arthur Mills.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Jovis, 11° die Julii, 1861.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have powe[redacted] Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to [redacted]

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REPORT

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed on COLONIAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE, to inquire and Report whether any and what Alterations may be advantageously adopted in regard to the DEFENCE of the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES, and the proportions of Cost of such Defence as now defrayed from IMPERIAL and COLONIAL FUNDS respectively:——HAVE considered the Matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:

1. THE dependencies of the British Empire (exclusive of India, to which your Committee have not extended their investigations) may be divided for the purposes of this inquiry into two classes:—

1st. Those which may properly be called "Colonies." To this class belong the North American and South African Colonies, the West Indies, Ceylon, Mauritius, New Zealand, and the Australian Colonies, with the exception of Western Australia.

2d. Military garrisons, naval stations, convict depôts, and dependencies maintained chiefly for objects of Imperial policy. To this class belong Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands, Hong Kong, Labuan, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Helena, and the Falklands, Western Australia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast.

Throughout their inquiry, your Committee have deemed it essential to keep in view the distinction to be drawn between these two classes.

2. In order to enable your Committee to form a correct opinion as to any alterations which it may be their duty to recommend in the military administration of the Dependencies to which their inquiries have extended, they have deemed it necessary, in the first instance, accurately to ascertain the details of the system which at present exists, and the proportions of cost actually incurred by the Imperial Government and the Dependencies respectively in their military defence. With this view they have examined witnesses connected with various public departments at home, and others who have held positions of official responsibility in various Colonies. They have also taken some evidence as to the actual condition, cost and objects of colonial fortifications.

3. It appears that the forces stationed in the British Dependencies, and the cost incurred in their defence, have fluctuated according to the circumstances affecting them at different times. In order to arrive at a fair estimate of the average annual expenditure incurred, and of the number of troops employed, your Committee have obtained returns for the year ending 31 March 1860, the most recent period during which no disturbing causes existed, involving an exceptional increase of force. Returns, Appendix.

4. The actual amount of Imperial expenditure (including cost of barracks, fortifications, transport, proportion of non-effective services, and of recruiting and departmental expenses at home) incurred in the defence of the dependencies (distinguishing the two classes above referred to), also the number and distribution of troops borne on the strength of the British army, and employed in their defence for the year ending 31 March 1860, will appear from the following

following table, compiled from returns furnished by various departments of the Government:—

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops borne on the Strength of the Imperial Army.					Imperial Military Expenditure.
	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTALS.	
COLONIES PROPER.						£.
North American Colonies:						
Canada	1,039	1,137	248	8	2,432	206,264
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	1,612	- -	177	92	1,881*	149,495
Newfoundland	- -	287	1	1	239	20,807
British Columbia	- -	- -	- -	138	138	37,000
Australian Colonies:						
New South Wales	507	- -	106	32	645	43,039
Victoria	618	- -	- -	6	624	36,557
South Australia	93	- -	- -	7	100	6,836
Tasmania	324	- -	- -	2	326	35,113
New Zealand	1,166	- -	45	41	1,252	104,852
South African Colonies:						
Cape of Good Hope, Natal, and British Kaffaria	3,409	1,042	176	239	4,866	456,658
Ceylon	846	1,356	135	7	2,344	110,268
Mauritius	1,449	- -	133	48	1,630	145,658
West Indies:						
Jamaica	534	802	94	3	1,433	118,285
Honduras	- -	329	24	2	355	30,621
Windward and Leeward, comprising Barbados, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana	1,145	1,104	136	7	2,392	213,793
TOTAL	12,742	6,007	1,275	633	20,657	1,715,246
MILITARY GARRISONS, NAVAL STATIONS, CONVICT DEPÔTS, AND DEPENDENCIES MAINTAINED CHIEFLY FOR OBJECTS OF IMPERIAL POLICY.						
Mediterranean:						
Malta	5,008	637	779	304	6,728	483,173
Gibraltar	4,537	- -	1,079	309	5,925	420,695
Ionian Islands	3,601	- -	487	206	4,294	280,061
Hong Kong	- -	- -	- -	- -	733	57,300†
St. Helena	- -	418	77	2	497	38,354
Bermuda	878	- -	159	91	1,128	87,587
Bahamas	- -	386	11	1	398	32,280
Falklands	- -	37	- -	- -	37	2,117
Western Australia	88	- -	- -	86	174	25,946
Labuan	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	7,329‡
West African Settlements:						
Sierra Leone	- -	356	- -	- -	356	27,302
Gambia	- -	334	- -	- -	334	27,910
Gold Coast	- -	306	- -	- -	306	19,781
TOTAL	14,112	2,474	2,592	999	20,910	1,509,835
GROSS TOTAL	26,854	8,481	3,867	1,632	41,567	3,225,081§

* About 1,300 of these troops were stationed in the garrison of Halifax, costing about 100,000 *l.*

† In the case of Hong Kong, the ordinary strength and cost of the garrison is given, exclusive of any excess occasioned by wars with China, also exclusive of cost of transport.

‡ The force at Labuan consists of 126 native Indian troops, the cost being repaid to the Indian Government from the Imperial treasury.

§ Total of Imperial Expenditure, given in Return 5 - - - £. 3,130,781
Add,—British Columbia - - - - - 37,000
Hong Kong - - 57,300
£. 3,225,081

It

It should be noted that of the total Imperial expenditure charged against the "Colonies proper," 264,521 *l.* is due to their proportion of the dead weight, recruiting, and departmental expenses at home; and 202,924 *l.* is the proportion of the same expenses charged against the second class of dependencies above enumerated.

5. It appears from returns laid before your Committee that, beyond the expenses defrayed from the Imperial Exchequer, the undermentioned dependencies contributed during the year ending 31 March 1860, the further sums specified in the following return towards their military defence (that is to say);

	£.	
St. Helena	482	For maintenance of local forces.
Sierra Leone	562	
Gambia	423	
Gold Coast	234	
Cape of Good Hope	56,176	
Canada	13,393	
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	198	
New South Wales	33,806	For pay and allowances to British troops, and for various military purposes.
Victoria	72,110	
South Australia	7,172	
Ceylon	97,198	
Mauritius	25,354	
Malta	6,200	
Jamaica	1,637	For construction of works, barracks, &c. including the cost of constructing works described as "sea defences" in Demerara.
Windward and Leeward Islands, with Guiana	29,279	
Ionian Islands	25,000	For general purposes of defence, in pursuance of a convention executed under the Treaty of Paris.
TOTAL	£. 369,224	

Of the above sums, the following amounts were passed to the credit of Her Majesty's Exchequer in the books of the War Office, by the following dependencies: Army Estimates, 1860–1, p. 146.

	£.	s.	d.
New South Wales	14,711	15	7
Ionian Islands	18,449	15	4
Mauritius	10,000	–	–
Malta	6,200	–	–
Ceylon	23,954	–	4
£.	73,315	11	3

And the residue was expended within the dependencies for various military purposes.

6. In connexion with this portion of their inquiry your Committee think it necessary to state that some of the appropriations in aid of military expenditure made by Colonial Legislatures, have not been properly brought to account at home. Large sums appear to have been received from the Colonial Governments by Imperial officers for strictly military purposes, as to which no accounts have been rendered to the War Office or the Treasury; and in the opinion of your Committee it is desirable that all monies so received should appear in the Home accounts; and that there should be appended to the Army Estimates, statements showing the sums so received during the last financial year in each Colony, as well as the total military charge for that Colony defrayed from the Imperial votes. Mr. Anderson, 1159-60, 1197, 3709, 3716. Captain Clarke, 1886, *et seq.*

7. It appears to your Committee that a want of system has prevailed in adjusting and sanctioning, by proper regulations, local contributions paid in aid of the ordinary pay and allowance of officers and soldiers on various foreign stations. Your Committee are of opinion that all rates of colonial allowances drawn by officers and soldiers serving in the colonies should be fixed by specific warrants, under the authority of the Secretary of State for War.

8. Your

Duke of Newcastle, 2482.

8. Your Committee deem it expedient, as bearing on the general subject-matter of their inquiry, to state that from recent returns it appears that more than 10,000 volunteers and militia have been embodied in British North America; a nearly equal number of volunteers in the Australian Colonies; 1,500 in New Zealand; and 1,200 at the Cape of Good Hope; and that these numbers have probably been since considerably increased.

Returns, Appendix.

9. Taking into consideration the facts disclosed by the evidence laid before them, your Committee are of opinion that no uniform rule as to the cost or mode of their military defence can be laid down which shall be applicable alike to communities so various as those which compose the British Colonial Empire; but, following the classification adopted at the commencement of their Report, it appears to your Committee that, as to the second class of dependencies above defined, the responsibility and main cost of their defence properly devolves on the Imperial Government.

Mr. Gladstone, 3780–81, 3792. Mr. Lowe, 3335, 3370–71, 3407.

10. With respect to the dependencies properly called "Colonies," and to which any recommendations hereinafter to be made as to the mode or cost of Colonial defence exclusively relate, the practical application of such recommendations, both as to time and place, must necessarily be left to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the local resources of each dependency, to its dangers from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the empire. With this reservation, it appears to your Committee that the responsibility and cost of the military defence of such dependencies ought mainly to devolve upon themselves.

Your Committee further submit the following general suggestions as arising from the evidence laid before them:

Lord Herbert, 3558, 3563–5. Mr. Godley, 2084, *et seq.*

11. That it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colonial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively should be the subject of negotiations with the various dependencies, but that evidence has been given tending to show that the mode of proceeding adopted by Lord Grey in 1851, in announcing to the Australian Colonies the terms on which alone Imperial troops could be sent there, may be gradually applied to other dependencies.

Mr. Lowe, 3333. Duke of Newcastle, 3058 (Tasmania).

12. That in the case of the Australian Colonies, comprised in the first class, the number of Imperial Troops, as shown in the above table, ought to be reduced.

Earl Grey, 2637–8. Mr. Lowe, 3343–4.

13. That with respect to New Zealand, while it may not be right, under all circumstances, to withhold from the settlers in that Colony assistance in protecting themselves against the attacks of native tribes, so long as the Imperial Government retains a control over native policy; their principal reliance ought to be on their own resources.

Mr. Owen, 1687, 1720, *et seq.* Sir J. Burgoyne, 1373. Lord Herbert, 3639.

14. That with respect to the South African Colonies, and all those similarly circumstanced dependencies which contain large European populations, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances should be provided for, as far as possible, by means of local efforts and local organization; and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely with a view to diminish Imperial expenditure, but for the still more important purpose of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in Colonial communities.

Duke of Newcastle, 3141 *et seq.*

15. That the settlers in South Africa should be called upon to contribute a larger sum than they do at present towards the military expenditure of those colonies.

Mr. Merivale, 2402 *et seq.*

16. That the expense of the troops in Ceylon should be in a greater degree borne by the Colonial Treasury.

Sir C. Elliot, 1008, 1059, 1012. Admiral Erskine, 3206 *et seq.*

17. With respect to the West Indies, it appears that about 4,200 troops (consisting of European and coloured regiments, in nearly equal proportions), are now maintained there, mainly for the purpose of securing those colonies against internal disorder; that the defence in time of war of these possessions of the British Crown, as well as of other distant colonies, must be principally naval, and that it is for many reasons inexpedient that the duty of a local police

should

should be performed by scattered detachments of Imperial troops, at the cost of this country; it is therefore, in the opinion of your Committee, desirable that, due regard being had to the peculiar circumstances of these colonies, the force now maintained in them should be gradually reduced.

18. Your Committee are further of opinion that the multiplication of fortified places and the erection of fortifications in distant colonial possessions, such as Mauritius, on a scale requiring for their defence a far greater number of men than could be spared for them in the event of war, involve a useless expenditure, and fail to provide an efficient protection for places, the defence of which mainly depends on superiority at sea. Earl Grey, 2565.

19. In conclusion, your Committee submit that the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and that it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the Empire. Lord Herbert, 3552. Earl Grey, 2626.

11 *July* 1861.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Lunæ, 18° *die Martii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Ellice.	Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Arthur Mills.	Lord Stanley.
Sir George Grey.	General Peel.
Mr. Roebuck.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Marsh.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Adderley.	

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS called to the Chair.

Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned to 18th April, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 18° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Ellice.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Baxter.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. FitzGerald.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Childers.
Sir James Fergusson.	

Mr. *T. F. Elliot*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 22° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. Baxter.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Adderley.	General Peel.

Mr. *T. F. Elliot*, further examined.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 25° die Aprilis, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.

Mr. *H. W. S. Whiffin*, Mr. *Thomas Carter*, and Rear-Admiral Sir *Charles Elliot*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 29° die Aprilis, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Baxter.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. Marsh.

Mr. *William George Anderson*, examined.

Mr. *William Henry Sharpe Whiffin*, further examined.

General Sir *John F. Burgoyne* and *Robert William Keate*, examined.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 2° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Sir George Grey.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Marsh.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Childers.

Mr. *Charles Mostyn Owen*, Captain *Andrew Clarke*, and Mr. *John Robert Godley*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday, at One o'clock.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE

Lunæ, 6° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Baxter.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Marsh.	Sir James Fergusson.

Mr. *Herman Merivale*, examined.

Resolved, That the Chairman do move the House, that a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will give leave to the Earl Grey to attend to be examined as a Witness before this Committee.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at Two o'clock.

Jovis, 9° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. FitzGerald.
Mr. Marsh.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Baxter.
Lord Stanley.	

Earl *Grey*, examined.

Resolved, That the Chairman do move the House, that a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will give leave to the Duke of Newcastle to attend to be examined as a Witness before this Committee.

[Adjourned to Monday, at One o'clock.

Lunæ, 13° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Lord Stanley.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
General Peel.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Adderley.

Sir *Stuart Donaldson* and Mr. *Walter Brodie*, examined.

Jovis, 16° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue	Mr. FitzGerald.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Stanley.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Childers.

The Duke of *Newcastle*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday, 27th, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 27° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Baxter.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Adderley.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Marsh.	

Rear-Admiral *Erskine*, The Right Hon. *Robert Lowe*, a Member of the House, and Sir *Charles Clifford*, examined.

Resolved, That the Chairman do move the House that a message be sent to the Lords to request their Lordships will give leave to Lord Herbert to attend to be examined as a Witness before this Committee.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at One o'clock.

Jovis, 30° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Baxter.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Marsh.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. Adderley.	Sir James Fergusson.

Lord *Herbert*, examined.

Sir *Charles Clifford*, further examined.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 6° die Junii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Ellice.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Adderley.
Sir James Fergusson.	

Mr. *William George Anderson* and Mr. *Wm. H. S. Whiffin*, further examined.

Right Honourable *W. E. Gladstone*, a Member of the House, and Mr. *Philip Wodehouse*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday, 17th, at Twelve o'clock, to consider Resolutions to be proposed by Chairman.

Veneris, 21° die Junii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir James Fergusson.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Sir George Grey.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. FitzGerald.

Resolutions proposed for the consideration of the Committee by the Chairman were read, as follows:—

"1. THAT the Committee have limited their inquiry to the dependencies administered through the Colonial Department.

"2. That the average amount of force maintained as garrisons in the dependencies, and borne on the strength of the Imperial Army from 1851 to 1861 inclusive, has been 42,689; and that while the force stationed in particular dependencies fluctuates greatly according to the prospects of tranquillity or disturbance in each dependency respectively at different times, the gross totals for the years above-mentioned show a general approximate uniformity.

"3. That from returns which have been laid before the Committee, it may be estimated that the average annual expenditure incurred in the military defence of the dependencies, including cost of barracks, fortifications, transport, and proportion of non-effective services, and of recruiting and departmental expenses at home, has been in round numbers 3,500,000*l.* a year.

"4. That there are, at the present time, 34 dependencies in which troops are stationed; 17 of which by giving extra pay and allowances, by maintenance of local forces, or construction of barracks, contribute some portion of the cost incurred in their defence; and that the average annual amount contributed by all those dependencies appears, from recent returns, to have been in round numbers 350,000*l.*, or about one-tenth of our colonial military expenditure; but that as to the assessment on the dependencies of payments in aid of their defence, and the terms on which arms and military stores are issued to them, no fixed rule exists.

"5. That a force of more than 10,000 volunteers and militia, capable of large increase, has been enrolled in British North America, a nearly equal number in the Australian Colonies, including Tasmania, 1,500 in New Zealand, and 1,200 at the Cape (exclusive of the mounted police); and as an evidence of the power of these Colonies to provide for their self-defence, it appears that, during the late war with Russia, Nova Scotia offered to raise a large militia force for the defence of the Colony, and when troops were withdrawn to New Zealand from the Australian Colonies their duties were undertaken by the volunteers,

volunteers, and that during the mutiny in India, the defence of Cape Town was almost entirely left to its inhabitants.

"6. That with respect to those dependencies which are maintained as military garrisons, convict depôts, or for other exclusively Imperial purposes, it is the opinion of the Committee that the main cost of their defence ought, of right, so long as such dependencies are retained, to devolve on the Imperial Treasury.

"7. That it appears from the concurrent testimony of Sir John Burgoyne, Admiral Erskine, and Admiral Elliot, that our Colonial military stations generally (with the exception of those in the Mediterranean) require a considerable increase of their existing fortifications and garrisons in order to protect them against hostile expeditions; and that even supposing such increase to be provided, their security from external attacks still depends entirely on the maintenance of our naval supremacy; that under these circumstances the multiplication of fortified places requiring for their defence troops, which in time of war can be ill spared from home, is a costly and comparatively inefficient method of protecting distant stations which are not of primary Imperial importance.

"8. That, in the opinion of the Committee, it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colonial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively should be the subject of negotiations with the various dependencies, but that evidence has been given tending to show that the policy successfully adopted by Lord Grey in 1851, in announcing to the free Australian Colonies the terms on which alone the Imperial troops could be sent there, may be gradually extended to other dependencies possessing representative institutions, which, by their increasing power and resources, appear to be as capable of undertaking in great measure their own defence as they are of providing for their own internal Government.

"9. That the practical application of the policy alluded to in the foregoing resolution must necessarily be left to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the local resources of each dependency, to its dangers from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the Empire, but that from evidence which has been laid before the Committee there are grounds for believing that a similar rule may advantageously be applied to the Peace Establishments of the North American Colonies, also to the Cape Colony, and New Zealand, so soon as the entire regulation of native policy shall be vested in the Colonial Governments; and to Tasmania when the financial questions arising out of the abolition of the convict system shall have been adjusted.

"10. That about 4,500 troops are now maintained in the West Indies, mainly, if not entirely, for the purpose of securing those Colonies against domestic disturbance; and that, in the opinion of the Committee, it is not expedient that the duty of a local police should be performed by Imperial troops, and at the cost of the mother country.

"11. That in the case of those distant dependencies which contain large European populations, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances can best be attained by means of local efforts and local organization; and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely with a view to diminish the cost now occasioned by the transport of troops, and the desertions therefrom, but for the still more important purpose of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in the more advanced Colonial communities.

"12. That the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and that in order to meet this tendency it is desirable to concentrate our troops for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to our naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of our Empire."

Resolutions proposed for the consideration of the Committee by Lord Stanley, were read, as follows:—

"1. That the different circumstances of the various Colonies, as regards exposure to external attack, danger from native races, and the relative wealth or poverty of their respective populations, preclude the adoption of any uniform rule for all in reference to the amounts to be contributed by them severally towards the expense of their military defence.

"2. That, in the case of the North American Colonies, only the Imperial ports of Kingston, Halifax, and Quebec should be ordinarily held by Imperial troops.

"3. That the number of troops at present maintained in the West Indies, being about 4,500, appears excessive. No contributions can be expected from the West Indian Colonies; but it is not expedient that the duty of a local police should be performed by Imperial troops, and at the cost of the mother country.

"4. That the circumstances of the South African settlements render necessary the maintenance there of a considerable European force, but that the present number of 5,000 appears needlessly large; and, considering the growing wealth and prosperity of the Cape Colony, it may be expected to contribute more freely than at present to its own defence.

"5. That in Australia, exclusive of New Zealand and Western Australia, no Imperial troops should be maintained at the cost of the mother country, beyond a guard of honour for the respective Governors.

"6. That, in Ceylon and Mauritius, the rate of contribution may be fixed, for the present, at about one-half the cost of the defence of those Colonies.

"7. That the present state of New Zealand being exceptional, no opinion can be given as to the amount of force which may hereafter be required there; but settlers in that Colony are entitled to Imperial assistance in protecting themselves against the attacks of native tribes.

"8. That the West African settlements, Bermuda, St. Helena, the Falklands, Labuan, and Hong Kong, must be considered as ports maintained for Imperial purposes, and to be defended principally at the cost of the Imperial treasury.

"9. That the Mediterranean garrisons do not come within the scope of this inquiry.

"10. That Vancouver's Island and British Columbia have been too recently colonised to admit of any considerable contribution being expected from them at present.

"11. That the multiplication of fortified places, requiring for their defence troops, which, in time of war, can be ill spared from home, is a costly and comparatively inefficient method of protecting distant stations which are not of primary Imperial importance.

"12. That it is not expedient that the British Government should bind itself, under any circumstances, by engagements with Colonial Legislatures, to maintain a specific amount of force in any colony."

Resolutions proposed for the consideration of the Committee by Mr. Adderley, were read, as follows:—

"That the relations between this Country and her Colonies cannot be in a sound and healthy state, unless they develope in every part of the Empire the self-reliant habits essential to free communities, and adequate resources for the defence of the whole.

"That every part of the Empire which has representative Government should provide the requirements for its own safety.

"That the Mother Country is bound to aid her Colonies in wars,
especially in those which may be the consequence of her own policy:

"And may expect, in return, the co-operation of her Colonies,
especially in wars which concern themselves.

"That placing in Colonies small garrisons of troops, raised and paid by England, and more likely to be withdrawn than strengthened in periods of danger, is a waste of our strength and means at home, a discouragement to our colonial fellow-subjects from taking their part in the defence of the Empire, a diminution of the aggregate national power, and a fallacious security to the localities so garrisoned.

"That it is the duty of Her Majesty's Executive to encourage her colonial subjects who enjoy representative Government to undertake the primary responsibility and charge of their own defence; and gradually to return to the old colonial system of this country, during the continuance of which British troops were never employed in Colonies for any purpose but that of aid against foreign enemies in time of war.

"That in the following instances, these principles are now departed from:

"1. The large force kept on the Kaffir frontier, entirely at the cost of this country.

"2. The police service of regiments sent to the West Indies.

"3. The entire defence of Tasmania, at Imperial expense.

"4. The small capitation per soldier paid for the employment of British troops by New Zealand.

"5. The distinction between our treatment of Ceylon and India.

"6. The maintenance of garrisons in North America, inadequate for defence, and preventing adequate defence being made; and which may embroil us with the Colonists themselves, or their neighbours.

"That

"That the result of inducing Colonists to undertake their own garrisons in North America, Australasia, and South Africa, and police duties in the West Indies, would be to make available more than 20,000 men, either to strengthen Imperial garrisons, or to serve in such Colonies as might desire to pay for their service, or to increase the reserved force maintained in the United Kingdom. The British Exchequer would be relieved of the cost of constant transport; and of several barracks and fortifications; and of extra colonial pay; and of the wear and tear which is said to aggravate military expenditure abroad; and this relief would be obtained without reducing the Imperial Army, and with great addition to the national strength throughout the world."

Resolution proposed for the consideration of the Committee by Mr. Childers, read, as follows:—

"That great irregularities have taken place in properly bringing to account in the Imperial Exchequer, the appropriations in aid of military expenditure made by Colonial Legislatures; that large sums appear to have been received from the Colonial Governments by Imperial officers for strictly military purposes, as to which no accounts have been rendered to the War Office or the Treasury; and that in the opinion of the Committee it is desirable that all monies so received should appear in the Home Accounts; and that there should be appended to the Army Estimates, statements showing the sums so expended during the last financial year in each Colony, as well as the total military charge for that Colony defrayed from the Imperial votes."

Committee deliberated.

The Chairman was requested to draw up a Draft Report for the consideration of the Committee.

[Adjourned to 8th July, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 8° *die Julii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS, in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Marsh.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir George Grey.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Fitzgerald.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Robert Cecil.

Draft Report proposed by the Chairman, read 1°, as follows:

"1. THE dependencies of the British Empire (exclusive of India, to which your Committee have not extended their investigations) may be divided for the purposes of this inquiry into two classes:—

"1st. Those which may properly be called 'Colonies,' the defence of which is undertaken mainly for their own protection (though they may in some instances contain within their boundaries posts which are held for Imperial purposes). To this class belong the North American and South African Colonies, the West Indies, the Eastern Colonies of Ceylon, Mauritius and Labaun, also New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand.

"2d. Those of which the defence is undertaken exclusively for Imperial purposes, whether as military or naval stations, convict depôts, or for other objects of Imperial policy. To this class belong the three Mediterranean Dependencies, Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands, Hong Kong, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Helena, and the Falklands, Western Australia, and the three West African Settlements of Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast.

"Throughout their inquiry, your Committee have deemed it essential to keep in view the distinction to be drawn between these two classes.

"2. In order to enable your Committee to form a correct opinion as to any alterations which it may be their duty to recommend in the military administration of the Dependencies to which their inquiries have extended, they have deemed it necessary, in the first instance, accurately to ascertain the details of the system which at present exists, and the proportions of cost actually incurred by the Imperial Government and the Imperial Dependencies respectively in their military defence. With this view they have examined witnesses connected with various public departments at home, and others who have held positions of official responsibility in various Colonies. They have also taken evidence as to the actual condition and cost of our colonial fortifications.

"3. From evidence laid before your Committee, it appears that the forces stationed in those outlying portions of our empire to which their inquiry has extended, and the costs incurred in their defence, have fluctuated in number and amount according to the circumstances affecting each dependency at different times; and in order to arrive at a fair estimate of the average annual expenditure incurred, and of the number of troops employed,

employed, your Committee have obtained returns for the year ending 31 March 1860, the most recent period during which no disturbing causes existed, involving an abnormal increase of force in our foreign possessions.

"4. The actual amount of Imperial expenditure (including cost of barracks, fortifications, transport, proportion of non-effective services, and of recruiting and departmental expences at home) incurred in the defence of the dependencies (distinguishing colonies proper and dependencies maintained for Imperial purposes), also the number and distribution of troops borne on the strength of the British army, and employed in their defence for the year ending 31 March 1860, will appear from the following table, compiled from returns furnished by various departments of the Government:—

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops borne on the Strength of the Imperial Army.					Imperial Military Expenditure.
	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Totals.	
Colonies Proper.						£.
North American Colonies:						
Canada	1,039	1,137	248	8	2,432	206,264
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	1,612	-	177	92	1,881*	149,495
Newfoundland	-	237	1	1	239	20,807
British Columbia	-	-	-	138	138	37,000
Australian Colonies:						
New South Wales	507	-	106	32	645	43,039
Victoria	618	-	-	6	624	36,557
South Australia	93	-	-	7	100	6,836
Tasmania	324	-	-	2	326	35,113
New Zealand	1,166	-	45	41	1,252	104,852
South African Colonies:						
Cape of Good Hope, Natal, and British Kaffraria	3,409	1,042	176	239	4,866	456,658
Eastern Colonies:						
Ceylon	846	1,356	135	7	2,344	110,268
Mauritius	1,449	-	133	48	1,630	145,658
West Indies:						
Jamaica	534	802	94	3	1,433	118,285
Honduras	-	329	24	2	355	30,621
Windward and Leeward, comprising Barbados, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana	1,145	1,104	136	7	2,392	213,793
Total	12,742	6,007	1,275	633	20,657	1,715,246
Imperial Garrisons, Convict Settlements, &c.						
Mediterranean:						
Malta	5,008	637	779	304	6,728	483,173
Gibraltar	4,537	-	1,079	309	5,925	420,695
Ionian Islands	3,601	-	487	206	4,294	280,061
Hong Kong	-	-	-	-	733	57,300†
St. Helena	-	418	77	2	497	38,354
Bermuda	878	-	159	91	1,128	87,587
Bahamas	-	386	11	1	398	32,280
Falklands	-	37	-	-	37	2,117
Western Australia	88	-	-	86	174	25,946
Labuan	-	-	-	-	-	7,329‡
West African Settlements:						
Sierra Leone	-	356	-	-	356	27,302
Gambia	-	334	-	-	334	27,910
Gold Coast	-	306	-	-	306	19,781
Total	14,112	2,474	2,592	999	20,910	1,509,835
Gross Total	26,854	8,481	3,867	1,632	41,567	3,225,081

"* About 1,300 of these troops were stationed in the Imperial garrisons of Halifax.

"† In the case of Hong Kong, the ordinary strength and cost of the garrison is given, exclusive of any excess occasioned by wars with China, also exclusive of cost of transport.

"‡ The force at Labuan consists of 126 native Indian troops, the cost being repaid to the Indian Government from the Imperial treasury."

"5. It

"5. It has been further proved by returns laid before your Committee, that during the year ending 31st March 1860, appropriations in aid of their military defence were made by the under-mentioned dependencies for the purposes and in the proportions following; that is to say, by—

	£.	
Malta	6,200	For maintenance of local forces.
St. Helena	482	
Sierra Leone	562	
Gambia	423	
Gold Coast	234	
Cape of Good Hope	56,176	
Canada	13,393	
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	198	
New South Wales	33,806	For pay and allowances of troops, and various military purposes.
Victoria	72,110	
South Australia	7,172	
Ceylon	97,198	
Mauritius	25,354	
Jamaica	1,637	For construction of works, barracks, &c. including 15,000 *l.* for 'sea defences' in Demerara.
Windward and Leeward Islands	29,279	
Ionian Islands	25,000	For general purposes of defence, in pursuance of a convention executed under the Treaty of Paris.
TOTAL	£. 369,224	

"6. It further appears, that of the above sum of 369,224 *l.*, designated in Return No. 16 as 'Colonial Expenditure,' the following amounts were paid into the Imperial Exchequer by the following dependencies:—

	£.
Mauritius	5,000
Ceylon	24,000
Malta	6,200
Ionian Islands	25,000
	£. 60,200

And that the residue of the said sum of 369,224 *l.* (that is to say, 309,024 *l.*) was expended within the dependencies for various military purposes.

"7. In connexion with this portion of their inquiry, your Committee think it necessary to state, that great irregularities have taken place in properly bringing to account in the Imperial Exchequer the appropriations in aid of military expenditure made by Colonial Legislatures; that large sums appear to have been received from the Colonial Governments by Imperial officers for strictly military purposes, as to which no accounts have been rendered to the War Office or the Treasury; and that, in the opinion of your Committee, it is desirable that all monies so received should appear in the Home accounts; and that there should be appended to the Army Estimates statements showing the sums so expended during the last financial year in each Colony, as well as the total military charge for that Colony defrayed from the Imperial votes.

"8. Your Committee have deemed it expedient, as bearing on the general subject-matter of their inquiry, to ascertain the extent and progress of the Volunteer movement in the various Colonies; and from recent returns it appears that more than 10,000 volunteers and militia, capable of large increase, have been enrolled in British North America; a nearly equal number in the Australian Colonies, including Tasmania; 1,500 in New Zealand; and 1,200 (exclusive of the Mounted Police) at the Cape of Good Hope; making altogether a force of nearly 23,000 Colonial Volunteers.

"9. Taking into consideration the facts disclosed by the evidence laid before them, your Committee are of opinion that no uniform rule as to the cost or mode of their military defence can be laid down which shall be applicable alike to communities so various as those which compose the Colonial empire of Great Britain; but, following the classification adopted at the commencement of their Report, it appears to your Committee that the dependencies secondly above enumerated, comprising military and naval stations, convict depôts, and the settlements for the suppression of the slave trade, are maintained for purposes which are exclusively Imperial, and that the responsibility and cost of their defence ought therefore to devolve on the Imperial Treasury. The same principle applies to the exceptional case of the Ionian Islands, which Great Britain is bound by treaties to defend, though entitled by the same treaties to a certain fixed subsidy from the local revenues of those islands in aid of that defence.

"10. With

"10. With respect to those dependencies to which the designation of "Colonies" properly belongs, and to which any recommendations hereinafter to be made as to the mode or cost of Colonial defence exclusively relate, the practical application of such recommendations, both as to time and place, must necessarily be left to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the local resources of each dependency, to its dangers from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the empire. With this reservation, it appears to your Committee that the responsibility and cost of the defence of such dependencies from perils not arising from the results of Imperial policy ought mainly to devolve upon themselves.

"Your Committee further submit the following general suggestions as arising from the evidence laid before them:

"11. That it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colonial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively should be the subject of negotiations with the various dependencies, but that evidence has been given tending to show that the policy successfully adopted by Lord Grey in 1851, in announcing to the free Australian Colonies the terms on which alone Imperial troops could be sent there, may be gradually extended to other dependencies possessing representative institutions, which, by their increasing power and resources, appear to be as capable of undertaking in great measure their own defence as they are of providing for their own internal government. And your Committee are of opinion that this policy ought to be applied to Tasmania as soon as the financial questions arising out of the abolition of the convict system shall have been finally adjusted.

"12. That in the case of the Australian Colonies generally, exclusive of Western Australia (which, as a convict settlement, requires the presence of a small number of troops), the maintenance of any Imperial troops, beyond perhaps a small body of artillery, appears to be unnecessary.

"13. That the present state of New Zealand being exceptional, no opinion can be given as to the amount of force which may be hereafter required there; but while it may not be possible, under all circumstances, to withhold from the settlers in that Colony asisstance in protecting themselves against the attacks of native tribes, so long as the Imperial Government retains a control over native policy, their principal reliance ought to be on their own resources.

"14. That with respect to the South African Colonies, the same principle may be held generally to apply; and that in the case of all those distant dependenencies which contain large European populations, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances can best be attained by means of local efforts and local organization; and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely with a view to diminish the cost now occasioned by the transport of troops, and the desertions therefrom, but for the still more important purposes of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in Colonial communities.

"15. With respect to the West Indies, it appears that about 4,500 troops are now maintained there, mainly for the purpose of securing those colonies against internal disorder; that the defence in time of war of these possessions of the British Crown, as well as of other distant colonies, must be principally naval, and that it is for many reasons inexpedient that the duty of a local police should be performed by scattered detachments of Imperial troops, at the cost of the mother country; it is therefore, in the opinion of your Committee, desirable that, due regard being had to the peculiar circumstances of these Colonies, the force now maintained in them should be gradually reduced.

"16. Your Committee are further of opinion, that the multiplication of fortified places not of primary Imperial importance, and the erection of fortifications in distant colonial, possessions, such as Mauritius, on a scale requiring for their defence a far greater number of men than could be spared for them in the event of war, involves a useless expenditure, and fails to provide an efficient protection for places, the defence of which mainly depends on superiority at sea.

"17. In conclusion, your Committee submit that the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and that in order to meet this tendency, it is desirable to concentrate our troops for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to our naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of our Empire."

Question, "That the Draft Report proposed by the Chairman be now read 2°, paragraph by paragraph," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 1 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 2 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 3 read, and amendments made.—Amendment proposed, after the word "times," in line 4, to insert the words, "although there is no appearance of any tendency

to a sustained process of reduction" (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted." The Committee divided:

Aye, 1.	Noes, 11.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Baring.
	Mr. Baxter.
	Lord Robert Cecil.
	Mr. Childers.
	Mr. Ellice.
	Sir James Fergusson.
	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
	Sir George Grey.
	Mr. Marsh.
	Lord Stanley.

Further amendment made

Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 4 read, amendments made.—Amendment proposed, that the following words be added at the end of the paragraph: "It should be noted that of the total Imperial expenditure charged against the Colonies proper, 264,521 *l.* is due to their proportion of the dead weight, recruiting and departmental expenses at home; and 202,924 *l.* is the proportion of the same expenses charged against the second class of dependencies above enumerated." (Mr. *Childers*).—Question, "That those words be there added," put, and agreed to.—Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 5, read.—Amendment proposed after the first word, "It," to leave out to the word "following" for the purpose of inserting the words "appears from Returns laid before your Committee, that beyond the expenses defrayed from the Imperial Exchequer, the under-mentioned dependencies contributed during the year ending 31 March 1860, the further sums, specified in the following Return, towards their military defence" (Mr. *Ellice*).—Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph" put, and negatived.—Question, "That those words be there inserted," put, and agreed to; words added; Further Amendments made.—Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 6 read, and negatived.

Paragraph 7 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 8 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 9 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 10 read, amendments made.—Amendment proposed, to leave out the words, "local resources" in line 5" (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 11.	Noe, 1.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baxter.	
Lord Robert Cecil.	
Mr. Childers.	
Mr. Ellice.	
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. FitzGerald.	
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	
Sir George Grey.	
Mr. Marsh.	
Lord Stanley.	

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words, "dangers of external attack" in line 6 (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 10.	Noes, 2.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Childers.	
Mr. Ellice.	
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. FitzGerald.	
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	
Sir George Grey.	
Mr. Marsh.	
Lord Stanley.	

Amendment proposed, after the word "dependencies," in line 8, to insert the words "and to the results of Imperiol policy" (Mr. *Fortescue*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted." The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 6.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. Childers.
Sir George Grey.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Lord Stanley.

Amendment proposed, after the word "dependencies" to insert the words "against external attack, ought to be partly borne by Great Britain, but against internal disturbances, ought to be borne by themselves" (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 3.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Baxter.
Lord Stanley.	Lord Robert Cecil.
	Mr. Childers.
	Sir James Fergusson.
	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
	Sir George Grey.

Amendment proposed, to leave out all the words from the word "dependencies" to the word "ought" in line 8 (Mr. *Childers*).—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.	Noes, 7.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Childers.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Sir George Grey.
	Mr. Marsh.
	Lord Stanley.

Words omitted.—Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of the proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 11 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 12 read.—Amendments made.—Amendment proposed to leave out all the words from the word "the," in line 3, to the end of the paragraph, for the purpose of adding the words "number of Imperial troops, as shown in the above table, ought to be reduced" (Mr. *Baxter*).—Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph," put, and negatived.—Question, "That those words be there added," put, and agreed to.—Amendment proposed, at the end of the paragraph, as amended, to add the words "as such troops ought never to be employed in suppression of local disturbances" (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That those words be there added." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 2.	Noes, 10.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Baxter.
	Lord Robert Cecil.
	Mr. Childers.
	Mr. Ellice.
	Sir James Fergusson.
	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
	Sir George Grey.
	Lord Stanley.

Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 13 read.—Amendments made.—Amendment proposed to leave out the words, "so long as the Imperial Government retains a control over native policy" (Lord *Robert Cecil*).—

Cecil).—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph."—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 5.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. FitzGerald.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Marsh.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Ellice.	
Lord Stanley.	

Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 14 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 15 read, and amendments made.—Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "mainly," in line 2 (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That the word proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph."—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 9.	Noes, 3.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Ellice.	
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. FitzGerald.	
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	
Sir George Grey.	
Mr. Marsh.	

Amendment proposed, after the word "be," in the last line, to insert the words "largely but" (Lord *Stanley*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted."—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Childers.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Ellice.
Lord Stanley.	Sir James Fergusson.
	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
	Sir George Grey.
	Mr. Marsh.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "reduced" for the purpose of inserting the word "removed," instead thereof (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That the word proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph."—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 11.	Noe, 1.
Mr. F. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baxter.	
Lord Robert Cecil.	
Mr. Childers.	
Mr. Ellice.	
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. FitzGerald.	
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	
Sir George Grey.	
Mr. Marsh.	
Lord Stanley.	

Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 16, read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 17, read, amended, and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the following paragraph be added to the proposed report, "That the settlers in South Africa should be called upon to contribute a larger sum than they do at present toward the Military Expenditure of those Colonies" (Mr. *Baxter*).—Question put, and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the following paragraph be added to the proposed report, "That the expense of the troops in Ceylon should be in a greater degree borne by the Colonial Treasury" (Mr. *Childers*).—Question put.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.	Noes, 4.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Childers.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Stanley.
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. Marsh.	

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the following paragraph be added to the proposed report, "It appears to your Committee that a want of system has prevailed in adjusting and sanctioning by proper regulations local contributions, paid in aid of the ordinary pay and allowance of officers and soldiers on various foreign stations; your Committee are of opinion that all rates of Colonial allowances drawn by officers and soldiers serving in the Colonies, should be fixed by specific warrants, under authority of the Secretary of State for War" (Mr. *Ellice*).—Question put, and agreed to.

Question, "That this Report, as amended, be the Report of the Committee to the House," put, and agreed to.

Question, "That the Minutes of Evidence taken before this Committee (with Appendix), be reported to the House," put, and agreed to.

Ordered, to Report.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Jovis, 18° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord Robert Cecil.
Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Arthur Mills.
Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Thomas George Baring.
Mr. Childers.
Mr. Fitzgerald.
Mr. Roebuck.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

T. F. Elliot, Esq., called in; and Examined.

1. *Chairman.*] YOU are Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, I believe?—Yes. *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

2. You have been connected with the department for 30 years?—Yes. 18 April 1861.

3. Were you a member of the Departmental Commission, to which the business of preparing a scheme for the guidance of the Government with respect to the colonial military expenditure was committed in 1859?—Yes.

4. Your attention has therefore been particularly called to the subject?—It has.

5. In order to limit and define the area of our inquiry, I will ask you what is the total number of dependencies, excluding those of the Mediterranean, which are administered through the Colonial Department, calculating separately each dependency the Governor of which communicates directly with the Secretary of State?—There are about 34 such Colonies, excluding the Mediterranean possessions.

6. Are there any of those dependencies in which no Imperial troops are stationed, and in the defence of which no Imperial expense is incurred; if so, be so good as to name them?—I do not think there is more than one of them in which there is not some Imperial force or other; that is Prince Edward Island, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

7. There remain therefore 33 dependencies?—Thirty-three dependencies in which Great Britain furnishes military assistance.

8. State in how many and in which of those dependencies any contribution is made from colonial sources towards the cost of that defence?—There are 11 which contribute more or less to the Imperial expenses on military objects; there are six others which, although they do not contribute towards Imperial expenses, furnish local forces for their own defence.

9. Then there are 17 altogether which, in one form or other, contribute something towards their own defence?—Yes.

10. But it may be taken that from the rest no contribution is made towards the cost of their defence, and that cost is defrayed from Imperial funds?—Yes.

11. From the returns embodied in the Departmental Report on Colonial Defences of 1859, and presented to Parliament, it appears that (excluding the Mediterranean garrisons) the total Imperial cost for the year ending 31st March 1858, was 2,549,019*l.*, and the total of the Colonial contributions 353,016*l.*?—Yes.

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12. In that estimate of Imperial cost, and in the estimates which are presented annually, the West India Regiments and the Colonial Corps are included, are they not, as borne on the strength of the Imperial army?—They are paid by Great Britain, and the troops are under the Mutiny Act.

13. I believe that the Colonial Corps include what are called the Cape Rifles, Newfoundland Companies, the Ceylon Rifles, the Cape Mounted Rifles, St. Helena Regiment, and the African Artillery?—Yes.

14. I believe there are three West India black regiments?—There are.

15. Do you put in a return forming a portion of a return ordered by the House of Commons on the 21st March last?—I do.

16. I believe that return is as yet incomplete, and does not contain the cost of transport of troops to and from the Colonies?—It does not contain that item yet. I understand that they are engaged in the Admiralty, in preparing the information, but that it has not yet been received at the War Office.

17. As yet, that return comprises only the North American Colonies, the Australian Colonies, and the Cape of Good Hope?—Those Colonies and New Zealand.

18. You also put in a return relating to the same Colonies, and giving the same figures, but distinguishing the direct and indirect Imperial military expenditure in the Colonies to which it relates?—I put in a return which makes that distinction, but my chief object in offering it is to let the Committee have the convenience of seeing the expenditure divided under the several geographical groups of Colonies. I believe it will save the Committee some trouble in their examination.

19. Taking the Colonies in the order of groups, I will first call your attention to the North American Colonies. I observe that the aggregate Imperial military expenditure in respect of those Colonies, for the year ending March 31st, 1859, exclusive of transport to and from the Colonies, is stated in the return which has been laid before the Committee, as amounting to 378,441 *l.*, and the aggregate of Colonial contribution during the same period for the same purpose to 35,268 *l.*?—Yes.

20. And the total number of troops, including infantry, artillery, engineers, and staff in those Colonies during the same period, is stated in the return at 5,523?—Yes.

21. What is the total number of militia-men and volunteers in those Colonies, as far as you have cognisance of it in your department?—Five thousand five hundred and eighty-four at that date, 1858.

22. Can you tell us what is the present distribution of the Imperial troops in British North America?—The total strength in each Colony stands as follows: Canada, 3,118; Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 2,196; Newfoundland, 209; total, 5,523.

23. Can you tell us the substance of the arrangements with the North American Colonies on the question of military defence propounded by Lord Grey in 1851, and subsequently by the Duke of Newcastle and Sir George Grey in 1854, and by Mr. Labouchere in 1856?—Lord Grey informed the Government of Canada in 1851, that the time was come when they must expect a less amount of exertion on the part of this country to contribute towards her military defences. He said that the troops would be reduced, and, perhaps, ultimately consist of little more than garrisons for the principal forts in Canada, and that if they wanted any further force, they must provide it from their own local population and resources.

24. Have you Lord Grey's Despatch upon the subject with you?—Yes, I put it in.

25. Now tell us whether in that Despatch, or any subsequent Despatch, any particular places were specified by the Government to be the places which the Imperial Government would undertake to defend?—Lord Grey said, and it was repeated afterwards, that the forces would be reduced chiefly to the garrisons of Quebec and Kingston.

26. What was the date of that Despatch of Lord Grey?—It is dated 15th of March 1851. It was laid before Parliament by command in April 1851, in a paper on Military Expenditure in Canada.

27. Were there not subsequent Despatches on the same subject from the Duke of Newcastle, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Labouchere?—Yes; and they adopted Lord Grey's views.

28. They

28. They were in 1854 and 1856, I believe?—They were written in 1854, at the time of the Crimean War.

29. Were there any answers to these Despatches?—There were; the Colonists, to the best of my recollection, cheerfully acquiesced in this country's withdrawing those troops, as their services were wanted elsewhere; they showed their desire to assist this country, and co-operate with her.

30. How far have the arrangements propounded in those Despatches been actually carried out?—In spirit, I think, they have been quite carried out. Perhaps this would be the proper time to ask the Committee to spare a single moment to hear how the troops are really distributed in Canada. I take rank and file as shown in the available returns; out of 1,968 on the 1st January 1861, 1,754 were divided between Quebec and Kingston, and the head-quarters at Montreal, rather less than 100 were at Toronto, the seat of Government, and another body of nearly 100 were at the Red River settlement; but orders have been given for their recal, and they will rejoin the main body in Canada. I must also request leave to add, that within the last few weeks the Commander-in-Chief has made arrangements for still further concentrating the troops in Canada, and for recalling the few small outposts that still remain.

31. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] In that return are the Canadian Rifles included?—They are included; so that in fact you have only one ordinary regiment of the line in Canada, you have besides that, the Canada Rifles 1,100 strong, but they are a localised force, and therefore cost this country nothing for reliefs or transport.

32. Mr. *Roebuck.*] But they are paid by this country?—Yes.

33. You mentioned the Red River settlement; is that included in Canada as far as regards military expenditure?—The force there is a detachment from the regiment in Canada, which has been spared for duty at the Red River.

34. I want to know merely whether troops sent to Canada were supposed to be sent also to defend the Red River settlement?—I have no means of giving any information on that point.

35. However they are sent from Canada to the Red River settlement?—Yes, they have been for a year or two at the Red River settlement, and are now about to be withdrawn, and not replaced.

36. *Chairman.*] What are the fortified places in Canada now?—Quebec, Kingston and some batteries at Montreal; I think that completes the list.

37. Have you anything to add to your evidence as to the execution of Lord Grey's arrangements?—Besides that concentration of the troops I have just described, I may mention that there has been a large progressive reduction in all the North American Provinces, thus carrying out the spirit of Lord Grey's measures. The force in Canada has been reduced in 15 years, before the present return for 1858, from 8,000 to 3,000; but since 1848, which is the last return I have before Lord Grey's Despatch, it has been reduced from 6,000 to 3,000. In the whole of North America the force has been reduced from 9,500 in 1848 to 5,500 in 1858.

38. I believe the Canada Militia and Public Defence Commissioners presented a report in 1854, recommending the formation of a volunteer force of 4,000 men, and a Militia Act regulating that force was assented to on the 19th May; is that so?—Yes.

39. I observe, that in the return it appears that New Brunswick and Newfoundland have contributed nothing towards their military defences; has that always been the case during your experience, and is it the case now?—Yes, it has always been the case.

39.* There is a small sum of 92*l.* mentioned as being contributed by Nova Scotia; to what purpose has that been applied?—I think it is a payment to a staff officer of militia, which had been embodied in former days, and a charge for cleaning and repairing arms; it is some trifling item of that kind; of course it is not an item which could have supplied any efficient military force.

40. Our early American Colonies provided, did they not, for the cost of their own defences, without the assistance of this country?—They did if you are alluding to a period of more than 100 years ago.

41. Up to what period?—Canada was conquered by force of arms by an expedition sent by Great Britain more than 100 years ago, and from that day

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to this you have maintained there an English garrison at the expense of this country, thereby establishing a usage of a century.

42. What are the arrangements for the cost of the defences of British Columbia?—As yet, the only land force supplied to British Columbia has been a body of Royal Engineers, and the colonial contribution towards them is provided for as yet in the estimate for British Columbia annually submitted to Parliament in the Colonial Estimates.

43. A certain number of engineers, I believe, were sent out there, across the Isthmus of Panama?—Yes, those are the engineers to whom I allude.

44. Have you any knowledge what the expense of forwarding those men by the Isthmus of Panama to British Columbia was?—In the year ending March 1860, Parliament voted in the Colonial Estimates 26,000 *l.* for the stores and freight for those Engineers, and 11,000 *l.* for the so-called colonial contribution towards their pay, the intention being, that as soon as the Colony is old enough, it shall defray that portion of the expense.

45. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Colony has hitherto not defrayed any part of the expenses?—In point of fact, it has defrayed no part.

46. How much do you say the whole expense has been?—In the first year, ending March 1860, 37,000 *l.*; in the year ending March 1861, for pay, 12,200 *l.*; and in the third year we have now submitted to Parliament, an estimate, ending 31st March 1862, for pay, 12,200 *l.* The total is about 61,000 *l.*

47. Where are those troops employed?—In British Columbia.

48. Not in Vancouver's Island?—Not in Vancouver's Island.

49. You cannot state for what object they were sent there particularly?—Yes; it was announced, that wherever England extended the sway of her sceptre, there she pledged the defence of her sword; and therefore, that some sort of military force ought to be sent out. The Royal Engineers were sent, under the idea that from their acquirements they would be useful in road-making.

50. Does the Colonial Office send out a military force to make roads for settlers?—Whenever they work at road-making, they are paid for the purpose; and I believe that, to the soldiers, the employment on that condition is very acceptable.

51. My question is, whether the Colonial Office have employed those troops solely for the purpose of making roads in the Colonies?—They were sent, as I understand, in order to supply an Imperial force to that Colony; that was the first object: the particular kind of troops were selected under the idea that they might also answer a collateral purpose.

52. I find no return of the number of troops sent out. Will you supply in your evidence the number of officers and men?—The number was 150.

53. I see that in Canada we have a large medical staff, one deputy inspector of hospitals, five staff surgeons, and six assistants, besides purveyors. Is that staff independent of and beyond the surgeons attached to the different corps?—On the details of the forces, the Colonial Office possesses no special information. A witness from the War Office would be able to give a far more satisfactory answer.

54. Mr. *Fortescue.*] When you gave the number of militiamen and volunteers, you gave them for 1858, did you not?—For 1858; because that happens to be the year for which the return was printed, which is in the hands of the Committee.

55. Are you able to give the numbers according to the latest information?—I will endeavour to do so presently.

56. What were the circumstances under which that detachment of Canadian Rifles was sent to the Red River?—I am afraid to say from memory.

57. Are you aware whether the Hudson's Bay Company has contributed to the maintenance of those troops?—They may have done so.

58. Are you not aware that the Hudson's Bay Company, at whose request those troops were sent to the Red River, offered to provide, and has provided, barracks and rations?—If ever those facts have been under my eye, it is so long since that I am afraid to give an answer upon it.

59. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you say that there are no other military forces in British Columbia, except these engineers?—Confining my answer to British Columbia, there are none.

60. There is a large number of marines there, is there not?—There is a force of marines, not in Columbia, but in the neighbouring island, St. Juan.

61. Not on Vancouver's Island?—Those marines, I consider, are stationed in the Colony of Vancouver's Island; they are close to its shore.

62. Are the expenses of these engineers put in the Army Estimates?—Their regular pay, I understand, is borne on the Army Estimates; all extra pay is provided for in the Colonial estimate.

63. When they make roads for the Colonies, do they receive any extra pay from the Colony for that?—They do.

64. And that does not diminish their regular pay in the Army Estimates?—No; that is not the practice.

65. It does not save anything to the Home Government?—No.

66. Mr. *Childers.*] Has it ever been proposed by any of the North American Colonies to increase the numbers of the artillery and engineers, with a view to a reduction of the number of the line?—Not to my knowledge.

67. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have any of the Despatches from Lord Grey, the Duke of Newcastle, or Mr. Labouchere, urged upon the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, the propriety of embodying their militia, and expending money from the Colonial Treasury upon the defences of their positions?—They were advised, in case they thought it desirable to have a larger force than was supplied from home, to furnish it for themselves from their local resources. Besides that, I ought to add, that in surrendering to the Government of Canada extensive lands, which belonged to the military department of this country, there was a sort of understanding that they would perhaps take measures to make their militia more efficient; they have not, however, done much in that direction; the lands have not been so productive as they expected, and they say they have not had much money to expend upon the object.

68. Is there a single regiment of militia embodied in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick or Newfoundland?—Not at the time of this return, in 1858.

69. Whereas, in Canada, there is a force of militia of upwards of 5,000 men?—Upwards of 5,000 men.

70. Did the Governments of those three Colonies express any disinclination to expend money from the Colonial Treasury upon the defences?—They have always told us that they have not sufficient money to spare; these are, many of them, comparatively small communities, their revenues are limited, and they have heavy debts; the small province of Nova Scotia owes, I believe, nearly a million; they say they have no surplus revenue to expend upon training a militia.

71. Has it ever been proposed to them to reduce the British Imperial force in their provinces?—There has been practically a progressive reduction of Imperial forces in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland.

72. I think you say, that previous to the reductions in Canada, the Colonial ministers had consulted the Government of Canada in regard to those reductions, and stated their intention of making reductions; has any similar correspondence taken place between the Colonial Office and the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland?—The Governments of those Lower Provinces, as we call them, were informed in 1854, that owing to the exigencies of the Imperial service elsewhere, the forces must be reduced, and that if they thought what remained, insufficient, they must depend upon themselves.

73. Can you give us the respective population of Canada, on the one hand, and of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, on the other?—The population of Canada in 1858 was, 2,700,000; the aggregate population of the other North American provinces may be stated at about 700,000.

74. That being the proportion, there are, notwithstanding, 3,000 troops in Canada, and 2,300, in the other Colonies?—That is the fact, and I think it exceedingly natural; the Lower Provinces include the great harbour of Halifax, one of the most important positions in a strategical point of view in North America; Great Britain, with a view to national objects, thinks proper to keep a large garrison in the poor province of Nova Scotia.

75. Is not Quebec also most important in a strategical point of view?—Yes, and Quebec is adequately garrisoned.

76. Is not the great disproportion between the numbers in the Lower Provinces and the coast provided for by the fact, that Canada has a militia force embodied, whereas

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whereas there is no local corps in the provinces?—I must answer that question to the best of my knowledge and judgment. I do not think that the existence of the Canadian militia has the smallest influence in determining the comparative force we keep in these provinces. We keep a large force at Halifax because it suits our own Imperial purposes. Nova Scotia does not want it, and would not pay towards it.

77. Will you state how many of these men are stationed at Halifax?—The whole force in Nova Scotia itself is in garrison at Halifax, amounting to 1,300 men; in the provinces of New Brunswick you have, in round numbers, 260 British soldiers; in the island of Newfoundland, rather less than 200. The whole remainder of the 1,350 is the garrison of the great naval station of Halifax.

78. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Was not that Despatch of Lord Grey's a general Despatch to all the Governors of all our North American Colonies?—It was addressed to Canada, but the principle of it was soon applied to the other provinces.

79. Mr. *Adderley.*] Can you state whether there is any intention of further reducing the British troops in North America?—Not that I have heard.

80. According to the best of your belief, we have now arrived at the extent of reduction intended by the Government?—I have no means of judging what the Government will do hereafter in the way of reduction; it is no part of my province to hear of it until the decision is taken. That question would be settled between the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of State for War.

81. You are not aware of that reduction to which you have alluded being still in progress?—I am not aware of its being still in progress.

82. Are all the British troops in North America now in garrison?—So far as I have explained in my previous answers, where I have mentioned the distribution.

83. In Quebec, Kingston, and Montreal?—Together with those troops in outposts, which I have mentioned in detail in my previous answers.

84. Mr. *Roebuck.*] There may be small outposts?—There are two or three small ones, which are now under orders to join the main body.

85. Mr. *Adderley.*] When Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland stated their inability to raise a militia, was any answer sent to that statement?—I do not remember any important answer of substance. I suppose the letters received some acknowledgment, but no practical measure has been adopted on the subject by the Imperial Government.

86. You say that the garrison is kept up at Halifax for imperial purposes. Will you state the nature of those imperial purposes?—I think that Halifax occupies a very commanding position in the part of the world where it is situated, and that probably Great Britain may be supposed to attach importance to its garrison there, for the same reasons that it does to its garrisons in the Mediterranean or at Bermuda, or any other places of general strategical importance.

87. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You mean that it is a very important naval station in that part of the world?—Yes.

88. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are there any British troops remaining in New Brunswick and Newfoundland?—At the last returns there were about 260 British troops in New Brunswick, and about 188 in Newfoundland.

89. Where are those troops stationed?—In New Brunswick, 140 are stationed at Fredericton, the capital, and 115 at St. John's, the great port of the province. I am giving the numbers by the last return which I possess, 1st January 1861.

90. That is the number left as a garrison at those two places?—Yes.

91. Can you tell as a matter of fact whether the present arrangements which you have just described for the defence of the British dependencies in America is an alteration from the original arrangement, or was the arrangement for the defence of those Colonies always the same as it is now?—I suppose it must have been different by an inspection of the number of troops at present in those Colonies; formerly they were very much larger than they are now.

92. To what time do you allude?—Beginning with 1858, the year of the return before the Committee, I have looked to the amount of force 5 years, 10 years, and 15 years previously, and if it is wished I will read over the numbers at those intervals.

93. I was

93. I was talking of the earlier arrangements between this country and the American Colonies of the last century. Were they the same as those you have now described?—I have not particularly looked into the nature of those arrangements; but there were two great wars on the continent of North America, and Great Britain supplied a large force for carrying on the operations, and the garrisons which have been mentioned before have, with greater or less strength, been maintained there at Imperial expense for a century.

94. Can you state the year in which British troops were first sent to America?—My opinion is that the practice of always having Imperial troops there must have originated with the great operations of war carried on by this country on the continent of North America; Wolfe's expedition to Canada, and afterwards the War of Independence.

95. Before that period the British dependencies of America maintained the cost of their own defences?—Yes.

96. Are you aware of their having maintained their defences, not only against native tribes, but also against the armies of the great powers of Europe?—The Colonies on the North American continent in those days, whether they were British or French, were very poor settlements compared with our modern Colonies, and they fought it out between themselves.

97. Did they only fight between themselves?—No; we had great expeditions from Europe which captured large French settlements, and led to very important results.

98. What do you mean by expeditions from Europe?—We took Louisburg, and we took Quebec.

99. Had the English colonial forces, before those actions, not fought with European armies by themselves, without any assistance from us?—I do not know what the question may allude to; there may have been such cases.

100. Did they also conduct wars against the Indian tribes by their own forces?—Yes, certainly.

101. Without any assistance from England?—Without any assistance from England.

102. And at a time when, as you say, they were very poor Colonies?—I said they were very poor compared with the great settlements which now exist as Colonies.

103. As compared with New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia?—As compared with the North American group of British Colonies, or as compared with the great Australian group of British Colonies.

104. At that time, I believe, England had commercial laws for her own benefit against those Colonies?—Yes, laws of trade which were supposed to be specially favourable to the home interest, as distinguished from the other.

105. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] As a matter of fact, are the garrisons in which the bodies of troops now in Canada are quartered, connected by railway?—Yes.

106. As regards British Columbia, roads are intended to be beneficial in a Colony for military purposes as well as for the benefit of the settlers?—Yes, they will be beneficial for both.

107. In such Colonies as British Columbia, it would be difficult to collect the revenue of the Colony, unless easy access could be had to the distant parts of it?—Yes.

108. Were not troops sent out to British Columbia, on its first formation, in order to retain possession of it to this country, and these troops employed in making roads in the Colony rather for the benefit of Imperial authority than for the benefit of the settlers?—It was doubtless for the interest of this country that the Colony should prosper, and soon return a revenue of its own; and I have no doubt that any labour of the troops in constructing roads much promoted that end.

109. Mr. *Baxter.*] Is it the case that every man in the British North American Provinces under the age of 60 was enrolled as a militiaman?—That is so, but it is so nominal that it would be misleading to place any dependence upon a return based upon that fact.

110. Have any militia regiments ever been embodied in the Lower Provinces?—Yes. In some former answers which I gave about militia in the Lower Provinces, I was alluding to 1858, the year for which printed returns are on the table, but in the year 1860 they took steps to embody the militia. In Nova Scotia much spirit was displayed on the subject, and 2,350 men have been enrolled, and a

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sum of 2,000 *l.* was voted by the Legislature to encourage the movement. In New-Brunswick, where also much spirit was shown, I see that in August 1860, 1,257 enrolled militiamen were inspected and well reported of. I ought to explain that they have no law in these North American Provinces for the regulation of a volunteer force; they therefore give the name of volunteer militia to those who voluntarily came forward to be trained as militiamen.

111. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Do you know whether there was any militia during the war with America, in the Lower Provinces?—I do not remember whether there was; the course of war did not run in that direction. In Canada, the militia distinguished themselves by their gallantry.

112. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] In recent years have the Imperial troops ever been used against the native Indians in Canada?—No occasion has arisen to call for such service.

113. Mr. *Marsh.*] With reference to British Columbia, you tell us that engineers were sent out in preference to troops of the line, because they might be useful in making roads; are you aware that the pay of engineers is much higher than that of the line?—It is.

114. Is that difference paid by the Colony, or by the Home Government?—The Home Government pays the ordinary pay of the engineers.

115. Common troops would have been as good as the others?—As a mere defence.

116. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Can you tell us whether the number of engineers sent out was more than 20?—Yes, a large body of men; as many as 150.

117. Mr. *Childers.*] You say that you do not know the political intentions of the Government as regards reduction; has any circular been sent to the North American Governments, suggesting any further reduction, or has their opinion been invited upon the subject?—No.

118. As far as the Colonial Office is concerned you are not aware that the Governors have been invited to express an opinion upon that?—I am not aware of it.

119. Mr. *Baxter.*] Has the Colonial Office ever proposed to the Government of Canada that the Canadian Rifle Regiment should be paid by the Colony?—No.

120. Mr. *Adderley.*] Has any alteration been made since the Despatch of Lord Grey of 1851, in the rate or mode of paying troops in North America?—Not since the date of Lord Grey's Despatch that I know of: those details do not come under my official cognizance but would be better known to the War Department. It may be right to mention that the Canadian Rifle Regiment has a rate of pay of its own; it is composed of old soldiers who have served a long time, and therefore are less likely to desert than an ordinary soldier of the line.

121. Does the whole of that payment come from the Imperial Treasury?—Yes.

122. Are there no Colonial allowances to troops in North America?—None.

123. Who pays for the barracks and the stores?—This country.

124. Entirely?—Yes.

125. And who pays for transport of the troops to and fro?—That is paid by this country.

126. *Chairman.*] Are the barracks in British North America the property of the Colonial Government or of the Imperial Government?—There was rather an elaborate arrangement on that subject; the Imperial Government handed over to the Province the great mass of its military lands and buildings, but there was a proviso that for certain selected barracks the Provincial Governments should bear the expense of repairs: a certain class of barracks was to be selected for that purpose, and designated by the letter B; for various reasons that selection has never been, in fact, made; so that we depend on the spirit, and not on the letter of the arrangement.

127. Mr. *Ellice.*] Did that transfer include the fortifications?—No, only the lands and buildings.

128. *Chairman.*] The fortifications are the property of the Imperial Governments as before?—Yes.

129. Mr. *Fortescue.*] It is the case, is it not, that the volunteer movement is in active progress in the Lower Provinces?—Actively in progress.

130. With great spirit?—With great spirit.

131. The

131. The volunteers being in fact drawn from the ranks of the enrolled militia?—Yes.

132. Do you recollect certain proposals that were made not long ago, upon the recommendation of Sir William Williams, to the Governments of the Lower Provinces, as to an increase of their means of defence?—When Sir Fenwick Williams assumed the command in North America, he thought he observed certain military positions at some of which new works or forts, and at others an increase of force in the Lower Provinces, would be advantageous; the War Office desired that those views might be communicated to the Provincial Governments, with an announcement that if they liked to bear one portion of the expense, this country would be willing to bear the other. They replied that they were much obliged for the suggestion, but that they were not disposed to build a new fort, and had not money enough to spare to pay for additional troops.

133. They declined to incur any expense for those purposes?—Yes.

134. Do you recollect that, some years ago, when the Lower Provinces appeared to be threatened by the United States, the Legislature of Nova Scotia voted a sum of 100,000 *l.* for their defences?—That was the case; they also offered to undertake their own defence in 1854, the time of the Crimean War.

135. *Chairman.*] I wish to direct your attention to the Australian group of Colonies, including Tasmania. Will you inform the Committee what was the aggregate amount of Imperial military expenditure, exclusive of transport to and from the Colony, in respect of those Colonies, during the year ending 31st March 1859?—£. 136,831.

136. What was the total amount of colonial contributions made by those Colonies during the same period?—£. 75,459.

137. What are the number of troops in those Colonies?—The whole number of troops in those Colonies was 1801.

138. Can you state the number of volunteers in those Colonies at the present time, according to your last return?—We have no actual return from New South Wales of the number of volunteers, but we have a despatch from the Governor saying that steps were being taken to organise an efficient volunteer force, both artillery and rifles. In Victoria there are 4,750 volunteers, and in South Australia 1,698; in Tasmania, 1,500. That makes a total of 7,948 volunteers in Australia.

139. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Excluding New South Wales?—Excluding New South Wales, from which we have got no return, and when that arrives, it will, of course, add to the total. From Queensland, also, we have as yet no separate return.

140. *Chairman.*] What are the names of the Australian Colonies?—New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia, and Tasmania.

141. There are no troops in Queensland, I believe?—A despatch has arrived within the last day or two, saying that a small party of troops has gone to Queensland; the government of Queensland have expressed their readiness to receive troops on the same footing as troops are received by the other Australian Colonies.

142. Are there any fortifications in Australia?—There are some batteries at Sydney, and they have lately been busy in erecting batteries in others of the Australian Colonies.

143. Are those barracks and fortifications in the Australian Colonies the property of the Colonial Government or of the Imperial Government?—They are the property of the Colonial Government, for they are built with their money.

144. Have you any other information to give in regard to the volunteers?—It may be right to mention that the Imperial Government sent them a supply of arms, some few of which were sent gratuitously, and the others were paid for by the colonists.

145. Is there any rule in the Government departments as to which of the Colonies shall pay for their arms?—I do not think that there is any fixed rule.

146. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Do they ever pay?—Yes, in Australia.

147. Mr. *Childers.*] Victoria, I believe, has sent already 100,000 *l.*?—In a single

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a single year it has voted for the purchase of arms nearly 50,000 *l.* The Australian Colonies are as liberal as they are rich.

148. *Chairman.*] Is there any other information you have to give in respect to the volunteers in the Australian Colonies?—No.

149. Arrangements were, I believe, commenced by Lord Grey, and have been carried out by other Governments, under which certain Colonies in Australia were ordered to contribute towards the cost of their defence. Can you give us any information as to those arrangements?—Yes, Lord Grey intimated to the Australian Colonies that only the very moderate force which they then possessed seemed to be the right number for the Imperial Government to furnish, and that if they wished to have more they would have to pay for them.

150. Can you give us the date of that despatch?—It was laid before Parliament on the 17th March 1851, in No. 123. Lord Grey's views on this subject were embodied in a series of despatches, the last of them, which recapitulated the previous despatches, was dated the 21st November 1849.

151. Am I right in supposing that the substance of those proposals made by Lord Grey was, that a certain number of troops would be sent to each of those Colonies, and no more at the imperial expense?—Yes.

152. And that if they required more, they must pay for them?—Yes.

153. Have those arrangements been acted upon?—Yes, they have been extensively acted upon, and, as the papers on the table show, large contributions are derived from the Australian Colonies.

154. Under those arrangements, I think there are four companies at Sydney?—Yes, four at Sydney.

155. How many at Melbourne?—The same number.

156. I observe that Tasmania was not included in that arrangement, and contributes nothing towards its defences. Are you aware from official information on what ground that is exempted from any contribution?—Tasmania has been exempted on account of the large proportion which still remains there of population of convict origin.

157. Are you aware of extra allowances to the troops in the Australian Colonies?—I am.

158. Do you know in what Colonies extra allowances are given to the troops?—In all the Australian Colonies. In Tasmania and Western Australia the Imperial Government pays the extra allowances; they consist of 5 *s.* a day to the officers, and a free ration to the troops; meaning by a free ration that the troops are fed without being subjected to a stoppage of 3 ½ *d.* a day, as is the case in this country.

159. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Does the 5 *s.* a day apply to all officers?—To all commissioned officers. In New South Wales, Victoria, and Southern Australia, the officers have likewise 5 *s.* a day: as regards rations, the usual stoppage is made by the Imperial Government; but it is repaid to the troops by the Colonial Treasury, which grants them extra pay besides.

160. How much besides?—In Victoria a soldier, in 1859, had his Imperial pay doubled; in New South Wales and Southern Australia he received 6 *d.* a day from the Colonial Government, including, however, the repayment to him of his stoppages. But those Colonial allowances may vary from time to time; I give the latest information.

161. *Chairman.*] Are you aware of any rule by which the question of whether troops shall or shall not have extra allowances is regulated, except the willingness of the Colonies, or otherwise, to give them?—I do not think that the granting of the extra allowances has depended merely upon the disposition of the Colonies; they have been granted on account of the living being unusually dear. The practice began, I believe, after the discovery of gold so much increased the cost of living. The proof of this is, that in two or three Australian Colonies the extra allowances are not paid by the Colonies, but by the Imperial Government.

162. I observe that not only in the Australian Colonies, but in Ceylon and Mauritius, the troops receive large extra allowances, whereas in others, the West Indies, for instance, they get none?—That is the case, except that there are some small allowances to officers in British Guiana.

163. Does that depend, in your opinion, entirely upon the question whether in one Colony living is dearer than in another?—Perhaps not, strictly; but still I think

I think that led to the practice. The practice of giving allowances in Ceylon arose from its being close to India, and in India the troops were allowed more pay, because it was thought a much dearer country.

164. Is Ceylon a dearer country than British Guiana?—I do not know how that is; but in British Guiana there are certain allowances to the troops, although they are small.

165. Very small, I believe?—Small allowances are granted to the officers at the expense of the Colonial Government.

166. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Is not that paid by the Colonial Government, when they are able to pay?—I think that the great resources of the large Australian Colonies have made them very liberal; but I do also think that those are Colonies in which both officers and men really need a higher rate of pay than elsewhere.

167. I wanted to know the circumstances out of which the pay by the Colonies originated; whether, when they were not called upon to pay, it was because they were very poor?—The Colonies that are poor are Colonies where living is not dear. What has made some of the Colonies very rich has made them also very dear to live in.

168. Is there not an extra allowance at the Cape?—That has been granted recently.

169. There is no gold discovery there?—No.

170. Is living dear at the Cape?—No. It may be right to add that the allowances are paid there by the Imperial and not by the Colonial Government; but the Imperial Government has pressed upon the Colony that it ought to pay, and by late advices we learn that the Legislature has voted 10,000*l*. for that purpose. The War Office, however, tell us that this is far from sufficient, and that the allowances really amount to upwards of 30,000*l*.

171. The Cape is a very flourishing Colony?—The Cape is a very flourishing Colony.

172. Now, I will direct your attention to Ceylon; is living there very dear?—The extra allowances at Ceylon have existed from a very early period indeed, and this island borrowed the custom from the neighbouring country of Hindostan, where, in those days, living was very dear.

173. *Chairman*.] Are you aware that Sir William Denison has addressed more than one despatch to the Imperial Government, with a view of impressing upon them the importance of carrying out further the arrangement made by Lord Grey, in reference to the Colonial contributions towards their own defences?—Yes; Sir William Denison has been an advocate of the plan of contributing some fixed proportion of the whole expense.

174. I think that those despatches have gone the length of advising the Secretary of State to extend the principle of Colonial contribution towards defences to the Colonies, generally?—I think he has expressed that opinion; the despatches are in the hands of the Committee.

175. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Can you state exactly what Lord Grey's scheme for the military system of the Australian Colonies was?—I think it has been correctly stated already; his plan was, that there should be a certain maximum force which should be there on Imperial account, and paid for out of Imperial funds; and that if the Colony wanted a greater number of troops they should pay for their charge.

176. Is not this the state of things, that at Sydney and Melbourne four companies of troops are allotted, under Lord Grey's scheme, to the Colonies for Imperial purposes, and that a certain number of troops are stationed there beyond that Imperial quota upon a different footing?—Yes.

177. As to the imperial quota of four companies, I believe it is the case that the Imperial Government pays the ordinary expenses, whilst the Colonial Government contributes the Colonial allowances?—Yes.

178. With respect to the troops beyond that number it is the case, is it not, that the Colonial Government pays both Imperial and Colonial expenses?—Yes.

179. The Government of New South Wales also pays the whole expense of a company of Artillery?—It has paid the whole expense of a company of Artillery, until a very recent date, when that company has been sent for service to another Colony.

180. A further part of the arrangement, I believe, has reference to the forts and

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and barracks, and military buildings?—The Colonies bear the whole expense of such works and buildings.

181. The existing works were handed over, were they not, to the Colony, and the Colony was in future to provide for their repair, and for the construction of new ones?—Yes.

182. Can you state more fully than you did just now, the nature of Sir William Denison's proposal with respect to the Australian Colonies?—What struck me as the leading feature of his view is, that they should bear a fixed proportion of the expense, which he took, for clearness' sake, at one-half.

183. Was not the idea of an equal division of the expenditure rather essential to his scheme, with respect to the Australian Colonies?—I think it was essential that it should be a fixed proportion.

184. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Are not these the words of his despatch; "The principle suggested by me, in former despatches, that the expense of the movement and maintenance of the troops, required for the defence of the Colony, should be shared equally between the mother country and the Colony, appears to me to be one which would meet every difficulty, and obviate every chance of disagreement between the Colony and the mother country"?—That is Sir William Denison's proposal, stated on his own authority.

185. Mr. *Fortescue*.] I think that in the expenditure which, according to that scheme, was to be halved between the mother country and the Colony, the transport of troops was to be included?—I believe he included everything spent on the troops employed in the Colony.

186. Did not Sir William Denison point to other cases in the Australian Colonies, in which the principle of half-and-half contribution between the mother country and the Colony had been adopted with success and satisfaction?—Yes.

187. Such, for instance, as the mail postal service?—Yes.

188. Are you aware that another service is likely soon to be conducted in Australia upon the same principle, the division of expenses, namely, the Naval Survey of the coast of Australia?—Yes.

189. You said, in answer to a former question, that Queensland had expressed her readiness to receive a small body of troops upon the same terms as the other Colonies; is it not the fact that she has repeatedly asked for a body of troops, although a very small body?—That is true. And they said that in receiving the troops they would cheerfully pay the allowances paid by the other Colonies.

190. Are you aware that in Queensland the volunteer spirit is very active?—Yes; I see that such is reported to be the case.

191. You are aware, probably, that the Government of Queensland has asked for this small body, I think one company, of troops for Sydney, to form a nucleus, as it were, of a military force, and to assist in the training of her Volunteers?—Yes.

192. Are you aware that Queensland provides, at her own expense, a police force for internal purposes?—Yes.

193. Called the Native Border Police?—Yes.

194. For the purpose of protecting her settlers against the aborigines?—Yes.

195. Mr. *Marsh*.] Do you know the cost of the police force in Queensland?—I do not exactly.

196. Is it about 15,000*l*. a year?—I find it reported at as much as 17,000*l*.

197. Is there anything of the sort on a similar scale in New South Wales?—There is a police force there.

198. You have been asked with reference to barracks and other buildings in the Australian Colonies; are you aware of the arrangements by which the Government transferred the old barracks in Sydney, upon condition that they built them entirely new?—Yes.

199. And that that condition was fulfilled?—Yes.

200. Are all the barracks in New South Wales situated at Sydney?—I have not those details before me.

201. Of course there is a large seaboard to be protected?—Yes, there is an extensive seaboard.

202. Your opinion is, that extra pay was allowed in consequence of the high price of living there?—Yes.

203. Would

203. Would that be felt by a soldier who is provided at the public expense with lodging, rations, and clothing?—I suppose no soldier is content with his rations; but it would not affect him so much as it would a man who was dependent for everything upon his own resources.

204. Do you not think that the real reason is, that labour is in such request that it would be hard upon them to be paid at a much lower rate than others around them?—That consideration also must have weighed. The necessity of checking desertion must have weighed materially in the question of extra allowances.

205. Mr. *Childers.*] When Lord Grey made his proposals with respect to the force to be maintained in Australia at the Imperial expense, the gold fields had not been discovered?—They had not.

206. Has any change been made since their discovery?—A larger number of troops are paid now at Imperial expense than was contemplated when Lord Grey wrote his despatch in 1849.

207. Have any other changes been made in that arrangement?—I do not know.

208. Do you remember the time when the Colony of Victoria, where the largest number of troops is stationed, paid the entire expense of those troops?—There was a period when they paid all the expenses.

209. They also paid, I believe, the expense of the staff?—Yes.

210. Can you tell the circumstances under which that arrangement began, and how it ceased?—If I remember right, it was when the head-quarter staff came into the Colony of Victoria that the Imperial Government found the Colonial Government willing to consent to pay the whole expense of the staff, although its services must, in fact, have extended over the whole of the Australian Colonies.

211. It was more convenient, was it not, for Imperial purposes that they should be stationed at Melbourne, which might be considered the centre of the whole group, and where there was the greater population?—It was considered more convenient that the head-quarter staff should be there.

212. The head-quarter staff had been at Sydney, where its expense had been borne by the Imperial Government. They then induced the Colony to receive them at Melbourne, and made an arrangement under which the Colony bore the expense of the head-quarter staff?—They made such an arrangement.

213. And, at the same time, induced the Colony to bear the entire military expenditure?—Victoria agreed to pay the whole military expenditure at that time.

214. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you recollect the circumstances under which the troops were sent to Melbourne?—They were sent for in connexion with the riots at the Gold Fields.

215. For the purpose of suppressing internal disturbances?—Yes.

216. And it was thought right; and they were willing to incur the whole expenses of every kind?—That was the reason on which the measure was justified.

217. Are you not aware that those exceptional circumstances having ceased, the Colony of Victoria has of late been brought within Lord Grey's arrangement?—Yes, and put upon the same footing as regards the troops, but not until quite recently so far as regards the head-quarter staff.

218. Mr. *Childers.*] Lord Grey's proposition being, that a certain number of troops should be, under any circumstances, paid for by the Imperial Government, what justified the Colonial Office in asking the Colony to bear the entire cost?—I might do injustice to the case if I were to give an answer upon matters which are beyond my province and authority.

219. At the present time, Lord Grey's proposition, varied as to numbers, is in force?—Yes.

220. How has the money contributed by the Colonies been paid over?—In the Army Estimates, and in papers laid before Parliament, called "Naval and Military Accounts," I have from time to time seen entries, that large contributions are brought to public credit.

221. Do you think that the whole of the contributions have been so brought to credit?—That is a question of finance, to which it is not my business to attend.

222. Have not all the arrangements between the Colonies and the Home Government,

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Government, as to bringing those monies to account, passed through the Colonial Office?—Not the details of the mode of transferring the money from one account to the other. If a Governor, for instance, is wished by the Treasury to pay over certain money to the Treasury-chest, it would be the place of the Colonial Office to be the channel for sending out that order; but as to how the money is brought to account in this country, that is a thing which is altogether beyond our knowledge.

223. Did any instructions go from the Colonial Office to the Governors how they should pay these contributions?—I am not at this moment able to say.

224. Could you, if necessary, produce the despatches?—Yes.

225. Mr. *Roebuck*.] You could tell us the actual sum contributed by the Colony, and the date at which it was contributed?—Yes.

226. Mr. *Childers*.] And the channel through which it was brought to account?—I must here request the Committee to attend to a distinction; possibly they may wish to see that this money has been brought to public credit here; if that is their desire, it would be far better to put the question to some gentleman of the Financial Departments; it lies beyond our business, and the information must be sought from the Treasury or the War Department.

227. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Certain of the steps come under your cognizance?—We should forward any letter addressed to us by the Treasury or the War Office.

228. The actual sum contributed by the Colony comes to your knowledge?—We could give that fact from the Appropriation Acts.

229. You tell the Treasury that such a sum is contributed by the Colony?—The Treasury receives the information.

230. All those steps are within your cognizance, and can be communicated to us by you?—Yes.

231. Mr. *Childers*.] Are you confident that the contributions from the Colonies are paid into the Commissariat chest there, or are they paid direct to the military?—I cannot say.

232. Do you remember the circumstances out of which the first objection of the Colony to bear its entire military expenditure arose?—No, I do not.

233. After the Colony had consented to pay the Imperial and Colonial expenses of the troops, and of the entire staff, do you know of a despatch being sent from the Colonial Office, calling upon the Colony to bear the expense of the transport?—If there be such a despatch, I can produce it; the papers will speak for themselves.

234. It is not within your recollection, that the Colony objected to the conduct of the Home Government in attempting to extort this additional charge?—The details of the correspondence to which these questions refer do not fall within my cognizance.

235. Has any proposition been made by any of the other Governors except Sir William Denison, as to the division of the expenditure?—Other Governors have applied for troops, and said that they are willing to receive them on the same terms as New South Wales.

236. Sir William Denison has been the Governor of the second Colony in importance, so far as military expenditure is concerned?—He has been the Governor of the great Colony of New South Wales.

237. Did not Sir Henry Barkly and the previous Governors of Victoria make recommendations as to the standing arrangement for the division of the military expenditure between the Home Government and the Colony?—If they have made such recommendations, they can be produced.

238. You have no recollection of them?—No.

239. Has any recommendation come from the Colony for reducing the military expenses by the substitution of the artillery forces for troops of the line?—Not to my knowledge, but there is no objection to produce any despatches which it may be wished to see.

240. Has it been suggested in the Colony that the cost might be reduced, by leaving to the Colony the whole of its internal defence, but sending a certain number of Artillery for defence against external enemies?—I will endeavour to ascertain whether there is any such proposition.

241. Has not a Commission been appointed in Victoria, comprising military and naval officers, to prepare complete plans for the defence of the Colony?—Yes.

242. Have

242. Have they made valuable reports?—Yes; they have reached the Colonial Office, and have been communicated to the War Office.

243. Has any decisions been arrived at by the War Office upon them?—I have not seen any.

244. Did not that Commission recommend steps which would save a large expense?—I did not study the recommendations, because they involved chiefly questions of a purely military character, and were referred to the War Office.

245. Then what time were those reports received?—In 1859 and in 1860. A collection of papers is in course of being made in the Colonial Office, containing all the latest Despatches from the Governors, and, as soon as ready, they will be placed before the Committee.

246 Is not the general character of the recommendation of that Commission, that the Colony of Victoria is disposed to incur a large expense towards its defences?—Undoubtedly.

247. Have they not sent over already 100,000*l.* for the purchase of arms?—They have sent very large sums; I do not know the aggregate amount, but in one year they voted a sum of more than 48,000 *l.* for this purpose.

248. And have they not undertaken the whole of the works?—Yes.

249. Was it not one of their suggestions to substitute a small force of artillery for troops of the line?—I dare say that is a part of their recommendations.

250. Would not such a substitution be economical to the Home Government?—That is a military question upon which I am not competent to speak.

251. Do you remember the date when the volunteer force commenced to be raised in Victoria; was it not about the year 1853?—I do not know as to Victoria; there was a small volunteer force in New South Wales, in 1854.

252. Many years before the subject was brought to bear in this country?—Yes.

253. Has not that force been increased from 1,000 to 5,000 men?—The existing volunteer movement is quite a new one.

254. Has not the object of the creation of that force been gradually to supply the internal protection for the Colony from Colonial sources?—I cannot interpret the motives and objects of the policy of the Colonial Government.

255. Have you not had despatches on the subject?—Yes, but I have not seen it stated in those despatches, that they intended to dispense with Imperial troops.

256. Do you know anything of the police force?—There is an efficient police force.

257. Is it not organised strictly upon military principles?—I believe it is very much like the Irish Constabulary.

258. Is it not the case, that the police form two regiments of military?—They are well armed and trained men.

259. And are trained in the same manner as soldiers?—So I understand.

260. So that, in addition to the number of soldiers given in returns, there is a much larger force ready to hand?—There is.

261. The entire expense of which force has been defrayed by the Colony?—Yes.

262. Do you see any difficulty in extending that system to other Colonies?—I do not know of any difficulty.

263. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] Has the establishment of the Volunteer Riflemen been based very much upon the model of the Canadian Rifle Corps?—The Canadian Rifle Corps is virtually a regiment of the line.

264. And for very much the same objects?—The Australian Volunteers are for the defence of the country by the resident population.

265. Mr. *Childers.*] In fact, then, the proportion in which the military expenditure for the defence of the Colony is divided between the Imperial and the Colonial Treasury ought to be much greater on the Colonial side than is shown in your return?—Undoubtedly, if you include the police.

266. In your account of the expenditure of the local force, you only put down the Volunteers at 3,000 *l.*?—We put down the fact for the year in which the return is made.

267. You do not count in that the expenditure, amounting to something like 100,000 *l.* recently incurred?—No, because that is of later date.

268. Can you put in a return of a later date?—Yes, we are ready to produce the returns for any later period to which we possess them.

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269. I think you say the Colonial allowance was 5 *s.* a day to every officer?—Yes.

270. And that that is fixed by the Colony?—I did not say so; I do not know who fixed it.

271. Is it not the fact that they grant a lump sum, and pay it into the Commissariat?—That may be the *modus operandi.*

272. Is it not a resolution in the Appropriation Acts that a fixed sum shall be paid to the officer commanding, to be appropriated as Her Majesty may direct?—I believe so.

273. Is that appropriation by Her Majesty in any way shown in the Imperial military accounts?—I know nothing about the Army Estimates.

274. Is not the Colonial Office consulted with reference to that part of the Army Estimates which relates to the Colonies?—Not that I am aware of; the duty of the Colonial Office is to keep the War Office informed of all reports on military subjects received from the Governors; and the duty of the War Office is to prepare the Estimates.

275. If the Colonial Appropriation Act appropriated a sum to be paid over to Her Majesty, and to be distributed among the troops, would it not be the duty of the Governor to report that to the Colonial Office, and the duty of the Colonial Office to communicate it to the War Office?—I believe it would, but I do not suppose that this is the only or the principal channel through which the facts would come within the knowledge of the War Office; if liberal allowances are granted in a particular Colony to the Queen's troops, I take for granted that the General commanding would know the fact, and that he would report a circumstance so nearly affecting the welfare of the soldiers under his authority.

276. For the payment of a sum in gross, to be appropriated, the Colonial Office is in no way responsible?—My opinion is that the Colonial Office is in no way responsible for the custody, transfer, or accounts of public money, and it is important that this should be borne in mind in the questions which are put.

277. I want to know who is responsible for the arrangement under which the Imperial Government receives a contribution in gross from a Colony, if the Colonial Office knows nothing about it, and it does not appear in the Army Estimates?—That department is responsible to which the information is reported for the purpose of being acted upon. The Colonial Office of course receives regularly all important intelligence, such as the Appropriation Acts, for instance, of the Legislature, but unless its attention was especially drawn to the item, I do not know that it follows that the Colonial Office would search those Acts to see whether it should inform the War Department that certain troops received a benefit from it.

278. Was not that arrangement one which would receive consideration in the first instance from the Colonial Office?—Yes, but the parties most immediately interested are the Military Department. They attend to all that concerns the pay of the troops.

279. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not the case that the sum annually voted by the Parliament of Victoria as a contribution towards the expense of the troops is paid over by four quarterly payments to the military authorities on the spot, and not to the Government?—I believe it to be paid into what is called the Treasury Chest.

280. Are you not aware that those payments are made quarterly to the Military Authorities, that is, to the Commander in Chief on the spot?—My impression is that it is paid into the Treasury Chest.

281. Mr. *Childers.*] Sir William Denison, I think, recommended that the military expenditure should be equally divided between the Colonial and Home Governments?—He did.

282. Whom did he recommend should be responsible for fixing the expenditure necessary?—I do not see that his Despatch provides for that necessary work, and the truth is, that if we decided at this moment to divide the expense of the troops between the mother country and the Colonies, there would come a task of immense difficulty which would only be disposed of after discussion, and by compromise: the task of settling what items should compose the expenditure.

283. Did Sir William Denison attempt to solve that?—No, he only proposed that all the expenses should be divided.

284. Supposing

284. Supposing the Colonists think that they ought to have 1,000 men, and the Home Government consider that 500 or 5,000 is the proper number, who would be the judges?—Sir William Denison proposed that there should be a certain maximum limit of force within which the money should be equally divided, but that if the Imperial Government, for any purpose of its own, thought proper to exceed that limit, the Colonists should not be liable to contribute towards the expenses of the force in excess.

285. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Every arrangement with respect to the amount of money to be paid, is made between the Colony and the Government?—Yes.

286. Every information that the Governor receives from the Colonial Legislature, he sends to the Colonial Office?—He sends the Appropriation Act, and every legislative proceeding.

287. So that you have been made cognisant of every step in the progress of those arrangements?—We know the result.

288. And therefore you can communicate it to this Committee?—Of course we can produce the Appropriation Acts, and I will produce those parts which contain military grants.

289. In Sir William Denison's contemplated scheme for Colonial defence, did he not include the consideration of the naval defences?—He touched upon that topic.

290. Was anything done with regard to that?—The Admiralty wrote a very elaborate letter, which is now printed for the House of Commons, in which they explained that they thought that the naval defences could not be made the subject of local contribution. If you have local contribution, you must have local claims, but a ship is an erratic body, and cannot with advantage be confined to a single spot, or prevented from combining with others. You cannot localize a navy. But although our Admiralty take the general view I have just mentioned, the Colony of Victoria, which is capable of carrying into effect its own views, thought that it would like to have an armed steamer for its own service; accordingly there is an armed steamer called the "Victoria," which is maintained at the charge of the Colony.

291. Is that ship officered by English officers?—Not as naval officers on full pay.

292. They are not Queen's officers?—They are not Queen's officers.

293. So far as their allowance is concerned, England has nothing to do with it?—England has nothing to do with it.

294. Mr. *Childers.*] As a matter of fact, that steamer was sent to New Zealand, I believe, and on Imperial duty there for a good many months?—That was done owing to the liberality and patriotism of the Colony of Victoria, which spontaneously put that steamer at the disposal of the Governor.

295. Has not the Colony of Victoria given extra pay to the Queen's ships?—Yes.

296. Then as far as regards the naval expenses, they do bear a proportion?—They grant an extra sum: in my previous answer I meant that they did not contribute anything towards the Imperial expenses of the navy.

297. Besides providing that steamer, you say that they contribute some portion of the expenditure upon the naval force in that Colony?—They grant some extra allowances.

298. Can you supply the Committee with the amount?—I will endeavour to learn what the allowances are; they are grants made by the liberality of the Colony in favour of these men; but whatever they are, they are not grants in abatement of the cost to this country of ships of war.

299. The expense of the pay of our officers is not any diminution of the expense borne by this country?—The remark alludes, I presume, to the extra pay of our military officers. It is true; and yet, if the Colonial Government did not grant it this Government must grant it.

300. If we do not do that with regard to the navy, the navy is worse off than the army?—That is so.

301. Is it not the fact, that in consequence of the low pay of the navy on the Australian coast, desertions were very numerous?—I believe so.

302. Mr. *Baxter.*] Was not the Government of Victoria at one time willing to bear the entire military expenditure, if the expense of transport was borne by the mother country?—Yes.

303. Was that offer refused by the Colonial Office?—I cannot say from memory how the case stood; no such offer was refused certainly.

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304. Can you put in the Despatches with reference to that subject?—Yes; the whole of the late Despatches are in the course of preparation, and I feel a reluctance to give answers upon these subjects when the Committee will soon have more accurate information than can be supplied to it from memory.

305. It appears that the Imperial expenditure for Victoria, in the year ending 31st March 1857, was about 47,000*l.*?—Yes, that is so.

306. Had this proposition of the Victoria Government been accepted, would not the greater proportion of that sum have been saved to this country?—I have not those Despatches sufficiently within my recollection to undertake to expound them; the Despatches themselves will be in the hands of the Committee in a short time.

307. Has any similar proposition been made by the Government of New South Wales?—None.

308. Can you say why Tasmania contributes nothing towards its own military expenditure?—Because a large number of convicts have been introduced into that Colony by the mother country, and many of them still remain; and therefore it was thought right that the mother country should defray the necessary military expenses.

309. How many convicts still remain there?—I cannot state accurately from memory; there are many thousands still; but it must be remembered that there are several times as many who have been convicts. The number of actual convicts is not the proper index of the extent of the population of convict origin.

310. Has the Colony of Tasmania been asked and refused to contribute any portion of the expenses?—No, it has not been asked.

311. You say that the garrison of Halifax is maintained there for Imperial purposes; would you say the same of the troops maintained by us in Australia?—I should say, within certain limits, that the troops are kept there for Imperial purposes. Those Colonies are part of the Empire, and it may reasonably be thought that the duty of the mother country is to provide for their defence against foreign countries.

312. Do you consider that Sydney is a port in Australia in the same light as Halifax, regarding defences on the part of the mother country?—I think that there are ports of the greatest possible importance in Australia, which it is the duty of this country to defend against foreign enemies if they present themselves; but I do not think that there happens to be a port occupying the sort of commanding position with reference to other countries which is occupied by Halifax.

313. Mr. *Childers*.] Is not Sydney the head-quarters of the naval station?—Yes.

314. Are there not Imperial stores there?—Yes.

315. Mr. *Adderley*.] Was the Colonial allowance in New South Wales, the first cause of extra pay being made to Imperial troops in Tasmania?—I cannot say from memory in which of these Colonies the practice originated.

316. Do you recollect a decision being come to in the Colonial Office, that extra pay ought not to be continued in Tasmania and New Zealand, which decision could not be carried out, because extra allowances were made in other parts of Australia?—The existence of the allowances in some of the other Australian Colonies would render it difficult to discontinue them.

317. Do you recollect that an attempt was made to discontinue the allowance, which was unsuccessful in consequence of the allowance being made in the other Australian Colonies?—I suppose the Governor represented that it was an inconsistency, and would be felt as a hardship.

318. Are you aware of any complaint being made by troops in other Colonies of their not getting an extra pay equal to that which was received in Colonies where allowances were made?—It has not come within my knowledge; that would be known if it be the fact to the Military Department.

319. Can you state when Lord Grey laid down the rule of four companies being the maximum for each Colony, on what ground that limit was laid down?—He stated various reasons why he thought that a small force ought to be sufficient for their wants.

320. Was it not a rough calculation which fixed the same limit for every Colony?—He took those which he found at Sydney as the number which happened to be there at the time, and he said that this country should be willing to pay for them. The Despatch is before the House of Commons.

321. Was

321. Was any opinion taken in the Colony itself as to the number of troops which would be required?—I find no inquiry of that sort among the Despatches laid before the House of Commons.

322. Large allowances are made in Ceylon, are there not?—There are.

323. Of course, in India, there is nothing of the kind?—There they have double pay. The expenses of the troops in India are paid by the Indian Government.

324. If Ceylon happened to be joined to India, probably it would partake of the same liability?—I suppose so.

325. Great efforts were made in the Colonies to raise a volunteer force subsequent to Lord Grey's letter?—Yes.

326. Is there any peculiarity in Australia which would account for greater efforts being made there than in all other Colonies?—I think that the existence of the Gold Fields gave them one great motive for wishing to have an adequate force for preserving order. I think also, that the very large population in a flourishing condition makes it easier for them to enter with spirit into the volunteer movements of the times.

327. You say that Western Australia does not pay the cost of troops, because it receives our convicts: Does not the first cost of the troops date from the time of England undertaking the whole defence of any Colony?—In Australia, yes.

328. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would you not say that Lord Grey's view in proposing his arrangement to the Australian Colonies was something of this kind, that whilst these Colonies from their situation were not in his opinion exposed to any great danger from foreign enemies, yet that he thought the Governor of an important Imperial Colony should not be left entirely without the presence of a very small body of troops to act as the Governor's guard, and as a symbol of Imperial authority?—I think that this would have been a very reasonable view to go upon, and I dare say that it may have influenced Lord Grey, but I feel diffident of undertaking to interpret Lord Grey's opinions. His Lordship's own Despatch is in print, and is before the House of Commons.

329. Do you not recollect that Lord Grey uses an expression to this effect, in relation to the small Imperial quota which he was ready to supply "as a guard for the Governor"?—That expression shows that such was his view.

330. With reference to Sir William Denison's plan, do you recollect these words in Lord Stanley's Despatch, in answer to Sir William Denison's first Despatch on the subject: "It would seem difficult to adopt this rule unless your own further proposal were incorporated with it, that the Colony should possess, through the Vote of its Legislature, the responsibility of determining the amount of force which should be maintained in it, whether in peace or in war. Her Majesty's Government do not, as at present advised, see in what manner this suggestion could be adopted without compromising that independent action of the central authority of the empire. The Executive in this country, having full information as to its available force, and as to the different calls on that force in the various portions of the empire, can alone be in a position to decide what force is required, and what force can be spared for purposes of defence against foreign aggression on each particular point. If every Colony were to assert a voice in this matter, as on your proposal it would have to do, I do not see in what manner the general defensive arrangements of the empire could be conducted." Do you recollect also that Sir William Denison afterwards explained that he did not mean to acquire for the Colony the right of fixing the number of troops to be supplied by the mother country, but that he was quite willing to allow that right to the Imperial Government?—I recollect it perfectly. He met the difficulty by suggesting that there should be a certain maximum amount within which the Colony should be bound to contribute; that it should be in the discretion of the Imperial Government to send a greater or less number of troops, but that if they sent a greater number the Imperial Government should pay the whole cost of the surplus number.

331. Was not the main obstacle in the way of accepting Sir William Denison's proposal, the supposition that his proposal intended to bind the mother country to the supply of a certain number of troops?—Yes.

332. Sir William Denison has since explained that he did not mean to impose any such obligation upon the mother country?—He has.

333. Are you aware that a proposal was lately made to the Colony of Queensland,

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land, giving them their choice whether they would have a very small body of Queen's troops detached from Sydney; or whether they would prefer that a local corps should be raised for Queensland purposes?—I am aware that the choice was offered.

334. Do you recollect the nature of the answer made by Sir G. Bowen, and the Executive Council?—They strongly deprecated the formation of a local force; they said that in their opinion great advantages accrued from the presence of Imperial troops, soldiers who shared all the adventures and vicissitudes of the British army, and who were ready to meet the Queen's enemies wherever they might appear. They thought that, independently of the military advantages, there were many political benefits to be derived from the sort of communication which the visit of troops of this kind keeps up with the mother country.

335. Mr. *Adderley.*] But you say that these troops were required as the Governor's guards, against whom?—I think that that word is used in the very common sense, not of a guard from any impending danger, but one given as a mark of honour and respect. I think that the presence of a small body of British troops at the seat of Government is viewed as an emblem of the connection with the mother country.

336. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] Have any representations ever been made to the Colonial Office from persons at home, interested in the trade of Australia, urging that a sufficient military force should be stationed there for their protection?—It has not fallen under my notice.

337. Mr. *Childers.*] Would you be inclined to say that the guard for the Governor, spoken of by Lord Grey, was in the nature of a guard of honour, such as is supplied in this country at the residence of the Queen?—I think, as I said before, that it was meant partly as a mark of honour to the Governor, but that it was also considered that the presence of these Imperial troops was an emblem of the connection with the mother country, and of the interest which the parent state still takes in the Colony.

338. Do you think that the Colonists of New South Wales, or of Victoria, would look upon the presence of a guard at the residence of the Governor with any feelings different to those with which people look upon the guard at the residence of the Queen in this country?—I have no doubt that they always look upon the soldiers there as their friends.

339. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] Did not the volunteers of Melbourne, during the New Zealand War, do all the military duty in the Colonies?—Yes.

340. *Chairman.*] I hold in my hand a minute of Sir William Denison's on the organization of the military force required for the defence of the Australian Colonies, enclosed in a Despatch from him, dated Sydney, 22d June 1860; "This regiment when once organized might be recruited in the Colony, and its strength might be increased or diminished according to the state of the political relations of the Empire without any difficulty either by adding to, or diminishing the number of men in such Company, or by increasing or reducing the number of companies; an arrangement such as this might be made to embrace the whole of the Australian Colonies; a regiment of Australian rifles consisting of two battalions would furnish a force which when supplemented with a few companies of Artillery, would be sufficient for the defence of all the Australian Colonies; for when the railroads now in contemplation are completed, facilities will be afforded for concentrating a very large proportion of the force either at Melbourne or Sydney, as may be required, and the means of moving men from Melbourne to Tasmania, or elsewhere, are always in readiness. The estimates appended to this minute will give a correct idea of the cost of a single battalion of such a regiment, and of the expense of a militia force of the same strength." Will you put in, if you please, those estimates which are not comprised in this Despatch?—Certainly.

341. Then he says: "From this it would appear that the actual cost of a battalion of eight companies of 80 men, including the existing Colonial allowance to officers and men, would be 38,925*l.* per annum?"—The Imperial Government would pay 14,291*l.*, leaving, in round numbers, 24,500*l.* to be provided by the Colony." I take it that the estimates alluded to in the footnote give the details of the gross estimates?—It will be found that such is the case.

342. Mr. *Childers.*] Have the other Australian Governors been consulted upon this proposition of Sir William Denison's?—Not that I am aware of. If

the

the proposition had been accepted, it would have been necessary to consult the other Australian Governors, in case the plan was extended beyond New South Wales.

343. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that an attempt has been made, within the last two or three years, in Victoria, to recruit a Victoria contingent of 400 men, to be added to the strength of the 14th Regiment, and of the success which the experiment met with?—Such an experiment was made in 1859. An attempt was made to raise, for local service, 300 men, for four companies, to be attached to the regiment at the time in garrison at Victoria, but it was found difficult to recruit; only 123 effective men were enlisted; and as they went away with the 40th Regiment to New Zealand, the Imperial Government adopted them as British soldiers, and relieved the Colony from any further expense on their account.

344. I think Sir Henry Barkly reports that the experiment has been in effect a failure?—Yes; it was considered to have failed. The high rate of wages in Australia must make it very difficult to recruit.

Lunæ, 22° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baring.
Mr. Baxter.
Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Childers.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Ellice.
Sir George Grey.
Mr. Mills.
Mr. Marsh.
General Peel.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

T. F. Elliot, Esq., called in; and further Examined.

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345. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you wish to add to your evidence some facts with reference to the volunteer force in British North America?—Since I was last before the Committee, a further report has arrived from New Brunswick; I, therefore, beg to read an amended account of the numbers of volunteer militia in North America in 1860: Canada, 4,456; Nova Scotia, 2,350; New Brunswick, 1,850; Newfoundland, 350; Prince Edward Island, 1,000; making a total of 10,006.

346. Are they embodied?—Those that I now mention are embodied and trained. The new report from New Brunswick mentions that 11 are companies of artillery, trained to light gun drill, and that there are about 30 companies of riflemen, consisting of not less than 1,400 trained to the use of the weapon. England furnished 3,000 rifles and 140,000 rounds of ammunition to the province of New Brunswick; to Nova Scotia also, 3,000 rifles; none to Canada.

347. Mr. *Adderley.*] What do you say as to the artillery?—I do not find a record of the gift of any artillery to any of those provinces.

348. *Chairman.*] Do you wish to add something to your evidence with reference to the volunteer force of the Australian Colonies?—Yes; from that group of Colonies also further information has come to hand since I was last before the Committee. I mentioned that a volunteer corps was expected to be formed in New South Wales, and we now know that it has been formed; I propose, therefore, to read an amended return of volunteers in Australia. New South Wales, 1,696; Victoria, 4,750; South Australia, 1,538; and Tasmania, 1,500; total 9,484. Those are armed and trained volunteers. There has been a small reduction in the return from South Australia.

349. Are the arms, in the case of the Australian Colonies, provided by the Imperial Government?—In some cases arms have been given, in others they have been paid for by the Colonies. They have altogether had extensive supplies of arms from this country; and some of the Colonies, such as Victoria, have voted large sums of money for their purchase.

350. Now I will direct your attention to New Zealand. What was the total amount of Imperial military expenditure in respect of the Colony of New Zealand, for the year ending 31st March 1859?—£. 104,077.

351. The Colony contributed nothing, I think, to its defence?—Nothing.

352. And never has contributed anything?—It has never yet contributed anything.

353. That is exclusive of the cost of transport to and from the Colony?—Yes.

354. What was the number of troops of all arms, including infantry, artillery, engineers, and staff, during that period?—One thousand three hundred and ninety-seven.

355. Have you any returns, in your department, of any costs incurred either by the Federal Government of New Zealand, or either of the provincial governments

ments in respect of volunteers?—No, we have not; we know that volunteers have been formed, and of course have cost the provinces some money, but we have no details.

356. You have no official information with regard to that?—We have no official information upon that subject. I may, perhaps, be permitted to take this opportunity of saying that we have received a report that a regiment of militia has been formed and embodied in Auckland, and the number armed amounts to 1,515. We have not any return that I can find of the number of volunteers at Taranaki; of course, the Committee are aware that volunteers exist there, and have distinguished themselves in the field.

357. Can you give us any cost actually incurred in any of the provinces in New Zealand, in respect of either militia or volunteers?—I am not aware of any.

358. Sir *George Grey*.] You have not got the return of the actual cost incurred, but you have no doubt, I suppose, that some cost has been incurred by the Local Government in respect of the militia and volunteers?—I do not doubt it.

359. What you mean is that you have no official return of the actual amount so incurred?—That is what I mean.

360. *Chairman*.] Can you give the Committee any information with respect to the distribution of Imperial troops in the Colony of New Zealand for the period to which this last return relates?—I will give the distribution on the 1st January 1859; Auckland, 392; Taranaki, 210; Wellington, 111; Wanganui, 189; Napier, 149: the total is 1,051. This return is of rank and file, and differs therefore slightly from the Committee's other return, which includes staff, and officers of all ranks.

361. What fortifications of any importance, if any, are there in New Zealand?—I do not know of any fortifications of importance.

362. In answer to my previous question you were going to give some further information, with regard to the number and distribution of troops in other years; perhaps you will give the information now?—Yes; the distribution on the next 1st January, namely, that of 1860, so nearly agrees with the one of 1859, that perhaps I need hardly trouble the Committee by reading it over.

363. Mr. *Adderley*.] Was the number the same?—The number was the same as in 1859, and the distribution almost the same. The latest return that I have seen was dated August 1860; at that time hostilities had commenced in New Zealand; the distribution, therefore, is very different, and the amount of force had largely increased. It is as follows: "Auckland, 201; Taranaki, 1,490; Wellington, 22; Wanganui, 187; and Napier, 115.

364. *Chairman*.] Can you say what the regiment was that was sent out as a reinforcement on the occasion of the late war, and from what quarter of the world it was taken?—From the Australian colonies.

365. Sir *George Grey*.] Does the increase which you have now referred to represent the addition of one regiment?—It does.

366. *Chairman*.] Then there was another regiment, was there not, which was brought to New Zealand?—Since that time, other regiments have been brought to New Zealand; one, I think, from China.

367. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Do you remember when the last grant was made to New Zealand by this country for the purposes of the civil government?—It is a long time ago.

368. Are you aware that Sir George Grey, during the greater part of his government, was assisted by the confidence of the Imperial Parliament for the purposes of the civil government of New Zealand?—Yes.

369. Are you aware of any arrangement made or proposed for the military system of New Zealand within the last year or two?—For some years a correspondence has been going on between the Imperial and the Colonial Government upon the question whether they should contribute, and to what amount, towards Imperial troops. The first proposition made from home was, that they should pay for barracks; that was in the year 1853. Much discussion ensued, and in the course of time the idea was broached that they should pay at a rate per head for the soldiers, to cover the expenses. They reluctantly offered at last to pay as much as 5*l*. a head. Last year the Government wrote to say that it would accept this payment of 5*l*., not to be considered as exclusively appropriated to barracks, but to form a general contribution towards the expenses of the troops in New Zealand. A despatch has recently arrived conveying

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veying the assent of the New Zealand Government to this proposal; but I must further explain that the Imperial Government, in agreeing to the sum of 5*l.* per head, demanded that it should be paid in arrear for the two or three years during which the discussion had continued. The New Zealand Government also agreed to that point. The benefit of the contribution of 5*l.* per head will therefore commence from 1858.

370. Sir *G. Grey.*] And referring to all the troops in the Colony, whatever their number might be?—Whatever the number might be in the Colony.

371. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you told us you had just got an account of the volunteer force in New South Wales?—Yes.

372. Are you not aware that there was a volunteer corps there so long ago as 1854?—There was; but I presume that it had fallen into disuse, because the Governor lately spoke of the intention of forming a volunteer corps as a new measure.

373. I think you told us, with regard to New Zealand, that there were no forts there?—I am not aware of any forts of importance; there may be batteries.

374. Then these troops are not for external defence, but to protect the people against the natives?—That is a matter of inference and open to discussion, for we have British troops in many places where there are not forts.

375. Mr. *Baxter.*] Are there many forts in Australia?—Very few, but there are batteries, for example, at Sydney, and they are building forts also at Port Phillip; all those works being constructed at the expense of the Australian Colonies.

376. There are new batteries at Sydney and Port Phillip?—Yes.

377. But they are manned by troops paid by the Imperial Government?—They are manned by Imperial troops paid in the relative proportions by the Imperial Government and the Colonies, which were explained in the last day's evidence.

378. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is the company of artillery at Sydney paid entirely by the Colony?—One company of artillery there was paid entirely by the Colony; but it has gone away to New Zealand, and its charge is again assumed by the Imperial Government.

379. Mr. *Marsh.*] You said that there were forts being constructed in Australia?—Yes.

380. Does the Home Government find the ordnance for those forts?—The War Department will, doubtless, in some cases, furnish the guns; but the Colony of Victoria has voted very large sums to pay for ordnance for its own use.

381. Mr. *Adderley.*] You say that after six years' correspondence the New Zealand Government have assented to pay 5*l.* a head for the troops sent to them from England?—Yes.

382. Can you state what proportion of the whole expense per head that is?—Undoubtedly, a very small proportion.

383. Taking the year which you have already alluded to, and which will be a favourable year to the Colony for the calculation, am I wrong in saying that the proporton is as five to 80?—That is about the proportion; the whole rate per man of the entire military strength of New Zealand is nearly 80*l.* a head.

384. Then the proposition which it took six years to induce the Colony of New Zealand to consent to was, that, for all the Imperial troops of New Zealand, the English taxpayers should pay 75-80 of the cost, plus the cost of transport?—That is the bare fact; but it is necessary to add that New Zealand had never paid anything at all before; that she then for the first time commenced paying; and that she received notice that the arrangement would be liable to further revision; and that likewise, in respect of this sum of 5*l.*, she has agreed to pay the arrears of the three or four years during which the correspondence lasted.

385. At the same rate?—At the same rate.

386. Is that, then, what we may consider the permanent arrangement between the Colonial Office and the New Zealand Government?—No; the Colonial Government were distinctly told that the arrangement would be liable to revision. I must ask leave to add a material fact, which had escaped me in my previous answer: that whereas in New Zealand, and many other Colonies in that part of the world, the Imperial troops receive extra allowances, this has occasioned

occasioned a communication to the New Zealand Government, inviting them to pay from their own local funds the whole amount of these extra allowances, in like manner as is done in neighbouring Colonies.

387. Do the New Zealand Colonies in their answers express their willingness to take upon themselves this further claim?—There has not been time to receive their answer; but the meaning of the communication I believe to be this, that their agreement before was to give a certain sum in abatement of the regular and ordinary Imperial charge, but that the extra allowance being something beyond these extra charges, occasioned by the peculiar circumstances of the Colony, it is thought fair to ask the Colonial Government to provide separately for that expense.

388. Can you state how long extra pay has been given to the troops in New Zealand?—I cannot state it exactly, but for a considerable time.

389. Do you know at all the origin of the extra pay?—Extra pay has been gradually growing up throughout the Australian group; the discovery of the gold first led to it in Australia.

390. Then the fact is, that the Australian gold colonies undertaking to give extra allowances to the British troops out of their own purse, necessitated the giving of extra pay from the Imperial treasury to troops in other colonies?—I do not think that is quite the case: because extra pay has been allowed in such a colony as the Cape, for example, where there is no question of gold, and where they are too far from Australia to be necessarily affected by the practice there.

391. Was not the extra pay given subsequently to the discovery of the gold in Australia?—Yes.

392. Mr. *Ellice.*] Upon what principle is the extra pay regulated; is it regulated by the division of the colonies, and the sanction of the military authorities here, or is it sanctioned by the Secretary of State for War?—Undoubtedly, extra pay has never been given to the troops without the knowledge and sanction of the Secretary of State for War; whether the report came to him direct, or whether the intelligence first reached the Colonial Secretary, who communicated with the Secretary for War, I cannot undertake to say.

393. The process, I take it, would be this, that either the Colonial authorities, or the military authorities in England would communicate any proposition with respect to pay to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in this country, and of the Secretary of State for the Colonies approved of it, he would communicate his approbation to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of War ultimately would have the power to decide upon the case?—Yes, the opinion of the Secretary of State for War would be that which would be deemed the most material in such a case.

394. Are any instances within your recollection in which such correspondence has arisen in the Colonies, and been transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Secretary of State for War?—There has been frequent correspondence on the subject between the Departments of War and of the Colonies.

395. Sir *George Grey.*] Am I to understand you to state that this extra pay, these extra allowances in New Zealand have been paid from the Imperial funds?—They have.

396. Was that extra pay received by the troops in 1859, during the period to which the return upon which we have been examining you refers?—I believe it to have been then in force.

397. These extra allowances, then, are included in the 104,777*l.* for that year?—That is certainly the case, unless I am mistaken as to the date of the origin of these extra allowances. They have lately, as regards all the Colonies, formed the subject of inquiry by a Committee at the War Department, and the Secretary of State for War, after considering the report of the Committee, intimated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies the course which he wished to be pursued; and, of course, the Colonial Minister issued the instructions which the Secretary of State for War thought proper.

398. Is it then the fact that, in addition to the 5*l.* a head which the Colony agreed to pay, a further demand has been made upon the Colony which would be a reduction from the gross sum appearing now to be chargeable to the funds of this country for the troops in New Zealand?—Yes.

399. Is the extra pay in New Zealand at the same rate as in Australia?—The extra pay in New Zealand is at the same rate as in Tasmania and Western Australia,

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Australia, those three being Colonies in which it is paid directly by the Imperial Government; the rate is 5 *s.* a day to the officers, and free rations to the troops; that is to say, a surrender of the usual stoppage of 3 ½ *d.* a day.

400. Is it the same rate as in the other Australian Colonies in which the pay comes from the Colonial Exchequer?—No, the extra rate is larger in the other Colonies.

401. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is the pay given to the officers and troops while they are in service in the field, or is it given generally?—It is given generally.

402. Mr. *Fortescue.*] The Colony of New Zealand, I believe, is about 20 years old?—Yes.

403. From the time of its foundation, there came a period of several years, I believe, during which this country contributed largely to the civil expenditure of New Zealand?—There was such a period.

404. After that there came, I think, a period of a few years, during which New Zealand bore the whole of its civil charges, and this country bore the whole of its military charges?—Yes.

405. The first step, then, has lately been taken towards obtaining from New Zealand, contribution towards its military expenditure?—Yes.

406. That is the step which you have just now described?—It is.

407. Is not that rate of 5 *l.* per head, intended to represent, roughly of course, the cost of military works and buildings of all kinds?—That was the principle upon which the sum was calculated, when it was originally proposed; but, as after all, years might occur when the military works would fall short of the rate of 5 *l.* per head, this may have been the reason why the Government thought it better to call it, in general terms, a contribution towards the military expenses of the Colony, without specifying either barracks, or works, or troops.

408. But the idea was, that the first contribution which the Colony should be called upon to make for its military expenses, should be one for the purpose of defraying the cost of military lodgings and military works?—Yes, the original idea.

409. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you told us that some of the civil charges was for that purpose?—For the provision of barracks; the rate of 5 *l.* seems to me by the present returns to have been even more than enough.

410. You told us, I think, that the civil charges were originally paid in New Zealand?—Yes, there was a contribution from England towards them.

411. That was the case I believe in Australia, for a certain time?—Yes, it was.

412. Now about the extra pay; was there ever any extra pay in Australia or New Zealand, or any of these Colonies until the gold discovery?—No.

413. Mr. *Childers.*] The number of troops kept in New Zealand is much larger than would be required for the external defence of New Zealand, is it not?—There is only a regiment of the line, and some artillery and engineers.

414. But in proportion to the population, that is a considerable force as compared with the population of the other Colonies?—Perhaps it may be so if you look at population alone, but if you look at the fact that this population is dispersed amongst four or five settlements, each of them possessed of considerable wealth, I do not think, according to the custom in other Colonies, that the presence of a single regiment of the line in New Zealand was at all disproportionate.

415. Had it not been for the presence of large bodies of natives, whose attachment is only doubtful, you would not have kept so large a military force in New Zealand?—That goes beyond my province.

416. Do you mean that if New Zealand had been without natives, like other Australian Colonies, you would have required all that force for the external defence of the Colony?—It is a military question; but looking to the past, which is all I can judge by, as I am no soldier, I do not believe that the Secretary of State for War could have sent less than a regiment for the four or five settlements in New Zealand.

417. But I am asking you if it would be so irrespective of the native question?—I believe if our Government supplied troops at all, they would not have consented to send less than one regiment for those islands; but I must repeat that

that I feel that I am no authority; I merely mention my inference from seeing what has been the practice elsewhere. *T. F. Elliot, Esq.* 22 April 1861.

418. Has the Government of New Zealand represented to the Colonial Office that any proportion of the military expenditure connected with New Zealand, originates in the relations with the natives with which the responsible ministers there has nothing to do?—At the time of the discussion as to whether they should contribute to the troops, and to what amount, they naturally used a variety of arguments to explain why they were unwilling to contribute; I dare say they relied on the foregoing as one of those arguments. But in order that I may not be misconceived in the previous answer, I hope that I may point out one distinction; I never questioned that the presence of a large body of warlike natives must be a material element in the military arrangements of any country; but what I said was, that only a single regiment of the line was in New Zealand, and I was obliged to state that from past practice in the Colonies this seemed to me no more than there would have been in the same Colony if there had been no natives.

419. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that a very small number of troops were, as the colonists of New Zealand conceive, left in the Colony before this disturbance, and that that was the subject of repeated remonstrances from the Government of New Zealand?—Yes, they did complain.

420. Are you aware that until the last two years there had been two regiments instead of one in New Zealand?—There was only one regiment both on the 1st January 1859, and 1st January 1860.

421. Are you aware that until within two or three years there were two regiments, and not one only in New Zealand?—Yes.

422. And that one was removed during the late war?—Yes.

423. That removal having taken place against the earnest remonstrances of the Government of New Zealand?—Yes.

424. Mr. *Adderley.*] Was that regiment removed in course of a regular reduction of troops in New Zealand?—It was removed in consequence of the exigencies of the Indian mutiny.

425. But was the cause of its not being replaced, the progressive reduction that was going on?—There was progressive reduction in North America, but in Australia there has been no reduction, the forces have been stationary for many years.

426. Then while the progressive reduction in North America which you have described was going on, there was no corresponding reduction going on in Australia and New Zealand?—There has been no corresponding reduction in Australia; I have just mentioned that there was a casual reduction in New Zealand.

427. Was that regiment, which was removed, not replaced as a part of the system of progressive reduction?—I do not believe that this could have been the reason, because no progressive reduction was at that time going on in the neighbouring colonies.

428. Mr. *Fortescue.*] But it is the case, is it not, that within the last few years the garrison of New Zealand has been reduced from two regiments to one?—It is.

429. And until the breaking out of the present disturbances there was no intention of replacing the regiment which had been removed?—There was no such intention that I ever heard of.

430. Mr. *Childers.*] In what year was that regiment removed?—In the year of the war of the Indian mutiny, in 1858.

431. Sir *George Grey.*] Was the regiment which was removed from New Zealand to India at the time of the Indian mutiny, replaced in New Zealand before the disturbances broke out there; or was the garrison suffered to remain at one regiment?—It was not replaced, and the garrison was suffered to remain at one regiment.

432. Mr. *Adderley.*] Can you state whether its not being replaced was in consequence of an intention on the part of the Home Government, permanently to reduce the numbers of Imperial troops in New Zealand?—That lies beyond my province.

433. You are not aware that at that time a progressive reduction of the troops was going on in New Zealand, similar to that which you have described in North America?—No; but the general question of reduction touches an important matter

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matter of fact which I wish to lay before the Committee. When Lord Grey was Minister, he wished to reduce the expenses of the troops in the Colonies: in North America, he effected his object by reducing the number of troops; in Australia he effected it in a different manner; he said that if they wished to have soldiers they might have some if they liked to pay for them; they did pay for them, and therefore the number of troops in Australia was not reduced.

434. Was that reduction of troops in New Zealand a process of reduction of the troops generally, or was it casual?—After the regiment was removed for the Indian mutiny, it was not replaced, and remained for some years without being replaced; from which I infer that the Government intended to save the expense of it.

435. If New Zealand is to pay $\frac{5}{80}$ of the cost of the troops sent from England, it will pay much less than Australia does?—Yes.

436. If New Zealand is to pay 5 out of 80 of the cost per head of the troops in New Zealand, will it not pay a much less proportion than Australia?—It will pay a far less proportion than those Australian Colonies which have contributed, but some of them make no contribution.

437. Is it not the fact, that during the New Zealand rebellion artillery were ordered from Sydney to New Zealand?—Yes.

438. Was that order, in the first instance, complied with?—The artillery was sent, and I never understood that it was delayed. The Government of New South Wales would have been dissatisfied if, after they had paid money for the introduction of these troops, they had gone elsewhere without reimbursement; but the Imperial Government has repaid the money.

439. Did the Governor reply to that order, that he could not press the Colony for their consent to send artillery from Sydney to New Zealand, unless the Home Government would refund the cost of their transport out, for that he represented that this portion of the military force was considered by the Sydney Legislature to be in a different position to that of the regiment of the line stationed there, and to be, to a certain extent, under the orders of the Local Government?—The Governor answered that he did not hesitate to suggest to the General to act at once; and that while he communicated, both to the Council and to the Legislature, the steps that would be taken, he did so in terms which he took care should not raise the question of the right of the General commanding to dispose of the military force in the Colonies according to the best of his judgment when any case of urgency might arise.

440. Sir *George Grey*.] Was the sole question raised of a financial character, a matter of payment between the Colony and this country?—The Governor put it upon that footing, and the matter was therefore settled by the Home Government's immediately assuming to itself the charge of all that had been spent by the Colony on the artillery; so that the affair has been concluded to the satisfaction of all parties.

441. And in the meantime the troops went to New Zealand?—The troops went to New Zealand.

442. Mr. *Adderley*.] On a previous occasion, did the Governor hesitate to send the same artillery to India, because the Colonial authorities considered that branch of the service under the command of the Local Government, to some extent?—On that previous occasion the Governor thought it better not to press the question.

443. Mr. *Childers*.] Is not the real reason this: that the Colony agreed to pay the original cost of the transport of that artillery company from England?—Yes.

444. Is not the difficulty that if, after they were there, they were subject to be removed, the Colony would not get fair consideration for what it had paid in the first instance?—The Colony would have a just grievance, unless the money which it had spent on the introduction of these troops were repaid.

445. Did not Sir William Denison use these words: "If the Colony is to pay for the passage of troops from England, which troops are liable to be recalled, either in small detachments, or altogether, at the will of the military authorities in England, just grounds of complaint will be given to the Colony"?—Those words occur in the Despatch.

446. Mr. *Adderley*.] Have the military and militia in New Zealand been found to work well together?—I know no more than appears from the ordinary sources of information.

447. Do

447. Do those ordinary sources of information show that there are some considerable jealousies between the two, so as, in some cases, to render it impossible for them to work together?—I am very loath to give any answer which would seem as if I gave a shadow of opinion of my own upon the subject. They have since been engaged together in important engagements against the enemy, aud they have gained important successes together; and if there was a time when there were jealousies, I hope they are past.

448. Has the Colony expressed any dissatisfaction?—I can only speak to what I have seen in the despatches. I have not seen any complaint by the Governor of the conduct of the Queen's troops.

449. Do the Colonists appear to have been satisfied?—As I said before, speaking from the ordinary sources of information, there has been a good deal of difference of opinion, and I can offer no judgment of my own. But I should hope, as they have been successful together, that the mutual feeling is much better than it was at the first commencement of the war.

450. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Do you know of any unsuccessful military operation in which there was not dissatisfaction?—It seems natural that it should be so.

451. Does your own experience in the Colonial Office extend so far back as the formation of the Colony of New Zealand?—Yes.

452. Can you tell the Committee whether those that first went out to found the Colony of Wellington did so with the full approbation of the Home Government?—No.

453. They wanted to found an independent State, did they not?—They did.

454. And the Home Government stepped in, and refused to allow them to do so?—They did.

455. Do you remember the grounds on which they refused to do so?—The Home Government explained that the plan was wholly illegal. The authors of it had a scheme for making the members of their society liable to the punishment of death; but the Home Government said that if they imposed the punishment of death, those who inflicted it would be liable to be hung themselves. The Home Government said it was not competent to a body of the Queen's subjects to go and found a new Colony in another part of the world, which would have the rights of a separate State.

456. The founders of the Colony were prepared at first to deal with the natives themselves?—They must have been prepared, for they went at their own risk.

457. They looked for no assistance from the Home Government?—No, they went solely at their own risk.

458. But the Home Government took from them their independence, and forced its Colony upon them?—The Home Government told them that it was not competent to them to set themselves up as a separate nation.

459. And since that time they have looked to the Home Government for their defences?—Yes. If they had been a separate nation, of course they would have cost our nation nothing.

460. *Chairman.*] I think you alluded to a Despatch from the Secretary of State, in which same future arrangements were spoken of with reference to the regiments?—I alluded to the contribution.

461. Has there been any despatch upon that subject, with reference to the Colony of New Zealand, which has not been laid before Parliament, a despatch bearing upon the subject, and propounding another arrangement for the future?—There have been some Despatches about the contribution.

462. Mr. *Adderley.*] Can you state the number of troops in New Zealand now?—I think the War Office would be better able to furnish that information.

463. *Chairman.*] Am I correct in supposing generally, with regard to these Colonial allowances, that the system has arisen from the liberality of some Colonies granting allowances to troops, which has led to the necessity of the Imperial Government granting similar allowances to others, in order to avoid jealousies. Am I correct in that view of the matter, as far as your official knowledge goes?—I strongly doubt that fact. I have been afraid to offer the evidence to the Committee lest my memory should deceive me; but I think it will be found on investigation that the idea of extra allowances originated with the Queen's Government. I have an impression that when living became so exceedingly dear, the officer in command of the troops thought that the forces might

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ought to have some extra allowance. If that be so, the Imperial Government would be merely acting on its own judgment in giving these allowances where the local funds do not contribute.

464. Mr. *Childers.*] As a matter of fact, in Colonies where the local funds do contribute, the Government has rarely expressed an opinion, I believe?—I suppose the Imperial Government are desirous that the troops should have the advantage of the liberality of the Colonial Government.

465. But they have not interfered?—They have not interfered; but it is within my knowledge that the authorities of the War Department have deliberated upon the question, whether in any of these places the allowances have been larger than have been necessary.

466. Mr. *Ellice.*] Could any officer having the command of any body of troops in the Colony receive any such allowance on behalf of the troops, without the direct authority of the Secretary at War?—Certainly not.

467. Mr. *Childers.*] But have they all, as a matter of fact, so received them in the Australian Colonies for many years?—Yes, with the knowledge and assent of their superior authorities at home.

468. Written assent?—That may be answered more certainly from the War Department. But I ought to add that these allowances have, I believe, varied in amount, and it is quite possible, therefore, that the principle being sanctioned, changes of amount may have taken place, and have been carried into effect before there was time for the formal sanction of them to arrive from England.

469. Mr. *Fortescue.*] They depend, do they not, in Australia, upon the annual votes of the Colonial Legislature?—Yes.

470. Mr. *Marsh.*] You have told us that some of the Colonies in Australia pay the entire cost for extra troops?—They do.

471. Does that entire cost include the pension which some of them may be entitled to afterwards?—No.

472. Does it include the cost of transport in every case?—No; generally it does not include the cost of transport.

473. Does it include the cost of the soldier whom the Government here has been paid for recruiting?—It does not.

474. Then the conclusion is, that although the Colonies of Australia pay for these troops, the Home Government is still at some considerable expense for them?—The Home Government is still at the expense of all those charges, which in the paper which has been laid before the Committee, I have ventured to class as indirect charges.

475. This is not the case with the Indian Government, I believe, the Indian Government pays the full cost in every way?—The Indian Government does; but it is a matter of extreme difficulty to settle what is the fair rate to charge the Indian Government, either in respect to pensions, or charges for recruiting, and depôts at home. To show what a difficult subject this must be, I may mention that, after a full discussion by the most competent authorities, they were of opinion that the rate which ought to be charged to the Indian Government for pensions, would be at the rate of about 4 *l.* per man. If, on the contrary, you take the rateable proportion by comparing the whole of the British army with the whole dead weight, the charge for pensions comes to nearly 14 *l.* per man, and that is the rate of charge against the Colonies which appears in the return now in the hands of the Committee.

476. General *Peel.*] The pay of all the troops in the Colony was originally charged in the Army Estimates?—Yes.

477. Then any payment from the Colony is a payment into the Treasury, and is not paid to the Secretary of State for War?—Certainly no payment whatever is made direct from the Colonial Government to the War Department. I should suppose that what takes place must be something like this: that some of the money granted by the Colonial Government goes at once to the military authorities there, and is touched by the officers and soldiers, and that the balance is paid into the military chest, and is brought to account in the British Treasury at home. The Army Estimates over here contain a statement of money received through the Treasury.

478. I will put it in another way: the regiments of the Colonies are included in the number of men voted by Parliament as forming the British establishment?—They are.

479. Those in India are not?—No.

480. Mr. *Ellice.*] Under Vote 11 there is no vote for troops in some of the Colonies?—I can say nothing about the details of the Army Estimates.

481. *Chairman.*] Now I will direct your attention to the South African Colonies: I find from the return presented to the Committee, that the total Imperial military expenditure in respect of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, during the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is stated at 479,599 *l.*?—That is correct.

482. I find also, that the total amount of Colonial contribution from the same Colony, is stated in the same return at 40,467 *l.*?—That is so; the gross total, therefore, is 520,066 *l.*

483. In the same return I find the total number of Imperial forces, including men of all arms and the staff, during the same period, is stated at 6,351?—That is so.

484. Is the German Legion included in that enumeration?—Yes.

485. What is the number of the German Legion now?—It was assumed for calculation, in that return for 1858, at 1,053.

486. Do you know whether the German Legion is now on full pay?—By a letter recently received, we learn that some of the German Legion have received full pay up to the 31st March 1861.

487. Do you know whether there has ever been a time when the German Legion was not on full pay?—There has been no time, so far as we know, when some of the German Legion have not been on full pay, but their numbers have been largely reduced in the last year.

488. You stated the total number of force in the Colony during the year for which the return was made, at 6,354: can you inform us of what that force consisted?—There were four European regiments of the line; there were also the Cape Mounted Rifles, a corps paid by Great Britain, numbering about 800, and artillery and engineers.

489. Do you include in those four European regiments the German Legion?—No, but it is included in the grand total in the return before the Committee.

490. What is the number of the German Legion, as given in that return?—One thousand and fifty-three.

491. *Chairman.*] I think that in one of the returns put in, it appears that there are 433 mounted police at the Cape: is that the only force in the Colony which is maintained at the cost of the Colony?—It is.

492. I suppose, under the title of Cape of Good Hope, Natal and British Kaffraria are included?—They are.

493. Can you give us the distribution of the forces in the South African Colonies?—The distribution of rank and file on the 1st January 1857, was as follows: Albany 981, Fort Beaufort 360, King William's Town 1,537, the Western District 81, and Natal 454; to those would have to be added the German Legion and the general staff.

494. Sir *George Grey.*] Where is the German Legion stationed?—In British Kaffraria.

495. *Chairman.*] Is the whole of the German Legion stationed there?—The whole of the German Legion supposed to be present in the Colony in the year of the return; some of them had gone to India.

496. Is Cape Town included in the Western District?—Yes.

497. I observe that, in your memorandum appended to the Report of 1859, you state that the force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, in 1859, is upwards of 10,000; and that, exclusive of all home charges and the cost of transport, the military expenditure of that year was about two-thirds of a million sterling: is that correct?—It is correct.

498. You stated also that the imports and exports of the Cape of Good Hope represented respectively 1-22d and 1-25th of those of all the other British Colonies, and that that Colony absorbed more than one-fifth of the whole force allotted to the Colonies, and costs more than one-fourth of the whole direct military expenditure. Are you aware of any material changes in that respect since that time?—The force has certainly been much reduced.

499. Can you say how long the German Legion has been at the Cape?—It arrived at the Cape about the beginning of 1857.

500. Can you state what has been the total cost of that force to this country since it was ordered to the Cape?—The German Legion left this country in

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the latter portion of 1856, and reached the Cape of Good Hope in the beginning of 1857; the number of men was about 2,300, with a few hundred women. For the year ending 31st March 1858, the sum of money voted by Parliament was 92,792*l.*; for the year ending 31st March 1859, 30,947*l.*; for the year ending March 1860, 18,133*l.*; for the year ending March 1861, the same sum of 18,133*l.* There was provided for in the army accounts of 1860; as excess of expenditure, in the year ending 31st March 1859, a sum of 7,537*l.* The total of those figures is about 167,544*l.* This is exclusive of the cost of transport, estimated at about 31,000*l.*

501. Sir *George Grey.*] Did that first year's expenditure include the cost of transport?—It did not; I have just given an estimate of it at 12*l.* a head, for the soldiers and their wives.

502. General *Peel.*] Can you state the conditions under which that Legion went to the Cape of Good Hope?—There was a letter written from the Colonial Department to the Treasury on the 4th of February 1859, which entered very fully into all the motives that led to sending out the German Legion, and into all the subsequent transactions in the Colony. If it should be the pleasure of the Committee I could hand in a copy of that letter, which would give a narrative of all the circumstance up to that date.

503. Mr. *Adderley.*] Does this item which you have given us for 1858, 1859, and 1860, for the first time cease to appear in the Estimates of this year?—The last vote taken was for the year ending March 1861.

504. There is no such item in the estimates for this year?—There is no such item in the estimates for the year ending March 1862.

505. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have you seen the last despatches from the Cape, which stated that all the German Legion would be finally disposed of on the 1st of April in this year?—I have.

506. After the 1st of April in this year, there will be no further sum chargeable on their account?—No.

507. General *Peel.*] Then they are not on full pay at this moment?—The last despatch stated that by the 31st of March 1861 they would all have ceased to be on full pay.

508. *Chairman.*] Can you give us any official information at all about the gross cost to this country of the Kafir wars?—I am sorry to say that no exact figure can be attained; I have looked carefully back to the old debates upon the Kafir wars, and I have seen very round numbers stated roughly, but I have never seen any clear account published; sometimes speakers state that the Kafir war cost one million, and sometimes two millions, but one figure may be worth mentioning: in a very elaborate speech which was made by Sir William Molesworth in Parliament in 1852, he calculated that the expense to this country of the Cape, on an average of three years ending 1850, had been about half a million a year; I have made similar calculations, and I find we have spent, as nearly as possible, half a million a year in the years just over; and that is without a Kafir war.

509. Can you give the Committee any information as to the extent of the frontier line of our South African Colonies?—It is very difficult to say, because, for practical purposes, we ought not to take the whole frontier line of the Colony, but only the frontier line of those parts where the Kafirs are numerous and warlike; the frontier line of defence is that about Kaffraria.

510. My question is, what, in round numbers, is the whole of the frontier line of our South African Colonies?—The inland frontier line of the Cape Colony must be 1000 miles, but it is only along a very limited portion of it that it is contiguous with powerful Native tribes.

511. Sir *George Grey.*] You gave the amount of force at the Cape of Good Hope in 1859, as 6,351, including the 1,000 the German Legion, which has since ceased to exist as a military force; can you state what the present military force is at the Cape?—The total rank and file on the 1st of January 1861, was 4,107.

512. Would that be liable to be reduced by the number of the German Legion then under arms, and which ceased to exist as a military body on the 31st of March 1861?—No, I do not think that it would be reduced, because I quote from the usual military monthly returns, and these do not include the German Legion.

513. Mr. *Fortescue.*] That number includes the Colony of Natal?—It does.

514. Sir

514. Sir *George Grey*.] Then there has been considerable reduction in the military force at the Cape since 1859?—Yes.

515. The aggregate amount of force in the return before us is 6,351; do you know what the aggregate amount was on the 1st of January 1861?—The amount of rank and file was about 4,000.

516. You cannot compare the total amount of the force now with what it was in 1859?—I have not the means of making the comparison quite accurately, because the latest return I have with me is only of rank and file.

517. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Can you compare the total force now with the force as given in the report of the departmental committee?—There has been a very large diminution since the departmental report in 1859.

518. Can you give us, roughly, the extent of the diminution?—In the year ending March 1858 the whole strength was returned at 10,759; in the year ending March 1859 the same description of force is returned at 6,351; that is a reduction of upwards of 4,000 men.

519. Sir *George Grey*.] I understood you to say that the 6,351 included about 1,000 men of the German Legion, who are not borne on the military strength of the country?—Yes, so that the total force has been further reduced by the amount of the German Legion.

520. Are you aware of any further reduction?—I am not.

521. Mr. *Adderley*.] To what species of force was the 40,000 contributed by the Colony?—To the Cape Mounted Police.

522. Where is that stationed?—In the frontier districts.

523. It is a frontier police to all intents and purposes?—Yes.

524. Is any force from England employed in the same service?—A large part of the force sent from England is employed on the frontier.

525. It appears that a very small part of the troops are employed in Cape Town?—Very small.

526. You say that upon the whole western district, including Cape Town, there are only 81?—Only 81.

527. So that, in fact, the half million spent by the Imperial Treasury is spent upon 6,000 troops in South Africa, who are almost entirely employed as a frontier police against the native tribes?—It is a force to prevent the incursions of the Kafirs.

528. Is there any reason why the Cape should not pay more that one-tenth of the expense of the police stationed along their own frontier?—That is a question which I, myself, proposed at another time and in another place; but I am not qualified to answer it.

529. Has there been any correspondence between the Home Government and the Cape Government, with reference to the reduction of the number of the Imperial troops employed as a frontier police in South Africa?—I believe the propriety of a reduction of military expenditure has been much enjoined, and we see by the facts just elicited, that the amount of force has been considerably reduced in the last three or four years; in recent despatches, I have seen suggestions of the Governor, for some additional reduction of expenditure.

530. For the Imperial troops in South Africa, the Colony does not pay one farthing, does it?—Nothing.

531. Of any sort or kind?—It pays nothing, except that quite recently they have voted a sum of 10,000*l*. towards the extra allowances to the Queen's troops, which have been so much noticed by the Committee in its examination.

532. When did they make that offer?—We learn it by some of the latest accounts.

533. Was there not extra pay before that?—Yes, which this country pays; the grant from the Colony will be in abatement of the cost to the Imperial Treasury of the extra pay.

534. With that exception, this body of troops, that costs nearly half a million a year, is employed on the frontiers of South Africa entirely at the cost of the Imperial Treasury?—It is.

535. Who determines the number of troops required in South Africa? Is it done by application from the Colony, or is it settled without any such application, upon the judgment of the authorities at home?—I apprehend that the amount of force sent into the Colony depends upon the judgment of Her

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Majesty's Government; and I presume that Her Majesty's Ministers at the head of the department concerned determine that amongst themselves.

536. The Colonial Government is not consulted as to the number of troops required for the Colony?—It is not consulted, except where there is a question of contribution.

537. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean that the Government at home sends out a number of troops without any communication with the local Government as to the number required, and as to the circumstances of the Colony?—I did not say that.

538. Mr. *Adderley.*] Irrespective of any Kafir rebellion, or danger of foreign forces, is the permanent establishment of troops in South Africa determined by the home authorities, or are the troops applied for by the Colonial authorities?—We have not periodically and annually a statement from any Colony that they want a certain number of troops; but before the Army Estimates are framed, I suppose the Government considers all the intelligence in its possession and determines the force required.

539. Without any intimation from the Colony from year to year?—Without any precise, or any annual, intimation of a particular number of troops. Of course, it is the duty of the Government to take advantage of all the general information which it receives.

540. In no instance does the Colonial Government state the number of troops required by the Colony?—I have not seen that it is the custom of the Colonies to make specific requisitions from time to time for the number of troops they require.

541. I suppose it is done in the way you stated the other day, that four companies were sent to an Australian Colony?—Yes; that was a judgment formed on the state of things at the time.

542. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] You alluded to some despatches received from the Cape a few days ago?—Yes.

543. In those, was not the distribution of the force fully entered into?—It was.

544. And suggestions made for a reduction?—Yes.

545. That would be essential information received from the Colony, as to the amount of force?—Precisely so; what I meant to say was, that the Government is daily in receipt of information from all parts of the world, and I suppose that when it makes up its mind what force it requires, it uses all the information it has received.

546. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Has not the Governor been in the habit of constantly reporting the condition of the Kafir tribes upon the frontier, and the amount of danger which from time to time he has apprehended from them?—He has.

547. Has it not been on the ground of the apprehension of danger from formidable native tribes beyond the frontier, that the Governor has constantly pressed for the presence of a certain number of troops?—Yes.

548. You would not say, then, that he has asked for those troops for the purposes of police?—No, I should say it was to prevent incursions of the Kafirs.

549. As the means of defence against formidable foreign enemies?—Against native tribes living beyond the British territory.

550. Do you understand that the greater part of the military force is required for defence against British subjects or against foreigners?—For defence against warlike natives, who are not British subjects.

551. Is it not the case, that in the western part of the Colony, where there are no formidable native tribes either within or without the frontier, the military force has been very small indeed?—It is.

552. Are you aware, that during the Indian mutiny, almost the entire defence of Cape Town was assumed by its inhabitants?—Yes.

553. Has there been of late years, any formidable danger apprehended from the native tribes upon the English frontier?—Yes; more than once, considerable apprehensions have been expressed of disturbances from the Kafirs.

554. There have been more than once, I believe, urgent representations from the Governor of the Cape, of danger impending from the native tribes beyond the frontier?—There have.

555. Mr. *Adderley.*] In the earlier Colonies of America, were troops ever sent out

out to contend for them with native tribes?—No, they were not; the war was carried on in a manner which would not be regarded with much favour in modern days.

556. Do you suppose that troops are sent from England to Cape Town in consequence of the feeling of the English against the mode in which the Colony itself would put down the natives?—I believe that if you left the Colonists to themselves they would carry on the war in a manner with which England would wish to interfere; and if so, the Colonists might say that in that case England ought to defend them.

557. You allude to the old commando system of the Dutch settlers?—Yes.

558. That was superseded by England undertaking the control of the Kafir tribes by Imperial troops?—Yes.

559. Since England has assumed that function has the commando system ceased?—I am not aware of its being kept alive.

560. Was it effectual or not against the Kafir tribes when it was in full force?—That is a matter of opinion on which a great deal of discussion has existed.

561. Did it succeed in keeping the Kafirs in check?—The Colonists had the best of it.

562. There were no Kafir wars of any duration?—There were Kafir wars, but we did not pay for them.

563. Nor did they last so long, nor were they so frequent?—I am hardly sufficiently well acquainted with the history of the Cape at that time to answer. I think, probably, that when the defence was left in the hands of the Colonists they had small but constant hostilities.

564. The undertaking of Kafir wars by British troops led to an enormous expenditure of English money?—It did.

565. Mr. *Childers*.] The Government of the Cape is not, I believe, what is called a responsible Government?—It is not.

566. The Governor's advisers are not the representatives of the people?—They are not.

567. Lord *R. Cecil*.] Has the Cape Colony ever asked for a responsible Government?—I do not think they have ever strongly applied for it.

568. Is it not the case that the frontiers have been altered in recent years?—Yes, enlarged.

569. And also diminished?—We have enlarged our territory on the whole.

570. Have we not also diminished that territory by ceding the Orange River territory?—We have.

571. Have not complaints been made by the Colony that probably that had had a strategical effect in weakening the frontier of the Colony?—I do not know.

572. Is it not within your knowledge that the Governor has so complained?—I believe that the present Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, is very favourable to an extensive British territory, and to the policy of what is called federation in South Africa.

573. He has stated his opinion, has he not, that such a policy would lead to a diminution of Imperial expenditure?—I know he has advocated the policy, and I dare say he has used that argument.

574. Has any danger been apprehended within the last two or three years from the different Dutch republics?—There has been some uneasiness on the subject.

575. That republic took its rise, I believe, in consequence of the English policy on the subject of slavery?—Yes, the Dutch boers emigrated from the Cape Colony on account of their dislike of the English policy on the subject of slavery.

576. You say, I think, that the only danger exists on the side of Kaffraria from native tribes; does not Moshesh lie outside the territory of Kaffraria?—Certainly, what I meant to say was, that the whole length of the frontier ought not to be considered as requiring defence, but I did not mean that only Kaffraria, in its strict sense, was a point needing protection.

577. Mr. *Fortescue*.] The northern frontier of the Colony is, I believe, generally desert and uninhabited?—Yes.

578. On the north eastern and eastern frontiers, you have the great tribes of the Basoutos and Kafirs?—Yes.

579. Mr. *Baxter*.] In any of these despatches, have the Colonies been asked to

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to contribute a larger proportion to the expenditure than 40,000 *l.*?—The only correspondence I have seen, has been upon the subject of extra allowances.

580. Has there not been a correspondence between the Government at home and the Government at the Cape with regard to the diminution of the forces?—Yes.

581. Was no reference made in that correspondence to the smallness of the contribution by the Cape, and that if it were not increased the military force would be reduced?—I do not remember seeing that topic used.

582. In point of fact, the Government of the Cape has never been urged by the Imperial Government to contribute a larger proportion towards their own military expenditure?—I think probably not, but the Government at home is obliged to make its applications with reference to the prospect of success, and if it were perfectly certain to meet with a refusal it would hardly make a fruitless application.

583. Do you say that these Colonies who have no British troops defending Cape Town would be disinclined to make a larger contribution than 40,000 *l.*?—I am not competent to speak for the people of the Cape of Good Hope, but I believe there would be a great deal of difficulty in getting any larger contribution from them.

584. Mr. *Adderley.*] Did not Lord Grey say that if they did not comply, the troops would be withdrawn?—That was in the case of New South Wales. Lord Grey was communicating with a Colony which had an earnest desire for troops, and an abundant revenue.

585. But when Lord Grey proposed a reduction of troops, and that they should pay a larger proportion, did he not say if they did not comply troops would be withdrawn?—He did.

586. *Chairman.*] Have you any knowledge of the state of feeling or of the opinions of the South African Colonists, any more than any Member of the Committee?—I have not.

587. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Although the Cape of Good Hope does not possess the system of responsible Government, it possesses a popular legislature, does it not?—It possesses a representative legislature.

588. By which alone any votes of money can be granted?—Yes.

589. Mr. *Baxter.*] Are you quite sure no representation has been made upon the subject of contribution by the Government at home, or do you only at present not recollect any such passages in the despatches from the Colonial Office?—I speak from recollection, but a confident recollection.

590. Mr. *Adderley.*] Besides the expense borne by England of the transport of troops is not an annual vote made by Parliament for the civilisation of the Kafir tribes?—There is.

591. Is that continued?—It is.

592. What does it amount to?—The votes for the civilisation of the Kafir tribes from the beginning up to this time have been 222,000 *l.* The sums voted or proposed to be voted have been as follows: for the year ending 31st March 1856, 40,000 *l.*; 1857, 40,000 *l.*; 1858, 40,000 *l.*; 1859, 20,000 *l.*; 1860, 40,000 *l.*; 1861, 27,000 *l.*; 1862, 15,000 *l.*, producing a total of 222,000 *l.*

593. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] You have spoken of the military expenditure as that of a peace establishment; but of late, I believe, the expenditure of the Cape has not been regarded as that of a peace establishment, but of a military establishment to ward off a Kafir war?—It has.

594. Mr. *Fortescue.*] When did the last Kafir war come to an end?—The war which began in 1851 ceased in March 1853.

595. That was the last of several sanguinary and expensive wars?—It was.

596. Which cost this country a great deal of blood and money?—Yes.

597. Within the few years that have elapsed since the termination of the war, have there not been frequent apprehensions of its renewal?—Frequent apprehensions to that effect have been expressed in the Colony.

598. Great excitement has on several occasions, I believe, prevailed among the Kafir tribes?—Yes.

599. That danger then, at all events, has been warded off by the system pursued?—So it appears.

600. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you know the amount of force sent from the Cape to India during the Indian Mutiny?—Between August 1857 and October 1858, the Governor of the Cape dispatched to India 7,026 officers and men of

the Queen's Army, besides 1,058 of the German Legion, making a total of 8,084.

601. Mr. *Marsh.*] You say that the Dutch emigrated in consequence of our views upon the question of slavery. Had our views with regard to the protection of the aborigines anything to do with the Dutch emigration?—They may possibly have been discontented with our views upon that subject; but I think that greater influence is attributed to our policy upon the slavery question.

602. The other may have had something to do with it?—Very probably.

603. We have heard something of the commando system. The Colonists, I believe, used to go and attack the Kafirs in an irregular way?—They did.

604. That was prevented by the Home Government?—Yes.

605. Was that in consequence of the views taken by the Aborigines Protection Society?—I cannot undertake to say what were the motives for the policy adopted by the Government.

606. Was it after certain views had been stated by the Aborigines Protection Society?—It was after that date.

607. Do you consider that the troops sent to the Cape are provided in order to protect the Kafirs as well as to protect the Colonists from the Kafirs?—The policy alluded to, admits of being described in those terms.

608. To protect the Kafirs as well as the Colonists?—I would rather say it is meant to protect the Colonists without putting them under the necessity of resorting to any barbarous mode of warfare against the Kafirs.

609. Has the commando system of late been in existence in a milder form, in the way of cattle stealing by Europeans?—I do not know of any instances.

610. Are you aware of a despatch in which the Governor states that in some instances the Europeans had rather the best of the bargain?—I have forgotten the despatch, if I ever saw it.

611. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Must that be an isolated case?—Most certainly; cattle stealing is not a general practice on the part of the Europeans.

612. Mr. *Childers.*] Do you know, in round numbers, the Colonial revenue of the Cape?—The Colonial revenue of the Cape in 1858, was 463,000*l.*

613. Is that the latest account that you have?—There may be later accounts in the Colonial Office; I have read the latest that I have with me.

614. That includes all the local revenues?—That includes all the local revenue.

615. *Chairman.*] Taking the Colonies in the order in which they are given in the return, and also in the departmental report, I come next to Bermuda, and I find that the Imperial expenditure for Bermuda, exclusive of transport, during the year ending the 31st March 1859, was 79,973 *l.*?—That is correct.

616. I believe there is no contribution from colonial resources?—There is no contribution from colonial resources.

617. There never has been any, I presume?—There never has been any.

618. The total number of troops, including infantry, artillery, engineers, and staff, for the same time, is given in the return at 1,201?—Yes.

619. What is the population of Bermuda, distinguishing the Europeans, the troops, and the convicts?—In 1858, the population of Bermuda consisted of 4,569 whites, 6,413 coloured people, and 1,000 convicts; making a total of 11,982.

620. For how many years has Bermuda been a convict settlement?—The first convicts went out in 1823.

621. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you not consider Bermuda rather as an important naval and military station, than as a Colony?—I do.

622. When you say it is a convict settlement, is it not the case that the convicts were sent out, not to settle there after their punishment had expired, but as they are sent to Portsmouth, Chatham, and Gibraltar, to execute public works going on for the fortification of Bermuda?—Yes.

623. Mr. *Marsh.*] Supposing that there was no Bermuda, do you not think that we should keep a greater number of ships there to protect our vast commerce with America and the West Indies?—I do not know whether in time of peace we should do so, but in time of war the possession of Bermuda would be equivalent to a powerful fleet.

624. *Chairman.*] Bermuda is the head-quarters of the North American and West Indian naval stations?—It is the place to which the admiral goes in the cold season.

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625. Halifax is the head quarters of the station, is it not?—The admiral spends a part of the year at Halifax and a part at Bermuda.

626. Sir *George Grey.*] Is there not a dockyard at Bermuda?—There is.

627. *Chairman.*] There are very extensive fortifications there, are there not?—There are.

628. And they have been at various times altered?—Works have been in progress for many years, and they are still in progress.

629. In fact, it is not a colony at all?—It is, in our modern sense, because we have the habit now of giving the name of Colony to every dependency abroad.

630. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] In the Estimates do you make that distinction between a military and a colonial dependency?—No, we do not make any distinction.

631. They all appear under the head of "Colony"?—They do.

632. Do you not think that that gives a general impression that our colonial expenditure is larger than, properly speaking, it is?—It would give that impression if it were not that so few, if any, military posts appear in the Civil Estimates; the Mediterranean garrisons do not appear in the Civil Estimates at all.

633. Sir *George Grey.*] How is the civil expenditure of Bermuda defrayed?—Almost entirely by the Colony; but there is a small annual grant for the salary of the Governor and Secretary and one or two other functionaries.

634. What is the revenue of Bermuda?—£. 9,800.

635. *Chairman.*] The next Colony in the Return is the Bahamas, and I find that the total cost for the Imperial troops for the year ending 31 March 1859, exclusive of transport, was 33,003*l.*?—Yes.

636. Of course there is no contribution from the Colony itself?—There is not.

637. And the total number of troops in the Bahamas at the same time, I find, was 449, including the staff?—That is correct.

638. What did they consist of?—With the exception of a very small party of artillery, these troops consist of a detachment of a West India regiment, of which the head quarters are at Jamaica; they are black troops.

639. In the memorandum appended to the departmental report, you allude to certain works which were then in contemplation at the Bahamas: have those works been carried out?—They have not. I submitted that although the situation of these islands was important, it was important on the water, and not on the land.

640. It is stated in your memorandum that it was proposed to expend 85,000 *l.* on the works at New Providence, in the Bahamas?—It was.

641. And you state in your memorandum that the object of that expenditure was to plant 120 guns, and to detain at a remote place a company of artillery, and a whole regiment of infantry, in order to watch over a narrow basin obstructed by a bar?—I made that statement. I acknowledge that it seemed to me that the expenditure was quite disproportionate to the object.

642. That has been abandoned?—It has.

643. Perhaps it will be convenient now to ask you a question arising out of your memorandum. You state, I observe, and it is in speaking of these fortifications at the Bahamas, that the Government offices are at the present moment full of such projects. Perhaps you will mention now one or more of such projects as those you allude to there for fortifications?—When the Italian war broke out in Europe the Colonial Governments were asked what their resources were for defence; that, I believe, produced a great deal of excitement among them; and they were very fertile in projects of military expenditure. I may mention one very large scheme of expenditure in fortifications: it was at the Island of Mauritius, I believe, that the cost of those works would approach 300,000 *l.*

644. There was also, I believe, a project for constructing barracks at the Cape?—Yes. The Cape also projected the erection of very extensive batteries; and it seemed to me that it could in no possible way add to the strength of Great Britain in a European war to erect works which would lock up a large force of artillery and four regiments of the line at the furthest extremity of South Africa.

645. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Could they not be maintained by Colonial volunteers?—If

—If they were competent for the service of large guns. My opinion was founded upon the report of competent military authorities, who said that this amount of Imperial force would be requisite. The only Colonial force at that time were the Mounted Police.

646. Mr. *Marsh.*] Is the military possession of the Bahamas of great consequence in time of war?—They do not contain any very good harbours for large ships of war.

647. Mr. *Fortescue.*] They may come under the same class of dependencies as the West India Islands?—Yes.

648. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Except as a strategical station, have they any importance?—No importance in any other point of view; but although of no great use to large vessels of war, they might be inconvenient to us as stations for privateers if they belonged to another country.

649. Sir *George Grey.*] Are you aware of a recent occurrence on which a ship with slaves on board touched there, and insisted on obtaining provisions, in consequence of which some ships of war were ordered there?—I have heard something of it.

650. *Chairman.*] The next dependency in the return is St. Helena; and I observe that the total cost is given; the return for the year ending 31st March 1859, is given as 35,447*l.*, exclusive of transport?—That is the amount of Imperial cost.

651. I observe that the amount of Colonial contribution is 453*l.*?—That is so.

652. Can you tell the Committee to what purpose that is applied?—It is for the local militia.

653. Sir *George Grey.*] What does the force of 426 infantry consist of?—The force consists of the St. Helena Regiment; it is a corps recruited in England, chiefly from volunteers from regiments of the line, to serve at St. Helena for a limited time.

654. The corps is stationary?—It is stationary; the men only serve there for a limited time. Men of that class are averse to being indefinitely shut up in small and remote islands; they have no objection to go to St. Helena for a few years, but recruits could not be obtained except upon the condition that they were at the end of that time to serve in the army elsewhere.

655. They are transferred to some other regiment?—Yes.

656. *Chairman.*] Are the St. Helena corps on the same footing as the West India regiments?—The officers at St. Helena are borne on the strength of the army.

657. Sir *George Grey.*] As a regiment there is no expense for transport?—The regiment is not moved bodily: the individual soldiers have to be sent out and taken away.

658. You consider that St. Helena is a military dependency and is not a colony, in the sense of being a place for the settlement of Englishmen?—I do.

659. It stands on the same footing as the Mediterranean stations?—The importance of St. Helena is that it lies in the direct homeward track of all ships returning by way of the Cape of Good Hope.

660. You consider that one of the objects is to protect the course of our trade?—It is.

661. Mr. *Marsh.*] One of the objects of the Cape Colony, you consider, is to protect our trade?—That is one of the objects of the Cape, among many others.

662. *Chairman.*] The Falkland Islands appear next in the return. The total Imperial military expenditure given for the Falkland Islands for the year ending 21st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is 1,744*l.*?—Yes.

663. There is no Colonial contribution?—There is not.

664. The total number of troops is stated to be 37?—Yes.

665. Is there a local corps?—They form what is called a garrison company; they are soldiers, I believe, who go specially to serve their time at the Falklands and be discharged there. The force consists of one officer and of a force of about 36 married men, selected for good conduct, and of not less than 15 years' service.

666. They are Englishmen, of course?—They are.

667. Mr. *Adderley.*] What do you consider the importance of that position?—Several years ago, but within my recollection, the Falklands were occupied chiefly

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chiefly at the instance of the Board of Admiralty of that time; and the Colonial Board of Land and Emigration, of which I was then a member, rather deprecated the occupation of those islands, thinking it might entail useless expense.

668. In what year was that?—In 1841. The Admiralty thought that as so large a trade came home by the way of Cape Horn (and since that time the gold fields have been discovered), it might be important to have a small British establishment there, to prevent its being turned to bad uses by other parties.

669. It is a naval station in the line of trade?—Yes.

670. *Chairman.*] Jamaica is the next dependency appearing in the return. The total military expenditure, excluding transport, for the year ending 31st March 1859, is given at 113,949*l.*?—Yes.

671. And the total Colonial contribution is given at 182*l.*?—Yes.

672. In the return it is stated that 182*l.* is spent in the custody of arms and stores?—Yes, belonging to the local militia.

673. It is no contribution towards the pay of troops?—Certainly not.

674. The number of men of all ranks is stated in the return at 1,568, including the staff?—Yes.

675. What does the force consist of?—The infantry consists of one British regiment of the line, and some West India regiments or parts of West India regiments; there are about 180 of them distributed between Kingstown, Port Royal, and Spanish Town; about 240 are in camp, and at the last return 500 at Newcastle; that is, doubtless, the British regiment at the healthy station; and 16 men detached.

676. Can you state where the West India regiments are now recruited?—Chiefly in the West India Islands. Formerly the West India regiments were recruited exclusively from liberated Africans, that is to say, negroes captured in slave vessels taken to Sierra Leone. After their release, becoming at the disposal of the Crown, those men were made into soldiers, and I am told that they were exceedingly docile and obedient, and particularly trustworthy in the West Indies. The slaves generally belonged to tribes different from the African tribes who furnish the creole negroes. When the slave trade was much reduced, there were no longer any liberated Africans from whom to recruit, and then the regiments were recruited in the islands themselves.

677. Sir *George Grey.*] How long is it since no contribution was made by Jamaica towards the Colonial military expenditure; some years ago did not Jamaica pay a considerable proportion of the military expenses?—That is the case. They used to grant what was called island subsistence, and to provide barracks.

678. Was it not a considerable sum which Jamaica contributed towards the military expenses?—Yes; Jamaica contributed towards the maintenance of the Imperial troops for, I should think, fully a century.

679. And a considerable sum?—A considerable sum.

680. Can you inform the Committee when that ceased?—In 1845, but a British regiment was at the same time withdrawn with the express purpose of not suffering any increase of expense to this country by the change.

681. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Jamaica has been for several years in a state of very great financial depression, has she not?—She has.

682. From which she is only now beginning to recover?—Yes.

683. *Chairman.*] Have you any means of knowing that Jamaica is beginning to recover from her financial depression?—I know it only from the general tenor of the reports.

684. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you consider that that financial depression was the cause of their ceasing to make contribution?—I do.

685. *Chairman.*] Honduras is the next Colony stated in the return; I find that the total Imperial expenditure upon the troops, for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is given at 29,609*l.*?—It is.

686. Honduras, I believe, contributes nothing?—Nothing.

687. And never has done?—And never has done.

688. What is the total number of troops in Honduras?—The total number of rank and file of all arms and ranks is 413, including the staff.

689. Where is the infantry?—There are 230 at Honduras and about 100 at the Bay Islands.

690. Are they black troops?—Yes.

691. I believe the Governor of Jamaica is also Governor of Honduras, is he not?—

not?—Yes; he corresponds with Honduras and forwards to the Colonial Department the reports of the superintendent of that settlement. *T. F. Elliot*, Esq. 22 April 1861.

692. Mr. *Marsh.*] Could the black troops be depended upon to defend the Colony against an European power?—In the case of all these garrisons, the object is rather mixed; in case either of war or of serious disturbances the troops would be available.

693. Against any European power they would not be so valuable?—I understand that they are obedient men and brave troops.

694. Is Honduras a colony now or only a settlement?—We still call it only a settlement.

695. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that the black troops could be relied upon in case of a revolt of blacks?—Of revolt, in the ordinary sense, there is no danger. The blacks, both civil and military, are very loyal. In case of commotions, I believe that the black troops could be relied upon. This has been fully discussed, and we have received able reports on both sides within the last few months. These men contract the feeling of soldiers, and become attached to their officers, if well managed.

696. *Chairman.*] Are there any returns in your department, or have any been presented to Parliament recently, giving, for a series of years, the percentage of military mortality in the West Indies?—I believe that the War Department have valuable returns on the subject.

697. The Windward and Leeward Islands, including British Guiana, appear next in the return. The total Imperial military expenditure for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is given at 196,300 *l.*?—Yes.

698. And the total Colonial contribution is given in the return at 32,481 *l.*?—Yes.

699. Can you state to what purpose that contribution is applied?—Yes, a large portion of it consists of an annual expenditure in the Colony of British Guiana, on what they call sea defences; I believe they are embankments to protect the forts and barracks from the sea.

700. I observe in the return, that there are stated to be militia and volunteers; does any portion of that expenditure of 32,481 *l.* apply to the cost of militia and volunteers?—A small portion.

701. Have you any information as to the numbers in the Windward and Leeward Islands?—We have a return of about 530 militia and volunteers in British Guiana, and we have reason to believe that there are some small numbers of militia in some of the islands.

702. Will you give us the distribution of the troops in the Windward and Leeward Islands?—On the 1st January 1859 there were at Barbadoes, 1,176; St. Lucia, 181; Trinidad, 295; Antigua, 100; Guiana, 435; giving a total of 2,187. They are chiefly black troops.

703. Have you any returns stating where the troops in British Guiana are, whether they are all at George Town or dispersed in the Colony?—In Demerara 348, and 87 in Berbice.

704. State in which of the Windward and Leeward Islands, if any, there are fortifications?—That is a question that could be best answered by the War Department.

705. Do you know whether those fortifications are the property of the Colonial or of the Imperial Government?—In the West Indies they are the property of the Imperial Government, and were built at the expense of Great Britain.

706. Sir *George Grey.*] I see, in these returns, for the year ending 31st March 1859, that there is a sum of 10,746 *l.* for barracks in the Windward and Leeward Islands. I presume that is not an annually recurring sum?—That must have been an exceptional year, because, by the return for the year ending March 1858, contained in the Departmental Report, the total amount for barracks and forts, both included in the previous year, was not above 5,000 *l.*

707. Mr. *Adderley.*] Is there any extra pay in these islands?—There are some small allowances to commissioned officers in Guiana, but there is no extra pay to the troops generally.

708. Mr. *Baring.*] Is there anything in the Army Estimates this year for barracks in the Windward and Leeward Islands?—Only a very trifling sum.

709. Sir *George Grey.*] I observe that in the same year a sum is entered of 5,562 *l.*

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5,562 *l.* for barracks in Jamaica; that, I presume, stands upon the same footing as the sum charged for barracks in the Windward and Leeward Islands?—It must have been for a special service.

710. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are these payments to commissioned officers made by the Colony, or by the Home Government?—By the Colony.

711. Can you state from which of these islands the Colonial contribution of 32,000 *l.* chiefly comes?—Chiefly from British Guiana.

712. Does any portion of that come from Barbadoes?—No.

713. *Chairman.*] Is there any correspondence between the Colonial Department and the Government of British Guiana on the subject of Imperial expenditure?—No material correspondence that I know of.

714. The next dependency in the return is Ceylon. It appears that the total Imperial military expenditure in Ceylon for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, was 119,728 *l.*?—Yes.

715. And the Colonial contribution is stated at 85,851 *l.*?—Yes.

716. What was the total number of Imperial troops in Ceylon during the same period, including the staff?—2,470.

717. What is the position of the force?—At the last return I have seen, the force was composed of one regiment of the line, and of the Ceylon regiment, which is about 1,100 strong.

718. Sir *George Grey.*] I see that the sum of 85,851*l.* is put down as the total Colonial military expenditure for Ceylon; there is a memorandum also that the sum of 24,000*l.* is received annually from Ceylon in aid of the total military expenditure; is that included in the 85,851*l.* or is it in addition to it?—It is included in it: by an arrangement made in 1837, Ceylon contributes a fixed sum of 24,000*l.* a year towards the British military expenditure; the Colony also pays certain local allowances to the troops, and incurs an outlay for rations and likewise for forts and buildings, of which the effect has been to raise its expenditure, in the year under the notice of the Committee, to 85,000*l.*

719. Mr. *Adderley.*] If Ceylon were annexed to India, it would, according to our relations with India, have to pay the whole of its expenses?—It would.

720. Sir *George Grey.*] That is, the Indian revenue would have to pay; you do not mean that the expense would be charged exclusively on the revenues of Ceylon?—No, I do not mean that; the Indian Government would have to provide the revenue from whatever source it thought proper.

721-2. Mr. *Adderley.*] I presume that if Ceylon were a part of the Indian Empire it would bear its full share of the taxes of the country?—If it were annexed to the Indian Empire it would, of course, pay its proper share of taxation towards the expenses of the Indian Government; and it is the case that whilst it is a dependency of Great Britain it contributes the large sum I have mentioned, but does not defray its whole military expenditure.

723. Probably it pays less than half the sum that it would have to pay as a portion of the Indian Empire?—It pays less than one-half of the whole military expenditure under the present arrangements.

724. Mr. *Baring.*] Are you aware whether the different presidencies in India, such as Burmah and Singapore, pay their actual proportion of the whole military expenditure?—I have no official information on the subject, but I suppose that those smaller governments cannot pay in proportion.

725. The contribution paid by Ceylon towards the military expenditure of the Indian Empire would depend upon the arrangements which might be made by the Indian Government?—It would.

726. *Chairman.*] It appears by the return that the total Imperial military expenditure for Mauritius for the year ending the 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport was 72,247 *l.*?—Yes.

727. And the total Colonial expenditure towards its defences is given at 22,642 *l.*?—Yes.

728. What is the total number of troops?—959, including the staff.

729. That must have been for one British regiment?—Yes.

730. Sir *George Grey.*] Besides artillery and engineers?—Besides artillery and engineers.

731. *Chairman.*] The return states that at Labuan there are no Queen's troops, but that the cost repaid to the late East India Company for the force maintained at Labuan was 6,897 *l.*?—Yes.

732. Sir *George Grey.*] Is that an annual payment?—Yes, the expense continues, although for a lesser amount; there used to be between 130 and 140 sepoys, but they are now reduced to 100.

733. *Chairman.*] Labuan contributes nothing to its expenditure; I believe?—Nothing.

734. For Sierra Leone the total Imperial military expenditure for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is given at 26,158 *l.*?—Yes.

735. What was the total colonial contribution?—£. 385; the force amounted to 372.

736. Sir *George Grey.*] Is that, with the exception of the staff, wholly a black force?—It is wholly a black force.

737. Does that always stay at Sierra Leone, or is it exchanged with the black force in the West Indies?—It is exchanged with the black force; in fact, it consists of detachments of West India regiments.

738. *Chairman.*] For Gambia the total Imperial military expenditure for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is given at 26,729 *l.*, and the colonial contribution 160 *l.*, the strength being 360?—Yes; and the force is composed in the same manner as that at Sierra Leone.

739. For the Gold Coast the total military expenditure in the same year was 16,348 *l.*, the local military expenditure 330 *l.*, and the strength 298?—Yes; but at the Gold Coast there is a force called the Gold Coast Corps, which is recruited on the spot, but officered by Englishmen.

740. Sir *George Grey.*] Is that a stationary force?—It is.

741. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is that a force of artillery?—Yes.

742. Mr. *Adderley.*] I observe a decrease in all the items of expenditure relating to Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast, since 1858: what is the cause of that decrease?—I do not know.

Jovis, 25° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Adderley.
Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Childers.
Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir George Grey.
Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Mills.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *Henry William Sharp Whiffin*, called in; and Examined.

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743. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Assistant Accountant General in the War Department?—Yes.

744. The finance of that department is brought specially under your supervision?—It has been during the last six months only.

745. How long have you been connected with the department?—With the service generally, about 20 years.

746. Before that, you were in the Ordnance Department, I believe?—Down to the year 1856.

747. Returns have been put in before this Committee, purporting to show the amount of Colonial contributions towards the military expenditure in the Colonies, for the year ending 31st March 1859. Can you give the Committee some information as to the mode in which those sums, and in what proportion, have been brought into the credit of the Imperial Exchequer. With regard to the North American Colonies, which stand at the head of the return, can you tell us whether any proportion of the sums given in that return, as the amount of Colonial contribution, has found its way in any form into the Imperial Exchequer?—The contribution from Canada does not pass through the War Office accounts.

748. No portion of it?—No portion of it.

749. Has any proportion of that sum in respect of the other North American Colonies found its way into the Imperial Exchequer?—There is no contribution by these Colonies, so far as I am aware of; I believe there is none that is paid to the credit of the Army service by the North American Colonies.

750. Have you any official information as regards the application of that sum which is given in the return as under the head of Colonial contribution, in regard to the North American Colonies?—None whatever. I do not know anything with reference thereto in connexion with the North American Colonies.

751. With respect to that item given in the return as Colonial contribution, in respect of the Australian colonies, I observe that there are sums which are given in the return in respect of the Colony of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. Can you give the Committee any information, or put in any return, which will show what proportion of those sums has been brought to the credit of the Imperial Government?—I am not able to identify the actual sums shown in the return, but I can give information with reference to a contribution paid by the Colony, as it appears in the Army Accounts. The arrangement, so far as New South Wales is concerned, I believe to be this: that the Colony issues 6*d.* a day to the men, and the men are entitled to Imperial pay also. The sum which appears to the credit of the Estimates is an advance made by the Colony to regimental paymasters. With reference to Victoria, the Colony provides the actual expenditure on account of pay and allowances of all the troops in excess of four companies, and they also give an allowance to the staff; the staff allowances are paid to the officers individually, and do not pass through the Imperial Exchequer. With reference to Victoria, a large sum is voted by the Colonial Parliament, and that is paid over to the officer

officer commanding the Queen's troops, and is divided among the officers on the station, but never finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer. The Colony of South Australia pays for all above one company.

752 In the return for the Cape of Good Hope I find a sum of 40,467*l.* under the head of Colonial Military Expenditure?—No part of that, so far as I am aware, for the year 1858–59, was credited to the Imperial Government at the date at which this account was made up, and, therefore, that sum must be the expenditure of the Colony with reference to the military expenditure which does not pass through the Army Accounts.

753. Under the same head I find a sum of 453*l.* with reference to St. Helena?—The same observation will apply to that.

754. For Jamaica, I find a sum of 182*l.*?—No portion of that is credited to the Imperial Exchequer.

755. Does the same remark apply to the Windward and Leeward Islands?—No portion of that, so far as I am aware, is credited to the Imperial Exchequer.

756. Or British Guiana?—That does not appear in this return; it is included in the Windward and Leeward Islands.

757. With reference to Ceylon I find a sum of 85,851*l.*, can you inform the Committee whether any portion of that finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer?—The only portion of that which finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer, is a fixed contribution of 24,000*l.* per annum, which is given, I believe, by the Colony in aid of military expenditure, and in addition to that, the Colony grants to the officers, staff, regimental, and departmental, what is called a Colonial allowance, and that is granted in lieu of rations of provisions, fuel, light, lodgings, forage, and servants' allowances, and doubtless in consequence also of its proximity to India, where very liberal allowances are granted; it also covers the expense of lodging-money and servants allowances. The Imperial Government merely pays the ordinary regimental pay of the officers and men. The Colony of Ceylon also takes upon itself the commissariat portion of the duty; we have no commissariat establishment in Ceylon, the whole of that expense being defrayed out of the Colonial revenue, and that, doubtless, forms a part of the 85,851*l.* which appears in this return.

758. For Mauritius, I find the sum of 22,634*l.* put down as the Colonial military expenditure. What portion, if any, of that finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer?—Of that sum, 10,000*l.* per annum finds its way directly into the Imperial Exchequer. That is shown by a statement at the end of the Army Estimates; but in addition to the 10,000*l.* contributed by Mauritius for the military expenditure, the Colony in the same manner as Ceylon, pays what is called a Colonial allowance; it is not exactly on the same scale as the Ceylon allowance, but it is equally liberal; that never finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer. We know very little about it; that is, we have not the adjustment of it; we know that the allowance exists, and I believe the Secretary of State for War is referred to, but it is rather a question between the Colony and the officers.

759. For Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast, I find other items given. Does any portion of those find its way into the Imperial Exchequer?—The stations on the west coast of Africa do not contribute any sum in aid of the army expenditure; the amounts must be small items paid by the Colony, not strictly applicable to army service proper, or probably for stores supplied. The information which I give with reference to New South Wales is subject to correction, because it is only within the last day or two that I have had notice to attend this Committee, and therefore I have not been able to get very full information as regards New South Wales.

760. Should you be able to put in before this Committee a return for those Colonies which you have mentioned as making payments, showing what proportion, during the average of the last five years, has been paid into the Imperial Exchequer, in respect of the Colonial expenditure of those Colonies?—You will find in the Army Estimates, for the last five years, a statement showing the actual sum paid over to the Exchequer as contribution by each station; if necessary, I can give a statement showing the detail making up those items.

761. Does this return to which you have alluded in the Army Estimates, give at page 154, the total amount of the Colonial payments which have found their

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their way into the Imperial Exchequer from the Colonies, to which that return alludes?—It gives the amount brought to account during the twelvemonth ended the 31st December previously. You will see a small item of 597*l.* from Victoria, but that dates back as far as the year 1854-5; it is an adjustment account, so that you must not be entirely guided by what you see in the estimates; you must not imagine that that is the amount contributed by the Colony for that year; it is the money brought to account during that year, and that amount was paid over to the Exchequer.

762. Would it be possible for you to procure and give in before this Committee a return, showing the actual average payments during a period of years, which have found their way into the Imperial Exchequer?—We can give the actual payments; you will not require an average.

763. Procure and put in before the Committee a return of that description for the last 10 years?—I will do so.

764. This return which has been put in, showing the expenditure incurred for the British dependencies, in the year ending March 31st, 1859, gives all the details in regard to all the Colonies. Can you supply us with a similar return for the year ending March 31st, 1860?—A return of that kind collected from every description of account we have, will take some time to prepare, but it may be done within the next two or three weeks.

765. Sir *George Grey.*] You say that, with regard to some Colonies, the figures which appear in this return, as the Colonial expenditure, are not brought to account at all in this country. Is it not the case that there is no contribution by these Colonies towards the Imperial expenditure, and that these figures represent simply Colonial expenditure?—I believe so; but I am also under the impression that at Demerara, for instance, in the Windward and Leeward Islands command, the Colony grants a certain allowance to the officers; of this, however, I am not quite certain.

766. Is not that extra allowance an addition to the pay voted in the estimates of this country?—Yes, if granted; and it is analogous to the contribution made by Victoria to the staff officers; it does not find its way into the Imperial Exchequer, nor is it recognised as an Imperial transaction.

767. Is any portion of it applicable to a diminution of the sum granted by Parliament towards the pay of the men?—Inversely, I think it may be; if the Colony did not make that contribution it would be a justification for the officers requiring a more liberal allowance, and therefore, negatively, it is a benefit to the Imperial Exchequer,

768. You mean, if the colony did not pay, a claim might arise on the part of the officers and men, that the Imperial Government should give them extra pay?—Yes.

769. Is there any sum voted in the estimates towards that allowance?—Yes; in some of our Australian Colonies we grant an allowance of 5*s.* a day to the officers, on account of the dearness of provisions. That arose about the time of the gold discoveries.

770. Is there any extra allowance provided by the Colony in those cases, over and above the 5*s* a day?—It is an allowance in those Colonies when no provision is made from Colonial revenues; for instance, New Zealand, Tasmania, and Western Australia.

771. I am speaking of those Colonies to which reference was made just now, in which contributions are made, no portion of which comes to the Imperial Exchequer. I ask whether those contributions are applicable in diminution of any portion of the sum voted in our estimates?—I cannot give a general answer to that question. If you ask with reference to any particular Colony, I will endeavour to explain it.

772. For the North American Colonies, I find a sum of 35,170*l.*, and for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 92*l.*, under the head of Colonial Expenditure: I want to know whether any portion of that is applicable to the reduction of the sum voted upon our estimates for the pay and allowances of the troops serving in the North American Colonies, or whether it is applicable to Colonial expenditure, quite independent of the provision made in our estimates?—So far as we are aware, it would not be any reduction of the army expenditure, because we have no knowledge of the amount paid by the Colony; this sum of 35,176*l.* must be for some Colonial expenses that we know nothing whatever of.

773. Where a Colonial contribution does find its way into the Imperial Exchequer,

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Exchequer, in what way is that brought into account: is the whole sum voted in the Army Estimates; and what is paid by the Colony in reduction, paid into the Exchequer, or are the Army Estimates voted minus that sum, which is paid by the Colony?—The whole amount of the contribution is paid over to the Exchequer, and forms no deduction of the Army Estimates, but is applicable to the general revenue of the country; it goes to Ways and Means. The mode of bringing the items to account varies at different stations; at Malta the amount contributed is paid to the Comptroller of the Treasury Chest, and it finds its way to the Commissioners of Audit; and then we are advised of it by the Lords of the Treasury, and ultimately it finds its way to the Exchequer.

774. Does any portion of it find its way to the War Department, so as to be applicable for the military expenditure of the empire; or does it find its way to the general Exchequer of the country?—The general Exchequer of the country.

775. Your system would, every year, show the exact sum received from the Colony?—Yes; and we have no power over that money, because the Appropriation Auditor would not allow us to credit that to one of our votes.

776. Mr. *T. G. Baring*.] You have explained, with respect to these payments and contributions of the Colonial revenue, which appears at the end of the Army Estimates, that these come into the Exchequer?—Yes.

777. And are not in any way placed to the credit of the Army votes?—No, we have no knowledge of them whatever. Then, again, with reference to Victoria, where the Colonial Parliament vote a sum of between 7,000 *l.* and 8,000 *l.* a year, on account of staff expenses, that, instead of being brought into the Army Estimates, and being shown among the other portions of the contributions, is given over to the officer commanding Her Majesty's troops, and divided among the officers of the station; and never finds its way into the Army accounts at all.

778. Are any payments made out of the Colonial contributions, which are also voted in the Army Estimates; that is to say, are the allowances of troops in any Colony voted in the Army Estimates, and really paid by the Colony, so that there is a saving, in any case, upon the general Army Estimates by the payment of this, indirectly, by the Colony?—No, but a saving accrues to Imperial revenues, *e. g.* with reference to Ceylon and the Mauritius, if the Colony did not grant an allowance, we should have to find barrack accommodation and lodging-money, which the troops obtain on the other stations.

779. Would not that be a saving of the sum actually voted by Parliament, and enable Parliament to vote less money?—Yes.

780. What I want to know is whether there are any other sums voted by Parliament which are paid not by Parliament, but by the Colony?—Not that I am aware of, because we should be getting the money twice over.

781. When you say there is a saving upon the Army vote, you mean that if the Colony did not pay this money, the British taxpayers would be obliged to pay it?—Yes.

782. You do not mean that there is money voted which is paid by the Colony?—Take the Australian Colonies during the year 1859, there were two regiments there, we voted the full amount of pay and allowances to those regiments, that is included in the Army Estimates; but the contribution by the Colony is paid into the Exchequer.

783. So that the money that is voted is applied to the service for which it is voted?—Yes.

784. Mr. *Marsh*.] But it appears in the estimate that it cost the whole sum?—Yes: the full amount is voted by Parliament, and the amount which the Colony contributes, reverts to the Exchequer, otherwise we should get the money twice over.

785. It comes in another statement?—Yes.

786. Sir *George Grey*.] When you say that Parliament vote the pay and allowances to the troops in Australia, do you mean the Colonial allowances?—No; what we term allowances are the contingent allowances to the captains of companies, command money, allowances for forage, issues of fuel, light, and provisions; with reference to the men, good conduct pay, and other allowances.

787. Given universally?—Wherever they are, it is a part of their pay.

788. Mr. *T. G. Baring*.] Do you think it would be an advantageous change in the system, that all contributions from the Colonies should be paid into the Exchequer,

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Exchequer, and that no contribution should be paid in the Colony?—I have been long of that opinion that it would be very desirable that the whole amount contributed by the Colony should be handed over to the Imperial Government, and that we should then make such arrangements as we might think necessary, with the officers and men at each of our stations.

789. We should then vote the gross expenditure in the Army Estimates, and the Exchequer would receive all contributions from the Colony, in aid of that Expenditure?—That would be a question of discretion with regard to the exchequer receiving it. My own view of it is, that the amount contributed by the Colony should be deducted from the Estimate; this is a question worthy of great consideration; formerly the deduction from the Estimates was made by what is called the appropriations in aid, the contributions were deducted from the aggregate vote; and it might be with propriety done now by deducting the actual amount paid by the Colony, we will say to the 31st December on each year, and when the Estimates are presented to Parliament for the total amount of keeping up our troops, there would be deducted from the gross amount the sum actually paid by the Colony for contribution for the previous year.

790. So that then you would have the actual sum, and there would be no uncertainty with regard to the contributions made?—Exactly, and then Parliament would see the actual sum paid by each Colony, and instead of going to Parliament for 12 or 14,000,000 *l.*, our Army Estimates might be reduced by the actual sums paid by the Colonies.

791. That of course depends upon the general principle of giving appropriations in aid of votes according to the Treasury Minute of May 1848; I believe it was decided that all credits made, whether by sale of Stores, or any other credits should be paid entirely into the Exchequer in aid of the votes?—Yes, but that has not been insisted upon, because you will find that in the Army Estimates for many years past we do make deductions on the estimates. For instance, take the contributions for hospital expenses, and provisions, we do not deduct the gross amount of the hospital expenses, or the gross amount of provisions, but we vote the net amount for these services.

792. Carrying out the principle, that all payments in aid of votes should be paid direct into the Exchequer, would it not be right that the whole of the expenses of the army employed in India should be borne by the Army Estimates, and the whole of the payments made by the Government of India, or the Company rather, should be paid into the Exchequer?—Unquestionably; you would treat India as one of our own Colonies, and then we should apply to Parliament for the net allowances which we should require for the army proper, after deducting the several allowances made by the Colonies.

793. If the amounts paid by the Colonies into the Exchequer are to be uniform, the amount paid by India ought to be paid into the Exchequer, and the gross cost borne by the Army Estimates?—Yes.

794. That is not done?—No.

795. Therefore the system carried out in India is inconsistent with the rule that all the contributions should be paid into the Exchequer?—Yes; and in consequence of that there are numerous anomalies. There are cases in which we have to vote money and give it back the next day.

796. As an instance of that, will you explain what takes place at the Royal Academy at Woolwich?—At Woolwich and at Sandhurst also, but more particularly at Woolwich, you will find in the Estimates that the expenses are about 25,000 *l.* per annum, and the friends of the gentleman cadets contribute within a few hundred pounds of that sum; therefore we go to Parliament and ask for 25,000 *l.*, and 24,500 *l.* of that we get back again, and the amount contributed is paid into the Exchequer.

797. Is not the effect of that, on the whole, to swell the apparent amount of the cost of the army in the Army Estimates?—Yes. With reference to this year's Estimates, for instance, the Army Estimates might actually be reduced by half a million.

798. Would you advocate, then, that the fixed payments should be paid in to the credit of the vote, or deducted from the votes?—All those fixed payments, for instance, the Colonial contributions, should be deducted after realisation, and the amount actually realised in the previous year shown.

799. Would

799. Would you deduct the actual receipts of the year before from the Estimates of the following year?—Of the following year.

800. And in that way the department would have no power, by under-estimating the receipts, to spend money of which Parliament was not cognizant?—Exactly; because it resolves itself then into a question of cash. We receive from Colonial resources a certain sum, which we should give credit for in our Estimates; and instead of, when we open our new year's account, debiting ourselves with the amount voted by Parliament, we should say, "Amount voted by Parliament, so much;" and then bring to our debit the contributions by the Colonies. actually brought to the credit of army services through the military accounts during the financial year. By this arrangement we should have no further control over the money than we have now.

801. Would there be any difficulty in carrying out that arrangement?—I should think not.

802. Mr. *Childers.*] Referring to that half million which you say would go in reduction of the army expenditure, is half of it the proceeds of the sale of stores?—Yes, a very large proportion of it: 224,000 *l.*

803. And under no possible system could that be allowed to go in reduction?—If you admit the principle of deductions on the estimates for Colonial contributions it could be extended to stores.

804. But it would be contrary to the Treasury Minute, and to all the principles upon which every department is governed?—At present it is contrary to the Treasury Minute.

805. So that you would not have to make a change with reference to the Army Estimates alone, but to the whole department?—It refers to the Navy Estimates also, but the Navy are not in the position in which we are, in reference to our receipts, we really bear upon our Estimates a very large sum for which we get no credit whatever.

806. Do you not also find that there is a sum of 30,000 *l.* contributed by men who purchase their discharge?—Yes.

807. That could not go in reduction, could it?—Upon the same principle; that is, if you take the amount actually realised, for we have to increase our Estimate for the succeeding year.

808. Then again there are tolls and rents?—For rents particularly we should take it, because we have to pay rents, in cases in which we have taken property for a term of years, and in those cases we have actually to pay the rents, and the party to whom we let the same repays us the amount which we have to pay over to the Exchequer.

809. But still if all these sums were to go in reduction, you would have to alter the principle upon which all these sums are treated?—It would be an alteration of the system.

810. Is it not merely a question of the contribution from the Colony, but the whole principle upon which that amount is obtained, would have to be changed?—It would alter the system.

811. Mr. *Marsh.*] With reference to Ceylon, does the Imperial Exchequer pay the expenses of the Ceylon rifles?—Yes.

812. Are you aware that the Ceylon Rifles are employed very often as police, and that they have relinquished the rifle, and taken to the weapon of the country?—I am not aware of it; we make provision for the pay.

813. Mr. *Fortescue.*] I want to ascertain exactly the component parts of the expenditure given in the last column but three of this return called "Total of the Colonial Expenditure." Am I right in supposing that the sums given in that column represent three classes of contribution; first of all they represent, do they not, contributions from Colonies in repayment of Imperial expenditure actually voted by Parliament?—With reference to the column headed "total of the Colonial Expenditure," that paper was made out in the Colonial Office; I am, therefore, not in a position to give any definite explanation of it.

814. As far as your knowledge goes, perhaps you will answer my question. It will comprise, will it not, first, contributions from Colonies in repayment of expenditure actually voted by Parliament, such as contributions from Ceylon, and the Mauritius, or contributions in aid of Imperial pay?—I should think so, but I am not in a position to give any positive information about it; I should only assume so by seeing that at Ceylon, for instance, there is a contribution

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of 85,000 *l.*; we know a portion of that, 24,000 *l.* is paid direct into the Imperial Exchequer; and we know also that the Colony makes a very liberal allowance to the officers.

815. If it is a correct return, it must, in the first place, include such contributions as I have mentioned?—Undoubtedly.

816. It must next include, must it not, Colonial allowances for the troops, such as you have described, and the cost of barracks and lodgings, and so on?—All those expenses.

817. Expenditure, which if not provided for by the Colony, would probably have to be provided by the Imperial Government, if the troops were left upon that station?—Yes.

818. And in the third place, it must necessarily include, must it not, Colonial expenditure for military objects, such as forts, and the cost of guns, and the cost of militia and volunteers, with which we have nothing to do in this country?—Yes it does, no doubt.

819. What are your means of knowledge of the expenditure incurred by the Colonies, in each of these three cases; in the first case, I suppose your means of knowledge are complete?—They are complete, to a certain extent. We will confine ourselves to Ceylon: all we know is, that we get from the Colony of Ceylon 24,000 *l.* in aid of the military expenditure; that is the full extent of our knowledge.

820. Is that a fixed yearly sum?—Yes.

821. Of the same nature as the contribution of the Ionian Islands?—Not exactly; the same as the Mauritius, I would say.

822. Now, with respect to the Colonial allowances; what is your means of knowledge of their amount and character?—We have no official knowledge; that is a question entirely between the Colony and the officers; all we know is, that in the Colony of Ceylon we grant no allowances to officers.

823. Do you mean that no department in the War Office has any official knowledge as a matter of course, of the amount and character of these Colonial allowances?—We might know incidentally, in fact we have got a table or statement showing the amount which each officer is entitled to, but whether that officer gets more or less, or whether he gets it at all, we do not know.

824. Then with respect to these Colonial allowances, there are no definite proposals made to the War Office from the Governors of the Colony through the Colonial Office or otherwise which have received the sanction of the Secretary of State for War, and then become the fixed Colonial allowances?—I believe not, but it would be in this way: supposing a class of officers entitled to an increased relative rank; for instance, we have put the officers in the army upon a classification as regards rank; we have been elevating certain officers as regards rank; that may bear upon the question of allowances, but the Colony may continue the allowance or not; the officer who has received the increase of rank might expect the increased allowance, but the Colony might resist that, and we should have no power to coerce the Colony to give the increased allowance.

825. In such a case as that does not the officer commanding in Ceylon, make a representation to the Governor, which together with the reply is sent home to the Colonial Office?—He would make a report that the officer was of such and such a rank, and would suggest that he would be entitled to such and such allowances, but the actual power of granting allowances would rest with the Colony.

826. I think, in the case of Ceylon, I recollect a correspondence with the Governor on the subject of the allowances. I take it that correspondence has been forwarded to the War Office?—Yes; it might be forwarded to the War Office, but we could only pass an opinion.

827. It is a matter with the Colonial Government?—Yes; because the payments of the allowances do not come through our hands at all; we know that the officers get the allowances, or are supposed to get them, but they are not treated as a matter of account.

828. With respect to the third class of expenditure, namely, the purely Colonial expenditure, undertaken by the Colonial authorities, for the purchase of arms and other things of that kind, I suppose your only information is derived from such despatches as are forwarded to you by the Colonial Office?—In many instances they would not communicate with us at all; for instance, as regards

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regards the expenses of the volunteers and militia; as regards the militia, they might, but it is a question whether they would communicate with us with respect to the volunteers, although that is put down here as a part of the military expenditure.

829. There is a great deal of correspondence, is there not, between the War Office and the Colonial Office with respect to the supply of arms?—Yes, and as regards the supply of arms to the Colonies for civil purposes, the Colony actually pay the War Office for the arms issued, and that also would form a part of this Colonial expenditure.

830. Mr. *Childers.*] You say that where a Colony grants an allowance, the War Office has no official knowledge of it; there is no uniform system, and you know nothing more than the fact as far as your department is concerned?—So far as I am personally concerned, and my own knowledge goes; that is with reference to the Colonial allowances granted to officers.

831. Now with reference to the expenditure at Victoria, I think you said that the Colonial Government at the present time pay the Imperial pay and allowances of the troops above a certain number?—Yes, beyond four companies.

832. They also pay a certain allowance to the staff?—Yes.

833. They also pay, I believe, some of the contingencies which otherwise would be charged upon Vote No. 10?—I think I limited my observations to the effect of the two first.

834. Then we will have the two first. The Colony of Victoria has had more than four companies for the last 10 years?—Yes, I believe so.

835. During that time they have paid at least that excess upon the Imperial pay?—I have no knowledge of that, but I should assume that it is so.

836. So far as you are aware the Colony has paid the Imperial expenditure of all but four companies?—Whatever amount the Colony has paid, has duly appeared in the estimates to the credit of the Exchequer year by year.

837. In the present Estimates, and the Estimates of last year, there are votes for the entire payment of the allowances to the troops stationed in Victoria?—Yes, with respect to the 40th regiment you will find the full amount of pay and allowances; that is Imperial pay and Imperial allowances, voted in the Army Estimates.

838. Yet as a matter of fact, the Colony has paid the Imperial pay and allowances for all above four companies?—Yes.

839. Do we find any contribution from the Colony of Victoria in the statement?—The Colony is liable to it, but whether they have actually paid it or not, I am not aware. If it be paid, it would be included in the present year, to the credit of the Exchequer. If they have not, I assume that the amount is still outstanding to the debit of the Colony.

840. Is it not within your knowledge that the Colony has for the last 10 years uniformly paid it?—I believe they have paid it year by year.

841. And is it not also within your knowledge that as a matter of fact it does not appear in that statement?—There is no contribution this year.

842. Is it not a matter of fact that no such contribution answering to the amount of the Imperial pay of those companies in excess, has appeared for some years?—You will find in the previous year's Estimates, I think, a contribution of 14,000*l.*

843. In the Colony of Victoria?—No, in New South Wales.

844. I am speaking of the Colony of Victoria, of which I have some personal knowledge; is it not a matter of fact that no contribution has appeared for some years past?—I do not remember any contribution appearing.

845. Therefore, as a matter of fact, with respect to the Colony of Victoria, we have here appropriated the entire expenditure of Imperial pay, with reference to the regiment there; the Colony has paid it, and, it does not appear in that statement at the end of the Estimate?—I would not exactly say that; because, if the Colony have actually paid it, I cannot understand how it does not appear as an Exchequer receipt.

846. That is exactly what I cannot understand; but is it not a notorious fact that the Colony has paid it?—It may be to you, out it is not to me. You may have Colonial information which I do not possess; but if you have reason to believe that the Colony has paid it, I will get you the best information I can at some future time.

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847. With respect to the Colonial pay, I think you said that the Colonial allowance does not come from the Exchequer at all?—You are now speaking of the Colonial allowance to the staff officers, I presume.

848. The Colonial allowance to the regimental officers?—To officers generally. The amount voted by the Colony is limited to the officers of the staff.

849. Are you sure of that?—Yes, the 7,000 *l.*

850. Is only 7,000 *l.* voted by the Colony?—Last year there was a sum of 7,947 *l.* voted by the Colony of Victoria, on account of the pay and allowances of the head quarters staff at Melbourne.

851. But does not the Colony vote a great deal more?—Not that I am at present aware of.

852. Does not the Colony, as a matter of fact, more than double the pay of all the officers stationed there, and make that payment as a Colonial allowance?—If they do I have no knowledge of it, but, as before observed, my knowledge of the mode of dealing with the military expenditure in the Australian Colonies is but limited. If the Colony vote a sum for the pay and allowance of the regiment, it would be paid over direct to the officers and men, and would not appear in our account at all, but would be treated exactly in the same way as the 7,900 *l.* voted by the Colony for the staff officers.

853. There are certain stoppages made, are there not, from the pay of all the men?—I presume you allude to the ration stoppages. In certain Colonies we grant the provisions, and exact no stoppages.

854. With respect to the troops in Victoria, how does the matter stand as regards stoppages?—In Victoria the stoppage is exacted from the men.

855. Is it paid into the Exchequer?—Yes.

856. Will you show me, in the Estimates or anywhere, where credit is taken for the stoppage; how much is the amount of the stoppage?—Three pence halfpenny per day. It would be at page 85 of the Estimates for the present year.

857. Will you show me where that occurs?—Victoria is classed under New South Wales. I presume you will not find Victoria in the Estimates at all.

858. Do you mean to say that the stoppage of 4,500 *l.*, against 11,200 *l.* in New South Wales really includes the stoppage in Victoria?—I believe it does.

859. Then the War Office has not discovered that Victoria is a separate colony?—I will not say that, because we are well aware of the fact. It is not shown in Vote 10 of the Estimates.

860. Are you not aware that the stoppage is really not made at all?—I am not aware of it.

861. Are you not aware that the Colony, as a matter of fact, not only gives a Colonial allowance to the men, of 1 *s.* a day, but also that the stoppage is not made in any shape?—The best information that I have, is that the stoppage is paid by the men, as appears by the account.

862. Do you mean to say that we take a vote under Vote 10, for the provisions of the men in Victoria?—Yes; to the best of my knowledge, it is included in the amount for New South Wales.

863. Do you think that that sum, amounting to 6,700 *l*, covers the cost of the provisions of a whole regiment?—I must get further information upon that point.

864. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] The Commissary General in Chief would be able to give that information?—Yes; it is a question which I cannot now answer.

865. Mr. *Childers.*] Is there not also a stoppage made for savings' banks; is there not a contribution made to the savings' banks by the men?—No; the men pay their money into the regimental savings' banks, and we grant them interest at the rate of 3 *l.* 15 *s.* per cent., but there is no deduction made from the men.

866. What becomes of that money in the Colony; is it paid through the Colonial Government in any way, where the Colony pays it?—I presume that is brought to the account in the same way as the money accruing in the savings' banks in other regiments.

867. There are also stoppages, I think, made for prison expenses from men who are in confinement?—Yes; the men in confinement are mulcted pay; they get no pay whatever.

868. Where

868. Where are those men confined in the Australian Colony?—That I do not know.

869. Do you know what becomes of the stoppage of their pay?—In the ordinary case the pay is never charged.

870. Do you know how the prison expenses are defrayed?—To the best of my knowledge they are defrayed in the same way as the other charges.

871. Out of the votes?—That I am not certain of.

872. Is there such a rule?—The fact is, I am not very well conversant with the Australian Colonies. I know less about them than any other. There is no vote taken for the military prisons.

873. Have you any knowledge how that is arranged; in what way the expense is defrayed?—None whatever; but I can get information upon that point.

874. With respect to the barrack expenses in the Colonies; is a vote taken for barrack expenses under Vote No. 7?—There is a sum taken for New South Wales, but none for Victoria.

875. And yet the greater part of the expense is in Victoria?—There is nothing, I find, in New South Wales for barrack expenses.

876. Do you know how that is arranged?—The whole of the barracks, I believe, were handed over to the Colony, and the Colony pays the whole of the expenses.

877. Are the barrackmasters Colonial?—Seeing that there is no vote for barrack expenditure, I should say they were Colonial officers. There is no provision made for barrack establishment in New South Wales; there is a barrack-serjeant for South Australia, and that is the only place where barrack expenditure is mentioned at all in the votes.

878. Is it not within your knowledge that there are very large barracks there?—I believe so; but that is a question entirely for the Inspector-General of Fortifications.

879. Has it been the uniform practice since troops were stationed in the Colonies to take a vote for the payment of those troops?—We vote the full pay and regimental allowances of every regiment in the service, excepting those in India.

880. Always?—Always.

881. Is no deduction made on the face of the Estimate?—No deduction is made on the face of the Estimate, because whatever the Colonies contribute goes into the Exchequer.

882. Have you looked back to the Estimates of past years?—I am now speaking of the present year.

883. Within the last three or four years?—I believe there has been a reduction in the last three or four years.

884. At the time of the Crimean war, was not a deduction made from the contribution of the Colonies for the Imperial pay of this regiment on the station?—I believe there was.

885. Has not that arrangement been altered now?—As I observed just now, the full amount is voted and the contribution by the Colony is paid into the Exchequer.

886. If the contribution by the Colony were paid into the Exchequer, it would make no difference practically?—Any contribution made by the Colony has been carried to the Exchequer; it has not been appropriated.

887. If, as a matter of fact, one particular Colony has been defraying a large amount of Imperial expenditure which is voted, and you do not find it in that statement, year after year, have you any reason to doubt whether yours is the correct information?—I can get information upon that point, but we have not appropriated the money to the credit of army funds; an error in the account may have occurred, but no misappropriation. You must bear in mind that, with reference to our expenditure, and with reference to bringing these items to account, we do not act upon our own responsibility. Over the War Office is placed an independent officer, whose duty is to see that all sums reported are accurately paid into the Exchequer; that is to say, not the contributions by the Colonies only, but all other extra receipts.

888. But is it not his duty to see that those Estimates are so framed as not to provide for more than is really required?—No; but if the full amount of

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allowances for the men were voted, then any contribution by Victoria would be credited to the Exchequer.

889. Do you happen to know the shape in which in the Colony the money is defrayed?—No; but I cannot help thinking that there must be some mistake in the arrangement; probably it has found its way into the Exchequer through some other source, or may be locally adjusted with the Treasury chest officers.

890. Is it not the case that the Appropriation Act of the Colony directs that the money shall be paid over in four quarterly instalments, to be defrayed in such manner as Her Majesty may by warrant direct?—That is the case with regard to the sum voted to the staff officers, and therefore I should assume it would be very likely the same. The contribution of the 7,900*l.* is given over to the officer commanding the forces, to be distributed as Her Majesty may direct.

891. You say that only extends to the 7,900*l.*?—No, I do not say that; I say my knowledge only extends to that.

892. You do not know whether it extends to any other contributions?—If you state it to be the case, I assume that it is so; because I know that in the Appropriation Act there is that clause with reference to the 7,900*l.* contributed for the staff.

893. Sir *George Grey.*] By whom is the statement on page 154, with reference to the Colonial expenditure, made out?—That statement is taken from the books, made out by the principal bookkeeper, and is the sum actually brought to the credit of Her Majesty's Exchequer during the year; and this sum was actually paid over to the Treasury.

894. Upon what authority does the bookkeeper make up this account; where does he get his information as to the sums paid into the Exchequer?—With reference to the Ionian Islands, Malta, and Ceylon, the sums are advised through the Comptroller of Army Expenditure, to the Treasury chest; and the Lords of the Treasury advise us that they have this money to our credit.

895. What I want to know is, whether this statement is made out from information received directly by the War Department or through some other channel?—With regard to the three places that I have mentioned, it is from information received from the Treasury; but with regard to the Mauritius, the contribution is paid at the station and is included in the local accounts of the military accountant forwarded to the War Office.

896. I want to know from what information the bookkeeper makes up this annual statement. How does he know what sums have been paid in from Victoria, or any other Colony?—From the accounts after they have undergone examination.

897. Who makes out the accounts?—The accounts are made up by the accountant himself on the spot.

898. Do you act upon the information of the Treasury, or do you deal with the accounts which come into your own hands?—With reference to these three stations, from the Treasury.

899. And with regard to the other station?—I have answered with respect to the three, but as regards the Mauritius I have endeavoured to explain that the amount is credited to army funds of the War Office accountant. Also as regards Victoria there is a sum remaining over from the year 1855.

900. We have heard that there is a sum voted annually by the Legislature of the Colony of Victoria towards the military expenditure, on account of the troops stationed there; I want to know how the War Department derives its information, whether that sum is paid into the Exchequer or not?—It appears that we have no information with reference to the transactions of this year; but in regard to last year there is a sum stated to be a contribution from New South Wales; but there may be an error in the station.

901. Supposing the sum appears in the Estimates of last year, as paid by Victoria, or New South Wales, how does the War Department ascertain that the sum has been paid into the Exchequer, so as to insert it in this annual statement; do they derive it from their own information, or from information received from the Treasury?—In reference to the three cases that I have alluded to, they derive it from the Treasury.

902. I am speaking of New South Wales exclusively?—There is an account of the advances made by the Colony, and they appear in the accounts of the regimental paymasters.

903. Then

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903. Then it comes to the War Department, without passing through the Treasury?—Yes, at least that portion which comes through the medium of the paymaster's accounts.

904. How does the War Department know it has been paid into the Exchequer?—Because we pay it in ourselves.

905. Mr. *Ellice.*] All these things are paid into what is called the Military Chest?—Yes.

906. And then by what authority are these allowances, which are applied to the military service, paid into the Treasury?—The amount is paid into the Comptroller of the Treasury chest, and included by him in his accounts with the Lords of the Treasury; and when the accounts are examined by the Commissioners of Audit, it is found that there are certain sums placed to the credit of the Imperial Government on account of army expenditure. They advise us that those sums are placed to our credit, and they are passed through the books, and by the War Office paid over to the Exchequer, and the detail of the credit finds its way into this statement.

907. These allowances having been paid into the Treasury chest, by what authority are they drawn out of the Treasury chest, and applied to the military service?—They are not applied to the military service in diminution of the final charge against Parliamentary grants.

908. You said that some of these go into the Exchequer and others come from the Exchequer, and others were applied to the Colony?—Yes; therefore the latter do not appear in the army accounts.

909. But still, this being Colonial expenditure applied to the payment of military service in this country, by what authority is that paid; is it by Queen's warrant or by the authority of the War Office, directed to the officers of the Colony, or by what authority is it paid?—The contributions made by the Colony on account of military expenditure, are, as I explained before, paid over to the Comptroller of the Treasury chest.

910. But you say that there are other sums beyond those which are paid over to the Exchequer which are applied by the Colony to military purposes?—Yes.

911. I wish to know, if you can tell me, by what authority those payments are made in the Colony?—A certain portion of these expenses, as in the case of Victoria, is paid over to the officer commanding Her Majesty's forces, to be distributed by him in the way Her Majesty's Government may think necessary.

912. Is it to be distributed by him according to the orders of the Secretary of War?—Not that I am aware of; the transaction does not go through the army accounts.

913. Sir *George Grey.*] What department of Her Majesty's Government directs the distribution of the sum to be paid over by the Commander in Chief in the Colony to the forces on the station?—I suppose the Commander in Chief at the station is the representative of Her Majesty's Government; and that that portion is divided amongst the officers on the spot.

914. You, as assistant in the Accountant General's department of the War Office, know nothing about it?—I do not; it is a question settled by the Colony.

915. Is it within your knowledge that any other Department has reported to the Secretary of State for War, the allowances so made by the Colony?—There is a letter from the Colony now, raising this very point, as to whether the accounts connected with this expenditure should be examined in the War Office, stating that hitherto they have always been examined in the Colony.

916. The question is whether these allowances are paid by the Colony to the Commander in Chief in the Colony, and by him distributed at his discretion among the troops without any sanction by the Government whatever?—Undoubtedly there is the sanction of the Government, but whether from the War Office, or the Colonial Office, or where, I do not know.

917. Mr. *Ellice.*] You cannot state whether that sanction is from the Secretary of War?—No.

918. Mr, *Fortescue.*] The officers do not receive these Colonial allowances under any direct authority or permission from the Secretary of State?—Not that I am aware of; we do not know whether they are received or not; for instance with respect to the 7,900 *l.* that I have alluded to, I believe the vote

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from the Victorian Government was 9,000 *l.* some little time ago, and when it was reduced, the officer commanding proposed a scheme reducing the rate payable to each officer.

919. I see under Vote 10 there are specified allowances to Tasmania, Western Australia, and New Zealand, on account of the high prices of provisions, to officers on leave; are those allowances of the same nature as the Colonial allowances, although defrayed by the Imperial Government?—Not exactly of the same nature; at these stations I have mentioned, it is a *bonâ fide* money allowance of 5*s.* and 3*s.* a day to the officers, on account of the high price of provisions.

920. Are those allowances of the same nature as the allowances in New South Wales and Victoria?—No, because those allowances include lodging money, and servants allowances, and so on.

921. Those allowances are over and above the Imperial pay and allowances, on account of the special services on the station?—Yes.

922. Are they not of the same nature, and allotted to the troops for the same reasons as the Colonial allowances are in New South Wales and Victoria?—Not exactly; because that in New South Wales and Victoria embraces a further allowance for lodging and servants allowance, and it also includes the allowance for the high price of provisions.

923. The heads of the allowance are not identical in the two cases?—No, because that to which you allude is limited to the dearness of provisions, and that is subject to periodical revision; it is only allowed from year to year, and in the event of the Colonies reverting to their normal condition of cheap prices, that allowance would be discontinued.

924. Mr. *Childers.*] Do you not take a vote for lodging and servants allowances for the whole army?—Yes; there is a vote taken, but lodging money is not taken in those Colonies where the Colony granted the local allowances.

925. Is not the vote uniform?—There is a lump sum taken of 35,000 *l.*

926. Mr. *Adderley.*] Upon what calculation is the extra pay made by the Imperial Treasury to the officers?—A Board of officers assemble, and they take evidence as to the price of provisions in the Colony (this is with reference to the Australian Colonies), and on the result of their deliberations, they report to the General that it is necessary to continue the allowance of 5*s.* a day. That report is sent home to the War Office, and the Secretary of State, after having obtained the sanction of the Treasury, approves the arrangement for another period. At the expiration of that period, another Board is asssembled, and so it goes on.

927. Does the rate of extra payment made to the officers differ in different Colonies?—Yes, at St. Helena it is only 3*s.* a day.

928. Does it differ in the same Colonies at different periods?—It has always been 5*s.* a day for all officers of all ranks in the Australian Colonies.

929. In each Colony there is a revision every year, is there not, of the rate of extra allowances made?—There is a periodical revision; I do not know whether it is every two years.

930. In every Colony?—Except St. Helena.

931. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you mean every Colony in which the Government pays the allowance?—Yes, except at St. Helena. I am not aware that any Board has been assembled there for some time. They have had 3*s.* a day there for many years past.

932. Do you know whether, in the revisions of extra payment made to the officers, the arrangement is made, not only upon the price of provisions in the Colony, but also with reference to the rate of Colonial allowance made by other Colonies?—The fact of some Colonies giving a contribution, for instance, the fact of Victoria giving a contribution coerces the Imperial Government into giving an allowance at other stations. That was found to be the case at Tasmania, where, upon taking evidence before the Board, it did not appear that there was any necessity for the extra allowances. They were abolished, and then an appeal was made on the plea that, as a liberal allowance was made in other parts of the Colony, it was but reasonable to extend it.

933. All that you can tell us about the Colonial expenditure is with reference to accounts kept between every officer and the Colonial Government?—We keep no accounts with the Colonial Government, but only with our own sub-accountants.

934. Nothing

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934. Nothing comes into the account connected with the Colonial expenditure but Imperial payments on account of the Colonies, and then Colonial repayments of the sum voted by the Imperial Parliament for the pay of the troops or stores?—No.

935. Beyond that, you know nothing of Colonial expenditure?—No; it is entirely a question for the Colony, and we have no direct knowledge of payments made in and for the Colony.

936. Nor does anything come into your accounts with reference to the transport of troops?—That is within the province of the Admiralty, except that we take the inland transport; the expense of transporting troops and stores from port to port is borne by the Admiralty; but we take stores and troops up navigable rivers, for instance.

937. Mr. *Adderley.*] If your plan for voting net estimates in Parliament were carried out, the Estimates for this year would be reduced from 14,600,000 *l.*, so far as the Colonial regiments are concerned, by 72,000 *l.* only?—Yes.

938. That would be the only reduction in this year's Estimates by all Colonial repayments?—That would be the only reduction.

939. When you say that your plan for voting net estimates would reduce this year's Estimates by half a million, you are talking of repayments and reductions of another kind?—Taking the whole amount, as shown to be paid into the Exchequer, as extra receipts.

940. The whole difference this year by Colonial repayments would be to reduce 14,600,000 *l.* by 72,000 *l.*?—That is all.

941. And that would be cumulative deduction over many years?—No; this represents the sum brought to credit during the year ending the 31st December 1860.

942. Did you not give us to understand that that sum represents the cumulative deductions over several years?—I mentioned a small sum of 500 *l.*, with reference to Victoria, which applies to other years; but the others are annual contributions.

943. £.72,487, deducting 597 *l.* for New South Wales, consists of repayments within the year?—Yes, and the contributions for a year.

944. You say you have the means of checking these accounts of repayment, in the case of the Australian Colonies, in the War Office: you know what the whole repayment ought to be?—Yes.

945. And therefore you have the means of checking it?—Yes; we ought to know the amount which each Colony is liable for, and it ought to be our duty to see that it is paid by the Colony and brought to account.

946. You know the exact item upon which the failure of repayment occurs?—Unquestionably we ought to, but perhaps that requires inquiring into.

947. In the case of three Colonies the repayments are by fixed sums, and therefore there you have not the same detailed account?—We only bring to account the actual sum advised by the Treasury as the contribution for the year.

948. Take the instance of Ceylon, where the payment is, as you say, 24,000 *l.* a year. Would you have a detailed account of that sent in?—There is no account; we receive a letter from the Treasury to the effect that they have it, and hold it at our disposal, and we dispose of it by placing it in the Exchequer.

949. You say that you consider the allowances made by the Colony to the officers may be regarded in the light of a saving to the Imperial Exchequer. In the same way you would look at all Colonial expenditure as a saving to the Imperial Exchequer?—Not necessarily so, because we may be incurring out of that contribution an expense in the erection of forts and works for defence in the Colony, which, if we had to pay for out of our own funds, might be a matter of consideration. For Mauritius a sum is voted year by year for fortifications, but that may be only on the understanding that the Colony is to contribute a portion of it.

950. Mr. *Baxter.*] Can you say whether this sum of 72,000 *l.* represents the whole amount of the Colonial expenditure that directly passes into the Exchequer, or only the whole sum that passes through the books of the War Office?—The whole sum that passes through the books of the War Office.

951. Is it not possible that other sums may find their way into the Exchequer through other channels?—It is not improbable, and that should be inquired into.

952. I understood you to say that it was your duty to ascertain that the Colonial

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Colonial revenues were charged with those sums for which they were liable?—Yes.

953. I should like to know what steps you would take to ascertain what sums they are liable for?—The step taken would be by an examination of the accounts. I am not exactly aware of the course followed.

954. If you are not aware what sums are contributed by the Colony through other departments of the Government, how is it possible for you to ascertain whether the Colony has performed its duty in that respect?—We ought to be able to tell exactly the sum that each Colony is liable for, and it is our duty, also, to see whether that contribution is actually paid by the Colony. Whether that has been faithfully done I am not in a position to say.

955. In your opinion, there is some confusion in that respect?—Since the Russian war there has been some misapprehension respecting the army accounts. There has been a large accumulation of work; it is, however, now nearly cleared off. This may partly explain the anomalies which appear to exist in regard to bringing to account the amounts contributed by the Colonies; but the matter shall be carefully investigated.

956. Under the present arrangements would it be possible for the Colonies to have ceased to pay contributions which they had agreed to pay, and had paid in former years?—It is possible, but the omission would ultimately be detected.

957. There is no check in any department of the Government, War Office, Treasury, or Colonial Department, upon the Colonial contribution being properly accounted for?—I cannot answer that with reference to what check the Colonial Office and Treasury may have. We ought to ascertain in the War Office the actual sum that each Colony has to contribute, and we ought to see that that is brought to account. That will be done in future very carefully.

958. But it has not been hitherto done?—That I am not exactly in a position to answer; the accounts are being put upon an entire re-organisation, and it will take a long time to get them into a satisfactory working condition.

959. You say that other contributions may have been received by the Exchequer for the year ending 1860; is it no part of the duty of the War Office to ascertain whether those sums have been paid?—Unquestionably; but, as I have stated once or twice before, the transaction being an exceptional one, it may have been treated under a misapprehension, and the money may have passed to the credit of the Exchequer through other accounts, because there are other accounts at the stations. The Treasury may have taken possession of the contribution, and not advised us of it.

960. Mr. Elliot in some of his answers stated that certain sums were paid into the Treasury chest. Those sums would not be included in the 72,000 *l.* which appears here?—Yes, those sums have passed through the Treasury chest.

961. In what other mode may contributions have been paid by the Colonies and received into the Exchequer?—Through the Treasury chest account, which is examined by the Commissioners of Audit on behalf of the Lords of the Treasury.

962. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] The only information you can give as to payments by the Colonial Government is by reference to the credits which appear in the army accounts?—That is all.

963. Consequently you could only answer from the army accounts?—Yes.

964. You can answer in respect of them that all the payments from the Colony credited to the army service in those accounts are transferred to the Exchequer?—Yes, I can answer that.

965. You can give no further explanation with respect to the payments made by the Colonies, and which do not appear in those accounts?—I can only speak to the sums passed through the army accounts. The Treasury can give that information to a certain extent.

966. *Chairman.*] I understood you to say, with respect to these payments made in the Colonies, that you do not know by what department at home they are sanctioned, or whether they are sanctioned by any department at all?—I am only aware that there is an extra allowance to the officers and men.

967. Mr. *Childers.*] Under whose control is the military chest?—The Treasury chest is under the control of the Lords of the Treasury.

968. What is the name of the officer who has the local management of it?—He is the senior commissariat officer of the station.

969. Does

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969. Does he not furnish accounts of the expenditure of the military chest? He does, but not to the War Office.

970. Do you not receive a duplicate of those accounts?—No, not from the Treasury chest, but the same officer may act as our representative.

971. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] The War Office would have no control over that officer as regards the Treasury chest account?—No; he raises money by bills upon the Lords of the Treasury.

972. *Chairman.*] Will you put in a return, prepared by the Admiralty, of the cost of transport of troops to and from the Colonies, for the year ending the 31st March 1859?—Yes (*handing in the same*).

973. Will you ascertain whether a similar return cannot be produced for the year ending March 1859-60?—Yes; the Admiralty will furnish it.

974. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You gave an answer in the early part of your examination with respect to New South Wales; you said you might be mistaken?—Yes; my answer is subject to correction, because it is a point upon which I require further information.

975. Mr. *Childers.*] Where the paymaster of the regiment pays the Imperial pay, which is defrayed by the Colony, that is, where there are more troops than the Government is bound to furnish, his accounts go to the War Office?—The accounts of the entire regiment come to the War Office.

976. Irrespective of the source from which the money has come?—I believe the paymaster of the regiment would send the accounts of the entire regiment to the War Office.

977. Take the instance of the 40th Regiment. The Home Treasury would pay for four companies, and the Colony for the other companies; the accounts with reference to the eight companies would come together?—Yes.

978. You would be able to tell from them what contribution the Colony had made?—We ought to.

979. Do you believe that there is any check established between those accounts and the amount you find, from the Treasury, to have been paid into the Treasury chest?—I am afraid not; I believe there must be some misapprehension about the accounts with reference to Victoria.

980. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] Perhaps you will be able to look into that question, and give the Committee some further information upon another day?—Yes.

Mr. *Thomas Carter*, called in; and Examined.

Mr. T. Carter.

981. *Chairman.*] ARE you a Clerk in the Adjutant General's Office?—I am.

982. Can you put in a paper showing the strength of the infantry in the Colonies, according to the latest returns of the War Department, distinguishing the numbers in each case of local corps and regiments of the line?—Yes.

983. Have you a return showing the average number of desertions from regiments of the line in North America, New Zealand, Australia, and the Cape, during the last six years?—I have one from 1854 to 1859 inclusive.

984. Will you state the average number of desertions in the North American Colonies during those six years?—In Canada, the number was 137; in Nova Scotia, including Newfoundland and New Brunswick, 124; in New Zealand, 36; in Australia, 139; and at the Cape, 125.

985. Sir *George Grey.*] Do those figures represent the number of men who have deserted, and were not recovered, or do they include the men who have been recaptured?—Those figures do not include those who have re-joined; these are men who have been struck off the strength of the regiment, after being absent without leave for two months.

986. Mr. *Ellice.*] Can you give us a return also of any augmentations, or diminutions, that have been made during the last five years in the staff, both military and civil, in these Colonies?—Of the military portion we can.

987. Including the civil officers of the army, medical officers, and commissariat?—This information will be furnished by the War Office.

Rear Admiral Sir *Charles Elliot*, called in; and Examined.

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988. *Chairman.*] WHAT Colonial appointments have you held?—I have been [illegible]

989. For

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989. For what periods?—I went to Bermuda at the end of the year 1846, and I came away in the beginning of the year 1853.

990. When were you Governor of Trinidad?—I went from Bermuda to Trinidad, and came away from thence at the end of 1856.

991. Have you been in any other Colonies?—I have served in different parts of the world; originally I was protector of slaves in the Colony of Guiana, and I have seen a great deal of other foreign service. That is the only Colonial service I have held.

992. With reference to the government of Trinidad, what was your experience there in regard to the confidence to be placed in the black troops?—We had a company of black troops of the Second West India Regiment there. It was formerly, as you are aware, the custom to recruit the West India regiments on the coast of Guinea; latterly, that has not been so; and those regiments are now recruited principally in the Colonies.

993. What was the number of troops in Trinidad when you were there?—We had the flank companies of a regiment of infantry, the grenadier company of the Second West India Regiment, and a detachment of artillery.

994. Sir *George Grey.*] What proportion did the black troops bear to the white?—Rather less than half.

995. *Chairman.*] What was the whole number?—Speaking from memory, the European companies were generally weak. The numbers would be about 200 white to 80 black.

996. Where were the black regiments recruited when you were at Trinidad?—Principally in the West Indies. We did not get recruits from the coast of Guinea, which I thought a disadvantage, because the creoles who were recruited were not of the best class usually.

997. At the time you were there, should you have said that reliance could be placed upon the black troops, as against internal disaffection?—There is very little fear indeed of internal disaffection in the West Indian Colonies now. I may take the liberty of dividing them into two classes. In some of the Colonies there is a mixed population, Asiatic and creole. The creoles occasionally show fugitive reminiscences of their old condition, and sometimes sympathise with each other in cases of imaginary wrong to one of their own class rather perniciously for the public peace; but those feelings are rapidly giving way to the spread of intelligence. Freedom soon teaches men what is best for themselves. Sometimes there may have been a little squabble, rather than any formidable disorder.

998. Sir *George Grey.*] We want to know whether black troops are, in your opinion, efficient for the purpose for which they are required in Trinidad?—I have never been able to understand what was the object of a military occupation of these Colonies.

999. *Chairman.*] Let me ask you whether, in your opinion, the presence of troops there is of any use at all?—Yes, I think that some amount of European force is necessary; but I have for many years been of opinion that it is desirable to have a corps of constabulary, something in the nature of the Irish constabulary, instead of detachments of the regular army. Every year's experience confirms me in the view, that no point should be held in military strength, except for the maintenance of our maritime supremacy.

1000. Would you move those between the West India Islands?—I think there should be a head-quarter station at Barbadoes. A few effective men, armed with revolvers and rifles, would, I think, be enough for the security of the peace.

1001. Sir *George Grey.*] In fact, you would recommend an armed police, instead of a regular military force?—For the Windward and Leeward Colonies.

1002. Mr. *Ellice.*] Would you suggest that any part of that body of armed police should be composed of white men?—They should all be Europeans.

1003. What was the relative mortality, in your experience, as between coloured troops and white troops?—The proportion was very heavy against the whites. The coloured troops are not subject to the yellow fever, but they are to cholera.

1004. Would not the same difficulty occur with respect to armed police?—According to my idea, the armed police should consist of very small garrisons, and of a mixed nature. I think that two gun-boat steamers should be attached to them, under the orders of the senior naval officer on the station; and I think that

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that the windward part of the station should never be left without a man-of-war, a small frigate, or large sloop.

1005. Sir *George Grey.*] The question of comparative mortality would be the same with white police as between white troops and coloured troops?—As the constabulary would probably receive higher pay, I should suppose that they would be of a higher standing, and therefore more careful of their health.

1006. Mr. *Ellice.*] In Trinidad, what number of constabulary would you consider sufficient?—I should suppose that the constabulary would be altogether independent of the ordinary police duties, and would be simply for countenance. I think that there should be a force of 150 men at Barbadoes, as a central station, 100 men at Guiana, and 75 at Trinidad, with easy means of concentration; and for that purpose there would be one gun-boat to windward and the other to leeward. For the Leeward Island station you would have 75 men, making up a total of 400. You would then easily enough concentrate a force, so as to prevent anything like a serious disturbance in the islands.

1007. Do you think it safe to maintain those Colonies without any works for external defence, in case of accident?—I hold the opinion that no portion of the Imperial military force should be stationed at any other points than those necessary to be held in effective strength for the maintenance of our maritime supremacy.

1008. You think the dispersion of the military forces of the empire full of danger?—All military and political authorities are, I believe, agreed in the mischief of the dispersion of the regular strength of the empire, and the multiplication of fixed works at the Imperial charge, in ineligible military positions. I consider, too, that there should always be present some means of transport, in rather an advanced state of readiness, at our great naval outports abroad.

1009. By whom do you propose that the police should be paid?—I think that the Crown should undertake the expense of transport, paying the force, and clothing them; the rations should be provided by the Colonists, and the lodging also. There would be no difficulty about barracks in the Colonies I have alluded to, because there is plenty of barrack-room; but I think that the barracks should be kept in order by the Colonists.

1010. Was there no police in Trinidad whilst you were there?—There was a local police.

1011. Would you keep that?—That is for ordinary police purposes. I mean this more in the nature of a *gendarmerie*. The local native police cannot always be steadily relied upon in any occasional trouble; sometimes they will take offence at some imaginary slight offered to one of their own class.

1012. *Chairman.*] Whilst you were at Trinidad, were the troops employed for police purposes?—Never.

1013. Mr. *Ellice.*] Would the change you suggest be acceptable to the Colonists themselves?—You are aware that in the Colonies to windward and leeward, excepting Barbadoes, Guiana, and Trinidad, there are no troops at all; they were withdrawn from Antigua whilst I was there. It is a question only of those three Colonies. At Guiana, if I remember right, there were no European troops whilst I was there. The Colonists would, no doubt, prefer troops.

1014. Sir *George Grey.*] How many years ago is it that you were there?—I left the West Indies in 1856.

1015. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You propose that the black regiments should be discontinued, that all the white troops should be withdrawn, and that, as a substitute for both, there should be raised a local European regiment, distributed through the West India Islands and the Colonies?—I would rather say a constabulary than a regiment; a regiment would involve some considerable depôt of military stores. I think that is dangerous in a position which is not naturally safe, and suitably defended. At Barbadoes, for instance, a frigate might go in and set the whole town on fire, with the mere purpose to destroy the military stores.

1016. You do not mean to dispense with the ordinary local police?—By no means. I am also the last person to undervalue the just claim of the proprietary and settlers in these Colonies to full protection and countenance by the presence of a suitable European Imperial force.

1017. You do not mean to suggest that the European corps should perform the ordinary duty of Irish constabulary?—I understand that to be police duty; I think

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I think it should be rather the duty performed by the *gendarmerie* in France; a duty of countenance, performed by Imperial force.

1018. You mean that there should be a local European corps, to perform in the West Indies the service which is now performed by the troops of the line, and by black regiments?—Differently armed and regulated, and differently moved, with a small staff of officers.

1019. But you propose that they should perform the same services?—Services of countenance.

1020. Mr. *Ellice.*] Would you recruit those men for life?—No; I think you might hold out to steady soldiers who had served three years the inducement that if they would volunteer to serve five years in the constabulary force in the West Indies, it should count for seven years in their time. I would also give some gratuity to every man of continued good character at the period of his discharge.

1021. Sir *George Grey.*] You would have a local stationary force?—No; I would have the head-quarters at Barbadoes, and move them about frequently.

1022. Under what authority would you put them?—Under the orders of the local Government.

1023. Would you put them under any military authority?—Yes; there should be an officer of the rank of a colonel in command.

1024. What would be the ordinary routine of their duties, if there is to be another police force in the island?—They would stand in the same position as the troops do now, except that they would move from Colony to Colony, especially when an epidemic broke out. Prompt dispersion of the force is the best mode of checking the progress of yellow fever.

1025. *Chairman.*] Which would be the principal stations of the police?—British Guiana, Trinidad, and Antigua.

1026. Mr. *Fortescue.*] What number of men do you suggest there should be?—I think that there should be 150 at Barbadoes, 100 at Guiana, 75 at Trinidad, and 75 to leeward, and then I think you would want a depôt of 50 men in England to keep it up.

1027. Sir *George Grey.*] How would it differ from the present system except that it would not be called a regiment of the line, and could not be moved to another part of the world?—I have heard it said by all military officers with whom I have talked upon the subject, that great mischief arises from distributing troops in small detachments.

1028. How would the constitution of that force differ from the constitution of the ordinary force of the line?—I am not competent to decide whether the organisation should be under a special Act of Parliament, or whether the force should be purely military.

1029. Is not your recommendation this, that there should be a local force called a police force, but subject to military discipline, commanded by a military officer, and performing the same duties as are now performed by the military?—Yes.

1030. And paid from the same sources, except that the rations would be paid by the Colony?—Yes; and in case of any of the mbeing called to Colonies not usually having stations, the charge for rations and lodging would for the time being fall upon the Colonies in which they were.

1031. Do you know anything of the Foreign Colonies in the West Indies, Martinique and Guadaloupe?—Yes.

1032. What number of troops are maintained there?—There were something like 3,000 there when I was there, and, I believe, Cayenne inclusive.

1033. Were any of those black troops?—None, I believe.

1034. They were all Europeans?—All Europeans.

1035. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Then it is your opinion that a corps of this kind, consisting of 400 or 500 men, would provide, as far as military protection goes, sufficiently for the defence of all the West Indian Colonies?—Not for the military defence; I know no position to windward which can be held with a view to military defence. The only great natural naval position which I know of to windward in the West Indies is Chaguaramas Bay, in Trinidad; that is a very noble harbour in all respects; easy of defence, beyond the limit of the hurricane range, and most importantly situated, close to the mouths of the Orinoco. It should also be added, that coal has lately been discovered in Trinidad. If we ever

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occupy any position in strength to windward, Chaguaramas Bay is the most eligible.

1036. Not including Jamaica?—Not including Jamaica; that is to leeward.

1037. Do you think it possible to keep the character and morals of this local force up to anything like the level of a regiment of Queen's troops?—I do, and that if they were more highly paid, you might, I think, expect rather higher conditions in that respect.

1038. Do you think that experience shows that a regiment of that kind permanently fixed in a tropical country can be kept up to the character and efficiency of a regiment of the line?—I by no means propose that they should be kept there permanently; I do not think that they should be there more than five years.

1039. Sir *George Grey.*] Each man?—Each man; I think that is quite long enough.

1040. Mr. *Fortescue.*] The regiment itself would not possess the character of a regiment of the British army?—It would be rather a *gendarmerie.*

1041. White West Indian police?—White constabulary.

1042. What is your idea as to officers?—I think they should be officers from the army, highly paid, as the officers of the *gendarmerie* in France are; they are officers of the army, and are usually men of great distinction.

1043. Would you limit them to a short time of service?—I think they should be frequently changed; five years is quite enough for one West Indian campaign.

1044 Are you aware what class of officers are generally procured for the Colonial West Indian regiments?—Whilst I was there I saw some persons of very honourable names in West Indian regiments, and I have been familiar with some very distinguished officers who had served in West Indian regiments.

1045. Sir *George Grey.*] You say you depend very much for the efficiency of this force upon their being more highly paid?—Yes.

1046. What amount of pay would you give them as compared with ordinary pay?—I have thought that at least one-third more should be given to all ranks.

1047. That would be paid from the Imperial Exchequer?—Yes.

1048. Would your plan be any saving of expense?—When I was last in the West Indies there were to windward, if I remember right, 2,000 men with rather an extensive staff. I think my scheme would be less expensive, and otherwise much less objectionable. It must be remembered, however, that this scheme supposes the constant presence of some naval strength on the windward part of the West India station.

1049. Would your plan involve a larger amount of naval force being kept on the windward and leeward station than was there when you were in the West Indies?—Although it is supposed that there should be two or three ships stationed there, I have known the station, in times of other calls for ships of war, without any naval force for several months.

1050. You do not think it would be safe to be without one?—I have no fears of any serious disturbance; I speak of Colonies in which there is a mixed population; there is not likely to be much sympathy between the Asiatic portion of the population and the creole.

1051. Have you made any calculations as to the comparative expense of the present plan, and that which you suggest?—I have not; but it seems clear to me that the force I contemplate would be less expensive than the force in the windward part of the West Indies when I was there. I do not exactly know what the present force consists of.

1052. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you consider that the garrisons at Guadaloupe and Martinique could hold those islands against a naval expedition from a foreign power, say from the English Navy, if there was a general war?—Certainly not; we could concentrate such a force in a short time as would make it necessary for them to abandon those positions.

1053. And yet those are larger garrisons than ours?—Yes.

1054. *A fortiori* the garrisons in our West India Islands are inadequate?—Avowedly so; there is no intention that they should be militarily occupied; they are not military positions.

1055. What is the use, then, of 200 soldiers in Trinidad?—For the purpose of countenance.

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1056. Explain what you mean by countenance?—When I was in Trinidad there were not above 700 men of English birth; there were some of creole and other origin, Spanish and French. These persons are chiefly large proprietors, living for the most part isolated amongst people of different races, and they would naturally desire to have something like a force in case of disturbances, upon which they could rely.

1057. In your opinion 200 troops are kept in Trinidad to preserve the settlers against internal danger?—That is the object.

1058. They would be useless against external attack?—There are no military defences at all.

1059. Their sole object is for the safety of the settlers against internal dangers?—Yes.

1060. Do you consider that the 80 black troops in Trinidad would be of any use against any such internal danger, as you say that is the only object of having troops there at all?—In the event of disturbance among the creole part of the population, I have no doubt that a company of a black regiment, recruited in Africa, would act with perfect vigour; it might want a strong hand to restrain them.

1061. In the case of internal disturbance, which you have stated to be the sole object of having any troops there at all, do you think that black troops, in Trinidad, as now recruited in the West Indies, not in Africa, would be troops upon whom you could rely for such a service?—I confess I do not like them so much being recruited in the West Indies, as if they were recruited on the coast of Guinea.

1062. Do you not consider that the sole defence from external attack of those islands is the British Navy?—I think that the whole fabric of the Colonies, and the foreign commerce of the country, must depend upon the maintenance of our maritime ascendancy.

1063. Must not those islands be at the mercy of any power which has command of the sea, in case of a general war?—Doubtless.

1064. Why do you say that the Crown should pay for the clothes, the transport, arms, and pay of this local force?—I am familiar with these Colonies, and I cannot but remember that, owing to a very large measure passed by the Imperial Parliament, which was most advantageous, no doubt, to all classes of the people, a complete social change was effected. Under these circumstances, I think that the West Indian proprietary are perfectly justified in counting on sufficient countenance and support by Imperial force at the charge of the Imperial Treasury, as respects payment, clothing, and transport. I think that the presence on the spot of such a force as I have suggested would be enough to prevent any disturbance.

1065. You think that the West Indian Colonists have a special claim upon England, owing to a former policy; that, at all events, would not attach to any other Colony not similarly situated?—There are Colonies which we possess which may be looked upon as great off-shoots of the empire, and which must be considered in a different light.

1066. The reasons which induced you to say that the Crown should pay for those troops are reasons special to the West Indies?—Quite.

1067. You allow that the Colonists are themselves most interested in the defence of their shores?—Quite so.

1068. If England withdrew all her troops from the West Indies, do you not believe that the Colonists would be able to defend themselves?—It is quite impossible to make any defence in the West Indian Islands in the case of organised forces going there; there are no positions to do so.

1069. Their sole defence is that of a large naval power, which they could not of course provide?—I apprehend that no foreign forces which might surprise one of our Colonies in the West Indies would remain there after our naval and military strength had collected to dislodge them.

1070. Is there any possible reason why Antigua should be safe without troops, and yet that Trinidad should require them?—There are no Asiatics there; it is a creole population altogether.

1071. In what respect does that contrast with the population of Trinidad?—At Trinidad the population is partly Asiatic.

1072. Do you think that Antigua is, for that reason, safe without troops?—I do not think that Antigua should be left entirely without European force.

1073. You

1073. You think that the reason for troops, they being exclusively for safety against internal dangers, applies to Antigua as well as to Trinidad?—Antigua and the whole Leeward group. If any troops were to be left in that part of the West Indies, I think that some should have been left at Antigua. It is to be remembered that there is a small dockyard at Antigua. I do not think that the Leeward Islands should be left without some European force.

1074. The sole object of troops being maintained in any of these Colonies being to defend settlers against internal dangers, do you not think that if England were to discontinue paying those troops, the Colonists would feel the necessity of raising troops to defend themselves?—The West Indian Colonies, to windward and leeward, are in no position to maintain defences.

1075. In what way are they unable to do so?—With the exception of Guiana they are all very poor. Guiana is saddled with a heavy debt, for which this country has given a guarantee, and Trinidad is in the same position.

1076. Do you think that the owners of property in the West Indies are not rich enough even to defend their own property?—I think they must rely, for the protection of that property, upon our naval protection, which would be very complete as against foreign enemies.

1077. From your knowledge of Trinidad, what would be the result supposing the Imperial Government said that they would no longer undertake to keep troops there?—I should not apprehend anything very serious, but still I think it is very desirable indeed that countenance should be given. You have a large amount of capital there, and if the Colonists thought that they were not in a secure position, there might be a considerable withdrawal of that capital from the Colony.

1078. When you say "countenance," you mean "defence"?—There is no military defence.

1079. You mean police security?—Yes, that is a better expression.

1080. From your knowledge of Trinidad, you think that the owners of property there would rather withdraw from the island than defend themselves?—I will not undertake to say that, but I think that it would be a harsher measure than it would be right for this great nation to take with regard to a population placed in such altered circumstances within the last 30 years by an Act of the Imperial Parliament. Some countenance is necessary on the part of the Imperial Government, in my opinion.

1081. *Chairman.*] You have served in British Guiana, have you not?—I have.

1082. Have you any means of knowing whether the answer you gave as to the inability of the Colonies to provide means of defence applies also to British Guiana?—Guiana I consider the most flourishing Colony of the British West Indies.

1083. Do you consider that Guiana would be unable to defray the cost of its own internal defences?—Guiana, I believe, does contribute something in the way of barrack accommodation.

1084. Mr. *Baxter.*] What would be the result if the small detachments of troops which are now in the Colonies were withdrawn, or if the British Government insisted upon the Colonies defraying their own expenses?—Great uneasiness was felt throughout the West Indies when the troops were withdrawn from St. Vincent and Grenada.

1085. What was the reason of that uneasiness?—They considered that it was a protection which they should not be deprived of.

1086. You say that these small detachments are no defence against a foreign power?—They are not so intended.

1087. Mr. *Adderley.*] Did the uneasiness which was felt by the Colonists appear to be well grounded?—I was not in the West Indies when the troops were removed, but I saw by the papers that there had been disturbances at Antigua afterwards, although they were not very serious, and that it was necessary to send a force down there.

1088. Sir *George Grey.*] What was the amount of the constabulary force in Trinidad when you were there?—There were, to the best of my recollection, 100 men, and 15 or 20 of them were mounted.

1089. Were there any Europeans?—A few, but they were principally creoles.

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1090. Did you consider that a sufficient constabulary force for the ordinary police duties?—Quite so.

1091. How was the expense of maintaining that force defrayed?—By the Colonists altogether; they were clothed, boarded, and paid for by the Colonists.

1092. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not your opinion that the population of Trinidad is one of a most heterogeneous character?—More so than any in the West Indies.

1093. There are, of course, people of English descent, French, and Spanish?—Yes.

1094. Are there also Africans?—Africans and Asiatics.

1095. And Indian coolies?—Yes.

1096. Are there any Chinese?—Yes, a small proportion.

1097. Do you consider that a very peculiar and exceptional state of things?—Quite so.

1098. Are not the inhabitants liable to excitement and to quarrel amongst themselves?—Not upon the same grounds of excitement. The creole population will sympathise with each other upon any supposed slight to their class, but they have not much sympathy with the coolies, supposing any trouble to fall upon them.

1099. I suppose there is far greater danger of occasional excitement in a population so constituted than there would be in an English Colony?—When I was at Trinidad, I sometimes asked myself that question, whether upon the whole there was less danger at Barbadoes, where the population is altogether creole, than in our Colony, where it was mixed. Upon the whole, I think that there would be more risk of serious general disturbance amongst a completely creole population of labourers than in a mixed community of Asiatic and creole labouring classes. They would pull more together in the case of some supposed slight offered to them. The Asiatics of Hindostan, on the other hand, might be disposed to resent any unintentional jar upon their prejudices. The Chinese would have no sympathy with creoles or coolies.

1100. Do you think that no means of preserving internal order amongst the heterogeneous population in the West India Colonies are necessary beyond what would be necessary in a small English Colony like New Brunswick or Tasmania, for example?—I take the standard of intelligence in Tasmania and New Brunswick to be different from the standard of intelligence in the West India Colonies.

1101. Then do you consider that in the West India Colonies something more is wanting than the mere ordinary police which is sufficient for an English community?—Certainly.

1102. Then you would say that such a force is intended not merely to protect the English settlers against the other races, but to preserve order amongst this heterogeneous population?—Yes.

1103. Do you think that without the presence of some such moderate force there would be a feeling of security to life and property?—I think not.

1104. Do you think that these West Indian Colonies are fit to be anything but dependencies of some great power?—I think not.

1105. Do you think that if they ceased to be dependencies of England they would naturally fall into a position of dependence upon some other power. Do you think that they are able to take care of themselves?—Having been once under the English flag, I think that they would never willingly subject themselves to any other power. If they ever fell into a position of dependency upon some other power, I think they would be glad to come back to us again as soon as our maritime ascendancy was asserted.

1106. *Chairman.*] Do you consider that any power would think them worth having?—Some of them have a value as coaling stations.

1107. Mr. *Baxter.*] What is the population of Trinidad?—There were about 80,000 people when I was there.

1108. Do you consider that 140 European soldiers are sufficient in that population to give the ample security to life and property just now referred to?—A very small force of European constabulary would, in my mind, be quite sufficient for the protection of life and property in Trinidad. The labouring classes of that island are well contented to live under the British flag, and I see no danger there of conspiracy against the Government, or against the employers of labour, by whom the people are justly and kindly treated.

1109. Do

1109. Do you consider that a force of 140 Europeans is sufficient for the security of life and property?—I think so, except in some occasional case of disturbance.

1110. In that rich island, do you think that there would be any serious objection on the part of the Colonists to pay for a force of that sort themselves?—I think that it would be more effectively managed if paid by the Crown.

1111. You think it would be more efficiently managed, but you do not think that the Colonists would object to pay a small sum necessary for keeping up such a force?—I think they would be greatly astonished if such a proposal were made to them. I think that they cannot be expected to do more than feed such a force of Europeans, and maintain their barrack accommodation.

1112. *Chairman.*] Bermuda is, I believe, the head-quarters of the North American station?—The Admiral commands on the North American station and the West Indian.

1113. Which is called the head-quarters?—In the summer months he remains at Halifax, and usually comes down to Bermuda about the middle of October.

1114. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You think that if the Imperial Government were to announce to Trinidad that for the future she would provide no description of military force for the purpose of preserving order amongst the various populations of that island, there would exist feelings of surprise and discontent?—Yes, and of uneasiness.

1115. Mr. *Baxter.*] Would those feelings be excited if instead of withdrawing the troops the Imperial Government insisted upon the Colony paying for them?—I think so; the Colonial revenues are all burdened.

1116. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think that the Imperial Government might fairly call upon these Colonies for a contribution towards the expense of the military force?—I think they should keep their barracks always in order, and pay the expense of the rations. I disapprove of their furnishing rations in kind.

1117. Mr. *Adderley.*] When you say you do not think they would so effectually defend themselves as England defends them, do you not suppose, as a general rule, that people look sharper after their own defences than others do for them?—These Colonies are not in a situation to do so.

1118. The only reason why, in your opinion, they would defend themselves less effectually than others would is their poverty?—And from the want of defensive positions.

1119. The presence of British troops in a Colony like that brings a considerable amount of money into the Colony?—Yes.

1120. That may be another ground why this kind of defence is popular?—It may be.

1121. *Chairman.*] I believe the fortifications are very extensive in Bermuda?—Very.

1122. Sir *G. Grey.*] It is an important naval station?—I consider it a most important part of the fleet of this country.

1123. *Chairman.*] You have been to Halifax?—I have.

1124. Do you consider that an important station?—I do.

1125. Do you think the presence of British troops in the North American Colonies of the slightest value?—I have never been able to understand what is the object of a military occupation of the Canadas.

1126. Mr. *Adderley.*] Does that include Halifax?—No; Halifax is a very important part of the naval strength of this country.

1127. Do you think that Halifax would be defended by the Nova Scotians if England did not defend it?—The inhabitants of Nova Scotia are people of great spirit; and it is impossible to suppose that they would be content to live under any other flag but the English flag.

1128. Do you think that they would be less effectively defended by themselves?—I hold Nova Scotia to be one of the most important naval positions which this country has.

1129. Do you say of Nova Scotia as you said of Trinidad, that they would defend themselves less effectually than they are defended by others?—Putting out of the question the great Imperial interests that are concerned at Nova Scotia, I think it impossible to imagine that the people of Nova Scotia would

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be content to live under any other flag than the British flag, or such as they might choose for themselves.

1130. If England withdrew the garrison, or insisted upon the Colony paying for it, do you think they would leave Halifax undefended?—Yes; I do not suppose that they would defend Halifax. It is a great military position, and is defended, I understand, as such, with a view to sudden attack. They have no means of doing that.

1131. Sir *George Grey.*] Then you would not withdraw the Imperial military force from Halifax?—By no means.

1132. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You have no idea of troops being kept there, as they ought to be in the West Indian Colonies, for the purpose of merely preserving internal order?—They are maintained there for the purposes of the empire.

1133. You think the little Colony of Nova Scotia incapable of holding the great naval position of Halifax against a foreign enemy?—Yes.

1134. *Chairman.*] Do you consider that the object of maintaining such ports as Halifax is for the protection of the course of our trade?—Yes, viewed as a general rule, I think the most effective as well as the most economical defence of our outlying dependencies will be found to be identical with the best means of protecting the great courses of our foreign trade.

1135. Mr. *Adderley.*] What force should, in your opinion, be maintained in Halifax?—I have heard military officers of great experience say, that with 1,500 or 1,800 good troops it would be very difficult to take Halifax by surprise.

1136. Do you consider the present garrison of Halifax, 1,300 men, sufficient?—After the frequent conversations I have had with military men, I should have thought that a small garrison.

1137. *Chairman.*] You consider that money spent upon the Colonial defences, which is not spent either for protecting the course of our trade, or for keeping in order disaffected populations, is money comparatively thrown away, or is an expenditure for which you see no reason?—I think that no positions should be held in strength by the Imperial Government except such as are necessary for maintaining our maritime supremacy.

1138. Mr. *Baxter.*] What are the positions in the West Indies?—The great positions on the eastern shores of America, I think, are Halifax, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and Jamaica.

1139. In your opinion, the British garrisons ought to be confined to Jamaica and Bermuda?—Yes, and Halifax.

1140. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you not see great danger in important positions being held by England with an inadequate garrison?—That has been the opinion all military men of great weight.

1141. What do you consider would be the result of an important place like Halifax being held by England with an inadequate garrison?—That is a question more for statesmen to answer than myself.

1142. You consider that great mischief may result from large depôts of arms and stores, and positions of considerable importance being held by England, and inadequately defended?—Quite so.

1143. Sir *George Grey.*] In your opinion, is Halifax inadequately garrisoned, taking into consideration the power of reinforcing it?—I consider that the possession by Her Majesty's Government of a sufficient tonnage of iron troop-ships, fitted and constructed in all respects in the most effective manner for speed, and capable of transporting 2,000 men each a distance of 7,000 miles within 21 days, is essential to any sound system for the protection of our outlying interests and dependencies. With means of this kind there would be no difficulty in reinforcing Halifax and our other great ports very rapidly and effectively. Very rapid means of maritime transport appear to me to be equally necessary on considerations of public security and of economy.

1144. Mr. *Baxter.*] How many men would it take to garrison Jamaica and Bermuda, in your opinion?—I think there are 2,000 Europeans above the yellow fever mark, and I suppose that that number would be sufficient at Jamaica.

1145. How many men are necessary for Bermuda?—I think, with the altered circumstances of naval warfare, there ought to be a different organisation for Bermuda. I have seen an American steamer of light draft come in, turning all the works several miles out of gun-shot. I think that you should have the

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the means of moving men about more rapidly, and for that purpose I think that there should be a flotilla there.

1146. Mr. *Adderley.*] You consider that there should be a large naval force?—Yes; I think that there should be means of moving men and guns about more rapidly.

1147. Mr. *Baxter.*] What was the whole military force of Bermuda whilst you were there?—It consisted of about 1,300 or 1,400 men; a battalion of infantry, a company of artillery, and a company of sappers.

1148. Was that number enough to man the works?—No.

1149. If convicts were no longer sent to Bermuda, there would, I suppose, be a smaller force kept?—I should think the force there should always be kept in effective strength.

1150. Do you know that part of the military force is employed in guarding the convicts?—When I was there we did not put the troops over the convicts, but they were always in reserve, of course.

1151. Do you consider the works sufficient in themselves?—When I left Bermuda I considered the military works completed, and the naval works, I should have supposed, would have been in three or four years. I do not know in what state they are now.

1152. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean the naval dockyard?—Yes.

1153. For the purpose of repairing the ships?—Yes, for repairing ships, and for naval stores. I understood that the naval works were nearly completed, but I have not been there for some years.

Lunæ, 29° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Childers.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Fortescue.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Baxter.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *William George Anderson*, called in; and Examined.

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1154. *Chairman.*] WHAT office do you hold in the Treasury?—I am a Principal Clerk in the Treasury.

1155. Will you inform the Committee what is the date of the Treasury Minute by which appropriations in aid of military expenditure arising from the colonial funds are regulated?—The Minute is dated 2 May 1848.

1156. Previous to that what was the system adopted with regard to those payments?—The War Department and the Admiralty had large receipts arising from old stores, rents, military contributions, and various other sources which they abated from their estimates, and submitted to Parliament estimates of the net sums required for the various public services. Some departments had one mode of dealing with those receipts, other departments had another mode; sometimes the actual receipts for the past year were credited in the estimates, and in other cases the prospective receipts of the coming year. The Treasury in 1848, in consequence of a Resolution of the House of Commons, moved, I think, by Dr. Bowring, directed that all these extra receipts should be paid into the Exchequer, and that the gross sums required by the different departments should be voted.

1157. That practice has been carried out since the Treasury Minute of 1848?—Since 1848 that practice has been carried out with regard to those receipts. It was the commencement of the change, which was completed in 1854 by Mr. Gladstone, by which the gross revenues were directed to be paid in, and the gross charges were to be voted out upon estimates.

1158. Some perplexity has arisen by reason of the evidence given before us as to the mode of dealing with the receipts of the Colony of Victoria, can you give us any particular information with regard to that?—Those receipts for military contributions, so far as the Treasury has any knowledge of them, where they are fixed contributions, are paid into the Exchequer through the military accountants on the spot; but there have been different modes in which these contributions have been dealt with. I have only seen these accounts this morning, but it appears to me that there are three modes in which the Colonies pay these contributions; some by fixed contributions which pass into the Consolidated Fund, others, such as Victoria, by paying for a surplus number of troops beyond a fixed number allowed, and some pay Colonial allowances to the troops. In Victoria the regular pay and allowances of 400 soldiers, I believe, are pad out of Imperial funds; all beyond that number are paid for by the Colony.

1159. Can you give any information as to how this is done in the Colony of Victoria?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details of the subject to be able to state precisely what the practice is, but from the accounts which I have seen this morning at the War Office it appears to me that the subject is very much involved, and the Treasury has been in correspondence with the War Department

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Department and the Audit Office with a view to place the whole system on a different footing.

1160. Will you be prepared on a future day to produce before the Committee some clear explanation of the system which now exists, and the recommendations of your department as to how it should be conducted in future?—I will devote my attention to it. The Treasury called upon the War Department as far back as July last to furnish a statement of the mode in which the whole of this business is managed. They have not yet had from the War Department replies to that requisition, but as soon as they receive that statement I think they will be in a position to issue instructions as to the mode in which these contributions should be dealt with in future; but it will take some little time.

1161. Sir *George Grey.*] Have you seen the return which has been laid before the Committee, showing the force stationed in the British Dependencies and the expenditure incurred in respect of it, containing a column of colonial military expenditure?—I have seen the account.

1162. Would you be able on a future day to furnish us with a statement of the sums actually paid into the Imperial Exchequer from the Colony of Victoria on account of the military expenditure during the last five years, and showing also how that has been brought to account?—There would be no difficulty, with the assistance of the War Department, in preparing such a statement. A portion of the amount only is paid into the Exchequer; another portion paid by the Colony is distributed directly to the troops without passing through the Public Accounts.

1163. I am speaking now only of that portion of the expenditure which goes in diminution of the Imperial military expenditure, exclusive of that which is paid by the Colony in the shape of extra pay and allowances?—That can be furnished no doubt from the War Department. I will endeavour to ascertain that.

1164. Mr. *Childers.*] You say that in 1848 the practice commenced of taking a vote for the entire charge and bringing into the Exchequer any contribution from the Colony, the sale of all stores or any miscellaneous receipts of that kind?—Exactly. The change was made in consequence of a Resolution of the House of Commons.

1165. In 1848?—The Resolution, I believe, was passed before that time; but the first step was taken in 1848, when Sir Charles Wood was Chancellor of the Exchequer.

1166. Are you quite certain that in every year since 1848 the estimates have included all the Imperial charges for troops in the Colonies?—I cannot state that; the War Department alone can furnish that information.

1167. Does the Treasury exercise no check over the estimates of the War Department?—There is a general approval given by the Treasury to the estimates, but the details rest upon the responsibility of the department.

1168. If the war estimates omitted a provision for a particular regiment, on the ground that its expense was defrayed by a Colony, would it not be the duty of the Treasury to see that that was rectified?—The Treasury could not enter into the details.

1169. The Treasury lay down rules, but do not see that they are carried out?—The Commissioners of Audit, who have the revision of the expenditure of the department, would call the attention of the Treasury to such an omission as that.

1170. I am speaking of the estimates; there is not any practical supervision?—A very general supervision, but not a detailed supervision; they are framed upon the responsibility of the department.

1171. Then if, since 1848, any of the Imperial military expenditure has been defrayed by the Colonies, it would be right that that should appear in the estimate; and that the amount so paid in by the Colony should be paid into the Exchequer?—That is my opinion; not only as regards the charge which falls upon the Imperial funds, but an estimate should be prepared for the gross, whether paid by the Colony or out of Imperial funds.

1172. If they were defrayed by the Colony, it would be right that the Imperial pay should be voted in the Army Estimates?—Certainly, I should say so.

1173. Any deviation from that practice would be a violation of the Treasury Minute?—Certainly.

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1174. Does that extend to estimates for military contingencies, such as stores and provisions?—It extends to the whole of the estimates; every charge should appear in those estimates.

1175. There is an Imperial charge for stores and provisions for every regiment?—The stoppage for provisions would not be stated in the estimates.

1176. Wherever a regiment is stationed, we should see the charge for that under Number 10?—Not for the pay.

1177. And under Number 10 for the provisions and stores?—I do not think you would see the charge for each regiment; you might see the excess of cost for provisions in each Colony.

1178. No. 10 is the estimate for forage, provisions, barracks, lodging, &c.; where a regiment is stationed in any Colony, whether the provisions are paid for by the Colony or not, the estimate ought to include a vote for the regiment so stationed, ought it not?—That estimate ought, I think, to include the gross charge; but such has not hitherto been the practice.

1179. But the vote shows the different Colonies or stations separately?—Yes.

1180. So that, if from that estimate we find one Colony has been systematically omitted, there is reason to suspect that the matter has not been brought properly to account?—There would apparently be an error in the statement of the account. I presume in that case that the Colony has paid the charge directly, without its being passed through the Public Accounts.

1181. Supposing the Colony has paid the charge directly, to whom would it pay it?—No doubt to the functionary of the War Department.

1182. That functionary is usually the senior commissariat officer?—The paymaster of the regiment would be the proper person; the commissary is merely an intermediate agent.

1183. The commissary is the only person with whom they deal directly?—He raises the money and distributes it to the regimental paymasters.

1184. Therefore in the accounts of the Military chest or the Treasury chest in the Colony, any expenditure of that sort would appear?—It ought to appear there if the money is paid to the commissariat officer.

1185. Those accounts, if I understand right, go to the Treasury?—They go to the Audit Office.

1186. Not to the Treasury?—No.

1187. The accounts of the military chest, you say, are not examined in the Treasury?—They are examined by the Audit Office on behalf of the Treasury.

1188. But the Treasury is responsible for that examination?—The Treasury have the whole control over the funds of the Treasury chest.

1189. If anything in those accounts appeared inconsistent with the Treasury Minute of May 1848, it would be the duty of the Audit Office and of the Treasury to call attention to that discrepancy?—It would be the duty of the Audit Office to inform the Treasury, so that it might take steps to have the matter remedied, and I presume they have done so from the letter to which I refer, dated so far back as July 1860.

1190. Between 1848 and 1860, have no such representations been made by the Audit Office?—I have not seen any. It does not pass directly through my department, but it has come under my notice this morning that the last letter written on the subject is dated July last.

1191. With regard to Victoria, whenever the Home government pays the extra allowances you take a vote for it?—Yes, I believe that is the rule.

1192. Where the Home government does not pay those extra allowances, they do not?—They do not.

1193. If the Colony did not pay those allowances, they would of course, fall upon the Home government?—They would be voted upon the estimates.

1194. That being the case, the contribution from the Colony is a direct reduction of the charge which would fall upon the Home government?—Certainly.

1195. Ought not that, under the Minute of 1848, to have appeared in the estimates?—I think so.

1196. In your opinion, the practice of not entering those charges in the estimates and of not bringing them to account is, at any rate, in violation of the Minute of May 1848?—I think it is contrary to the spirit of that Minute which

which required that the gross sum should appear on both sides of our accounts, and that no fact should be suppressed.

1197. The result of not adhering to that rule has been great confusion?—I think that has been the result.

1198. In your opinion, it would be better in future, to include all sums defrayed by the Colonies, on account of Her Majesty's troops, in the estimates of expenditure, taking credit for them as contributions from the Colony?—I think that the estimates voted by Parliament should cover the whole of those charges, and that the amount repaid by the Colonies, should be paid into the Exchequer.

1199. Do you think it would be better to show in the estimates the amount contributed in past years, or the amount to be contributed in the year for which the estimate is voted?—I think the contributions should be omitted from the estimates altogether; but in the public accounts, the sums actually paid by the Colonies should appear.

1200. Would it not be well to show, in the paper at the end of the estimates, the contribution which will probably be made in reduction of the amount?—I would take a vote for the full amount; but the contribution should be stated at the foot of the estimates, so as to show the amount which reverts to the Exchequer.

1201. Do you know the exact mode in which the vote for military expenditure in Victoria has been taken?—It is shown in the printed estimates.

1202. Is it not a gross sum to be paid over quarterly to the senior officer, to be appropriated for the pay of the troops, in such a manner as Her Majesty may direct?—That is so.

1203. Was not that a distinct intimation that the expenditure of that sum should be the subject of a Royal warrant?—I think so.

1204. And it has been a very grave violation of the rule that that should not be accounted for?—I think it should have appeared according to the spirit of the Treasury Minute of May 1848, on both sides of the account.

1205. And the apparent intention of the vote itself?—Of the Colonial vote.

1206. Mr. *Baxter.*] Has your attention been called to the statement of the sums passed to the credit of the Exchequer in the books of the War Office, at p. 154 of the Army Estimates?—Yes, I have seen that statement; it is added to the annual estimates under the Minute of the 2d of May 1848, to which I have referred.

1207. Can you tell us whether this 72,487 *l.* represents the whole contributions from the Colonial revenues in aid of the military expenditure which has found its way into the Exchequer?—No doubt that is the full sum which has been paid into the Exchequer during the period to which that account refers, but other sums are contributed by the Colonies, which are paid directly to the men, which do not pass into the Exchequer.

1208. There is no additional sum which finds its way into the Exchequer of this country?—None.

1209. Whose duty is it to see that the contributions for which the Colonial revenues are liable are paid either directly into the Imperial Exchequer, or to persons connected with the Imperial Government on the spot?—It is the duty of the War Department to watch the collection of all those receipts.

1210. Under the superintendence of the Treasury?—No, it is part of the ordinary duty of the department; formerly these receipts never passed into the Exchequer at all; they were abated on the estimates, and the War Department acted just as a revenue department does in collecting the revenue which belongs to it.

1211. Do I understand that the Treasury simply receive whatever contributions the Colonies may choose to give, without having any means of ascertaining whether those contributions are in order or not?—It is the duty of the War Department to check that, and to see that all sums payable by the Colonies are paid over to the military chests in the Colonies; their accounts are audited, and if they omit to perform that duty the attention of the Treasury would be called to it by the Commissioners of Audit.

1212. Has the attention of the Treasury been frequently called to the state of these accounts, by the Commissioners of Audit?—There is a correspondence going on now between the Treasury, the Audit Office, and the War Department, on the subject of these colonial contributions.

1213. Did that begin in July last?—I cannot say when it began; but it terminated then; the last letter from the Treasury to the War Department,

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calling for information which has not yet been supplied, is dated in July. The delay has probably arisen from the necessity of referring to the Colonies for information.

1214. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you see any objection to the charge for the troops in Australia, which is to be repaid by Australia, being entered upon the Estimates in the same way as the pay of the troops in India is entered?—I think that the Estimates should give the full charge, and that the full charge should be voted; all sums which are repaid by the Colonies, should go into the Exchequer.

1215. Do you see any objection to the mode in which the charge for the troops in India is voted upon the Estimates?—Very considerable difficulty arises with regard to that mode; at the present moment probably the Indian Department is in debt to the Government seven or eight hundreds thousand pounds for advances made in this country, on account of charges repayable by India; considerable embarrassment is caused by the delay which takes place in the repayment of these advances; I would rather see the full charges voted, and every repayment credited.

1216. Your proposal extends to a different mode to that adopted for India?—I think it will come to that, owing to the great embarrassment which the present system entails in regulating the Army Finances.

1217. Sir *George Grey.*] It has been assumed that, from Vote 10, to which reference has been made, which is for provisions, forage, fuel and light, including money allowances in lieu thereof, at the stations mentioned, Victoria has been omitted. Are you able to inform us whether the New South Wales command includes Victoria?—I believe Victoria is part of the New South Wales command, and would therefore be included in that Estimate.

1218. Are you also aware whether in the Estimates the vote is taken for the charge of the establishment of every regiment in the service, with the exception only of those which are marked, at p. 31 of the Estimates, as serving in India?—I believe that is the case; but I have no practical knowledge of the detailed preparation of these Estimates; that duty belongs to the War Department, and not to the Treasury.

1219. If that is so, would not that vote cover the pay and allowances of any regiment serving at Victoria?—Certainly.

1220. By whom was the statement at p. 154 of the Estimates proposed?—By the War Department.

1221. Exclusively?—Exclusively.

1222. Mr. *Childers.*] Would it not be more correct to say that New South Wales is included in Victoria?—It may be so; I am not in any way responsible for the preparation of the Estimates; it may be a wrong description.

1223. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In the annual paper just delivered by the Treasury, giving the state of the Treasury chest at end of the financial year 1860, only three colonies, I believe, are given as having paid any military contribution into the military chest; the Ionian Islands, Ceylon, the Mauritius, and perhaps Malta. I suppose that if any colony has paid a military contribution into the Treasury chest within that year, which ought to appear in that account?—There are four colonies which pay a fixed contribution, Ceylon, as well as Malta, the Ionian Islands, and the Mauritius; and it is those four only which pay the sums into the military chest. Any other contributions which are paid, are paid to the military authorities direct; that is, to the paymaster of the regiment; and those do not pass through the Treasury chest at all.

1224. I take it those are older military contributions, fixed by Colonial Acts?—They are of long standing, I believe.

1225. Then it appears that the military contribution of Victoria, which is not fixed by Colonial Act, but is annually voted, has never been treated in the same way as the fixed military contributions?—They are not paid, I believe, into the military chest; certain sums have reached the Exchequer, but through a different channel.

1226. Through what channel?—They have been paid to the paymaster of the regiment, returned in his accounts with the War Office, and the War Office have made the payment direct to the Exchequer here.

1227. Sir *George Grey.*] In the Estimates of last year there is an entry of a sum of between 15,000 *l.* and 20,000 *l.*, and with reference to it a statement corresponding with that at p. 154?—Yes.

1228. Would

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1228. Would that come from the Treasury?—It would be returned by the military officer in his accounts with the War Department, and the War Department here would transfer the fund to the Exchequer.

1229. Do you see any difficulty in adopting a uniform system in those accounts?—It appears to me that the whole system requires a change, and that there should be but one mode of dealing with the contributions, in whatever form they are made.

1230. *Mr. Childers.*] Are you sure that these moneys were paid direct to the paymasters?—I have seen seen a pay-list this morning from Victoria, in which certain sums were put down as paid by the Colony to the paymaster.

1231. Were they not paid by the Colony to the officer in charge of the military chest?—They may have passed through the military chest to the paymaster; but I believe the officer in charge of the military chest or the regimental paymaster accounted directly to the Colony for the expenditure of those sums.

1232. And omitted them from his accounts in the military chest?—And omitted them from the accounts rendered to the War Department and the Audit Office.

1233. The military chest includes a great many accounts which do not come into the Home accounts?—I think that every sum paid into the Treasury chest in the colony, ought to appear in the accounts rendered to the Home Government.

1234. The accounts of the military chest include transactions which do not come into the receipt and expenditure of the Exchequer?—Clearly.

1235. So that it does not follow that every sum which appears in the accounts of the military chest of the station, should come afterwards into the revenue and expenditure accounts laid before Parliament?—Not in the Exchequer account; very few charges appear in that.

1236. That being the case, why has the commissariat officer, in charge of the military chest, omitted from his accounts these payments by the Colony?—I apprehend, the reason is, that he has accounted for them directly to the colonial authorities; that he has considered himself as a sub-accountant for those payments to the colonial authorities, and has rendered them an account.

1237. Is not that in direct violation of the rules by which the military chest is governed?—I think it is wrong.

1238. Are not the commissariat officers instructed not to keep separate accounts?—I believe they are so instructed, and that explanations have been called for which form part of the correspondence to which I have referred.

1239. Who has audited those accounts of money received from the Colony?—The Colonial Auditor would be the person to examine them.

1240. How could he audit expenditure of money which has been paid over to the officer at the station, to be defrayed as Her Majesty may direct?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the regulations by which those receipts and payments are governed to be able to answer the question.

1241. Would not the inevitable result of such a vote, and the money under it not being paid into the military chest, be, that the accounts could not be audited at all?—I should imagine that those sums paid out of the Colonial Treasury to the Treasury chest officer, would be accounted for by him to the Colony; I think that the rules of colonial audit would apply to that sum.

1242. But where the amount is directed to be paid over in four quarterly payments, would not the receipt be a sufficient voucher?—The receipt would be a sufficient voucher, for the sum advanced; but the detailed application of the money would necessarily be audited either by the colonial authorities or by the War Office, according to our rules of audit, applicable to Imperial funds; I think that in any change of system the latter course should be adopted.

1243. *Chairman.*] Will you prepare, if you please, a paper giving a clear explanation of the present system, and of the alterations suggested by the department, and produce it before this Committee?—I will endeavour to ascertain from the War Department all facts which bear upon this question, and we shall be prepared to state the view of the Treasury as to the mode in which they should be henceforth regulated.

1244. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have the audit office, in your opinion, any correct data upon which to form an opinion whether the contributions which have been paid are correct or not?—I think that the examination of the detailed expenditure

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of all the advances made by the Colonies should be conducted by the War Office; the Audit Office merely examines the Treasury chest account to see that all sums advanced out of the Treasury chest to any department having received grants from Parliament, are repaid out of such grants.

1245. The Audit Office, so far as I can see, affords no guarantee that all contributions due from the Colonies have actually been paid through the account of the War Office?—It is no part of the duty of the Audit Office to check that, but it is the duty of the War Department to see that all contributions out of colonial funds in aid of military expenditure are duly brought to account.

Mr. *Henry William Sharp Whiffin*, called in; and further Examined.

Mr. *H. W. S. Whiffen.*

1246. Sir *George Grey.*] YOU informed us the other day that you were employed in the War Department in the preparation of the Estimates?—The Estimates for the present year were prepared under my superintendence.

1247. You are conversant, I presume, with the particulars of Vote 10?—Yes.

1248. Are you able to inform us whether, as Victoria is not mentioned in the list of stations, it is really excluded, or included under the head of New South Wales?—It is included under New South Wales. Several years ago Sydney was the headquarters of the Australian colonies; but about eight years ago, the headquarters were transferred to Victoria, and the term "New South Wales" is still kept up, although it embraces and includes both Victoria and Sydney.

1249. Is it the case, that in these Estimates, the whole charge of the regimental establishment of troops serving in Victoria is voted by Parliament, or is any reduction made on account of payments made by the Colony?—The whole amount is voted, and no deduction is made.

1250. Mr. *Childers.*] That is so for the present year?—It is.

1251. You cannot speak to what has been done in past years?—I cannot, but the officers and men at both stations receive Imperial pay, excepting, I believe, one company of Royal Artillery stationed in New South Wales.

General Sir *John F. Burgoyne*, called in; and Examined.

Gen. Sir *J. F. Burgoyne.*

1252. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Inspector General of Fortifications?—I am.

1253. There are, I believe, deputy inspectors appointed who report to you?—There are.

1254. Will you state to the Committee what you consider the chief stations in a military point of view which it is important for us to maintain in strength, excluding the Mediterranean garrisons?—I think that the Mauritius and Bermuda are the two principal ones, and after those, perhaps Halifax. I know that the navy attach great importance to Halifax. Then there come, perhaps, in a secondary view, the Cape, Ceylon, Hong Kong, and St. Helena; and besides those, others are now rising into notice of some importance, particularly as coaling stations for steamers, such as Aden and Seychelles; and the Falkland Islands, I imagine, will be of importance in that respect.

1255. I believe there are now works at all those places?—There are, but many of them are quite incomplete and inefficient; most of them have great capabilities for defence, all of them, indeed, except the Cape and Halifax.

1256. I observe in reference to the works at Mauritius, that the total estimated cost of works there is 202,000 *l.*, the sum already expended as posted up to March 1860, is 119,450 *l.*, 15,000 *l.* is proposed for the present year, leaving 64,000 *l.* to be expended; can you inform the Committee whether, when that 64,000 *l.* has been expended, the works will be complete?—No, I think they will require a great addition; those Estimates were framed a great many years ago, and at a time when we were very much limited in our views, and military powers have augmented to such degree the modes of attack th, at hardly any of those total Estimates can now be relied upon.

1257. Can you give the Committee any idea of what should be the additional expenditure in order to complete those works at Mauritius, in the mode which you think desirable?—I could not tell you offhand; at the present moment we have under consideration some reports from Mauritius; the General there

there has taken a new view of the works, that is, he attaches more importance to the protection of the whole of the island than has been done before, and I think very judiciously so; that will alter the consideration of expense.

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1258. What is the ground upon which you consider the defence of the Mauritius important?—It is well known, I believe, that before it was taken by us in the French war, the loss we sustained from cruisers that came out from the Mauritius amounted to about seven millions of money; besides the indirect loss by delay in waiting for convoys, and having to act together in that way. The loss, therefore, was enormous, and with the introduction of steam would probably now be still more. Then again the Mauritius is under some degree of danger from the neighbourhood of the island of Bourbon, now held by the French, where they have a considerable body of troops. Mauritius has a very fine harbour, and is in the direct communication from the Cape to India, and has great reference also to the communications with Australia.

1259. By what soldiers are those works manned?—Entirely by Europeans; it is one of those colonies in which, I believe, it is found impracticable to collect a local force which, if it could be collected, would be of the greatest advantage.

1260. The cost of those works is, I presume, entirely defrayed by the Imperial Exchequer?—Entirely so.

1261. Including not only the cost of erecting them, but of defending them?—Entirely; I believe the island makes some contribution in money.

1262. I observe that the local revenue of the Mauritius, by the last returns, is given at nearly half a million; do you think that Mauritius might fairly be called upon to do something towards its own defence?—Wherever you call upon a colony, it should be directly for money, and not to pay any portion of the distinct expenses, because that creates confusion; for instance, a discussion arose some short time ago, about the removal of a company of artillery from Sydney to New Zealand because the Colony had paid part of the expenses of that company. I think that if the colony pays a given sum of money, upon some calculation to be agreed upon, it would be better than letting them share the expenses, as the Ionian Islands do, which pay 25,000*l.* a year.

1263. Looking at the resources of the Mauritius, do you think it fair that they should be called upon to pay more than they do now towards their own defences?—That is hardly within my attributes; but I should think they ought to pay; they have no other charges, I believe.

1264. Sir *George Grey.*] You have very clearly stated what, in your opinion, is the value of the Mauritius to this country; I should like to know what you consider to be the object of these forts; are they to enable the garrison to stand a regular siege, and if so, of what duration?—If we try to defend the whole island the works will chiefly consist of small batteries and forts round the coasts; the landing-places are limited in extent and number, and that appears to be the most practicable and the best mode of proceeding.

1265. What garrison would be requisite effectually to man the works in the event of an attack?—When you have available works, a very small garrison will make a respectable defence, unless the attack is very forcible indeed.

1266. What is the ordinary garrison there?—Not above 1,800 or 2,000.

1267. What proportion of that is artillery?—I am not aware; but I suppose they have three or four companies.

1268. Do you know the amount of force which they have in the Island of Bourbon?—One thousand five hundred regulars and 5,000 militia; they have a great advantage over us in respect of the militia.

1269. Is that island fortified?—It is not, with the exception of a few batteries about the coast; we know little about Bourbon.

1270. Would the object of the Mauritius forts be to enable the garrison to withstand an attack until assistance came?—By defending the island I hope we should be allowed to continue defences for Fort George, which is what we have been confined to hitherto.

1271. What sort of attack do you contemplate on the Mauritius?—The attack of a large squadron. We know that it has been proposed to France, as a principle of action, to divide the navy into squadrons of four line-of-battle ships, some frigates, and a number of transports with troops, and send them about to do as much mischief as they possibly can, either singly or combined; and, getting the start of us, they would have full play on the Mauritius.

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1272. Assuming that they would get the start of us, is it your object that these forts should enable the garrison to hold out until a squadron should be despatched from India, or the Cape, or from England, to intercept the proceedings of the attacking parties?—Until the British Navy had resumed its ascendancy in that quarter.

1273. You do not contemplate that the garrison would maintain a protracted siege without being relieved by a naval force?—Yes; the advantages are very great there. I think you would have a great chance if you defend the whole island.

1274. What garrison do you consider necessary to man those works?—There is an idea that the more works you have the more troops you want.

1275. What is your estimate of the number of troops necessary to defend the island?—About 6,000, when you have the works, and you will then have a powerful place in the Mauritius which would probably defy any enemy.

1276. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Supposing, in the present state of the Mauritius, that a foreign force succeeded in establishing itself there, and that afterwards our supremacy in those seas was restored by the arrival of an English fleet, do you think that we should have much difficulty in retaking the island?—I think we should have the greatest possible difficulty, because a foreign power would probably have the means of sending a strong garrison there; if they sent 10,000, or 12,000 men there it would be hopeless to think of taking it again.

1277. I said, in its present state?—Even in its present state.

1278. Supposing that, in the state in which you propose to put it by the erection of these fortifications, a foreign power succeeded in taking the island, would not the difficulty of retaking it be infinitely increased?—Undoubtedly it would.

1279. In that case the fortifications we had erected, would be turned against us?—That must be the case with all fortifications.

1280. Unless the fortifications were fully garrisoned, so as to secure them against any reasonable risk of such a fate, you think it would be better that they should not be there at all?—They may be capable of considerable defence even if not fully garrisoned. If you have a fort with 100 men in it, it is probably secure against a *coup de main*; forts have a great advantage.

1281. Supposing your proposed forts were erected, and it was not found possible to spare such a large force as 6,000 men for the defence of so small an island, would there not be great risk of the fortifications being taken and turned against us?—Certainly; if you have a small garrison there is greater risk of its being taken from you, but a small garrison would secure it against a moderate attacking force. As regards the expense of fortifications, I think we may fairly say, that 100,000*l.* spent in fortifications, would be equivalent to the expense of maintaining only about 80 or 100 men constantly, and the fortifications would be worth, probably, 500 men.

1282. You are aware that the present garrison of the Mauritius consists of two regiments of the line, and a company or two of Royal Artillery; whereas you propose, as part of your plan, a garrison of 6,000 men?—As a war garrison; but even with 2,000, I should have great hopes of holding it.

1283. Are you aware what amount of works would be sufficient to secure the harbour of Fort Louis against the attack of a small squadron, or a single man-of-war?—It would take very little to defend the entrance against a floating attack.

1284. In its present condition?—It would be so easy to defend the entrance into the harbour against even steamers, that I should have no apprehension from a maritime attack.

1285. You consider Port Louis already secure against any ordinary maritime attack?—Yes; I should think so; it is a narrow entrance, and there would be no difficulty in preventing a ship going in.

1286. Your object is to prevent a military force being landed on some other part of the island and taking the town in the rear?—That is the object.

1287. Mr. *Ellice.*] Have you made any inquiries lately into the state of the fortifications there?—Yes, reports have been very lately received.

1288. What is the nature of the report generally with respect to expenditure required, either to improve the present fortifications or to build additional ones?—At

—At present they are employed upon a work called Fort George at the mouth of the harbour; the last report we have suggests some modifications in that work, which, probably, will be agreed to.

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1289. That work is already commenced?—Yes, to some considerable extent.

1290. Is not a sum of money asked for for that work in the estimates of this year?—Yes, chiefly for that work.

1291. You do not know what the whole sum required for that work will be?—No, I cannot tell you exactly what the whole sum will be; it is to be the last hold in the island.

1292. When those estimates were framed, and you desired that a sum of money might be asked for on account of the fortifications, did you also report to the Treasury what the whole amount required to finish the work would be?—Yes, the estimate which is before you is for Port Louis.

1293. So that we are involved in an expense, which is to result in the expenditure of 200,000 *l.* in the Mauritius?—Eventually we shall want a great deal more, probably, for the Mauritius.

1294. Mr. *Childers.*] Do you see your way in any way to reduce the annual charge for the troops in the Mauritius?—No; I am not aware of any mode in which they can be reduced.

1295. You know no way in which a smaller number of men might be kept there in time of peace?—Not a smaller number than 2,000; that is a great deal too small.

1296. There is no harbour, I think, to the Island of Bourbon?—There is no harbour.

1297. There is no foreign naval station near the Mauritius?—There is not; but we apprehend that in the Isle of Bourbon the French have great means for fitting out an armament of troops; they have stores, guns, and ammunition, and everything else that is necessary; if they sent a fleet out they could equip a force for the attack of the Mauritius.

1298. Could they refit a fleet at Bourbon?—No, I think not; there is nothing but open roadsteads.

1299. Of a dangerous character?—I am not aware; but I apprehend not.

1300. Bourbon could not in any way be the basis of naval operations against the Mauritius?—Except that the navy could go safely there and get a military force.

1301. Lord *Stanley.*] I presume all our calculations are based upon the assumption that England will be permanently in possession of the command of the sea?—Yes; all our colonies would be in a precarious state if it were not so.

1302. In assuming that an attack takes place upon the Mauritius or any other place, you assume that for the time, and for the time only, we have lost that command of the sea?—Precisely.

1303. And if a large invading force were to attack and occupy for a time Mauritius, or any other colony similarly situated, when the command of the sea returned to us that force would find itself entrapped, would it not?—Hardly entrapped, unless easily retaken.

1304. Would not that be a strong military argument against the probability of any such attack being made?—I think, if it was taken by an enemy they would prevent its being retaken by putting a large force on it, which we cannot afford.

1305. The force, whether large or small, would be cut off from all communication?—It would, as it was in the early part of the French war, but there is a common idea that a colony must depend upon the navy for its protection, and that is made use of as an argument against any preparations or precautions whatever. The navy cannot be every where in force, and there is no sea in which some other navy may not be in command for weeks, and perhaps months.

1306. Mr. *Adderley.*] You do not think it likely that England would lose the command of those seas?—I think probably we might for weeks and months together.

1307. There is no nation which has a naval force so near to the Mauritius as England?—Certainly not, but it is very difficult to follow up the movements of an enemy's fleet; you never know where they are going or what they are about.

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about. We all know that Lord Nelson once sailed to the West Indies in pursuit of a French fleet which was going quietly up the Mediterranean.

1308. You told us that the French had raised a militia in Bourbon, but that England could not do so in the Mauritius. Why is that?—It is partly because the population is chiefly French, and a very large proportion of it is Chinese. I have asked whether militia cannot be raised there, and I am told it is quite out of the question.

1309. Mr. *Fortescue.*] I believe there is also a large coolie population?—Yes, very large

1310. Mr. *Adderley.*] Why do you suppose that the French depend upon the number of troops at Bourbon and not upon such works as you propose?—Because they have a large force of 6,000 or 7,000 men.

1311. Why should not they have the same reason for reducing their force which you recommend in the Mauritius?—I am not aware of the particular state of the island of Bourbon; if they have the same advantages as the Mauritius I would recommend them also to have works.

1312. *Chairman.*] I think you say that Halifax is one of the places which you think ought to be held in strength?—Yes.

1313. I observe that there is a vote for the construction of the citadel of Halifax, of which the estimated cost is 14,486 *l.*, but the amount annually voted is 26,200 *l.* Has anything been suggested since the original estimate was given?—No, that estimate is for a specific work; the citadel is a large fort which had rough ground in front of it, and that ground had to be filled in, so as to bring the surface under fire of your guns; those calculations were made 20 years ago, and they are not sufficient; 500 *l.* has been voted this year, and another 500 *l.* will probably be required, and that will complete the works.

1314. Do you know what the cost of works at Halifax has been?—There has been very little more than that citadel; that is the chief work.

1315. It has appeared in the Votes from year to year?—Yes; I think that there are some sea batteries to defend the harbour. Halifax would be a place very easily defended against any enemy, except the United States.

1316. Mr. *Adderley.*] You say that the defence would be easy because you reckon upon a large local force?—Yes.

1317. But without such a local force, do you consider that the garrison which is now kept there, 1,300 men, is sufficient for its defence?—No, that would not be sufficient.

1318. Do you consider that very far short of an adequate garrison?—Yes.

1319. Without some basis in the way of a local militia, you do not consider that the works can be held by 1,300 men?—I do not. At Halifax the people are all well disposed; they are all English, and have the same animus as we have here, and I have no doubt that a large local force might be raised. The defence of these colonies which have large British populations, may, I think, be made impregnable by a much less expensive system than that hitherto adopted, of having a few militia, namely, to organise the greater part of population like volunteers, without taking them away from their occupations. Out of those materials, you might make such a force as a navy crossing the sea, would never look at.

1320. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that, at the present moment the volunteer movement is in active progress, both in the North American and the Australian colonies?—I believe that they are organising a regular militia, with fine uniforms and bands, and all that sort of thing, which is very expensive, and they are brought together so much that they are taken away from their occupations. If you enrol a militia as they do in the United States, or give them some little exercise in the first elements, you may make a body of men to which it would be impossible to oppose any force coming across the sea.

1321. You are aware that a volunteer force is at present in the course of being drilled in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia?—I think they have about 4,000 or 5,000 men in Canada; but I should expect, according to my idea, to have 100,000.

1322. *Chairman.*] Are you aware of any means which the Imperial Government could take to obtain a larger force at any less expense than is incurred now?—No, it must rest with the colonists.

1323. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you wish to see this volunteer force left without any nucleus of Imperial troops?—I would have a nucleus to serve as a model; a small

small force is all that is necessary for such purpose. One regiment at each of the Australian Colonies would form an admirable basis for them to go upon.

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1324. You think that even the presence of a small Imperial force in the Colonies would make the local force far more available and efficient than they would otherwise be?—Certainly.

1325. Mr. *Baxter.*] Are you aware that up to a comparatively recent period there has been no volunteer force in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia?—I believe there was none in New Brunswick or Nova Scotia.

1326. In the circumstances that have obtained for many years past, do you think that there is much use, in our keeping up a large garrison at Halifax?—Not unless you attach much importance to the country; they should find a force to protect themselves.

1327. You say you do not think it possible for a garrison at Halifax to defend itself unless supported by a local militia force?—No.

1328. And you are aware that there has been, up to a recent period, no such force in Nova Scotia?—I believe not; but I believe they have it in contemplation to raise one.

1329. Under those circumstances, what is the use of our garrisoning Halifax if it could not hold the citadel without the aid of a local force which does not exist?—They would resist any small attack.

1330. Those 1,300 men are not considered capable of defending Halifax against a naval attack?—Not by a considerable force landed; assuming that the people of the Colony were indifferent to the issue.

1331. Sir *George Grey.*] In the event of a war breaking out with the United States, do you suppose that the garrison could not be reinforced?—Certainly it could; if we had a war with the United States only we could throw a large force into all these Colonies.

1332. What was the garrison reduced to at the time of the Russian war?—I do not know, but I should think you might reduce them to a very great extent.

1333. Are you aware what the forces in the Mauritius were reduced to in order that the troops might be made available elsewhere?—I have no recollection; there was no chance of any attack in that quarter from the Russians.

1334. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that there are laws under which every able-bodied man is liable to be called out?—The liability is not enough; they should be enrolled.

1335. Do you not take for granted that if there was any appearance of danger a large local force would have been raised in a very short time?—Yes, I have no doubt that a large local force might be raised in a short time, and made very powerful; but the organization should take place at once.

1336. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you not think that the placing of an adequate garrison there would lead to the neglect of the Colony?—I think so; it has never been clearly defined what they should do for themselves.

1337. You have stated that the presence of a small body of English troops would be useful in forming other troops?—Yes.

1338. If Canada undertook its own defence, do you think that they would consider it necessary to send to England for such a basis?—I do not think they would; they would do it imperfectly and badly, probably, if it were left to themselves.

1339. *Chairman.*] What other fortified places do you think should be maintained?—Kingston and Quebec.

1340. Has anything been done lately at Kingston?—No; it is a small inclosure to prevent any sudden inroad; it is the harbour for the great Lake Ontario.

1341. At whose expense are those forts maintained?—By the Imperial Government. Kingston, Montreal and Quebec were retained when Lord Grey was Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the rest were given up to the colonies.

1342. Is Kingston now held in such strength as is satisfactory to you?—I think that, with the kind of warfare you would expect there, it is.

1343. What sort of warfare would you expect there?—The incursions of perhaps 50,000 or 60,000 or 100,000.

1344. From what quarter?—From the United States; it would be a warfare that would only last for a short time; a month or six weeks.

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1345. What is the number of the standing army in the United States?—They have but a very small standing army, but they make great use of their militia force; in the present warfare the militia force will come out in a short time favourably.

1346. In the event of a war with the United States, by what means would you propose to relieve Kingston, if the war broke out during the seven months that the St. Lawrence is closed?—There would be no communication during the winter months.

1347. If Kingston were then attacked by 100,000 men, what would become of their garrison?—It would be reduced.

1348. Lord *Stanley.*] It is the fact, is it not, that the northern route to the interior of Canada is closed during the whole of the winter months?—I think that is the case. I believe the St. Lawrence is not navigable during the winter months.

1349. And the only access is by Portland and through the State of Maine?—By Portland and Boston.

1350. *Chairman.*] The frontier line of our North American Colonies extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific?—Yes.

1351. Do you think that the force we have there is adequate to the defence of that frontier in any contingency?—Only by the goodwill of the population; supposing 100,000 men were in arms, it would not be worth the while of the United States to make the attempt.

1352. Mr. *Adderley.*] Is it not the fact, that Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton, were all conquered by the colonists, unaided by us?—They were.

1353. And were held in garrison?—A great many years ago.

1354. Do you see any reason why English colonial forces should not do now what English colonial forces did then?—A great many years ago the country was very wild, and the population very small, and the army on both sides, also, very small.

1355. But the colonial forces conquered those Colonies for us?—Yes, by numbers.

1356. It was in 1710, and those Colonies were not very populous then?—No, but I suppose the colonial troops were 10 to 1 in force to the regulars opposed to them.

1357. At that time the Colonies found troops for all forces, Indian forces, and foreign forces?—Yes.

1358. And for a great many years they held the principal places, and garrisoned them?—They did, but it was against a very small body of troops.

1359. In all the great positions at that time the English contributed nothing until the seven years' war?—No, so far as I recollect.

1360. Mr. *Ellice.*] Are the fortifications in Canada in perfect repair?—They would admit of great improvement, particularly at Quebec. During the summer months Quebec is our only communication; assuming that we could go up to Quebec without any impediment, that would be the basis of operations for the Colony.

1361. From the reports which you now have from Quebec, do you consider that those fortifications are in efficient order for the present system of military science?—Yes, as far as they go; but they are capable of great improvement.

1362. At what expenditure are they capable of being made good?—I cannot tell you off-hand, but there is one thing in fortifications which differs from many others; every 10,000 *l.* you spend puts you in a better position than you were in before, even if you do not continue the outlay. We make a plan of a fortification, particularly on the present system of detached works, and we make a plan for the whole mass of works; but every work you put up puts you in a better position than you were in before, even if you do nothing more. Then you may go on adding to a place like Quebec, and improving its position by one work after another.

1363. Do you suppose that the garrisons left in Canada are sufficient to garrison Kingston and Quebec?—I do not know how many troops there are, but I should imagine so.

1364. *Chairman.*] The total force, including the Canadian Rifles, is 3,000 men, and the number of troops between Kingston and Quebec, 1,800?—That is a very weak garrison.

1365. Sir *George Grey.*] Are we now incurring any expense on account of those

those fortifications?—No, very trifling indeed; just for small repairs and maintenance.

1366. There is nothing, I think, in the estimates of this year for fortifications in North America?—There is nothing but for the common repairs going on in keeping it up.

1367. Except in Nova Scotia?—No.

1368. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You said, in answer to a question just now, that Nova Scotia was captured for this country by the military forces of the Colonies, which have since become the United States of America?—Yes.

1369. The fact then is, that the country, which was then a Colony of this country, has since become a foreign power?—Yes.

1370. So that what at that time was a colonial ally of England has now become a foreign power, and liable to be an enemy?—Yes.

1371. With the addition that it has become 10 times as strong as a possible enemy to what it was then as a friend?—Yes, all our possessions there were taken by the colonists.

1372. So that the nation which was then an ally is now a foreigner, and liable to be an enemy?—Yes.

1373. You said just now that you thought that the presence of British troops in the Colonies had discouraged local efforts of defence; how would you propose to remedy that evil?—By having some definite understanding with the Colonies that they ought to supply their own defences.

1374. Do you mean by calling upon them to pay for the British troops quartered there, and in case they refused to pay for them, by withdrawing those troops?—No, I would rather they would furnish local forces, we giving them some support by our own; with regard to Nova Scotia they pay nothing at all, neither for barracks, fortifications, troops or anything.

1375. Are you prepared to withdraw, or diminish the garrison of Imperial troops in these provinces, unless the provinces consent to pay for them?—No; I should leave them to supply their own, but we should give them a certain number of troops as the basis of their defences.

1376. I understood you to say that by supplying them with Imperial troops, we had discouraged local efforts?—I do not think we positively discourage them; but they hold it as a maxim that their defence rests with the Imperial Government, and not with themselves.

1377. *Chairman.*] Have you seen the opinion expressed by Sir William Denison on the subject?—Yes.

1378. Do you agree with that opinion?—I agree with him almost entirely; I have had a great deal of communication with Sir William Denison, and a great deal of correspondence on the subject; I do not quite agree in some details of his works as applied to the defences of the Colony.

1379. Sir William Denison has expressed an opinion that it would be desirable that all Colonies which are capable of contributing towards their defences should be called upon to do so; do you concur in that opinion?—Yes, but I would not do it as he proposes. He proposes to do it by allotting some specific portion of the expense to the Colonies; I would rather you should make a calculation of whatever you think right, and then let them pay that in money.

1380. Mr. *Adderley.*] I understand you propose a fixed sum to be paid by the Colony?—Yes.

1381. As Ceylon pays 24,000 *l.* a year, so every Colony should pay a fixed sum; that is your proposition?—Yes; any sum that should be thought right by the Government.

1382. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that in the Colonies which we have been speaking of, possessing the representative institutions, a plan like Sir William Denison's cannot be carried out, except with the consent of the Colonies?—I suppose not.

1383. Then it must be a matter of agreement with the Colonial Government?—A matter of agreement, and a matter of interest to themselves; for instance, the Colony of Victoria is paying much more than any other; they seem prepared to pay for anything; for troops even.

1384. Mr. *Childers.*] You said, I think, that for seven months in the year there is no communication with Canada?—My general impression is, that the communication for certain months in the year is quite stopped.

1385. Have you been consulted as to the necessity of opening a communica-

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tion by railway from Halifax to Canada?—No, except generally on a proposed railway.

1386. But has not that idea been taken up in a military point of view by the Government?—Yes; and it has been very much encouraged.

1387. If such a railway were constructed from Halifax, joining the Grand Trunk Railway in Canada, communication would be open throughout the year?—Yes, if you could protect the frontier; but it would approach the frontier, and be very liable to inroads from the United States.

1388. As far as the climate is concerned, if the line were made, it would afford a communication throughout the year?—Yes.

1389. If such a communication were carried out, would it not tend to enable you to reduce the force stationed in Canada?—I think not; the British force in Canada would be always small; I should trust entirely to the local force in a country like Canada, but I think you ought always to have a small British force to act as an example for the troops, and to afford them a few officers and staff.

1390. Do you think there could be any reduction in the British forces in Canada if a larger number of artillery were sent out there?—No; I do not think that would make any difference; but as regards the description of the troops, I should mention one thing which, I think, would be of great importance to the Colonies, which is, that they should use engineers more than they do, for instance, at Victoria and Sydney, and places of that description.

1391. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are you aware when English troops were first sent from England to aid in the defences of the Colonies?—I should think almost from time immemorial.

1392. You do not know when the Mutiny Act was first extended to the Colonies?—No.

1393. Before those American Colonies, which are now the United States, became independent, had the system of sending English troops there begun?—I do not know.

1394. Mr. *Childers.*] Carrying on the question I was asking you, do you think that if a larger number of engineers were stationed in Canada, for instance, you could see a means of reducing the number of troops of the line?—There is always an objection to send engineers to Canada, because there is such a tendency to desert there; they are skilled workmen, and there is such an attraction offered in the United States for the employment of them, that the greater part of them desert. For that reason we have never sent engineers or sappers over to Canada; we have sent them to Nova Scotia, because that is rather more distant, and there is not the same inducement.

1395. *Chairman.*] You are aware, are you not, that engineers were sent to British Columbia, at a cost of 60,000 *l.* to this country?—There were a few engineers sent there to make a survey of the boundary; they were sent exclusively for that purpose, and some of them have deserted.

1396. Do you know what they have done there?—They were not sent away by us, but I imagine that they were engaged in laying out the survey of that frontier.

1397. You are not aware that the only thing they have done is to make huts for themselves within the last few years?—No.

1398. Mr. *Childers.*] Were you not consulted upon the propriety of sending these engineers?—Only so far as whether there was any objection, and whether they were proper men for the purpose.

1399. But you were not consulted as to the object of sending them?—Only as to its being for the purpose of making this survey.

1400. That was the object which was suggested to you when these men were sent?—Yes.

1401. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you allude to the sappers and miners who were sent out by Sir Edward Lytton under Colonel Moody?—They were not sent out under Colonel Moody; they were sent out under another officer who had charge of the survey.

1402. Then the Chairman and yourself have been alluding to different parties of sappers; are you aware that Sir Edward Lytton, when the British Colony of Columbia was founded, sent there a body of sappers under Colonel Moody?—I was aware that they were sent there; and they were sent expressly to mark out the boundaries in a very difficult country.

1403. Are

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1403. Are you aware that, independently of that boundary survey, there has been a body of sappers who were sent out upon the first formation of the Colony, under the recommendation of Sir Edward Lytton?—I do not recollect, but I suppose it was so.

1404. Do you conceive that, if it were not for that difficulty as to deserters, there would be an advantage in making use of engineers in Canada?—I think in every Colony it would be a great advantage, because the engineers are perfect soldiers, and as soldiers they cost very little more than others, and they are all of them more or less skilled artisans, good workmen, for which they get the pay of about 1*s.* a day, upon the average; and in those Colonies they get, perhaps, 2*s.* a day, and they do the work that you would have to pay civilians for doing from 4*s.* to 10*s.* a day, and the difference between the 2*s.* a day and the 4*s.* or 10*s.* would go to the credit of their expenses as soldiers.

1405. Mr. *Ellice.*] And that difference is an inducement for the men to desert whenever they can find an opportunity?—Yes, in Canada they would, but not in Australia.

1406. Is not that temptation equally great in a thriving country like Australia?—I think not, because there you have the police, who can catch them. The moment they cross the frontier in Canada they laugh at you.

1407. Mr. *Childers.*] Would not that difficulty be still greater in British Columbia, where you have both a foreign country and mines?—They have some deserters, but not many; about one-twentieth of the men desert.

1408. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you know anything about the defences of the harbour of St. John, in New Brunswick?—No, nothing at all.

1409. Do you know anything about the estimate respecting the coal mines of Cape Breton and Pechin?—There has been application about the defences of these coal mines, and it was thought they ought to devolve upon the Colonies themselves.

1410. Would it be desirable, in an Imperial point of view, to secure the defences of these coal mines against the visits of an enemy's cruiser?—Yes, no doubt it would; indeed, they have gone part of the way towards it, for they have formed a corps of volunteers among the miners themselves. Mr. Cunard told me they had formed a very respectable corps of 200 or 300 young men, which is a proper thing for them to do; and if they require it, I think we might very reasonably give them a few guns to assist them.

1411. Are you aware that the works are so situated that they could be destroyed in a very short time by the guns of an enemy's ship?—The coal mines are very near the water, and they might destroy some of the outhouses and store rooms if they thought it worth their while.

1412. Mr. *Adderley.*] There are other people interested in their security besides the Imperial Government of England?—Oh, yes, it is a private concern, and probably a very profitable one to the proprietors.

1413. England might reckon upon this being defended, without undertaking the whole defence?—Yes.

1414. Can you state what stores and arms there are in North America?—No, I cannot.

1415. Do you know if there are any in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick?—I have no idea; of course, if they organize a local force they will require arms. In Victoria there is a great difficulty in procuring arms, and there is a gentleman here purchasing them for Victoria.

1416. How is the garrison of Calcutta supplied with arms?—They have their little armoury, I have no doubt. When there are Imperial troops they have their arms and provisions supplied.

1417. Can you state whether the arms at Halifax are supplied direct from England or through Canada?—From England direct.

1418. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do I understand you to say that these coal mines would be of little or no value in an Imperial point of view in those parts of the world?—They are of great value, because it is, I believe, the easiest way of getting coal. But there is a great deal of coal in Nova Scotia, and they may open mines anywhere.

1419. *Chairman.*] Upon the same grounds as you said the Colony ought to be called upon to defend itself in other matters, should you not say it ought to defend its coal mines?—Perhaps it comes within the general scope of defence

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which anyone who has charge of the defences in case of war would pay attention to; they would not make arrangements exclusively for that part.

1420. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would it not be a great advantage in time of war for our fleet to have a good supply of coal?—Certainly.

1421. You cannot open coal mines at a moment's notice?—Undoubtedly it would be a great advantage to the Government to have coal mines there.

1422. *Chairman.*] And it would be a great advantage to the proprietors of the coal mines to sell their coal?—Yes, of course.

1423. You mentioned Bermuda as a place of importance to be maintained in strength; I observe that the sum of 4,500 *l.* was the expense for the defences of Bermuda, of which 1,000 *l.* appear for the first time in the Estimates of this year; is that for new works?—It is in consequence of the new guns made recently, and it requires the works to be adapted to them.

1424. There has been in Bermuda a variety of systems of fortifications, has there not?—There was, about a twelvemonth ago, a very elaborate report made out by a joint commission of army officers and navy officers, on the defences of Bermuda; that is very full, and the great object now is, to reduce it as much as possible, before the Government comes to a determination. They very properly made it as full as possible, but it may be reduced.

1425. I presume we have not come to the end of our expenses with respect to the fortifications of Bermuda?—Oh dear, no.

1426. I mean that this sum of 4,500 *l.* cannot be supposed to represent all that we have to spend?—Oh, no; that is merely altering the works which exist there, adapting them for new guns.

1427. Mr. *Ellice.*] Has there been any report with respect to the further fortifications which may be necessary for Bermuda?—We have full reports now, but we have to make out the estimates before we come to a decision as to what part of the report we shall adopt.

1428. But in any view of the case, the expense of those fortifications will be very considerable?—It will be, I dare say, 200,000 *l.* or 300,000 *l.*

1429. *Chairman.*] Do you know at all what we have expended in Bermuda; am I wrong in saying that we have expended 5,000,000 *l.* or 6,000,000 *l.* there?—Not a hundredth part of it in fortifications.

1430. Sir *George Grey.*] Is there any vote for the defences of Bermuda, except the 4,500 *l.* which appears in the Army Estimates?—No.

1431. Is there any expenditure going on in Bermuda, except for those new works?—Nothing, excepting the wear and tear of the existing works.

1432. Nothing as yet has been decided?—No; most of the Colonies are in a very unprovided state, and require new projects altogether.

1433. *Chairman.*] I understand that in your judgment, whatever may be the sum in the Estimates of the present year, the amount of 4,500 *l.* put down for the arms and defences of Bermuda, would be altogether inadequate for putting the defences on a proper footing?—Oh, quite.

1434. Sir *George Grey.*] I understand that sum to be merely for the specific object of adapting the defences to a new kind of gun, which is now brought into the service?—Exactly.

1435. Has there not been a large sum already laid out in the defences of Bermuda?—Not of late years; it has been already done by little driblets.

1436. In what state are the fortifications now, with a view to defence?—They are very small; Ireland Island, where the dockyard is, is enclosed in a fort.

1437. *Chairman.*] There was a project, was there not, originally—I do not know whether it was carried out—for the defences of Bermuda, to be a central station, which was to ramify out to the coast?—Merely a fortified barrack in the centre for a reserve force, but there are coast batteries besides.

1438. Were there originally, at Bermuda, small towers, like the Martello towers on our coast?—I dare say there were

1439. Mr. *Adderley.*] Does not the cost of Bermuda appear less than it really is, from the fact of the convicts being employed upon the works?—The convicts are chiefly employed upon the navy works.

1440. The actual pay of the labour upon those works, does not appear in the Estimates?—Not of the convicts.

1441. Is Ireland Island adequately defended?—No, not at all.

1442. Sir

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1442. Sir *George Grey.*] You have spoken of the works going on at the dockyard; would they appear in the Army Estimates or the Navy?—The works of defence in the Army Estimates entirely.

1443. Do you know on what works the convicts are chiefly employed?—They are chiefly employed on the naval works.

1444. Would the expense of the works which they perform appear in the Army or the Navy Estimates?—They would appear in the Navy Estimates, as far as regards naval works.

1445. Are you aware whether the whole expense of those works appears in the Navy Estimates, and the value of the convict labour appears in some other way, or is the value of the convict labour deducted from the estimated expense of the works?—I conclude that if they have convict labour, they estimate accordingly.

1446. Deduct the value of the convict labour?—Yes.

1447. That does not appear in the Army Estimates?—No.

1448. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Have you any idea of the amount of works which would be necessary to secure the dockyard of Bermuda against any ordinary attack, any moderate attack?—I could not say off hand; I should take it, it would require a couple of hundred thousand pounds for that purpose, for standing defences, by which you would be able to reduce the garrison.

1449. Sir *George Grey.*] Would you not look to a naval force as the principal defence of Bermuda?—No, and for the same reason as I gave for the others; that you cannot be sure that a naval force would be always at that station. Another mode proposed for naval co-operation is, for a provision of block ships, and floating batteries; these, however, could never be supplied; they would be too expensive, and would abstract from the previous naval resources of the country; and for defences for which shore batteries might be a perfect substitute.

1450. Mr. *Fortescue.*] At present an enemy's ship could shell and destroy the dockyard and stores at Bermuda without much difficulty?—Yes, it might; but this distant cannonading, I think, would hardly answer the purpose of an enemy, with the chance of the mischief they did; cannonading a dockyard is different to being actually in possession of it.

1451. Do you think Bermuda is safe at present from the visit, we will say of a single cruiser coming for the purpose of shelling the dockyard?—I should say a single cruiser would have a very poor chance; she would suffer more herself. Bermuda is surrounded by a reef of rocks, in the first place.

1452. Do you think an enemy's ship would not venture in?—It would be a desperate attempt except for a considerable force.

1453. Then the works which you propose would be for the purposes of defence againt a formidable naval expedition?—Yes, of a formidable character. I take it that a single small armed cruiser would be a good thing to go about to keep a single enemy's vessel off, which might do mischief, but not to have a large naval force.

1454. Are you aware of any means of executing such works in Bermuda, except by convict labour?—No; I suppose labour is very scarce there. But that is a place to which we should probably send two or three companies of sappers, which would be of great service to carry on the works.

1455. Could you execute such works by the labour of the troops without convicts?—A great deal of it; all the ordinary manual labour.

1456. *Chairman.*] What do you consider the grand object in an Imperial point of view of Bermuda to us?—It has a very fine harbour, and overlooks the whole coast of the United States within reach.

1457. You look on it as protecting the course of our trade?—Yes, and the cruisers from it would give security for all the passing trade.

1458. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that men-of-war can repair and refit in Bermuda?—They have got a dockyard there, and it is used a great deal; I do not know the capabilities of it, but they have a regular dockyard.

1459. *Chairman.*] You mentioned St. Helena as one of the places which you thought ought to be maintained; there is a sum of 20,000 *l.* for the improvement of the defences of St. Helena, of which 2,500 *l.* appears in the present year; can you give us any information as to the nature of those defences?—It is to defend the landing places. St. Helena is very difficult of access, and if

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those landing places are perfectly defended, with a few works and a small garrison, St. Helena becomes impregnable.

1460. With regard to the places which you have mentioned, the Mauritius, Halifax, Bermuda, and St. Helena, you have stated to the Committee what is actually necessary for this defence adequately; but if it were not possible to defend them so adequately as you think they ought to be defended, and you think there would be great danger in leaving them inadequately defended, would it not be better not to attempt to hold them at all than to hold them insufficiently defended?—I think I would rather defend them as they are, than abandon them altogether, so that a single cruiser might come and take them.

1461. Are there not instances on record which prove the extreme danger of manning places with an inadequate garrison?—Certainly, it is very bad policy, especially in cases where a moderate force could defend them. But I cannot help thinking that such places as these would be quite worth the Imperial interest to defend thoroughly.

1462. With regard to other places which you mentioned in an answer to one of the earlier questions, do you think it is desirable that we should be maintaining the small force which we do at those places, unless we can very greatly increase it; I think you mentioned among others the Falkland Islands?—Yes.

1463. With reference to the Falklands, I think you said you considered them profitable as a coaling station?—Yes.

1464. And Aden?—I think Aden comes under a different arrangement altogether; it belongs to the East Indies.

1465. You mentioned also the Cape; what, in your opinion, is the value of the Cape in a military point of view?—Its only value is, that all the communication from India must pass within reach of the Cape; an enemy may have possession of the Cape, and their cruisers might be very detrimental to our intercourse and communication with India.

1466. Then in your view, the Cape is valuable as a means of protecting our trade?—Yes. Now the West India Islands may perhaps be hardly worth the expense of defending.

1467. Would you give them up?—I would give them up; the most valuable, Jamaica and Barbados, would defend themselves.

1468. Now with reference to the Cape for the purpose which you mentioned, namely, the protecting our trade, do you consider it very important that we should retain the very large Colony which we now possess in South Africa; is that of any importance to our trade?—Not at all; I do not see the importance of it as a possession.

1469. Then what is your view with regard to the expense at which the Cape ought to be maintained?—All that we require is Simon's Bay; that is the best naval station.

1470. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You are speaking of the Cape purely as a naval station?—Purely as a naval station; I know nothing of it as a Colony.

1471. You are not taking into account the existence of the Kaffirs, for instance?—No, I know nothing at all about that.

1472. Mr. *Adderley.*] It has been stated to us, that, out of the 5,000 troops which we sent to South Africa, there are only 81 in the whole of the western district, including Cape Town; should you consider 81 men a sufficient garrison for the whole of that district?—Certainly not; we ought to have 5,000 or 6,000 men there to keep it.

1473. Mr. *Baxter.*] Are you aware that a large proportion of our forces is on the frontiers?—Yes, holding it as a great Colony.

1474. You disapprove of that distribution of the force?—Unless they say they cannot hold Cape Town without occupying the upper country.

1475. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you believe that 81 men of the regular army is the garrison of Cape Town under ordinary circumstances?—I think it very likely; the people are very quiet there; the troops are up the country, for the warfare against the Kaffirs.

1476. Are you aware that, at the time alluded to by Mr. Adderley, the Indian mutiny was going on, and that a very strong volunteer force was raised at Cape Town and in the neighbourhood, and that every man that could be spared was withdrawn?—I think I saw a despatch from the Governor of the Cape about a twelvemonth

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twelvemonth ago. He said he was under no apprehensions, and that there was no difficulty in defending that colony against any foreign enemy.

1477. Do you mean the defence of Cape Town?—No, the whole colony. He was quite confident in the force he had there, which would be, I suppose, a local force; but it would be very desirable to have the matter organised.

1478. Do you mean that the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope is capable of defence against any foreign power, without the presence of any Imperial troops?—Of course, he expected a moderate force of Imperial troops with him.

1479. Sir *George Grey.*] Do we incur any expenses on account of fortifications in the Cape, or any of the Australian colonies?—There have been no expenses on the Cape, and very little in the Australian colonies.

1480. Is there any expense proposed in the Estimates of this year for any fortifications in the West Indies?—No, there is nothing there.

1481. *Chairman.*] I think it has been stated that there are no fortifications in any of the Australian colonies; are there any fortifications, to your knowledge?—There is none that we have ever made; there have been some made by the colonies themselves.

1482. There are works in Sydney Harbour, I believe?—In Sydney Harbour there are three or four forts, but the Government have not made them; and in Victoria the same.

1483. Mr. *Childers.*] Are the works in the colonies which pay for them, submitted for your approval?—They have been always hitherto; they have had reports made by the officers on the spot, and they have always hitherto been sent to the War Department for their opinion.

1484. In the case of the Colony of Victoria, I believe there is a defence commission?—There is.

1485. Which has made very large suggestions as to the defence of the colony against foreign aggressions?—Yes.

1486. Those suggestions, I suppose, have been submitted to you?—They have, and we have given an opinion upon them.

1487. Are the whole of those expenses proposed to be paid by the colony?—All the works are proposed to be paid for by the Colony of Victoria, and of Sydney.

1488. Those works involve, do they not, armaments by guns of the new construction?—They do.

1489. The colony is ready to pay the expenses of them?—The colony has an officer here now purchasing arms.

1490. Do you not think that under these circumstances, as they are prepared to pay the whole expenses, it would be well to encourage them in obtaining guns of the new construction?—Certainly.

1491. Even if the doing so would postpone, to a small extent, the supply of these guns to other places?—That depends upon which is most important.

1492. Is it not most important to encourage a colony which comes forward and says that they will pay for the whole?—Certainly; but as regards those guns, there was a difficulty in giving them the numbers they want, and it was proposed to give them a small proportion.

1493. Do you not think that is a policy which, if we wish to reduce our expenditure for colonial purposes, ought to be carried out?—Certainly.

1494. No Armstrong guns have been yet allowed to any colony, have there?—I think there have been some ordered for Victoria, four or six, or something of that kind.

1495. A commencement has been made in granting the colony guns of the newest construction?—Yes.

1496. With reference to the military force in the colonies, you mentioned that you thought the force of engineers and artillery might be increased there?—The force of engineers I mentioned particularly as being more economical, because they would furnish such useful labour.

1497. As a matter of fact, I believe some years ago, the engineer force was increased there?—There was once a question as to sending out a company of sappers and miners, but it was not persevered in; I think they are very wrong not to send a company, because it would cost them much less.

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1498. The colonies are anxious to get such a company, are they not?—They seem anxious to get everything in a good military condition.

1499. Have you seen the Estimates for the current year?—No, I have not.

1500. You are not aware, perhaps, that there is on the Estimates provision for a detachment of artillery, and a detachment of engineers?—I am very glad of it; I recommended a company of engineers long ago.

1501. If a small force of artillery and engineers were sent to the colonies, do you not think it might reduce the expenditure of troops of the line?—No, I think it quite independent of troops of the line. In a colony of that kind, I would have one regiment as a basis; it is bad to reduce your military force below one regiment, because you have the advantages of complete organization. I would have one regiment at each of those places.

1502. Do you mean a full regiment?—Yes, say a small one of 600 men.

1503. You do not think that by increasing the force of artillery and engineers, you could in any way diminish the cost of the troops of the line in the colony?—No, I would have one regiment as a basis, to teach the local people, and one company of engineers for working; you could not have a very large force of engineers, because you would be scattering them about over the country.

1504. If a Colony came forward very liberally, both as to arming its defences, and also as to militia and volunteers, do you not think the number of troops of the line might be considerably reduced, if you had the scientific corps increased?—There would be no great danger in reducing it, particularly after local bodies were formed, but I would not reduce them to less than one regiment.

1505. As a matter of fact there is very little more than one regiment in the whole of Australia, is there?—More than that, I think; I think there is one regiment at Sydney.

1506. Mr. *Marsh.*] Are the troops of the line now trained to be gunners?—The troops of the line are always trained to be gunners whenever there is an opportunity.

1507. As a matter of fact, are they pretty fair gunners generally?—Middling. They are not so good as seamen, for instance, and not so good as marines.

1508. Then, for the defence of a colony marines would be better than troops of the line to defend, for instance, the harbour of Sydney?—I do not think there is very much difference between marines and troops of the line on shore. I do not think there ought to be.

1509. Do you think the marines are more accustomed to gunnery?—I think they would be from their habits on board ship, but it would be very little.

1510. You were asked with regard to the Cape, and you said that there was an objection to holding it as so large a colony, but as a mere garrison for the protection of our trade?—For the protection of our trade.

1511. But supposing we had not all those possessions, it would be very possible, would it not, for another power to have a naval colony at Natal, or some other point on the coast?—There is no harbour.

1512. Is there no place but the Cape?—Only just at the Cape; there is no other harbour on that coast. At Natal there is great want of an harbour.

1513. Then there is no place capable of being the nucleus of a naval station, or anything of the sort?—No, nothing of the sort.

1514. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You said that those places, as to which you were examined, were inadequately garrisoned; you mean, I suppose, inadequately as against a formidable attack?—Yes.

1515. But you conceive them to be sufficiently garrisoned as against the attack of a cruiser or two?—Yes.

1516. Do you conceive that without some moderate garrisons they would be exposed to great danger, even from a cruiser or two?—Yes; without small garrisons, certainly.

1517. During the absence of the British fleet?—Yes.

1518. So that in that case, a power which was far weaker than ourselves at sea, might yet, during the temporary absence of the fleet, be capable of inflicting great damage upon us, in spite of our usual and permanent superiority?—Certainly.

1519. So that, by so far the neglect in having moderate garrisons in these stations,

stations, we should lose the advantage of our command of the sea?—You would, certainly, to a great degree.

1520. Mr. *Adderley.*] Can you state whether Ceylon is adequately garrisoned?—It is not; but being so near India, where there is always an immense force, I take it for granted, that if there was a war with any European power, say with France, a force of 3,000 or 4,000 men might easily be thrown into Ceylon from India.

1521. If Ceylon were annexed to India, you do not think that it would be less adequately garrisoned than it is now?—I suppose it would come to the same thing.

1522. Except that India would pay for it?—Yes.

1523. You look to India for the safety of Ceylon?—Yes; because from that quarter 3,000 or 4,000 troops may be detached without any difficulty.

Robert William Keate, Esq., called in; and Examined.

1524. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Governor of Trinidad?—I am.

1525. What other Government appointments have you held?—I have been Governor of Grenada; and before that, I was at the Sanchal Islands.

1526. How long have you been at Trinidad?—Three years, and some few months.

1527. Can you tell us what number of troops there is there now?—Three companies of a white regiment, and one company of a black regiment, and there are a few artillerymen.

1528. Where are the head-quarters?—The detachment of white troops is drawn from the Jamaica command, but Trinidad is in itself in the command of the Windward and Leeward Islands.

1529. Where are the head-quarters of the black regiments?—Barbadoes, I think.

1530. Where are the black troops recruited now?—I believe they are still partly recruited from the coast from liberated Africans, and partly in the West Indies.

1531. What is your opinion of the black troops as regards their efficiency for the purpose for which they are intended?—I have never seen them except in small detachments, and then I have always found them very disorderly and turbulent.

1532. Have you known instances in which white troops have been called upon to act against black troops?—I have heard of that lately, since I have been away from Trinidad.

1533. Can you tell when the system was altered?—I cannot tell exactly.

1534. What do you consider to be the object of the presence of troops in Trinidad; is it for defence against external aggression or for the maintenance of peace and order in the island?—I should suppose for both objects; they are very useful in the maintenance of peace in the island.

1535. Are they, in fact, used for police purposes?—Not for ordinary police purposes; they have been used in support of the police on more than one occasion.

1536. Do you think that, under the present system, the black troops can be relied upon for the purposes for which they are now used?—I think that there is a total want of confidence in them among the inhabitants.

1537. If the alternative of the withdrawal from Trinidad, or part payment by the Colony were offered to the Colony, which do you think would be preferred?—Part payment, certainly.

1538. I observe that the revenues of Trinidad, by the latest returns, are about 140,000*l.* a year. Do you think that the Colony has power to pay any portion towards the cost of the troops?—I do.

1539. I do not know whether the statement I have just made, as to the revenues, is a correct statement. Has there been any more recent return than that?—I presume that some return has been received since the commencement of this year, but I have not seen it.

1540. Have you any knowledge at all of British Guiana?—Not at all.

1541. Or of any other of the West India Islands?—I have no knowledge of Jamaica. I have been in Bermuda and St. Vincent, but only for a few days.

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1542. Sir *George Grey.*] What military force was stationed in Granada when you were Lieutenant Governor of that island?—When I arrived there I think there was one company of white troops, one of black, and a few artillerymen; but they were withdrawn a short time afterwards; that I think was in 1854.

1543. Did any inconvenience arise from the withdrawal of those troops?—Not that I am aware of.

1544. Was there a constabulary force in Granada?—Yes.

1545. Is there any similar force in Trinidad?—Yes.

1546. Do you think that any serious inconvenience would arise from the withdrawal of the troops from Trinidad?—I think so, in consequence of the mixed nature of the population.

1547. What is the ordinary duty of the troops?—They have a few guards to take; there is a guard at the Commissariat, and at the barracks, and one at the Governor's residence.

1548. Do the black troops do precisely the same duty as the white?—I think they make use of the black troops as much as possible for sentry duty.

1549. Is the mortality different in the white troops and in the black?—No, I believe not.

1550. Have the troops been generally healthy?—Except during the time there was an epidemic of yellow fever; I believe that was in 1858.

1551. Did it attack the black troops?—No; they do not suffer at all from that kind of complaint.

1552. You say that the troops have sometimes been employed in support of the police; is that of frequent occurrence?—Once every year there is a great riot in the town during what is called the Carnival, and then they are obliged to show the troops. If the police are mixed up in the riot they get the worst of it, being small in number.

1553. If the troops were withdrawn, and the constabulary increased, do you think that they would be sufficient to maintain order?—Not if recruited in the island.

1554. Of what materials is the police force now composed?—The best among them are soldiers who have received their discharge; the rest are negroes from Barbadoes, and from Trinidad itself.

1555. Might not the force be composed of the same materials as at present?—It might be; but there is a difficulty even now in recruiting the force.

1556. Do you consider four companies of troops necessary?—No, I would not say that; some part of them might be withdrawn, looking upon them as a force to maintain internal order.

1557. Do you think three companies quite sufficient?—Yes, two companies of white troops, and one of black troops.

1558. What time would it take to bring a reinforcement from Barbadoes?—By steamer it would take, I suppose, 24 hours after the news was arrived that they were required.

1559. Mr. *Ellice.*] You say that the inhabitants have no confidence in the black troops?—I do.

1560. Then they would not willingly pay any contribution towards the expense of black troops?—I think not.

1561. Mr. *Childers.*] You say, also, that they are of no use?—I think that they are so turbulent and insubordinate, that they are of no use; they are a constant source of fear to us.

1562. If all the black troops were withdrawn, how many white troops would be necessary?—I consider that the present number of white troops would be sufficient.

1563. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you think that the black troops would be of any use against a foreign enemy?—I have no means of judging.

1564. Mr. *Childers.*] Is it from your colony that they have gone to the Gambia?—I do not know.

1565. Mr. *Baxter.*] The principal use of the white troops being, as you say, to maintain order on the occasion of this annual riot, do you not think it fair that the colonists should pay a certain proportion towards the expense of maintaining those troops?—I think so; and I believe that they would be very ready to do it.

1566. Have

1566. Have they ever been asked by the Colonial Office to contribute any portion of the expense?—I believe that lately, since I have been away from the island, some correspondence has taken place on the subject.

1567. Can you state the nature of that correspondence to the Committee?—The only knowledge I have of it is from the newspapers.

1568. *Chairman.*] When was that?—In the early part of the present year, I think.

1569. Mr. *Baxter.*] Then there would be no indisposition on the part of the Colonists to pay a part of the expenses incurred by their own military defence?—I think not.

1570. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you say that there is a local force in Grenada?—Yes.

1571. By whom is it paid?—It is a volunteer militia; they have a police force also paid by the colony.

1572. Supposing the troops were withdrawn from Trinidad, do you see any reason why Trinidad should not be defended in the same way as Grenada?—Yes; it would not be very difficult, but very mischievous in consequence of the mixed nature of the population. The properties are held to a great extent by the French people, who keep up French sympathies.

1573. My question was whether, in your opinion, the colony would undertake themselves to suppress any disturbance?—I think that they would be ready and willing to increase the police force, or to pay any amount that was considered reasonable for a regular force, but I do not think that they could possibly raise a local force of any kind.

1574. What do you suppose, from your knowledge of Trinidad, would be the result of England withdrawing all its forces, or at all events, refusing to pay for them?—I think the first result would be an offer to pay a large proportion, and secondly that the withdrawal would lead to a total want of confidence, and also to the withdrawal of capital on the part of those who are now giving their efforts towards developing the resources of the island.

1575. You think that the resources of the owners of property in Trinidad are so small that they would rather leave Trinidad than defend it?—No; I think they would be ready to pay. I do not know whether they could take upon themselves the whole expense; that is, whether their revenue would be sufficient.

1576. Do you think that it would lead to an abandonment of the colony, or to the colony undertaking to defend themselves, either by troops hired from elsewhere, or from troops raised on the spot?—I think that the feeling would be very strong in favour of defending themselves as far as they possibly could, but it would also lead to the withdrawal of those persons from the island whose means would enable them to leave.

1577. Sir *George Grey.*] What is the whole civil expenditure of Trinidad?—It comes to about 160,000 *l.* a year.

1578. What is the revenue?—It is about the same, I believe.

1579. Do you know the cost of maintaining four companies there?—No, I have no knowledge of that.

1580. You think that the mixed nature of the population in Trinidad renders impossible the formation of a local force similar to that which exists in other Colonies where the population is not mixed?—I think so.

1581. But you think there is no indisposition on the part of the owners of property in the island, so far as their resources permit, to provide for their own defence?—Just so.

1582. And you think that that could best be provided for by a force not raised in the island?—I think so.

1583. Although paid for by the island?—Yes.

1584. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think that any community like Trinidad can be treated like any ordinary British community?—Not at all.

1585. In Trinidad the British population is very small, I believe?—Very small.

1586. The population mainly foreign, and singularly heterogeneous?—Singularly so in all classes.

1587. You think that something more is necessary to maintain internal order and security in such a population than in a purely British community?—I think so; its proximity to the Republic of Venezuela is an important consideration;

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sideration; we get all the turbulent spirits from that republic whenever they change their government.

1588. There are also foreign Colonies in the neighbourhood of kindred race?—Yes, the two French Colonies of Martinique and Guadaloupe.

1589. Do you think that if Trinidad were left to her own defences, and her own devices, comparisons would be drawn in Trinidad between the state of things that would then exist there, and the condition of the neighbouring French Colony?—I think so.

1590. Sir *George Grey.*] Have you had any experience of black troops, except in single companies, in Trinidad?—I had a short experience of them in Grenada.

1591. To what do you attribute the misconduct of which you have spoken?—I think that the class of negroes from whom they are recruited are a particularly insubordinate race; their ideas of discipline of any kind are very small indeed.

1592. You have never seen a whole regiment together?—I have not.

1593. You do not know the state of discipline at head-quarters?—I do not; but I understand it is better than that which prevails in detached companies.

1594. Have you any knowledge of the military strength of the French islands you have alluded to?—No; I could not give the amount of strength.

1595. Do you think that the money spent by the troops in the Colony forms any ingredient in the desire of the colonists of Trinidad to keep troops there?—No, I think not in Trinidad; I think it was so in Grenada.

1596. Are the troops much dispersed in Trinidad?—The three companies of white troops are kept together in barracks about two miles from the town, and the black troops are quartered in the town itself.

1597. Mr. *Marsh.*] Does the French Government pay for the defence of its Colonies, or do the Colonies themselves?—I do not know.

1598. You say that there is a large military force in the French colonies?—I have heard so.

1599. Is Trinidad an important place for naval defences?—I should say so.

1600. What is the language of the population there generally?—It is a good deal of Spanish and a good deal of French *patois.*

1601. What would be the sympathies of the people of Trinidad?—I should think that the larger number of negroes are negroes coming from French colonies; the white population is chiefly French, a small body of English, and on the mountains there are a great many Spanish and Indians.

1602. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In Guadaloupe and Martinique the population is principally a native population, whilst at Trinidad it is mainly a foreign population?—A foreign population.

1603. Are you aware that Grenada and the other small West India Islands have got on apparently very satisfactorily lately, without the presence of any military force?—Yes.

1604. Do you think that that would be the case if our military forces were withdrawn altogether from the West India Islands?—No; I think that at Grenada they look at the fact of there being troops at Barbadoes in case of need.

1605. The policy of late years has, I think, been to concentrate the troops more than formerly?—Yes.

1606. You think that the presence of troops at a few points in the West Indies has a great effect upon the security of the whole?—I think so.

1607. In speaking of the black troops, did you mean to say that you suspected their fidelity in case of its being necessary to make use of them against the native population of Trinidad?—I think that they would be very unwilling to act against their own class.

1608. I understood you to say that the danger was that they were rather inclined to quarrel with the native population?—I think that their quarrels are chiefly with the police, in which they would be backed up by the native population.

1609. Mr. *Baxter.*] Is any contribution received from the West India Islands towards the military expenditure?—There is a small contribution from Trinidad; they find the barracks for the black troops.

1610. *Chairman.*] Do you know how long England has ceased to receive contributions

contributions from the West India Islands towards the expense of the troops? —No.

1611. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Have you ever heard of Trinidad paying for her own troops since she was conquered?—No, I should think she has not.

1612. *Chairman.*] Are you aware that the Dutch and Spanish colonies not only pay the expense of their own troops, but pay money also into the Exchequer?—I have heard that the colony of Cuba sends a large balance every year to Spain.

1613. Mr. *Baxter.*] From your knowledge of the West Indies, do you think that there would be any serious difficulty in the way of the Colonies paying the whole of their military expenditure?—I think that one great difficulty would be that those colonies in which detachments of troops are not stationed, but which depend upon a garrison in a neighbouring island, would be unwilling to pay anything for troops which were not stationed in their own island.

1614. These islands in which British troops were stationed would be willing to pay for them?—They would be willing to pay a portion of the expense.

1615. You say that if required you think that Trinidad should pay the whole expense?—I think it would rather pay the whole than be left without troops; but I think they would find it very difficult, and it would be very hard upon them.

1616. Mr. *Adderley.*] I suppose that the unwillingness to undertake the whole expense would depend very much upon the way in which the proposition was put to them?—I suppose so.

1617. If the alternative of withdrawing the troops were strongly placed before them, the probability is that that would govern the character of the answer?—I think they would state their willingness to pay, and would remonstrate against it.

1618. *Chairman.*] Looking to the prosperity and the wealth of Trinidad, do you consider it equitable that the Colony should pay a portion of the expenses? —I do.

Jovis, 2° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Fortescue.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Baxter.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Ellice.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *Charles Moystyn Owen*, called in; and Examined.

Mr. *C. M. Owen.*

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1619. *Chairman*] 'I BELIEVE you are now the Chief of the Oxford Constabulary Force?—Yes.

1620. I believe that some time ago you held official positions at the Cape Colony?—Yes.

1621. How many years were you at the Cape altogether?—Nearly 11.

1622. In what year did you first go there?—The end of 1841 or the beginning of 1842.

1623. When were you first employed in an official capacity?—I was employed in native levies in 1846, on the breaking out of the Kafir war.

1624. What was the nature of your employment then?—I commanded native levies.

1625. What number of native levies were you instrumental in raising?—First of all they were pressed, under the old commando system, and served for a few months, but afterwards they acted as volunteers, and then I raised altogether about 1,500, under Major Hogge.

1626. Where did those levies first serve?—On the frontier.

1627. On what part of the frontier?—On the Kafir frontier.

1628. On the north-east frontier?—On what we call the British Kaffraria frontier, beginning from the Fish River.

1629. How long were those levies so employed?—Till the end of the war, in 1847.

1630. Will you describe the nature of the service which you had to perform with those levies?—We served with the troops against the Kafirs.

1631. Did you serve with regular troops?—With regular troops, and sometimes alone; we were occasionally a week or two without them.

1632. Was that in making reprisals for the cattle stolen by the natives?—Yes.

1633. How long did that last?—Until, I think, the end of 1847.

1634. When that service was completed, what was the next employment which you were engaged in?—I was appointed by the then Governor, Sir Henry Pottinger, to raise and command the Kafir police, at the frontier.

1635. Was that police force composed exclusively of Kafirs?—The officers were Europeans.

1636. Of what materials were the volunteers of whom you spoke just now?—It is difficult to say, for they were of all sorts; the Hottentots predominated; there were what we call bastards, or half-castes of every description between that and a white man.

1637. Were there any white men?—The officers were white men; the blacks predominated.

1638. What was the nature of your employment in the second case you mention, as commanding the Kafir police?—I had a certain length of frontier to protect; the Kafirs would break through and steal cattle, and go back again, and I had posts along the line of frontier. I had 10 men in one place, 20 in another, and 40 in another; and when we heard of the Kafirs making incursions and stealing cattle, we took more, if possible, as a reprisal.

1639. Were

1639. Were you engaged against some of the natives of whom Sandella was chief?—He was the chief of the Ghikas, but there were other chiefs.

1640. How long did that second employment of yours last?—Somewhere about four years.

1641. You returned to England, I think, in 1850 or 1851?—In the beginning of 1851.

1642. In that year were you sent out by Lord Grey as Assistant Commissioner, with Major Hogg?—I was.

1643. What was the special duty which you were expected to discharge?—I was Assistant Commissioner to General Sir Harry Smith, who was Her Majesty's High Commissioner.

1644. What were your duties as Assistant Commissioner?—To assist Sir Harry Smith in making inquiries, and giving him advice.

1645. And in making treaties with the frontier tribes?—Settling boundary lines between the frontier tribes and differences between the Dutch and the Kafirs, or the Basouta Kafirs.

1646. Where were you stationed principally?—All along the Kafir frontier.

1647. On the Orange River Sovereignty?—On the Orange River Sovereignty for a considerable time, and also at Port Natal. I was three months, I think, in Port Natal.

1648. In the first instance you were to act with Major Hogg, and subsequently with Sir George Clark?—First with Major Hogg, until he died, and then a man of the country was appointed by General Cathcart; he was not confirmed from home; and then Sir George Clark was sent out in place of Major Hogg.

1649. Your duties as Commissioner were, I think, of a civil nature?—Yes.

1650. During the time you were engaged in those duties, were military operations being carried on in the Orange River Sovereignty?—Yes; General Cathcart made war with Moshesh.

1651. I observe from the Blue Books that, in December 1852, General Cathcart invaded the Orange River territory; were you in the territory at that time?—I marched up with those troops.

1652. At that time I think there was a considerable loss of the Queen's troops?—Yes.

1653. Especially of the 12th Lancers?—Yes; a good many of the 12th Lancers were lost.

1654. From your occupation there, then and at other times, do you think that the Queen's troops, that is, cavalry, are a proper force to employ in dealing with these frontier tribes?—It is a very rough country for Lancers, at any rate; they are very unsuitable for that country.

1655. Do you think that they were of much service?—No, I cannot say that they were.

1656. At what time did your occupation as Assistant Commissioner cease?—I came home in May 1854. My appointment was originally for two years, but I served three years.

1657. Have you formed any opinion as to the effect of our policy in regard to the withdrawal of our authority over the Orange River territory as regards the maintenance of peace on the frontiers; do you think that that was a step which led to satisfactory results?—Certainly; we should have had another war there if we had remained.

1658. Have you formed any opinion as to what would be the best kind of force, both with a view to efficiency and economy, for the protection of our North Eastern frontier?—The rifle brigade were very useful there; there are many good regiments which have served there, but the lance is a useless weapon as against a Kafir.

1659. There is a force called the Cape Mounted Rifles; do you think that they are a satisfactory force for the defence of the Colony?—They used to be, but there have been great alterations since I left; they were originally raised, I believe, as a corps of guides, and then they were composed of natives, little smart Hottentots, who knew the country well and could shoot well; now I believe they enlist scarcely any, if any, natives, and it has become an European regiment.

1660. From what you know of them now, do you think that they are a satisfactory force for the defence of the frontier?—That I cannot answer, because I have not been there since 1854; I can only speak from hearsay.

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1661. Can you form any opinion as to any particular kind of force that would be useful in defending the frontier?—A very useful force is Currie's Police; they are called police, but they are mounted and armed; they are, in fact, irregular soldiers; they are men of the country, who can ride well and shoot well, and Sir Walter Currie is their chief. I believe they are now called the Border police.

1662. Whatever force we had, do you think that we could reasonably rely upon the populations to be found in the Colony for mainly constituting that force?—Yes, but it would require some assistance. Sir Walter Currie has a difficulty already in recruiting, for I have sent out some men to him from this country; the Government paying their passage.

1663. Do you think that you could defend the frontier by a force mainly composed of men in the Colony?—For that purpose they are better than soldiers; but they must be backed by soldiers.

1664. I observe that Sir Harry Smith, speaking in 1847, the time that you were in the Colony, of an ineffectual attempt to capture Sandilla, says, "in this bit of a brush, 56,000*l.* was spent in waggon-hire alone." Do you think that that represents fairly a sample of the kind of cost which these frontier wars have occasioned us?—Waggon-hire is very high; an immense number of baggage waggons are employed in moving from place to place.

1665. Within your knowledge, is it the fact, that whenever a war has broken out, the cost of everything has enormously increased, and that therefore it is greatly to the interest of the people of the Colony that such wars should arise?—The price of everything has certainly greatly increased; it has doubled.

1666. Do you know what may be stated to be the extent of the land frontier line of our South African Colony, to the north?—From sea to sea, it is more than 1,000 miles.

1667. What portion of that frontier may be said to be bordered by warlike tribes?—All of it, more or less, except where there is a desert.

1668. You have been in Natal, and in the country between British Kaffraria and Natal?—Yes, I have passed over there.

1669. What tribes are principally located there?—Our old enemies, the Kafirs, driven back; amongst others, the Creli Kafirs.

1670. Are they a warlike race?—Yes.

1671. Do you think that we ought to be surprised at any time, if we are engaged in some trouble with them?—No, I should not be surprised, at any time.

1672. What is the presentposition of the Orange River Free State; is that united with Trans Vaal territory, or is it separate?—It is a united Government, and Moshesh's Government is separate from the Dutch.

1673. In that portion of our north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, there is the Orange River sovereignty. Is that united in its form of government with the Trans Vaal Republic, or is it entirely separate?—When I was there it was separate, but they have now joined the Trans Vaal.

1674. The Basonta is separate?—It is separate; but the boundary is so little defined, that it is almost impossible to separate them.

1675. Is the population of the Trans Vaal and of the Orange River Free State principally white?—Principally white.

1676. What is the population of the Moshesh's territory?—I cannot tell you what he has; he has a large population.

1677. Are they principally blacks?—Principally blacks. He has 50,000 fighting men at least.

1678. Do you know at all what the population of British Kaffraria is now?—I do not; it has been much increased since I left, by the German Legion and emigrants.

1679. What has become of the German Legion?—They have merged into the Colony; they have gone as servants, and so on, I understand; but I do not know it of my own knowledge.

1680. Sir *George Grey*.] How many British troops were there at the Cape Colony at the time you were organizing and commanding these 1,500 volunteers in 1846 and 1847?—I cannot tell exactly; there was a large force.

1681. Several regiments?—Several regiments. I should think, 4,000 or 5,000.

1682. Do you think that that could have been materially reduced, with safety

safety to the Colony, at that time?—There was war at that time; there were few enough.

1683. In 1852, when you went with General Cathcart on that expedition, what was the number of the British troops in the country?—Five thousand men or more.

1684. Could that force have been materially reduced, with safety to the Colony?—That I cannot say; there was war then also.

1685. How is Currie's police force paid?—By the Colony, when I was there; they received so much a day; I believe the pay of a private is 4*s.* 6*d.* a day, and he finds himself in clothing, his own arms and accoutrements, and a horse.

1686. Of what number did it consist?—I believe between 400 and 500.

1687. Do you think that it could be materially increased, so as to admit of any considerable reduction of the number of troops in the Colony?—It might be increased materially, I have no doubt, to advantage.

1688. Do you think that that increase would allow of a proportionate diminution of the British troops in the Colony?—I should think so, certainly; but I do not know how many troops there are in the Colony now; I left in 1854.

1689. That force did not exist then, I suppose?—Yes, it did; but not to the same extent that it does now. I think there were 200 then.

1690. Lord *Stanley.*] During the war of 1846 was much readiness shown by the European population, at the Cape, to volunteer against the Kafirs?—Not particularly; but I do not think they were backward when they were called upon.

1691. To what extent was a volunteer force organized?—The volunteer force that I belonged to was different to what you would call a volunteer force; a real volunteer would get no pay, but we were all paid.

1692. As I understand that the volunteers were Europeans?—Not those who served with me.

1693. Then they were paid at the expense of the Colonial Government, I presume?—No, they were paid at the expense of the Home Government, I believe; each man receives a bounty for enlisting for three years.

1694. They were, in fact, a part of the regular force?—They were enlisted to serve during the war, receiving a bounty of 3 *l.* each.

1695. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you not think that irregular troops are better adapted for frontier warfare than troops of the line?—Certainly.

1696. Mr. *Adderley.*] How long were you engaged in the commando system?—I was under the commando system, I think, nine months the first time, and received pay all that time. I did not serve as a burgher. The Hottentots were pressed men, and I was a pressed man; but serving with the Hottentots, I received pay; if I had served with the white men, I should have received no pay.

1697. At that time there was a double force under the commando system; one which was not paid, and another which was paid?—Yes; the burghers got only their rations.

1698. Did you serve in both kinds of force?—No; I was pressed to serve with the burghers, and then I was transferred to the Hottentot volunteer force; I thought if I was going to be there at all, I might as well be paid.

1699. When you were transferred to the Hottentot force, what was the pay?—It was changed two or three times; I think at first I had only 7*s.* 6*d.* a day.

1700. As the officer in command?—Yes. Then I had 11*s.* 7*d.*, and then 15*s.*, and at last 1 *l.* a day.

1701. What pay did your men receive?—A man received 6*d.*, a corporal 9*d.*, and a sergeant 1*s.*

1702. Whilst the double system was in force, the burgher part of it was a volunteer unpaid force, except as to rations furnished by the Colonial Government?—I believe it was furnished by the Home Government, but I am not sure.

1703. The Hottentot levies under that commando system were wholly paid for by the Home Government?—I believe they were.

1704. Is this system which you are describing the old Dutch commando system?—Yes.

1705. Were the volunteers of 1847 the same as the native force under the commando system you are now describing?—Yes, just the same; they were the

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same men, except that they had just served their time, and they were disbanded; but to induce them to come back again they gave them a bounty.

1706. Mr. *Roebuck.*] They were called volunteers, but they were pressed?—They were pressed men in the first instance; they were bound then to serve for nine months, and then they were disbanded; and to induce the men to volunteer again they received a bounty, and then were called volunteers; but they were in fact enlisted men.

1707. Do you say that the white men were pressed and called volunteers, and not paid; did they press men and not pay for them?—Yes.

1708. Mr. *Marsh.*] They did not press the black men?—Yes, they did, but they paid them.

1709. Mr. *Adderley.*] What is your opinion of the old Dutch commando system, as a defensive system against foreign depredation?—I do not think that the old Dutch system would answer now; it did in the old times.

1710. Why should it not answer now?—The Kafirs are more organized, and can shoot better, and are less afraid of the Dutchmen.

1711. Sir *George Grey.*] How have they become much better organized?—We have taught them by continual war with them.

1712. The instructions by the use of the regular troops has ended in making the Kafirs more formidable?—Yes.

1713. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Has not the white merchant supplied them with arms and ammunition?—They have got them somewhere.

1714. Is not that one means of making them formidable?—Yes, certainly.

1715. Mr. *Adderley.*] The present system of defending the frontier has made the frontier more difficult to defend?—Certainly.

1716. The old Dutch system, I believe, was perfectly efficient for its purpose?—I think it was, but the Kafir had only his assegais, and had neither ammunition nor a good gun.

1717. It was a cheap mode of defence?—It cost the Government nothing.

1718. What is your opinion of the cruelty of the system towards the natives?—I think it is the other way.

1719. You think that the present system has led to more bloodshed than the old commando system?—Certainly.

1720. So that if the old commando system was put down upon principles of philanthropy, you think that that was a mistake?—Certainly.

1721. What is your opinion of the value of regular troops in bush warfare?—I am not a soldier, and it would ill become me to say anything about soldiers.

1722. You have been a commandant of volunteer levies?—Yes.

1723. Then can you not express an opinion as to the use of regular troops?—I think that when a man has a heavy load on his back, and is buckled tight up, he cannot march very well.

1724. Will you describe the nature of the country?—It is very rough; it is very bushy.

1725. What is the nature of the bush?—There are many kinds of bush; some of it is from three to ten feet high.

1726. What is the nature of the wood?—There is a great deal of thorn.

1727. Is it a thorn bush that cavalry can penetrate?—No.

1728. Is it a thorn bush that English infantry can penetrate?—If they are properly dressed and accustomed to it, Englishmen can go where any other men can; but soldiers buckled up, and just come from England, cannot get about through the bush.

1729. I believe it is the most impenetrable thorn bush in the world?—It is very thick.

1730. You say that the Cape Mounted Rifles were formed of natives; smart Hottentots. Was that in your opinion a good sort of force for bush warfare?—Yes.

1731. Now that they are formed of Europeans do you say that they are more or less useful for bush warfare?—I should think less useful.

1732. Have you any doubt about it?—I have not seen them since the alteration.

1733. Now, you say that in bush warfare this volunteer force should be backed by regular soldiers; what do you mean by that?—They would require something to fall back upon.

1734. You

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1734. You think that there should be a corps of reserve out of the bush?—The Hottentots fight very well if all goes the right way.

1735. You say that the baggage carriage has been very expensive; did it come to your knowledge whilst you were in the Colony, that large fortunes were being made by contractors who supplied the British troops?—No, I do not know of any large fortunes; some people got a great deal of money, no doubt, but they speculated and lost it again.

1736. Do you know men who have made themselves rich by contracting to supply British troops?—I have no doubt some have done so.

1737. Do you think that Kafir wars are likely to cease?—No, I should think not.

1738. The cause of the wars is generally depredations upon cattle feeding upon the borders, I believe?—Yes.

1739. As the Colony increases the cause of wars would increase also, would it not?—We keep advancing all the time; the Kafir says, "You steal my land, and I steal your cattle."

1740. The larger the amount of property exposed to depredation the greater the chance of war?—I do not know; if there is a thick population and fewer cattle there will be less chance of war.

1741. Do you think that the fact of the Colony making these wars and not paying for them is a fact which is likely to check wars?— That I cannot say.

1742. Mr. *Forteseue.*] Do I understand you to give your opinion, that for the last 20 years all throughout the Kafir wars of recent times, it would have been better if no Imperial troops had been sent to Cape Colony?—Certainly not, we could not have done without some troops.

1743. I think you say that the system of leaving the colonists to fight the natives themselves, which is called the commando system, would have been a far better system?—I am talking of the old times, before we taught the Kafir how to fight.

1744. Do you think that it would have been better if we had not taught them to fight by the introduction of Imperial troops?—I do not think that the Imperial troops taught them to fight, under the old commando system; directly there was any difference between the colonists and the blacks, the missionary stepped in, or some philanthropist got up a tale here, and then we sent out troops to take care of the Kafir, and we pampered him.

1745. Not to crush him, but to protect him?—To protect him, that was the beginning of it, and then we took such care of him that he made himself strong enough to fight us.

1746. Do you mean to say that, no matter what the nature of their fighting was, the Kafir must in the course of years have learned the use of arms, and learned to fight better, or do you mean that the introduction of Imperial troops taught them to fight?—They learned to fight better in the course of years, and in continual wars.

1747. You do not mean, then, that the system of allowing the colonist to fight without troops would have been a better system than that of pitting them against the Kafirs by the aid of Imperial troops?—I was not in the Colony at that time, and I can only speak from hearsay. Before the Kafirs were armed with guns, the colonists could master them, as I always understood and believe.

1748. You say that the system of allowing the colonists to fight the natives and master them was a merciful system?—Yes.

1749. Is that your opinion?—Yes.

1750. You think that it was not a sanguinary system on either side?—No, I do not think that they were cruel to the Kafirs, more than was necessary.

1751. You think that no atrocities were committed by the colonists upon the Kafirs, or by the Kafirs upon the colonists?—I do not say "no atrocities," but I think that there were comparatively very few.

1752. But that that system of individual warfare between the colonists and the Kafirs was a more merciful system than the system of warfare by means of regular troops?—Yes.

1753. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that there will be a constant recurrence of Kafir wars?—I should say so, but not at present, because the Kafirs have been starved the last three years; they destroyed their cattle.

1754. Do you consider it necessary to keep up a force of 6,300 British troops in

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in the Cape Colony?—I cannot say how many troops are necessary now, it is some years since I left the Colony.

1755. You stated that the chief use of British troops was to form a force for the native services to fall back upon?—No, I say they were necessary for that purpose.

1756. You have had a long experience in the Colony, what force do you think it necessary that we should keep up in that Colony for that purpose?—That I cannot tell; I left the Colony in 1854, and I do not know the present wants of the colony. When a war has broken out it requires a very great force.

1757. In the event of a large Imperial force being employed at the Cape, do you not think it fair that the colonists should contribute a considerable proportion of the expenses of that force?—If they can.

1758. Have you any doubt that they can?—I do not know what their money resources are.

1759. From your long residence at the Cape you must be aware of the fact, that there is a great deal of wealth in the Colony; do you not consider it fair that the Colony should contribute, at all events, some proportion of their military expenses?—Certainly.

1760. What proportion do you consider fair?—That I cannot say.

1761. Are you aware that at present they do not contribute 10 per cent.?—I know that they contribute very little, but I do not know what it is.

1762. Do you believe that there would be any great difficulty in getting them to contribute more largely?—There would be a great outcry amongst the colonists.

1763. Has that question ever been discussed in the Legislature?—I do not know.

1764. You are not aware whether any representations have been made by the Home Government to the Colony on that subject?—Yes; I think representations were made before I left the Colony.

1765. In what manner were representations made; were they made by Despatches from the Colonial Office?—I do not know.

1766. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that a system of defence has been pursued now for some years upon the frontier, which has prevented Kafir wars?—There has been no Kafir war.

1767. Are you aware that the Kafirs have been dislodged from their main stronghold, and driven further eastward?—They have been starved out; they killed all their cattle about three years ago.

1768. Are you not aware that they have been dislodged, and are not permitted to occupy their own stronghold?—Anatolas has been peopled by white men.

1769. I believe that a regular system of military posts has been organised at the frontier?—Yes.

1770. And that the white population has been largely increased on the frontier?—Yes.

1771. Do you think then that a Kafir war is as likely to arise now, as it was a few years ago?—No; I do not think anything of the military posts; I do not think that they will prevent wars, but I think that the Kafirs are now so poor that they are not able to fight.

1772. Do you recommend the withdrawal of the troops?—No; but I do not think that cooping up the troops in a fort will prevent a Kafir war.

1773. You are speaking of it as a mode of defence?—Yes.

1774. Do you think that the causes which are, and have been, at work tend to make a Kafir war less likely?—I do not know what means are at work now. I have not paid any attention to the Cape for some time.

1775. In fact, you know very little about the Cape since 1854?—No.

1776. What you tell us is from hearsay?—Yes, I left in 1854, and I have not concerned myself about it since.

1777. Have not Kafir wars caused an immense destruction of colonial property?—Yes.

1778. Setting that against the gains to be made by individuals from the expenditure of the war, which way do you think that the interest of the colonists lies?—Some of them have lost everything, and have become so poor that they have had nothing to begin with again.

1779. Setting one of those considerations against the other, which way do you think that the interest of the colonists in the eastern district of the Cape lies; is it their interest to make war, or to prevent war?—It is not to their interest to have wars; it is the merchants', who never see anything of the war, but who bring the produce and make a profit by it.

1780. Do you not think that the larger proportion of the colonial population is deeply interested in preventing Kafir wars?—Yes.

1781. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Is it for the benefit of the Colony to have a Kafir war?—No; it brings a great deal of money into the Colony, no doubt; but a man who has his house burnt down and his cattle taken away is the loser, whilst the man at a distance is the gainer.

1782. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think that the colonists, generally, or their representatives in the Colonial Parliament, wish to make or prevent Kafir wars?—To prevent Kafir wars.

1783. Are you aware by whose authority the wars in 1846 and 1847 were engaged in?—In 1846 it was upon the authority of Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was then Governor.

1784. And not upon the authority of any colonial power?—No.

1785. They were not engaged in it by the Colonial Parliament?—There was no Colonial Parliament at that time.

1786. Or by the colonial representatives?—There were none then.

1787. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean that Sir Peregrine Maitland made an aggressive war, or that he acted in defence of the Colony?—It was in consequence of the attack of the Kafirs.

1788. I do not understand you to say that, during those wars, the British troops should have been withdrawn from the Colony?—No.

1789. When you say that the British troops are necessary, as supports to the irregularly formed levies, you do not mean, I presume, that troops were not actually engaged, even in the bush?—Some of the regiments were very actively engaged.

1790. I believe that the first battalion of the Rifle Brigade was there several years?—Yes.

1791. Did it not render as efficient service as any irregular troops could have done?—It did.

1792. Mr. *Adderley.*] When you say that the British troops could not be dispensed with, you mean unless some equivalent were found?—Unless some equivalent were found.

1793. Did you find any difficulty in raising 1,500 volunteers?—No.

1794. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in raising double the number?—No, but at a price; of course, if you want more men you must offer larger bounty.

1795. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you say that those were paid by the Home Government?—I do not know who paid for them.

1796. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Supposing the British troops had been withdrawn, could you have found a sufficient body of troops in the Colony to supply their place?—Certainly not at the moment.

1797. Any conclusion therefore that might possibly be drawn from your answers does not go to show that we could withdraw entirely the support of British troops from the Colony?—No, I do not mean to say that at all.

1798. Mr. *Adderley.*] When you say that you could not have found volunteers at the moment, you mean that it would have taken time to find them?—We had to strip the Colony, in a great measure, to get as many as we did; we left few men to till the land, or scarcely any.

1799. At all events, you say that the old commando system was efficient against Kafirs till you fought them by Imperial troops?—I believe so.

1800. *Chairman.*] Do you think that if the force which could be raised in the Colony itself were partly supported by British troops, the Colony might be rendered secure if the defence were mainly entrusted to volunteers raised in the Colony?—It is so long since I left the Colony that it is difficult for me to say that: I do not know in what state they are now on the frontier.

1801. Since 1854 I suppose you have been in frequent communication with the Colony?—I see friends from there, and I hear from there occasionally. I know most of the people there.

1802. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you believe that if the commando system had been

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been continued, and no Imperial troops had been engaged in Kafir wars, the Kafirs would be at this time armed only with assegais, and that they would not have had guns?—They might have had a few, but the British settlers, I presume, would have taken care that they did not get many.

1803. How are they supplied with guns and ammunition?—They buy them.

1804. They buy them from whom?—From the English traders, no doubt.

1805. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Does the existence of an army in the Colony facilitate the transaction of commercial proceedings of that sort?—The merchants import them.

1806. Would the existence of the army facilitate barters between the merchant and the Kafirs?—I do not think so.

1807. Then how could the introduction of a British army assist the Kafirs in the art of war?—They fight with them.

1808. You say that the existence of the British army there enables the Kafirs to learn the art of war?—Yes.

1809. I suppose it was a desire on the part of the Kafir to attack the colonists which led to the fighting?—Yes.

1810. And therefore it was not the British army which led to the fighting?—The Kafirs commenced the fighting.

1811. If there had been no British army there to fight them, they would have subdued the Colony?—I cannot say that.

1812. You think that the Colony might have defended itself?—It could in old times, I believe.

1813. I am talking of times when the blacks became so powerful that they attacked the colonists?—Then the Colony would not have been able to protect itself.

1814. Mr. *Adderley.*] You think that the task of self-defence being left to the settlers, they would have seen that the Kafirs were not well armed?—Yes.

1815. Mr. *Marsh.*] Would the old commando system be sufficient?—In old times, but not now.

1816. Supposing there had been no interference on the part of the Home Government, do you think that the commando system would have been sufficient?—I am led to believe so.

1817. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Therefore the introduction of the British army aided the Kafirs?—I do not say so.

1818. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you think that Sir Peregrine Maitland, at the time you have spoken of, would have been justified in doing nothing, but leaving the colonists to defend themselves?—Certainly not; the Kafirs would have taken the whole frontier.

1819. Mr. *Marsh.*] The commando system has been put down for many years?—In a great measure it has been; they would not let them make reprisals.

1820. If they had been allowed to make war as they had previously done, you seem to think that that would have been sufficient for the protection of the Colony?—Yes.

1821. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Did not the old commando system allow them to shoot down the Kafirs whenever they met them?—I never heard that, except when they were thieving.

1822. But the men were allowed to determine whether they were thieving or not?—No, I do not think that; they went out under their commandant, who was responsible, or their field cornet, who was responsible to the commandant.

1823. They determined whether there was any thieving going on?—Yes.

1824. And when there was thieving going on, they shot every one they met?—Some of them.

1825. That was the way in which they kept down the Kafirs?—Yes.

1826. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You say that the troops were sent out to protect the Kafirs; against whom?—Against the burghers.

1827. If the commando system was a merciful system, why did the Kafirs require protection?—I do not know; the missionaries were of a different opinion; the same with the Hottentots; they nursed up the Hottentots till they rebelled in 1857; they have never been ill used.

1828. *Chairman.*] You say the Kafirs are starved out?—Yes.

1829. Do you think that, so far as the system goes which is pursued now, there

there is anything in the system which affords any guarantee against a Kafir war breaking out at any time?—No.

1830. Mr. *Adderley.*] You say you think that the Imperial warfare has led to more bloodshed than the old commando system?—I think there was less bloodshed then than since there has been regular warfare.

1831. Do you think that the plan of starving the Kafirs out is more merciful?—They starved themselves; they destroyed the cattle.

1832. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you think that more Kafirs have been killed in consequence of the commando system being put down?—Yes, a great many more.

1833. *Chairman.*] In a report which was presented to the Duke of Newcastle by Sir George Clark, at the time you were with him on the frontier, speaking of the object of your co-operation with him, he uses these words: "Mr. Owen's presence there I considered to be desirable, in order to watch and suppress intrigues which some of the speculators in the southern districts have before employed to involve the British authorities in military expeditions, and by recurring to which at the present time they would attain both the usual profits accruing to them from such undertakings, and create a necessity for the consequence of British protection over the scene of their unscrupulous transactions." Do you think that that is a correct statement of the nature of your functions as assistant Commissioner on the frontier?—Yes.

1834. Mr. *Marsh.*] I understood you to say that the frontier people were the only losers by the Kafir war?—As far as I know.

1835. Have the people on the frontier any political influence in the state of affairs at the Cape?—Yes.

1836. Much?—They send their representatives.

1837. Do they bear any proportion to the representatives from the large towns of other parts of the Colony?—I believe not, they do not attend regularly, because it is too far off.

1838. Their political influence is not so great as it ought to be for the position they have?—I do not like to answer that question, because I am not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances since I left.

1839. *Chairman.*] You say that the first colonists have had an interest in wars for various reasons, whilst those on the frontier have an interest in peace?—Yes.

1840. Mr. *Baring.*] Supposing all parties to be influenced by their own personal interests?—That is how I understood it to be put.

1841. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Is it for the interest of the Colony, as a body, that there should be a war?—No; I think it is desirable that there should be peace.

1842. Mr. *Marsh.*] The frontier colonists suffer from the war, whilst others do not?—The frontier colonists suffer, and the others do not.

1843. Mr. *Adderley.*] To say they do not suffer, is a weak expression; do they not greatly enrich themselves?—Some of them.

1844. Are they not the stronger influence in the Parliament and in the towns?—I think they are the stronger.

1845. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Have you ever heard of the Governor of the Cape being allowed by Parliament, or by the population, to engage in hostilities with the Kafirs?—There has been no Parliament until within the last few years.

1846. Does not the movement of the troops depend upon the discretion of the Governor?—It does.

Captain *Andrew Clarke*, called in; and Examined.

1847. *Chairman.*] YOU are, I believe, an officer in Royal Engineers?—I am.

1848. You were for some time in New Zealand?—Yes.

1849. You were also Sir William Denison's private secretary in Tasmania?—Yes.

1850. And Surveyor General at Victoria?—Yes.

1851. You were, I believe, a member of the Cabinet of Victoria?—Yes.

1852. What was your office?—Surveyor General and Chief Commissioner of Crown Lands.

1853. Has your attention been called to the correspondence which has passed between the Imperial Government and the Colonial Government on the subject of military expenditure in Victoria?—Yes; the general subject I have had to consider.

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1854. Can you give the Committee any information as to the opinions or feelings of the colonists with regard to their proportion of the contribution?—There has been a considerable change of feeling from the year 1852 down to the present time; for during that period the subject has assumed several aspects. Of course, when the gold fields were discovered, in 1851, the difficulty of securing order and obedience to the laws, together with the enormous influx of an undesirable population from the adjacent penal colonies, was so great, that the first object of the local Government was to obtain, in aid of police, a military force from this country. Upon the thorough establishment of order, and the formation of a local police by the colonists, and regarding the large expenditure that was being incurred for military purposes, rendered no longer necessary, not only for these reasons, but from the entire change of policy in 1854-55, in the collection of the revenue from the gold fields; and at the same time, the existence of a strong feeling with reference to the Russian war, I may say a feeling of patriotism, the anxiety to keep the troops ceased. That has increased, and, as a whole, the colonists have not been very anxious for the presence of a very large military force; and with this change has the local Parliament diminished from time to time the Votes in payment of the Royal troops, whose numbers have been reduced in proportion.

1855. Are you aware of any correspondence which has passed between the Colony of Victoria and the Imperial Government upon the subject of the transport of the troops, by which the Colony has expressed its willingness to pay the cost of obtaining for itself a much larger amount of defence if the Imperial Government will pay the cost of a certain number of troops?—As far as my memory serves me upon that point, shortly before the death of Sir Charles Hotham, a Despatch fell into the hands of his advisers, in which the Home Government insisted upon the transport of the military to the Colony being paid by the local Government.

1856. Sir *George Grey*.] Has that Despatch which you are now speaking of been published?—That I do not know.

1857. What is the date of it?—I should fancy 1854 or 1855; but, however, it referred to two previous Despatches on the same subject, insisting on the payment by the Colony of the transport of the troops. The local Government of the day resisted this, on the ground that it was not a part of the original contract between them and the Home Government that the transport of troops should be paid by them.

1858. You are speaking of a contract which they had entered into at a previous time; what contract are you referring to?—Perhaps "contract" is too strong a term to use. I should say, perhaps, the condition upon which, in the earlier part of 1851 or 1852, the colonists requested a military force, by which it was arranged that the transport of the troops should be paid by the Imperial Government.

1859. *Chairman*.] Was it a part of that proposed arrangement, that all except the cost of transport should be paid by the Colony?—Of all troops that were sent there for the purposes of internal defence. Of course there was an Imperial guard under the terms of Lord Grey's Despatch, which the Home Government was supposed to pay for, but which, as far as I can ascertain, they never did pay for.

1860. What has been the upshot of that?—I believe the result of that proposal has been that the Imperial Government now pays the transport.

1861. Sir William Denison suggested in some Despatch "That in accordance with the practice adopted with respect to the postal service and the Australian survey, the cost of defending the Australian Colonies," speaking of the Colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, "should be shared in equal proportions by the Imperial Government and the Colonial Government"?—Yes.

1862. From your experience and knowledge of the state of public opinion, and feeling in these colonies, what is your opinion as to that arrangement?—My opinion of the arrangement is this, that only the Imperial pay should be borne by the mother country; and that all other expenses such as allowances, rations, forage, barracks, and so on, should be borne entirely by the Colonial Government, which would, instead of one-half, involve an expenditure of more than two-thirds upon the part of the Colonies, and one-third on the part of the Home Government. It is a modification of Sir William Denison's plan, and it would

would place the Home Government in a better position; but it is still very undesirable to leave the military subject to the discretion of a local Legislature.

1863. Sir *George Grey.*] When did you leave Victoria?—In 1858.

1864. What was the number of British troops there then?—Nominally, 700; but it was never kept up to that strength.

1865. What proportion of that was paid for by the Colony, and what by this country?—At the time I left, the whole of the expense of every soldier was borne by the Colonial Government; nothing was paid for by the mother country, except the Imperial pay and allowances of the head quarters staff, and which was the staff for the whole Australian and New Zealand command.

1866. Was that in accordance with the contract to which you have referred?—No, it was far beyond the contract. The Colonial Government at that time, never enforced the contract. Four companies were supposed to be paid for from Imperial funds.

1867. And the Colony was to pay for everything above four companies?—Yes, and at that time there must have been seven companies.

1868. Was that the ordinary amount of force of the Colony, or had it been reduced from particular circumstances?—There had been a larger force there before, but that was due to the temporary excitement at the close of 1854.

1869. For how long a period have the Colony paid the whole cost of the British troops in the Colony?—As far as my memory serves me, from 1851, until the last two or three years. I should fancy that for about five or six years the entire cost has been paid by the Colony.

1870. Then the only cost incurred by this country on account of these troops was the cost of transport?—As far as I can trace it during the period I name.

1871. Mr. *Childers.*] Originally the Colony of Victoria was a subordinate part of New South Wales?—Yes.

1872. And at that time the whole force stationed there was a detachment; it was hardly a company?—Hardly a company in number.

1873. Then when Victoria was separated from New South Wales in 1850 and 1851, she became a distinct Colony?—Yes.

1874. Then in the same or the following year, the gold fields were discovered, and she rapidly went ahead of the original Colony?—Yes.

1875. Upon that it became necessary to give her as much protection as was given to New South Wales?—Yes.

1876. And upon that it was decided that four companies should be stationed at Victoria, as four companies were stationed at Sydney?—Yes.

1877. Under the original terms of Lord Grey's Despatch of 1849, the pay of those companies was to be defrayed by the Home Government?—The pay and contingencies.

1878. And only the allowances were to be made by the Colony?—Only the allowances.

1879. The Colony was very desirous to receive a larger force, was it not?—Yes.

1880. That was before the Crimean war broke out, and also before the disturbances in the gold fields?—Yes, in September 1853.

1881. The disturbances, I think, were the subsequent year?—Yes, in December 1854.

1882. But that desire to have an additional force arose from the anxiety of the Colony to be in a good state of internal as well as external defence?—Yes.

1883. She offered to defray, if the additional force was sent to her, the whole of the military expenditure within the Colony?—Within the Colony, minus the Imperial Guard.

1884. Except the expenses of the Imperial Guard?—Yes.

1885. A good deal of correspondence took place between the Home Government and the Colonies upon the matter?—Yes.

1886. And it ended in the Colony defraying all the charge except that of one company?—Theoretically, but practically they paid that too. I will give you one instance: in 1856 the 40th Regiment consisted, on paper, of 37 officers, 122 non-commissioned officers, 21 drummers, and 999 privates. I find that the whole charge for their Imperial pay, adding to it the staff for the whole of Australia, is upwards of 35,000 *l.*; good conduct allowances and other allowances for the 40th Regiment, borne on the Imperial Estimates of that year, were all paid for by the Colony, and increased this to 59,082 *l.* There were also contingencies,

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tingencies, which were for rations and forage, amounting to 44,000 *l.* more; and there were the military commissariat, barrack master, and other items; that is to say, the whole military cost for the Colony amounted to 147,519 *l.* I find in the year 1855, the previous year, it was 181,000 *l.* to pay the whole force of the Colony; and in the year 1854 there was a supplemental vote very much increasing that; making it about 226,000 *l.* in that year.

1887. Mr. *Baring.*] From what document did you draw that statement?—From the votes under the Appropriation Act of the Local Parliament, and the Abstract of the Revenue and Expenditure furnished by the Colonial Treasury at the end of each year.

1888. That is drawn from the accounts; not the Estimates?—That is drawn from the account.

1889. Mr. *Childers.*] Then the practice of calling upon the Home Government to pay for one company dropped in one of those years, but which, perhaps you do not remember?—It dropped, but the question was raised again in March 1857.

1890. It was while the Colony was defraying its entire expenses that the Crimean war broke out?—Yes.

1891. And then they began to look to the possibility of relieving the Home Government of the necessity of keeping so many troops there?—Yes.

1892. And simultaneously there was the organization of the volunteer force?—Yes.

1893. That was in 1853?—The latter end of 1853 the agitation on the part of the Colony was commenced, and during 1854 the first volunteer regiment was enrolled.

1894. In 1854 and 1855, part of the troops which had been in Victoria were withdrawn, and the Colony approached more to its normal state with respect to the number of troops; it commenced to organize a very large volunteer force, which has been most successful, and it reduced, to a considerable extent, its military expenses, did it not?—Yes, very considerably.

1895. And after that it defrayed the whole charge of its military expenditure, until the year 1858?—Yes.

1896. In the year 1856 a question arose as to the additional demands of the Home Government for the payment of the transport?—Yes.

1897. And the result of the raising of that question was, that the Colonial Government felt less disposed to defray so large an amount of military expenditure?—Yes.

1898. There was also a less favourable state of the local revenues?—Yes.

1899. Was it not a matter of complaint of the Colony, that she did not get credit at home for her large expenditure for military purposes?—If she got the credit, we could not trace it.

1900. For instance, I believe you had looked up the accounts of the year 1856?—I looked up the accounts of the year 1856.

1901. Will you state how much the Colony voted in that year for military expenditure?—In 1855, 181,700 *l.*, for that year 1856.

1902. Would you be so good as to read some of the items of military expenditure in 1856?—In 1856 it was 147,000 *l.*; and in 1855, 181,000 *l.*

1903. I am speaking of 1856?—In 1856 there was the whole of the Imperial pay.

1904. How much was that?—The actual Imperial pay would be 28,950 *l.*; that was what was voted for pay only.

1905. The whole of the Imperial contingencies?—The whole of the Imperial contingencies; good conduct pay, and also the ration allowances, and forage allowances.

1906. The whole of these charges in that year, taking that as an example, were defrayed by the Colony?—The whole of those charges were borne by the Colonial Government.

1907. So that in that year the Imperial Government had no occasion to spend anything in the Colony of Victoria, except the Imperial pay of the staff?—Nothing, for which I am aware.

1908. Mr. *Baring.*] Have you looked in the Army Estimates to see whether there was any sum deducted from Vote No. 2, in respect of "wanting to complete"?—No, except a small charge for sappers and miners; and it was that which drew my attention to it, seeing credit taken for that, and no credit taken for

for the other regiments in the Colonies, which were being paid for by the Colonies.

1909. I do not know whether you are aware, that at the end of Vote No. 2 of the Army Estimates, a sum is sometimes taken under the designation of "wanting to complete;" that is to say, the whole number of the men are estimated for, and a deduction made in the Estimates for a certain portion of those men?—Yes; for instance, take 1858.

1910. Mr. *Childers.*] Have you the Imperial Estimates of 1856 before you?—No, I have not.

1911. Mr. *Baring.*] I want to ask you whether when you say that the pay and allowances of these troops are taken in the Army Estimates of the year, you have adverted to the possibility of the money not being taken in the Army Estimates of the year, in consequence of the deductions made in the gross estimates under the designation of "wanting to complete"?—No, because I cannot trace it; the only sum I can find is a sum total of 1,225 *l.*, taken from the Army Estimates, for a small detachment of Imperial troops; this is a charge for engineers in Australia, but I do not see anything deducted for the regiments of the line who had been paid from Colonial revenues.

1912. Mr. *Childers.*] In that statement it appears as if there had been entire provision for the regiments which are stationed in Australia?—Yes.

1913. Mr. *Baring.*] That is, in the detailed statement, the total charge for the regiments would appear; but you are probably aware that the total charge for the regiments which are expected home from India, for instance, in the course of the year, appears in the detailed statement, whereas at the end of the vote, a sum is deducted under the term "wanting to complete," in order to meet a portion of the charge for the year that is gone?—I believe that is so.

1914. Therefore, I want to call your attention to the fact that that must not be taken to prove that the money was actually voted?—No, but no credit was taken for it.

1915. What you mean is that you do not see any credit to Victoria, in respect of the sums paid by Victoria?—No, nor the deductions from the Estimates.

1916. Although it is possible that the deductions might have been made under some general heading not specified?—Truly.

1917. Mr. *Childers.*] Then with respect to the year 1856, putting aside the estimates, the Colony defrayed its entire charges?—The Colony defrayed its entire charges.

1918. Looking at the accounts of the Treasury-chest, and of the sums paid into the Exchequer for that year, is there any credit taken similar to the amount defrayed by the Colony?—Yes, because we find the contributions of the Colonial Revenue in the military expenditure; we know that in that year, the Colonies expended the sum of 140,000 *l.*, and the Colony of Victoria 3,618 *l.*; that is the only sum that I can find here.

1919. That is the only sum which appears to have been paid into the Exchequer?—Yes.

1920. Although very large sums appear to have been voted for the Imperial pay of those troops?—Appear to have been voted.

1921. Looking into the accounts of the Treasury-chest of that year, do you find any contributions?—No, none whatever.

1922. Although large sums have been voted by the Colony also in the year 1855?—Yes.

1923. So that in the year 1856, nothing appears to have been brought to account, either for 1855 or 1856?—No.

1924. Whether that may be explained or not, which is a totally different question, did not facts such as these cause considerable surprise in the Colony?—Yes.

1925. And they were much remarked upon, were they not, in connexion with the large amount which the Colony was asked to vote for the Imperial military expenditure?—Yes.

1926. Do you know in what manner the Colonial Government paid over to the military authorities the sums contributed by the Colony towards military expenditure?—Well, the exact machinery I hardly know. At that time I fancy the Commissariat or the paymaster, I am not quite certain which, upon the estimate of the current expenditure, submitted certain amounts to the

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Treasury; and then the Paymaster or the Commissariat issued a requisition to the Treasury for the amount he would require, from month to month.

1927. At that time, I think, there were two regiments there?—At some portion of the time there were two regiments.

1928. Do you think there were separate requisitions from the paymaster and the Commissariat, or was there but one requisition from the Commissariat?—I fancy it was from the Commissariat.

1929. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean that the ordinary pay and allowances for the 40th Regiment, for instance, during the year you have spoken of, were paid direct by some colonial officer to the paymaster of the regiment?—They were drawn direct from the Colonial Treasury, through the Commissariat.

1930. In what way were the extra colonial allowances paid?—In the same way.

1931. Was there any distinction made between them and the other payments made to the paymaster by the Colony?—That is a part I cannot tell you; but there were separate votes, and therefore I should say there was.

1932. You had nothing to do, probably, with that department of the Colonial Government which is concerned in these payments?—No.

1933. You do not know what receipt was given by the paymaster for these sums?—Except that they were separate items in both cases, I forget.

1934. Mr. *Childers.*] Can you recall to your memory how you yourself drew the expenses of the military engineer force, which was under your control during part of that time?—My own impression is that I signed for the Imperial pay; because we only receive the Imperial pay from the Military Vote, and that by a requisition upon the Commissariat.

1935. You think that the Commissariat drew the amount, which afterwards came through your hands to the sappers and miners employed under your charge?—Yes.

1936. Mr. *Baring.*] Who was the Commissariat officer then in charge of the accounts?—Mr. Bower, I think.

1937. Mr. *Childers.*] This state of things lasted, I think, until the year 1857 or 1858?—Until 1857, of my own knowledge.

1938. Was there not some alteration in that year, or about that time, in the form of the vote given by the Colonial Parliamnt?—Yes; the officer commanding the troops was made directly responsible for the distribution of the money voted by the Colonial Legislature.

1939. Sir *George Grey.*] Was that for ordinary pay and allowances as well as the extra colonial pay and allowances?—Whatever was paid; 1857, I think, was the first year in which there was a difference made between the payment of the four companies and the Imperial Guard, and the six companies in addition. They were voted separately; that is to say, pay and allowance to four companies, the Imperial pay being defrayed by the Home Government, and the whole charge of the six companies being borne by the local Government. The sum was taken out of the general vote, and directed by the Appropriation Act to be paid to the military authority, that is, the officer commanding the troops.

1940. Mr. *Childers.*] Were not the pay and allowances to be distributed to the troops in such manner as to Her Majesty may seem fit?—I believe those are the words in the Act of 1858.

1941. Sir *George Grey.*] Have you the Appropriation Act before you?—I have not.

1942. Mr. *Childers.*] From that time the Colony has only defrayed the Colonial allowances of four companies, and the Imperial pay and allowances of everything above four companies?—All above four companies.

1943. She has defrayed the contingenies of the entire force?—She has defrayed the contingencies all through.

1944. And the ration stoppage of the men is entirely paid by the Colony?—Entirely paid by the Colony.

1945. The forage, and lodging, and rent, and servants' allowances, I believe, are paid by the Colony; do you remember whether the lodging money is?—The lodging-money is, but the servants' allowance is paid by the individual officer.

1946. That is the arrangement at the present time?—That is the arrangement.

1947. Have

1947. Have you had occasion to refer to the Votes of the Legislature for the last two or three years?—I have seen the Votes.

1948. And they are based upon that principle, are they not?—They are based upon that principle.

1949. In the last year's Votes there was provision for Colonial allowanee for 400 men, and Colonial allowance and Imperial pay for only 300?—Yes.

1950. This year there is provision for Colonial allowance for only 400 men?—Yes, and 300 also.

1951. Is the Vote for the 300 on the Estimates of this year?—Yes.

1952. Could you refer to the Estimates?—Yes.

1953. And the Appropriation Act?—Yes.

1954. Is it your opinion that the proposal which has been made to divide the expense of the troops in the Colony equally between the Home Government and the Colony, but leaving to the discretion of the Colony the amount of troops which it should receive, is a wise one?—With regard to the question of leaving the amount of forces in the Colony to the Colonial Government, I do not think that is a wise discretion to leave it to them. I do think that the Home Government itself ought to use its own discretion only with regard to the nature and number of the forces.

1955. Then it is your opinion that everything to do with the management and the number of the troops in the Colony should be as much as possible with drawn from the Colonial Legislature?—Altogether. The Colonial Legislature, or the Colonial Government, should be in no way responsible for the troops in the Colony, the Governor himself being the only responsible officer.

1956. Do you think that a standing proportion of the expense should be paid by the Colony?—The proportion to be paid by the Colony should be for a certain number of men, and that fixed under the provisions of an Act for five years, so as to remove the discussion during that time of the military expenditure from the local Parliament.

1957. Would that be consistent with your view, that the Colony should have nothing to say as to the amount of troops to be kept there?—No; I think the first thing to determine is the amount of troops for purely Imperial purposes, distinctly laying down this principle, that the Colonial Government is in no instance to look to military force to back its police and its own strength for internal order; but that it should be kept entirely in case of actual warfare with a foreign power.

1958. Do you think it would be possible that an amount could be arrived at which the Colony should agree to pay for a limited number of years?—Yes; because, in my opinion, the amount that the Home Government would ask the Australian Colonies especially to pay under the other system would be rather less in amount than they are paying now. I think the Colony would be too glad to receive a proposal of that kind, instead of the one which now gives them a large expenditure with a very insufficient and scattered force.

1959. At the present time, 30,000*l.* a year is being annually paid by the Colony?—Yes.

1960. Do you think there would be any great difficulty in persuading the Colony to agree to pay 20,000 *l.* or 30,000 *l.* a year, provided the Home Government undertook that a certain force should be supplied?—I do not think there would be any difficulty, more especially at the present time, in the Colonies.

1961. The only condition to be made with the local Legislature being as to the minimum of force?—With respect to the minimum of force.

1962. With respect to the amount of force which is kept now in the Australian Colonies, do you see any means of reducing the expenditure?—If you go upon the principle which I start with, that the military and naval force of the Colony is only for defence against external attacks, and not the internal police of the country, your Imperial force should be only looked upon as a secondary force to your naval; that is to say, the forts and garrisons, more especially the forts in the harbours, should be supplied by a force from this country, and the present various means of employing soldiers there should be at once abandoned. By granting that you would then have arrived at a fair and fixed amount of money, which this country and the Colonies themselves have to provide.

1963. Take for instance the Colony of Victoria, she pays the entire expense of erecting forts?—All military works of every kind.

1964. Do you think she would pay the entire military expenses of a police

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character within the Colony, provided these forts should be properly garrisoned by the Home Government?—Yes, by the Home Government.

1965. Do you think that that could be done by a force of artillery at a very much less charge than the cost of keeping up a regiment?—A very much less charge.

1966. Was that question ever discussed in the Colony of Victoria?—No, I do not know that it was discussed publicly.

1967. Has it been discussed in the Colony of New South Wales?—The Colony of New South Wales at present pays for a company of artillery, and I fancy it must have been discussed in connexion with them, but if it has, it has escaped my memory.

1968. But it is an opinion that you have formed from personal observation?—I had that opinion long ago, and impressed it upon the Colonial Government.

1969. Did the Colonial Government support that opinion?—Yes, and they have now ratified it; they have applied again for artillery for Victoria.

1970. And also for a small body of engineers?—And also for a small body of engineers.

1971. Do you think that in spite of the high rate of wages the public spirit of the Colony would enable the Colony cheerfully to defray all its other military expenses, provided that force of artillery were supplied?—Yes, I think so, because I see that the money voted for arms alone is 77,000 *l.*, and for works 81,000 *l.*, within the last year. And they propose to organize a force of 4,440, of whom a great portion is artillery, with a certain proportion of infantry; but I know the feeling is that there should be some Queen's artillery, together with a locally organized force.

1972. A militia force?—No, the volunteer movement is sufficiently strong there to enrol the number now given, and keep them well together.

1973. A local force?—A local force.

1974. That is the recommendation of the present Commission?—Yes, that is a recommendation adopted by the present Government.

1975. That there should be a force of 4,400 men?—Yes, of whom 820 should be Queen's troops.

1976. Is it your opinion that the Queen's troops could be considerably reduced in force, if the artillery were sent out?—I think three or four batteries of artillery would be much more advantageous.

1977. And would entail less expense?—It would entail less expense.

1978. Sir *George Grey.*] What would be the strength of three or four batteries of artillery?—I hardly know the strength of a garrison battery of artillery; I think there are 126 or 128 officers and men.

1979. That would be the whole number kept in the Colony?—In each battery; it would on the whole be about 400.

1980. In fact, what you recommend would be an increase of the number which the Imperial Government has thought it necessary to keep in Victoria, which is only four companies, or about 300 men only?—No. I could by that means release the whole regiment of infantry, confining the number of Queen's troops to the force of artillery.

1981. But in Victoria, would not the cost to the Imperial Government be thereby increased; because instead of paying only four companies, with an aggregate of 300 men, it would pay for three batteries of artillery, which would be 400 men?—Yes; but I get rid of other things which cost considerably.

1982. To the Imperial Government?—To the Imperial Government.

1983. In point of fact, would not you recommend an increase of expense to the Imperial Government, above the expense they are now liable for in the contract with the Colony, they paying now only for four companies?—No, certainly not. I do not think, practically, it would be so.

1984. Is the pay of an artillery-man less than that of a regular soldier?—No.

1985. Is it higher?—Yes, but we have other advantages from them.

1986. I thought the Imperial Government, according to your statement, only paid the expenses of four companies, with an aggregate of 300 men?—No, 400 men are what the Government pay for.

1987. One hundred in each company?—Nominally so.

1988. You stated just now that the Colony paid for four out of seven hundred, and this country paid for three?—No; this country pays for four out of seven.

1989. Then,

1989. Then, in point of fact, the pay of an artilleryman being higher than a regular infantry soldier, the cost of the artillery would be higher?—Yes, taking Imperial pay only; but taking the whole brigade of artillery allotted to Australia, you would reduce regiments, and consequently the cost. I am not speaking of Victoria alone.

1990. Mr. *Childers.*] You say that if, in the Australian Colonies generally, you could substitute a smaller force of artillery for the line, it would entail a very much less amount of military expenditure upon the Home Government: and you illustrate it by the fact, that you could then keep 400 instead of 800 in Victoria?—In Victoria, and throughout Australia the remainder.

1991. Mr. *Baxter.*] How many are there now in Australia?—Most of them are in New Zealand.

1992. You advocate the permanent withdrawal of all the troops of the line, and the substitution of an artillery force?—In the Australian Colonies; and I think the same would apply to Canada.

1993. Sir *George Grey.*] When you say 400 artillerymen would be a substitute for 800 infantry, is it not the case that the Imperial Government thought four companies sufficient, and that the others have been kept by the Colony to support the police?—The Imperial Government thought that was sufficient when the population was 120,000; the population is now about half a million.

1994. Are those soldiers employed exclusively for the purpose of defending the Colony against external attack, or have they been employed in support of the police in keeping internal order?—Up to a certain time, which I have before explained, they were employed to aid the police.

1995. Up to what time?—1855 and 1856; but since then they have been confined to their military duties only.

1996. Why would the Colony be desirous of retaining and paying for a large force when the Imperial Government thought four companies enough?—Since 1856 they have been retained merely for Imperial purposes.

1997. Thinking the number larger than necessary, why did the Colony retain them when they have been deriving no benefit from them?—They have retained them, taking them as the nucleus of a military force in the event of the probability of a war; but year from year, since 1856, their numbers, and consequently provision for them from Colonial funds, have been reduced.

1998. Then is it the case that the Colony would not have felt secure, unless the military force had been retained there?—No doubt about it; they do not feel secure without the nucleus of a small force there; although I may mention that they are now, I believe, without a single soldier in New South Wales, and very few in Victoria and Tasmania, because they have sent their soldiers to New Zealand, and the work is recently done by a volunteer force; but they still feel that the British soldier is the cheapest military protection they can have, because they have to pay the English soldier 2 *s.* 6 *d.* a day, and could only procure a substitute at an expense of 6 *s.* or 10 *s.*

1999. Mr. *Childers.*] During the panic of the Eastern war, the Colonies were most anxious to retain their troops?—Yes.

2000. And when the mother country required these troops for New Zealand, they cheerfully paid the whole of their pay and allowances while they were away?—Yes.

2001. And put the whole of their duties upon the volunteers?—Yes.

2002. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Were there any troops in Victoria when the gold field riots broke out?—Yes, there was part of the 40th Regiment, and part of the 12th.

2003. At that time?—Yes.

2004. Were they paid by the Home Government?—By the Colonial Government altogether. At the time of the riots in the gold fields that was the case. In that year, or the previous one, there might have been credit given for the company of the 11th Regiment; for I do not think that company were withdrawn at that time, and the pay might have been borne by the Home Government.

2005. Was not the original grant, for the purpose of charging the Colony with the pay of the troops, at the time when they were intended for police purposes, to keep order in the gold fields?—The address of the Legislative Council, on which the 12th Regiment was sent out there, did not represent that it was for the purpose of internal police, but in consequence of the threatened

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Eastern war. Before that time it was auxiliary to the police, but after that time it was as against a foreign enemy.

2006. Originally, was not a distinction made in the mode of sharing the expense of the troops in Victoria and New South Wales, because in Victoria they were supposed to be mainly required for police purposes?—I think that the same principle applies to New South Wales and Victoria.

2007. Do you remember when Lord Grey's plan was carried out in New South Wales?—Yes.

2008. Why was not that plan carried out at the same time in Victoria?—I believe it was; there were four companies in Sydney and one in Melbourne.

2009. Are you aware that Lord Grey's plan has been applied to Victoria as well as to New South Wales?—The plan applied to Victoria for many years was not entirely Lord Grey's plan.

2010. You are aware that Lord Grey's plan was applied to both Colonies alike?—I do not think that it was applied in its integrity to New South Wales.

2011. Are you not aware that it was originally devised for New South Wales, and was first applied to New South Wales?—In its details it has been modified.

2012. Is it not the case, that since fears of internal commotion at the gold fields have ceased at Victoria, the system of charging the whole expense of the troops upon the Colony has also ceased?—Yes, in consequence of the remonstrances of the colonists themselves in 1857.

2013. Within the last few years, the reason that has induced the colonists of Victoria to wish for a larger force than the Imperial quota of four companies has been, not the fear of internal commotion, but of external danger?—Yes.

2014. Threatenings of general war?—Yes.

2015. Some allusion has been made to what is called Sir William Denison's plan; are you not aware that he has explained that he did not intend to bind the Home Government to the supply of any definite number of troops, but that he only required for the Colony the right of refusing to accept any number of troops beyond a maximum fixed by themselves?—I have not seen that Despatch.

2016. You say it was part of Sir William Denison's plan that the Home Government should be bound by agreement with the Colony to supply, under all circumstances, a definite number of troops?—Yes.

2017. Are you aware that Sir William Denison has explained that that is not part of his plan?—I am not.

2018. Mr. *Marsh.*] Are there any troops in Victoria except at Melbourne?—I believe they are all now at Melbourne.

2019. The other places on the coast are undefended?—Quite so, the only place liable to attack would be Portland.

2020. Is Port Fairy liable to attack?—It is difficult of approach.

2021. The other places must depend upon a naval defence?—Yes, and I believe they have now volunteer forces.

2022. Do you think that the artillery duties could be performed by marines?—By marine artillery.

2023. Or by ordinary marines?—I cannot say positively but I should presume so.

2024. Are you aware that the marines are trained gunners?—Yes, they are all trained to garrison gun drill; the artillerymen would be trained to field work besides.

2025. Sir *George Grey.*] Would there be any saving of expenditure?—I should fancy that Marines and artillerymen would be maintained at about the same expense.

2026. If you have a permanent force of Marines in the Colony they must be sent out; would not the transport of Marines cost the same as troops of the line?—No, because you might reduce the number considerably.

2027. Assuming the numbers to be the same?—Not when you are relieving a regiment; you must relieve your troops at some time or other.

2028. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that the entire expense of the artillerymen should be borne by the Imperial Government?—The estimate of the expenses of the whole of the force in the Australian Colonies is now I believe more than 125,000*l.*; a brigade of artillerymen would be about 35,000*l.*, and I propose

propose that those should be distributed through the Australian Colonies where you have had three regiments of the line.

2029. Do you propose that the whole expense should be borne by the Imperial Government?—The Imperial pay only; all other charges by the Colonies.

2030. Have you formed any estimate of the expense that that would involve?—It would be a considerable reduction on the present plan, and much more efficient.

2031. Would it allow a certain number of troops for Tasmania?—Yes, it would allow a garrison for Tasmania also.

2032. You are aware that there is no contribution from Tasmania towards the military expenditure?—None.

2033. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you not think that fewer Marines would be needed in consequence of their being more easily moved about by steam than soldiers?—I believe that Marines and artillerymen are about the same in that respect.

2034. Is not some requisition required for moving soldiers, whereas the captain of a ship may do what he likes with Marines?—No, the Marines would be extra to the force ordinarily on board.

2035. He would have full command over the Marines?—No, he would only have control over them when borne on the books of his squadron or ship.

2036. Mr. *Adderley.*] I observe that you have called the four companies furnished by the Home Government the Imperial guard?—That is the term I think that Lord Grey gives them in his Despatch.

2037. Is that the term by which they are known in the Colony?—Not generally.

2038. Does it imply that the Colony look upon them as a guard of honour to the Governor?—No, but as a symbol of the integrity of the empire.

2039. What do you consider to be the real value to the Colony of those four companies?—I think that it is the nucleus of the local military forces.

2040. Will you state in what way they are useful as a nucleus of local forces?—As disciplined troops setting an example to volunteers, and as furnishing a model force.

2041. Do you think it impossible for the Colony to raise a model force upon which to drill volunteer forces?—No doubt, but it would be at an extravagant price as compared with the cost of English soldiers. The local police force is as highly disciplined as any in the world, but each man receives about 12 *s.* 6 *d.* a day.

2042. The Imperial troops are valuable, because they are paid for by the mother country?—Yes, because by paying for that force you do not withdraw the same number of men from the ordinary avocations of the industry of the Colony.

2043. During the six years in which Victoria paid the whole military cost, except transport, what was the nature of the complaints made. Was it that they thought it a breach of faith on the part of the Government, or that it was a burthensome tax?—At the end of the Eastern war, and with the anxiety for public works, which demanded the distribution of the revenue in another direction, as regards this large sum of 200,000 *l.*, they were anxious to economise in every direction, and they did not believe that the force was any longer required in support of order.

2044. What was the difference in the expenditure in 1856, owing to the British Government not paying for the four companies?—I should think hardly 10,000 *l.*

2045. What was the whole military expenditure in that year?—One hundred and seventy-seven thousand pounds.

2046. Can you state what, in that year, was the revenue and expenditure of the Colony?—In round numbers about 3,000,000 *l.*

2047. Is it understood in Victoria, according to the arrangement to which you have referred, that the troops placed there and paid by the Imperial Government, may be moved by the Imperial Government in case of war?—Certainly.

2048. In case of general war those troops might be withdrawn?—Yes; the colonists could not oppose it in any shape or way.

2049. You say that the Colony having a representative Parliament, that is a reason for their not being called upon to state the number of troops they want?—With

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—With this view simply, that the local Government should in no way consider the Imperial troops as supporting their police. I think that the local Government should be responsible for the policy they carry out, and by local means should keep their own Colony in order, and not look to the Queen's troops as assisting their police.

2050. Would not the effect of their having a representative Legislature enable them better to state their requirements of troops?—No doubt; but the question is, whether you ought to accede to that proposal or not.

2051. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You mean that if the policy of the Government, or Parliament, should produce discontent amongst the population of Victoria, requiring to be kept in check by forcible means, the local Government should provide and pay for those means of repression?—Yes.

2052. And that they should not receive any assistance for that purpose?—Exactly.

2053. But that, on the other hand, if the Colony is involved in danger, from external enemies, and war is produced by the policy of the mother country, they may then look to the mother country for assistance?—That is exactly the distinction I draw.

2054. And that the Colony may be called upon to pay a part of those expenses?—Yes.

2055. But that, on the other hand, the mother country should be called upon to pay her share?—Yes; for in addition to the fact that to the policy of the mother country must the responsibility for war be ever due, England has her direct interests in the security of her Colonies, especially "those of purely British origin, founded and exclusively settled by English, under which conditions the Australian group more peculiarly comes." For from this very intimate connexion, the chief buildings, the treasure in the banks, the merchandize in the stores of the city of Melbourne, are all to a very great extent the investments of English capitalists, so that its bombardment would be almost as severely felt in this country as it would be on the spot. Whilst the capture or destruction of the merchant ships anchored in its ports, with their cargoes, amounting on a yearly average to more than a million tons, being almost solely the property of English shipowners and merchants, would be the source of greater disasters and loss to individuals here than in the Colony. Though this is not likely to occur in any of her Colonies, as long as England retains her naval supremacy, yet the military force stationed in them should be of such a character as to assist the efforts of her fleets; and this would be best done by artillery occupying the forts and batteries of her Colonial ports, leaving to the colonists themselves all other measures for defence.

2056. And as a nucleus for the advanced efforts of the Colony herself?—That would result from it.

2057. You are aware of the nature of the two systems on the subject of military expenditure called by the names of Lord Grey's, and Sir William Denison's?—I am.

2058. What is your opinion with respect to the merits of those systems?—I think that, under certain modifications, Sir William Denison's is the best system, with this exception, that I should leave to the local Legislature no voice in the matter, except that of furnishing the pay and allowances of the troops, which the Imperial Government decided should be stationed in the Colony.

2059. Are you not aware that Sir William Denison's plan is, that the whole expense of every kind, including the cost of transport of the troops allotted to the Colony, and accepted by the Colony should be divided in equal shares between the home Government and the Colonial Government?—I am.

2060. What is your opinion of that proposal?—That involves at once the necessity of obtaining from year to year the sanction of the local Legislature, which would bring before the local Parliament the question of military expenditure. It is only those who have seen the effects of that upon the Colony, and also upon the troops themselves, who can form a correct opinion how undesirable is such a course.

2061. Might not some such arrangement be come to, once for all, or for a series of years?—Yes, I think it may be come to in this country without any reference to the Colony until the scheme is sent out for adoption or rejection. I am not applying that remark to colonies which are essentially military, or to such colonies as have not adopted free institutions.

John Robert Godley, Esq., called in; and Examined.

2062. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Assistant Under Secretary of State for War?—I am. *J. R. Godley*, Esq. 2 May 1861.

2063. Were you a member of the Departmental Committee, to whom was committed the task of preparing a scheme on the military defences in the Colonies in the year 1859?—Yes.

2064. Are you responsible for the report of that Committee?—I am.

2065. You have also, I believe, written for private circulation, a paper containing remarks on Mr. Elliot's Memorandum, appended to the Committee's Report? Will you put that in?—Yes, with Lord Herbert's sanction. [*The document was handed in.*] *Vide* Appendix.

2066. Those papers, I think, express your opinions upon the subject?—Yes.

2067. I wish to ask you for some explanations on some passages in those papers. Do you not see a difficulty in carrying out the system of a uniform rate of contribution as applied to such differently circumstanced communities as our Colonies?—For my own part, I think it a fair practical compromise; but if anyone thinks otherwise, and proposes a plan for apportioning the joint contribution in a different way, I should make no objection; certainly, it does not form an essential or even an important part of my plan. I wish to say, however, that the plan is not mine; it was proposed to the Colonial Office several years ago by one of the ablest and most experienced of our Colonial Governors, a man who was not at all a *doctrinaire*, but a working soldier, and one as little likely as anybody to be carried away by a specious theory. I would add, also, that the plan adopted with the old American Colonies, of making the Colonies pay for the whole of their expenditure was equally uniform with that which I propose, and that all the objections to uniformity of joint contribution apply equally to it.

2068. Who is the Governor to whom you refer?—Sir William Denison.

2069. What do you consider the leading and essential principle of your plan for the defence of the Colonies?—Colonial responsibility and management, and, as a rule, the contribution of the Imperial Government, if any, in the shape of money only. This was the system pursued with the old American Colonies; Parliament having been in the habit of voting sums of money to compensate them for any disproportionate expenditure incurred by them in the common cause.

2070. Do you think that, if Great Britain left it to the Colonies to defend themselves, there would be great danger of the defence being neglected?—If we judge either by our knowledge of human nature, or by history, we shall come, I think, to a different conclusion. Englishmen have never shown themselves slow in defending themselves, and as a matter of fact, the old American Colonies, to whom the responsibility of defending themselves was entirely left, did successfully defend themselves, so that there was not one of them conquered during the period during which that system was pursued.

2071. Are not the Colonies to be considered as military posts, essential to the interests of the empire, and which, therefore, the empire cannot afford to risk the loss of?—I have already said that I think the plan of throwing the responsibility of defending themselves on the colonists, is the most effectual way of defending them, and that they are less effectually defended by our garrisons, which are uniformly inadequate, whilst the fact of their presence renders the colonists unprepared to defend themselves. A remarkable confirmation of this is to be found in the proceedings of the South Carolinians, at the present time. I feel quite sure that, if they had been in the habit of trusting to a federal garrison to defend them, they would not have taken half such vigorous, or effectual measures of self-defence, as they have done.

2072. You insist much on the contrast afforded by the system pursued with the old American Colonies; do you not think their circumstances were so different from those of the present day, as to prevent the analogy from being a correct one?—No; I think the analogy is complete as regards the present question.

2073. Did they not treat the Indians more unjustly and aggressively than would be tolerated in England now; and were not wars more frequent then?—I do not think that there is any evidence of their dealing with the Indians more cruelly

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cruelly or aggressively than was not only tolerated, but was the custom at that time; on the contrary, their treatment of them was rather exceptionally fair and just, and they dealt with them more effectually, certainly. The consequence was, that I find only one record of an Indian war in the history of New England, for the first half-century after the New England Colony was founded.

2074. Do you not think a nucleus of British soldiers an important element in the defence of the Colonies, to train, and drill and encourage the militia?—Very possibly; and if the Colonists think so, my plan provides that they should be able to carry such a plan into effect, provided England could spare the troops.

2075. Do you not think that the withdrawal of the troops would cause great irritation and excitement, and perhaps run the risk of causing a separation of the Colony from the mother country?—I think that there would be much loud talking and violent writing, because the Colonists, having long been accustomed to have us pay the whole expense, would naturally feel it a hardship to have to pay their share, but I do not think it would involve the slightest risk of a separation.

2076. How do you think that any change could be effected practically in the present system?—In the same way in which Lord Grey effected the change in the plan of defending the Australian Colonies, which in that case produced no permanent discontent.

2077. Do you think that the Colonies generally would acquiesce in such an arrangement?—They would, of course, have to acquiesce, if the same plan which Lord Grey pursued was pursued generally; and I think after a little time they would consider it as the old colonists did, a matter of pride and privilege to defend themselves.

2078. Mr. *Ellice.*] You are acquainted with the Colony of North America?—Yes.

2079. You know the state of the defences in Canada?—No, I do not.

2080. Do you believe that if the English Government were to withdraw the garrisons from the forts of Quebec and Kingston, the inhabitants of Canada would undertake the defence of them?—I think they would.

2081. Do you know anything of the expense of stores and artillery required for the defence of those forts?—No, I do not.

2082. Generally speaking, do you think that the inhabitants of Canada, if the garrisons were withdrawn, would undertake the defence of the large forts now in existence in Canada?—I do not know whether they would undertake the defence of those particular forts, but I think they would take steps for effectually defending the province against foreign aggression.

2083. But if they did not undertake the defence of those forts, is it your opinion that they should be abandoned by this country?—Yes.

2084. *Chairman.*] Do you think, if negotiations were opened with the different Colonies to obtain their consent, the result would be likely to be satisfactory?—No, quite the contrary.

2085. Will they not strongly protest against the change which would involve throwing upon them the responsibility and cost of their own defence?—Most Colonies undoubtedly would, and probably refuse to negotiate on the subject at all.

2086. If it is not to be done by negociation, in what way, practically, would you have the overtures made by the Imperial Government to the Colonies, with a view to carry out any arrangement?—I have always said I would do what Lord Grey did in dealing with the Australian Colonies, that is, propose the conditions on which the Imperial Government would give assistance, and say, that if they were not accepted, the troops would be withdrawn. I may add, that a similar intimation has since been made to the Government of New Zealand.

2087. Mr. *Ellice.*] And do you think that the Colonies of North America were in the same relative condition with respect to the military defences with the Colonies of Australia and New Zealand?—There are various differences between them, undoubtedly; but I do not know exactly to what differences you refer.

2088. Have not the North American Colonies, especially Canada, an immense length of frontier to defend against a thickly populated country in the immediate neighbourhood?—Yes; but, on the other hand, they have much greater resources of a military kind from their superior population.

2089. Against

2089. Against what danger have the Australian and New Zealand Colonies to defend themselves?—The danger of an attack by a hostile expedition from a nation with which they might be at war, say France, or America, or Russia.

2090. Have not the North American Colonies to defend themselves against the same danger of an attack by land on an extended frontier?—Yes.

2091. *Chairman.*] Do you not think that, in the case of war, there are some Colonies which would afford valuable stations for coaling and refitting our ships, such as the Bahamas; is it not worth while to retain such places as the Bahamas, for instance?—It appears to me, that if those points are essential to the interests of the empire, the better plan would be, if we were stronger at sea, to occupy them when war broke out; if we were not stronger at sea, our garrisons would be ineffectual in defending them; the plan now is, to scatter garrisons over the world, on the chance that they may be wanted; I should propose keeping the troops at home, and sending them to the places where hey were wanted when war broke out; the Bahamas happen to be a case peculiarly in point; I find that we spend about 40,000*l.* a year upon their defences; so that, since the peace of 1814, we have spent nearly two millions of money in defending the Bahamas, and during all that time, we have never had a force there that could have resisted the crews of two frigates.

2092. I see that in one of your papers, you say that no British Colony, left to defend itself, has ever been conquered; and that, on the other hand, no Colony, of which the defence was entrusted to the mother country, has ever successfully resisted a hostile expedition. Is that actually the case?—As far as I recollect, it is.

2093. Do you think that the presence of the British flag on these stations all over the world adds to the prestige, and consequently to the power of England?—I believe it adds very much to our weakness. I have never seen a foreign criticism upon the power and troops of England, without observing that the writer considered the necessity of protecting Colonies all over the world as the main element of our weakness.

2094. Do you not think that the circumstances of the West Indies, are such as to call for special assistance from the mother country?—I do not think they are such as to call for the necessity of our paying for their police, any more than we are called upon to pay for making their roads, or paying their civil officers.

2095. Is there any rule in the War Department, as to granting, gratuitously or otherwise, stores to the Colonies?—I believe there is no rule.

2096. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] That is a question which the director of stores would probably be able to answer?—I think I know as much about it as he does.

2097. *Chairman.*] As you know something about it, do you think you could procure for the Committee any information upon the subject, or can you inform us, in order to ascertain the point, whether in some instances stores are given gratuitously, in others payment being exacted for them, without any rule being laid down on the subject?—I believe so, but you can no doubt obtain full information if Lord Herbert chooses to give it.

2098. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you advocate the entire withdrawal of British troops from the Colonies of this country?—Not necessarily; I should leave that for the colonists themselves to settle.

2099. Provided the Colonies are willing to defray the larger proportion, if not the whole, of the expenditure, you would not object to British troops being scattered over the world, as they are at present?—I should not think it a good plan; but if we could spare the troops I should acquiesce in it, in deference to the general principle of letting the colonists settle for themselves what is the best way of defending themselves.

2100. Why do you not think it a good plan?—Because I think it would be better for them to arm and train their own people; but that is more a military question, and is not one upon which my opinion is worth having.

2101. Your main object is to diminish the Imperial expenditure in respect to the military defences of the Colonies?—No; my main object is to throw upon the colonists the habit and responsibility of self-defence; it is a secondary but very important object to diminish the Imperial expenditure.

2102. Have not the Australian Colonies acted very liberally in their negociations upon the subject of contributions?—Most remarkably so; I think [redacted] have paid more than their full share.

2103. Then your former remarks with reference to the difficulty of [redacted]

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by negociation do not apply to the Australian Colonies?—No. I do not think it would be a good plan to adopt it in any case; I do not think that you could make exceptions, but I feel sure that the Australian Colonies would object to no such plan; in fact, my plan originated with themselves; it originated with the ministers of Sir W. Denison.

2104. In point of fact, no such difficulties as those to which you have adverted have occurred in regard to the Australian Colonies?—Not at all.

2105. *Chairman.*] Do I understand you to draw a distinction between negociation and that mode of action which you suggested on the part of the Imperial Government?—Yes.

2106. Do you characterise the communication which passed between Lord Grey and the Government of the Australian Colonies as negociation?—No.

2107. Mr. *Fortescue.*] It is the case, is it not, that a dependency of the empire has no control over its foreign policy, but that all its relations with foreign powers are settled for it by the mother country?—Yes.

2108. Does not that fact appear to you to be one of the most important in discussing this question, as giving a dependency a strong claim upon the mother country for protection against those dangers which are produced by her policy?—Certainly; it is the only one that makes it a question at all.

2109. Then are we to understand you fully to admit that amount of claim?—I fully admit it as a claim to the protection of the mother country.

2110. You think that a dependency has a claim to the advantages, as it must submit to the disadvantages, of its dependent position?—Certainly.

2111. Then admitting that claim on the part of the colonists, and the corresponding duties on the part of the mother country, is it your meaning that the mother country should afford her proper amount of protection to a Colony, not by the supply of Imperial troops but by a contribution of Imperial money towards the expenses of a local force?—Not necessarily or always, but as a rule; if the colonists require the presence of troops, I have already explained I would let them have them.

2112. Do you think that the local forces raised in our numerous colonies, many of which are very small, many inhabited by foreign and mixed races, can ever be brought up to anything like the efficiency of Imperial troops?—Certainly not; by which I mean that undisciplined militia will not be so good as Imperial troops; but if they chose, I have no doubt they could raise, train, and drill, at a certain expense, as good troops as we have; it is a mere question of money. I do not think it would be a good plan for them to do so.

2113. Do you think it possible, at all events in the smaller dependencies of the empire, that local forces should be created which should attain to anything like the efficiency and *esprit de corps* of the British regiments?—I think it highly improbable that they ever should do so; but I do not think it impossible. I repeat, I should consider it an exceedingly inexpedient plan, for the smaller colonies at any rate, to attempt.

2114. Then you confine your proposal to the larger Colonies?—Not at all; I should leave it to the Colonies themselves to settle the details of their responsibility and management. I simply propose to acquiesce in their arrangements.

2115. These local forces would, of course, be confined to the Colonies in which they were raised?—That would depend upon the Colonies themselves. In the times of the old Colonies of North America they were not so confined, but made war on the king's enemies in other parts of the world, West Indies as well as in other parts of America.

2116. Do you think it would be a good bargain for the Imperial Government to contribute sums of money towards the expense of local forces throughout the Colonies, which you admit must be inferior to the Imperial troops, and which, at all events, as a general rule, must be confined to their own Colony, and could not admit of being moved and handled by the Imperial Government for the general purposes of the empire?—I should consider it a very good bargain, under the conditions I have stated repeatedly, both in this examination and in the papers I have put in. I am sure the saving of money would be very large, and I think the colony would be better defended.

2117. Do you think that the entire withdrawal of the presence of British soldiers from any part of the Colonial Empire would not mainly tend to check and lessen the Imperial feeling in our different Colonies?—I do not think so.

2118. Are

2118. Are you aware that in many cases the Colonists themselves entirely differ with you upon that point?—My only surprise is that all do not differ from me; people generally do differ from every one who asks them to pay.

2119. Are you aware that when the question has been put to the Australian Colonies whether they preferred to raise a local force, or to pay for a certain quota of Imperial troops, they have given reasons, entirely irrespective of the party who is to pay, in favour of the presence of a small body of Imperial troops rather than of an attempt to raise a local corps?—I am quite aware of it, and my plan provides that they should be able to do so if they like.

2120. You said just now that Englishmen are never slow to defend themselves; has it escaped your notice that a considerable proportion of our dependencies are inhabited mainly, not by Englishmen, but by people of foreign races, either European or aboriginal, and do you think that one uniform scheme can equally apply to dependencies of such different origin?—I have not proposed that it should; in those places which are not properly colonies, but only garrisons, I have proposed that the whole expense should be defrayed from the Imperial Exchequer. I allude to such places as Malta, Bermuda, and others.

2121. Would you be prepared to withdraw the Imperial garrison from such a Colony as the Mauritius, in case the Colony of Mauritius declined to accede to the proposed scheme?—The Mauritius is another doubtful case upon which a military opinion would be more useful than mine; but my own opinion is, that it would be better to trust to occupying the Mauritius when war broke out, than to keeping a garrison in peace time in case it should be wanted, because I feel sure (as the question implies) that the population of Mauritius are not inclined to defend themselves. It would, therefore, be merely in that case a question of economy with me whether it would be better to garrison it now, or to take it afterwards; at any rate, the best military authorities tell us that the garrison and the fortifications we now maintain there are inadequate; so we have the expense without the security.

2122. Supposing the dependencies of the empire, finding themselves left without that amount of protection from the mother country to which they consider themselves equally entitled in all the dangers that may be created by the policy of the mother country, should be prepared to place themselves under the protection of some other power, do you think that in that case the mother country would be fairly in a position to refuse her consent to that course?—I do not think it would ever be expedient or desirable for the mother country to retain her dominion over any Colony that deliberately wished to withdraw itself from it.

2123. But in the case I suppose, would not the inclination to transfer themselves from this country to another, have been directly produced by the policy of the mother country herself?—I think the motive does not signify at all, if any Colony deliberately, and after proper means of consideration were given, desired to separate itself from this country, I do not think it would be desirable to retain its allegiance by force. I do not of course speak of garrisons, such as Malta or Bermuda.

2124. Although that inclination not now existing would, in the case supposed, have been produced by our own policy?—By whatever motive it might have been produced. I must guard myself, however, from being supposed to admit that it would be the effect of the plan I am proposing.

2125. Do you not think that most of our Colonies are, in the very nature of things, dependencies, and if not dependencies upon this Crown must be upon another?—I can hardly answer that question as you put it; I do not think that all are, but I think some are.

2126. Do you think that the small Colonies could ever answer as independent communities, or must they become the dependencies of some other power if they are not retained as ours?—I think that there are very few of them that any other power would take on condition of having to defend them. The Mauritius is almost the only exception I know.

2127. Are two of our Colonies, at least, in the peculiar position of being liable to great and sudden danger, not from foreign forces, but from formidable native tribes within their borders or within their frontier, New Zealand and the Cape?—Yes.

2128. Would you not look at the case of these two Colonies as a peculiar one?—In that respect they are peculiar.

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2129. Are you prepared to advise that the defence of such Colonies should be looked upon as a matter of internal police, or of protection against foreign danger?—I think that at the Cape it might be looked upon as protection against foreign danger, but in New Zealand as matter of police. In New Zealand the tribes in theory are, and practically might be made to be, subjects of Her Majesty; at the Cape the Kafirs are foreign nations; but I do not admit, practically, the effect of your question.

2130. Are you not aware that the tribes of New Zealand are, to a great degree, semi-independent?—They are; but they need not be.

2131. Do you think it possible to treat those dangers as a matter exclusively of colonial arrangement, just as you treat protection against the danger of internal disturbances in an ordinary English community?—I have already drawn a distinction between New Zealand and the Cape. In New Zealand they say, "Give the colonists the power exclusively, and without interference from home of dealing with the native question." There I think the responsibility and expense of dealing with the natives may be entirely left to them.

2132. Do you think that the duty of keeping order amongst the foreign and mixed communities which constitute many of our Colonies, such as the West India Islands and the Mauritius, could be treated simply as a matter of police in a homogeneous English community?—I think it should be so treated, upon condition that the Colony is not interfered with in its management of such races from home.

2133. Mr. *Adderley*.] You say that the relation of a Colony to foreign powers, depending upon the mother country, gives that Colony a claim upon the mother country?—It is the only thing which gives them any claim.

2134. I presume you do not mean that it gives them a claim to the entire protection of the mother country?—Of course not.

2135. It gives them only a qualified claim?—A claim to such protection as the mother country may think it right and fair to afford.

2136. In answer to a question just now, you stated that Canada was more exposed to danger than Australia. Do you think that that fact gives Canada a larger claim to the protection of the mother country than Australia?—No.

2137. You do not think that the greater exposure to danger is a ground upon which the claim might be calculated?—No; I think that is one of the necessary incidents to every community of its geographical position, and an evil that it must bear with, and cannot expect some one else to bear. In the case of Canada, if the danger is greater, the means of resisting it are greater too.

2138. The greater exposure to danger does not, in your opinion, increase the claim of the Colony upon the mother country?—I have already answered that.

2139. Would not the present plan of Colonial defence, undertaken by England, require us to increase very much the fortifications and garrisons of the various parts of the Colonies, if it is to be carried out effectually?—Undoubtedly.

2140. Then you think that, to make the present plan of Colonial defence complete, a very large expense must be incurred?—Yes.

2141. It would be a part of that plan to increase the dispersion of British troops in distant parts of the world?—I do not say that; it would increase the force of the garrisons.

2142. And it would increase the number of British troops dispersed through the world in distant places?—Yes.

2143. What would be the effect of that dispersion upon the resources of England, in case of a general war?—Of course it would weaken it.

2144. Would it not amount to England, having a large portion of her forces locked up in distant parts of the world, and her own resources for any general war proportionately diminished?—Yes.

2145. In your opinion, did the plan of scattering troops, during the Russian war, in garrisons of distant Colonies, lead to England being obliged to levy foreign mercenaries to supply the requirements of her own army?—It led to a diminution of her military powers, and that was one way in which she endeavoured to supply it.

2146. Do you think, that if the garrisons of England in Colonial forts at that time could have been made available, they would have rendered foreign legions needless?—I cannot answer that question.

2147. They

2147. They would have gone so far towards it?—To that extent they would have strengthened the British army.

2148. Can you state what number of troops England had in South Africa when the Indian mutiny broke out?—I do not know exactly, but, speaking roughly, and from recollection, I think it was about 13,000 of all arms and ranks, but that may be exactly ascertained.

2149. Upon the news of the Indian mutiny arriving at the Cape, does it appear that the troops, at that time in South Africa, were made available towards its suppression?—I do not remember the dates exactly; a considerable number of troops were sent.

2150. You have stated that, under the Colonial system of England in the last century, the colonies of America undertook their own defence, both internal and external?—Yes.

2151. Do you see any reason why the Colonies of England, at the present moment, should not act exactly in the same manner?—Absolutely none; all the same arguments which apply to the Colonies now, applied to the Colonies then.

2152. There is no reason to suppose that English colonists now are degenerated in spirit from the English colonists of the last century?—No.

2153. Have American colonists kept in check all attacks upon them by the American Indians?—Yes.

2154. And also sometimes from the regular armies of France?—Yes.

2155. Are you aware that during the Spanish succession war the English colonists added Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to the possessions of the English Crown?—Yes.

2156. Are you aware that in the subsequent Austrian succession war of 1745 the colonial troops reduced the great fortress of Louisbourg?—Yes.

2157. Are you aware that in the seven years' war the French regular army attacked the Virginian settlement, and that the Virginian militia alone repulsed them?—Yes.

2158. Can you state when English troops were first sent to the assistance of Colonial forces in America?—The first time I recollect to have observed that was in the expedition that took New York in 1654. I have given these instances at large in the paper which has been put in, and I would rather refer to that than speak from recollection.

2159. Can you say when it became the habit of England to send troops there?—When Braddock went to America in 1757; I think that was the commencement of the system of keeping standing armies in America; and, just at that time, the provisions of the Mutiny Act were extended to America.

2160. Which of those considerations tended most, in your opinion, to the ultimate separation of those Colonies from England?—Neither of them otherwise than indirectly; but I do not think that the English Government would ever have attempted to infringe upon the rights of the Colony, or to tax them without their consent, unless they had had a standing army in the Colony; and, therefore, indirectly, the presence of a standing army there was the cause of the American war; besides which, the necessity of billeting and providing transport for the troops was felt as a grievance by the colonists.

2161. Do you think that the colonists, before the introduction of the Mutiny Act, being still entitled to the defence of their own Colony, any discontent was produced which led to the final separation of the Colonies?—Absolutely none; there is not the remotest particle of evidence of it. They considered it a privilege to provide for their own defence, and considered the presence of a British army a grievance.

2162. What was the feeling of the colonists towards England, when the war first broke out?—That of enthusiastic loyalty.

2163. Can you state at all with regard to the Colony with which you are personally acquainted, New Zealand, whether the action of the troops there recently in connexion with the local force, has been satisfactory?—Very much the reverse, as my own accounts lead me to believe. I was going to ask leave just now in answer to a question that was put to me, to read an extract from a letter which I have received from Mr. Fitzgerald, who is superintendent of Canterbury, and was prime minister of the Colony at one time.

2164. Will you read that extract?—It is to this effect: "Government formally declines our offer to volunteer to the Taranaki war. The Minister's army

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army is hanging like an incubus on the Colony, doing nothing itself, and preventing any one else." That is the opinion of a very intelligent colonist.

2165. Do you believe that that Colony would be both willing and able to develope volunteer forces to a large extent?—I am quite sure it is able, but I do not say that it is willing, unless we make it imperative.

2166. *Chairman.*] Do you know whether the force in the province of Canterbury has been paid for out of the funds of the province, or entirely by private efforts?—I am not quite certain; I think it has been armed by the province, but I am not sure that it has been so paid.

2167. Mr. *Adderley.*] Supposing the evidence to be true, which we have heard from the two Governors of the West India Islands, that the British troops in those islands are utterly valueless against external attack, and can only be of any use in preserving internal peace both against the population, and against the doubtful fidelity of the black troops, would your views upon colonial policy lead you to recommend the entire withdrawal of the British troops from those islands?—Certainly.

2168. Do you see the necessity for retaining troops in any one of them, in Jamaica, for instance?—No.

2169. When you said that if the West Indian Islands ceased to be dependent upon England, they would probably become dependent upon some other powers; I conclude that that opinion was given upon the assumption that other powers had gained the command of the seas?—I did not say that they would be dependencies upon other powers.

2170. Do you think that they would?—I think that the West India Islands would be likely, under any circumstances, to prefer connexion with the English to connexion with any other power, nor do I believe that even if their connexion with England terminated, they would attach themselves to another power.

2171. Do you think that any power could hold the West India Islands against us without the command of the seas if we chose to take them?—I am quite sure they could not.

2172. Have you stated your views as to the value in an Imperial point of view of the garrison of Halifax?—I have not; but the observations I have made generally apply to Nova Scotia as well as to other places. The Nova Scotians are perfectly well able to defend Halifax just as New England with a smaller population was able to defend Boston.

2173. We have it in evidence that Halifax, as a strong post upon the American coast, is important to Imperial interests. Supposing we retained Bermuda, and effectually garrisoned her, would it not sufficiently answer these Imperial purposes?—That is hardly a question I can answer; that is a question for naval and military men; but I think that Bermuda could not defend itself, and I think Nova Scotia could.

2174. I see in Mr. Elliot's portion of the report, in which you have taken a share, that one reason assigned for England contributing towards the expenses of the defence of Ceylon is, that there are large works going on in Ceylon for railways and other purposes, and that if money was defrayed to pay their defences they would have less for their public works. To your mind, does that seem a good reason why the military expenditure in the defence of Ceylon should fall upon this country?—No; that is equivalent to saying that we ought to contribute towards the railways.

2175. I have an extract from a speech which Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape, made in the City of London, before his recent return to that Colony, in which he expresses his opinion that the Colony sufficiently contributes towards the military expenditure of England in its defence, by purchasing commodities from England, which by the taxation on the export brings money into the English Exchequer. Is that a view of the subject which you consider reasonable?—I think it might as well be said that they contributed to the expense of the French army, because when they purchase commodities from France they pay taxes in France.

2176. In fact nothing would satisfy your view of Colonial policy, short of the Colonies themselves undertaking the first responsibility of their own defence, and we contributing such a quota towards their external defences as may be reasonable on the ground that they are involved in England's foreign policy?—That is what I propose.

2177. Is

2177. Is there not some consideration the other way for England, in the way that England is involved in warfare by Colonial interests and relations?—Undoubtedly, and that should never be forgotten. Within the last 20 years we have been three or four times on the verge of war with America, upon purely Colonial questions in which this country was not interested. I refer to the Maine boundary question, the fisheries of Newfoundland, and many others. *J. R. Godley, Esq.* 2 May 1861.

2178. Should you not say that, in the long run, England incurs as many liabilities by her Colonial relations as the Colonies do by their implication in English foreign policy?—No, I should think not.

2179. In the case of the Cape, where you say you think that the Kafirs may be looked upon to a certain extent as foreign enemies, the expense of all the wars which have been created by the relation of the Cape with the mother country has fallen upon the English Exchequer?—Yes.

2180. Many millions have been so spent?—Yes.

2181. To what extent should you say that the proper claim of the Cape upon England for protection goes towards England defraying the expense of such wars?—I cannot say to what extent. I should be sorry to bind myself to any particular proportion of contribution: I have already said that I think half and half is a fair rough compromise, but I do not adhere to that very particularly. It is quite impossible upon any system to make a theory of joint contribution. You must have a practical compromise, and in the case of the Cape, I should be satisfied to make such a practical compromise.

2182. Do you see any difference in the question as it relates to the Kafir frontier, and as it relates to the garrisoning of Cape Town?—Yes, there is a difference, of course.

2183. Do you think that England is more properly liable to the expense of garrisoning Cape Town than to the expense of defending the frontier?—So far as the Colony has more the means of procuring or avoiding war in one case than in the other.

2184. Do you see any danger in England undertaking, as she does, with the exception of one force, the whole defence of the frontier of the Cape, leading to extravagance in such wars?—Yes.

2185. Do you see, also, any danger in the way of its keeping up the recurrence of such wars?—I think so.

2186. Mr. *Fortescue.*] With respect to Mr. Fitzgerald's letter, do you think that the people of the Northern Islands, who are exposed to those native dangers from which Mr. Fitzgerald is free, would agree with him that the presence of an Imperial force is a mere incubus?—I dare say they would not; many of them would be glad to have the Imperial troops do everything. I am only quoting the opinion of Mr. Fitzgerald as a spectator.

2187. Mr. Fitzgerald does not mean to say that he does not wish the authority of the Queen to be asserted, and the colonists to be protected in some way from native dangers?—Certainly not; but he means to say that it would be better done if left to the colonists themselves.

2188. But those who are really exposed to the dangers in question, you think would not agree with him?—Very likely not; I cannot say to what extent that opinion is held; but I know that all the colonists are dissatisfied with the way the war has been carried on.

2189. You said just now that we have been several times on the brink of war with the United States, arising out of purely colonial relations; is it not the case that, upon those occasions, the policy to be pursued was entirely a question for the Imperial Government?—It was wholly for the Imperial Government; but it was a question that had reference solely to colonial interests.

2190. But whether it was worth while to carry on such a controversy, or to maintain such a claim as might result in war with the United States, was entirely a matter within the discretion of the Imperial Government?—Of course.

2191. Do I understand you to say that, in allotting a certain amount of Imperial protection to the Colonies, the actual danger to which any Colony is exposed ought not to be any element in the calculation?—I do not think you could estimate that with any precision, especially as the means the Colony might possess of resisting danger would have in that case to be considered also.

2192. So that you would contribute the same amount of protection [illegible] more

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more, to the Cape, with its formidable native tribes, and to Victoria, where there are none?—I have already explained, that I do not consider the rate of contribution on the part of the Imperial Government essential or even important; and therefore if it is considered better to allow a varying rate, I should be quite satisfied with it; but, as I said before, the essential principle, in my opinion, is that the Colony should be responsible primarily, and that the assistance of the Imperial Government should be only given in the shape of a contribution. Upon the question upon what principles or in what ratio that contribution should be given, I think that half and half is a fair compromise; but I should be quite satisfied with any other ratio of contribution that might be considered more fair.

2193. You say that that is not to vary with the danger to which a particular Colony is exposed?—My opinion is that it should not; but I do not consider that question as at all an essential or important one.

2194. You think, for instance, that the existence upon the frontier of Canada of a first-class foreign power, with which Canada is liable to be involved in war, not by her own act, but by the policy of the Home Government, should be no element in calculating the amount of assistance to be afforded to Canada?—My opinion is that it should not. I have already explained why I think Canada would be better defended without our assistance, as given at present.

2195. Do you think that there is no difference between the date of things now existing in America, and the condition of things in those times, to which allusion has been made, when that great foreign power in the United States was a dependency?—On the contrary, I think that you had then, as an immediate neighbour, a far more formidable power, viz., the French; and on the other side a more formidable naval and military power, the Spaniards; so that in fact, I think that the danger to our New England Colonies from foreign aggression, was infinitely greater than the danger of Canada from foreign aggression by the United States.

2196. Was not the French power in America at that time insignificant?—On the contrary, it was most formidable.

2197. Was it anything to be compared with the power of the United States?—Certainly; it far exceeded it for aggressive purposes, although not for defensive purposes.

2198. With respect to the practical steps which you would advise should be taken, do I understand you to mean that the Imperial Government is to make up its mind as to the amount of assistance which it will afford to the several Colonies, to say to each of those Colonies that that is the determination, and to abide by that determination irrespective of the effect that may be thereby produced upon the feelings of attachment of the Colonists?—Yes, as Lord Grey did with the Australian Colonies, and with the most complete success.

2199. Do you think that the case you have just alluded to affords at all a parallel to what would be the consequence of such an announcement throughout the various Colonies of the Empire?—I have already explained what I think the consequences would be.

2200. But whatever the consequences may be with respect to the feelings, or the allegiance of the Colonies, that is the course which you think the Imperial Government ought to take?—Yes, as the only practical course.

2201. Mr. *Adderley*.] Can you draw any such distinction between the case of India, and that of other dependencies, as would justify our requiring India to pay its own military expenses, whilst we pay those of other Colonies?—No; I think there is none.

Lunæ, 6° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Adderley.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Baring.	Mr. Fortescue.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Marsh.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Childers.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Herman Merivale, Esq., called in; and Examined.

2202. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Under Secretary of State for India? —Yes.

2203. And you were for many years Under Secretary of State for the Colonies?—About 12 years.

2204. Beginning, I think, in 1846?—From October 1847 to March 1861, I fulfilled the office, that is, of Under Secretary of State for that time, although at first with the title of Assistant.

2205. During that period, how many Chief Secretaries of State were there? —There were seven who acted as such in one year, I recollect; but I cannot recollect the whole number.

2206. I think that the departments of Secretary of State for the Colonies and Secretary of State for War were separated in 1854?—Yes.

2207. So far as your official observation goes, can you tell us whether that separation produced satisfactory results?—I think that upon the whole the results were satisfactory as regards the Colonial Department.

2208. You think that the conveniences overbalanced the inconveniences?— I think so.

2209. In a letter, dated March 14th 1859, which has been laid before Parliament, and which was addressed to yourself from the War Department, setting forth the difficulty and embarrassment occasioned to that department by the absence of any fixed and recognised principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State, in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which are continually arising in most of the Colonies, I find the following passage: "The general principle to be borne in view in negotiating with Colonial Governments on this subject would be, as General Peel conceives; 1st, that England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign civilised nations, and (in a less proportion) of formidable native tribes; but in a case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence; or the contrary, she should insist, as a condition of her aid, that the Colony should also contribute its share, by maintaining at its own expense, a local force, or, if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the expense of the Imperial garrison; and second, that military expenditure, for purposes of internal police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a colony and an independent nation in this respect; and the preservation of internal peace and order being properly thrown upon local authorities, both because it depends upon their own legislation and management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it;" do you concur in that opinion expressed by General Peel?—Not the whole of it.

2210. Will you state how far you concur with that or differ from it?—I differ from it in this, that I think the Colonies are of such entirely different classes, that I feel it impossible, in my own mind, to apply any uniform rule to the question of what proportion of their defences the mother country ought to contribute, and therefore I could not assent to the words, "in no case." I think that there are cases in which England had better assume the whole of the

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defence, and that no such condition as that mentioned, however useful in particular cases, could be made a universal rule.

2211. Will you mention some of those cases to which you allude, in which you think it would be desirable that Great Britain should assume the whole of those defences?—I think that where the colony is not necessarily a mere garrison, but a position kept up for Imperial purposes, such, for instance, as the Colonies on the West Coast of Africa, there is no sufficient object in calling upon the Colonies to aid. Again, in such cases as that of the West Indies, where from circumstances the colonies are poor, it is a doubtful question whether anything would be gained in calling upon them to contribute to the inconsiderable extent to which they could contribute. And in the case of the North American Colonies, where the object in maintaining a force is a political and not a colonial object, it is an extremely doubtful question whether you should call for contribution from the Colony, or to what extent, although I am not prepared to say that you should not do so.

2212. Do you include the whole of the West Indies when you give it as your opinion that we cannot expect any aid from them towards their defences?—I do not say that we cannot expect it; but that although there are some of them in circumstances to contribute, yet, what you would get, might hardly be worth the nation's while, considering the questions that you must raise. To treat one Colony in one way and one in another is always a difficult matter where they are under the same general circumstances.

2213. Evidence has been given before us in reference to the Colony of Trinidad, and opinions have been expressed by parties conversant with that Colony, to the effect that it is able, and if the alternative of withdrawing the troops were submitted to it, would be willing to undertake a portion of the cost of its defence; do you think it desirable that steps should be taken to procure some aid from that Colony?—I think you may take such steps with regard to Trinidad, because Trinidad has no representative assembly; but that will not help you towards any satisfactory solution of the general question, it being the only Crown Colony left in the West Indies.

2214. Do you think that, without running any risks, you might attempt to obtain a contribution from British Guiana towards its defence?—Yes, I think you might attempt it, but you have a *quasi* representative body to deal with, which would not yield the point without a struggle.

2215. Do you not think that the Imperial Government might obtain a contribution from Colonies where there is no representative Government?—No doubt; you can take it.

2216. What do you say with regard to Jamaica; I assume that Jamaica would be very unwilling, and would, perhaps, refuse to make any contribution towards its defences; but do you think it would be at all worth while for the Imperial Government to make any attempt to get contributions from Jamaica?—I do not much think it would.

2217. You mentioned the West African dependencies as a class of dependencies, with regard to which you thought the question of the apportionment of military expenditure did not apply?—I did.

2218. You also mentioned, I think, the North American Colonies, as an instance of a group with regard to which you think it questionable whether it would be worth our while to endeavour to extract any contribution from the colonists themselves?—Yes.

2219. I observe, from a return which has been presented to Parliament, that although some contribution is received from Canada in some form, there is no contribution from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, or Newfoundland?—There is none from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; Newfoundland, I think, contributes a small sum.

2220. Do you not think that Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, are so far *in pari passu*, that the same rule that applies to one would apply to the other, if they had equal means?—No, I think that they are very differently circumstanced.

2221-2. In what respect should you make any great distinction between New Brunswick and Newfoundland on the one hand, and Canada on the other?—The circumstances are very different. In Newfoundland you have the very disagreeable task of watching the execution of treaties. In Nova Scotia you have a comparatively poor and small Colony, with one of the most important military

military stations which you possess, and the question is, whether you could raise from that people any sum which would bear a proportion to the cost of maintaining Halifax. If you could organize the North American Colonies into a federation, a different question would arise, but that is a political question. Taking the Colony as it is, Nova Scotia could do next to nothing. Canada is a great country, and all our relations with Canada are those of one great country with another. No ordinary colonial principles could apply.

2223. By the latest returns, I observe that the local revenue of Nova Scotia amounts to very nearly 300,000 *l.* a year. Do you not think that with so large a revenue, it is fair to expect that Nova Scotia should do something towards its own expenses?—I feel it difficult to answer that question, because I cannot give any definite meaning to the word "fair." If you ask whether it is expedient, I think it very doubtful. There is nothing unreasonable in it in the abstract.

2224. Considering the resources of Nova Scotia, as indicated by such a revenue as that, do you not think it reasonable to suppose that Nova Scotia is rich enough to afford something towards its own defences?—That it can contribute something, there is no question; the question is whether it is sufficient to make it worth our while to open the question.

2225. I believe Nova Scotia has considerable resources in coal?—It has resources, I have no doubt; but I am not aware that they are very considerable.

2226. The opinion which you express in regard to Nova Scotia, you give also as applied to New Brunswick and Newfoundland?—There are no troops to speak of in New Brunswick; I believe it has hardly so much as a company.

2227. During the time that you were in the Colonial Department, did any correspondence take place between that department and the North American Colonies, on the subject of a railway from Halifax to Quebec?—Yes, two or three times such a correspondence did take place. Lord Grey, in communication with some of the authorities in the North American Colonies, originated the idea of the railway, which should go from Halifax to Quebec, entirely skirting the sea-board of New Brunswick, and that, considering it of importance in a military sense, he was willing that this country should contribute. The Colony on the whole preferred a line going more inland, and there was a good deal of discussion as to whether any Imperial guarantee or other assistance could apply to the line, which, avoiding the coast, ran inland. There was a good deal of correspondence, which ended in nothing.

2228. Lord *Stanley.*] One was a military line, and the other a commercial line, and the people of the Colony preferred the commercial line?—That is just it.

2229. Mr. *Childers.*] Did the Colonial Office drop it, or the Colony?—There were some parties in the Colony who understood, or professed to understand, that the guarantee would apply to the line if it was carried further inland. I remember that view was not agreed to at the Colonial Office, and thus the matter came to an end.

2230. *Chairman.*] Do you recollect any proposal in that correspondence, which took the form of the Colonies collectively taking upon themselves the cost of their defence, if the Home Government would give them an Imperial guarantee for the construction of the line?—I do not recollect it.

2231. I understand that the different North American Colonies were not agreed as to the mode in which this should be carried out, and therefore that nothing came of it?—I do not recollect any difference between the Colonies; it was rather a difference of opinion between the Government here and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; to Canada the matter was indifferent, I believe.

2232. At present, I believe, that for seven months in the year the only access to the interior of Canada is through the state of Maine and by Portland?—As I thought; but I observed in the newspapers, in speaking of the fugitive slave Anderson, some statement that there is a tolerable snow road from Quebec to the St. John's.

2233. Lord *Stanley.*] Not a railway?—No.

2234. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given as to an arrangement made for sending engineers to British Columbia; I think in 1857; can you tell the Committee what the substance of that arrangement was, so far as the expenditure to be incurred is concerned?—To the best of my recollection, this country agreed to pay indefinitely, but subject to the power of calling on the Colony at

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any time when this country thought that it had sufficient funds to undertake the charge. I do not recollect anything more definite than that.

2235. We have no troops, I think, in the island of Vancouver?—I do not know how that is now.

2236. I think it is in evidence, that in the North American Colonies altogether we have something over 5,500 troops, irrespective of the fortifications at Halifax; what should you say is the object of our keeping troops there?—I have always considered, but that is a question much more for a politician than for an official person, that the object was for fear of the United States, and for no other reason.

2237. Would the value of those troops rise in the contingency of an aggressive act on the part of the United States, when there might be a divided allegiance on the part of our North American colonists, and as available to support the cause of order; is that the view in which you suppose they are useful?—That would be my view, but it is only the view of an individual. If all Canada were against us, and we were engaged in war, we might, probably, let Canada go; if all Canada were with us, we should not want the troops; but if, as probably would be the case, there was a great division of sentiment amongst the population, a military force would be an encouragement to the loyal side, and a preventive against invasion. But this is merely a speculative opinion,.

2238. We have had evidence given before us as to a scheme propounded by Lord Grey in 1851, in respect to the mode in which the defence of the Australian Colonies should be arranged. It was considered in a series of despatches between the Colonial Office and the Government of the Australian Colonies in reference to the proportion of expenditure to be borne by the Colony?—I do not remember the details of that correspondence.

2239. Perhaps you recollect that there was an arrangement, the substance of which was that those Colonies were to have a certain number of troops paid for by the Imperial Government, but that if they wanted more they should pay for them themselves?—I dare say that was so; that arrangement certainly has been made.

2240. Have you a sufficient recollection of that arrangement to form any opinion as to whether it was a satisfactory arrangement or not, or whether it has worked well in regard to the Australian Colonies, or whether they are satisfied with that arrangement?—I should say that on the whole it has worked well; that is, with less friction than most arrangements of that kind.

2241. And with satisfaction to the Colony; it has not produced disaffection?—I never heard that it had.

2242. Do you think that there are any special reasons in the case of the North American Colonies which would lead them to resent such a proposal as that made to the Australian Colonies?—I do not know whether the word "resent" is applicable to such a case; but I think that there are reasons which, in their opinion, would render it a far less fit arrangement to apply to them.

2243. Will you state what those reasons are?—The Australian Colonies have no permanent apprehension or idea of a foreign power or invasion; it is not a contingency often thought of in those Colonies. In the political horizon of Canada, however, it is always present; they are always thinking of their relations to the United States and the position in which they would be in the case of a difficulty between us and the United States. They consider (according to such evidence as I have seen) that the business of this country is to take care of them in the event of political complications of which they are not in any way the cause, and of which they expect they will be the victims.

2244. Lord *Stanley*.] You mean in the event of a difference arising between Canada and the United States, the Canadians would feel that that was not a quarrel in which they were the principals, but that they were drawn into it in consequence of their connexion with the mother country?—Yes, and I may illustrate what I believe their feeling to be by this: that two years ago, when it became a question whether we should not be involved in difficulties with America, in consequence of the boundaries in Vancouver's Island, many Canadians said, "This is no concern of ours at all."

2245. At the same time they would be the first attacked?—Canada would be the first battle-field, in their opinion.

2246. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In Australia, there has been a considerable panic about European wars?—That was so just at the time of the Russian war, but it is not a permanent feeling, so far as I can judge.

2247. It is far less real than the Canadian feeling?—It is far less real than the Canadian feeling. I suppose that the Australians are well aware that their real defence would be a naval and not a military defence.

2248. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] They have shown considerable apprehension, in a naval point of view?—Yes; they apprehended that their trade would be interrupted during the Russian war.

2249. *Chairman.*] The Australian Colonies, I think, applied for an increase of our naval power in the Colony?—Yes; they have been constantly applying for more vessels to be placed at the disposal of the Government, and also against French aggression in the Pacific.

2250. I think you were Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford?—Yes.

2251. As professor, you delivered a series of lectures on colonization?—Yes.

2252. I have a scheme of your lectures in my hand, and I observe in the 21st lecture, after stating that our total colonial expenditure then was about 1,400,000*l.* a year, and that about three-quarters of that was applied to military establishments, you go on to use this expression, that there are many who reject with contemptuous displeasure the suggestions of those who consider these burthensome, and the general scale of colonial expenditure as extravagant; do you not think that now our colonial expenditure is much increased, the importance of considering the question is at least as great as it was then?—I dare say it is; but in those days the civil expenditure contributed by this country to the Colonies was considerable. There was also a portion of the military expenditure which maintained troops in Canada to keep down the Canadians. To the best of my recollection, that was what was on my mind 20 years ago when those lectures were given.

2253. In another portion of the book, you say, "Every soldier in the French Colony costs, according to M. Say, twice as much as if he remained at home, and I believe the proportion is rather higher in our own service." Has subsequent observation led you to believe that that is correct?—Yes, the maintenance of soldiers in the Colonies, generally speaking, is expensive.

2254. After describing the colonial policy of other countries, such as France, Spain, and Holland, you say, "We have seen in our review of past history that there have been colonies, although rarely, which have yielded a revenue to the mother country. There have been more which in time of peace have cost the Sovereign State nothing, their own revenue being amply sufficient to defray the expense of governing and protecting them. And I think that even the warmest friend of foreign dominion, must feel that there is some serious defect in the principles of our colonial government, when so far from realising either of these conditions, our settlements occasion us a constant and heavy expense, which seems rather to increase than diminish, and appears to bear more and more on our financial support instead of hastening towards the period of emancipation from it." Do you still hold the opinions which are expressed in that lecture?—So far as they relate to civil expenditure, entirely; so far as they relate to military expenditure, confining it to what was then incurred, namely, such expenditure for police purposes, and by way of keeping the people in order. The military expense for foreign objects I have always considered a different matter.

2255. With regard to the Colonies which you spoke of just now, the West Indian group of Colonies, is it not the fact that our military expenditure there is mainly, if not entirely, for the purpose of maintaining order among the population, and not for the purposes of defence against aggressive war?—I believe it is the only group of Colonies of which that may be said.

2256. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] For the purpose of maintaining order amongst those whom we have emancipated?—They were emancipated 20 years ago.

2257. Against the will of the Colony?—No doubt.

2258. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is there not this distinction in the case of the West India Colonies and some others, that they are most heterogeneous communities, and in a great degree of foreign origin?—No doubt.

2259. Do you think that the task of keeping order in such communities, can be treated precisely as the ordinary duties of police would be in a purely

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English community?—It is a question of considerable difficulty; certainly, there is a general feeling in the West India Islands, among the higher classes, well founded or not, that they are not altogether safe; that although all appearances are peaceful and quiet, and have been so for a long time, they are not secure from that extraordinary revulsion of feeling which sometimes takes place amongst imperfectly educated, and particularly coloured races. How far that feeling is well founded, it is beyond my judgment to say; but it is a very prevailing feeling, and it is a feeling which is very much satisfied by the presence of a few red coats.

2260. Do they keep the peace better than police?—The knowledge of their presence is no doubt a damper to anything like tumultuous disposition.

2261. So that there is a real difference between a purely English community like New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and mixed or foreign communities like the West Indies?—Undoubtedly there is a great difference.

2262. Lord *Stanley*.] As I understand your evidence, you consider that every large group of Colonies must be dealt with on different principles, and that it is impossible to apply a uniform rule to all, when in the one case you have to deal with communities of purely English descent, and in another case with mixed races; in one case, with communities having powerful neighbours, and in another case with communities having no neighbours from whom danger is to be apprehended?—According to my view there are three or four different purposes for which we maintain and pay troops in the Colonies; by way of insurance against foreign aggression; of insurance against internal disturbance; of insurance against danger from native tribes in the one or two Colonies in which these are powerful and warlike. Those purposes appear to be very distinct. There are few cases in which they all apply, several in which only one applies; and consequently, with these differences, I am unable to frame any general rule as to how the Colonies should be dealt with.

2263. Take the group of Colonies in which the least danger is to be apprehended, the Australian Colonies; there is no native population which can be formidable, and there is no external enemy within a considerable distance?—I believe that in the Australian Colonies there is not much for the payment of troops by us, except reasons which may be termed of sentiment and parade.

2264. You lay down the principle that troops, if maintained for police purposes, should be at the cost of the Colony?—I should not be desirous of maintaining them at all in such Colonies as the Australian for police purposes. But, if maintained, I believe that any arrangement making the Colonies pay any proportion of the cost would be attended with some serious practical difficulties.

2265. What would be the practical difficulty of withdrawing the forces?—None at all; but if you keep them there, and the Colonists pay them, the question of command would arise very soon.

2266. In the event of the Imperial Government threatening to withdraw the troops, and the Colonial Government desiring to maintain them, it would, I presume, be made a stipulation, that the command should remain as before?—No doubt; but stipulations are of very little consequence in matters like these. Whenever there was a change in the Government of Mother country or Colony, the whole question would be sure to be brought up again, as if there were no stipulation.

2267. I find on the average of five years, from 1853 to 1857 inclusive, the force maintained in the Australian Colonies, not including New Zealand, was about 2,500; do you not think that that force would admit of reduction?—I have no reason to doubt it, unless it be an advantage to be able to send troops to New Zealand on an emergency, like that which has lately happened.

2268. I find, also, that the force in New Zealand, on an average of the same years, was 1,430; considering the presence of powerful native tribes, you would probably, not think that excessive?—Not if you are to have troops there for that special purpose; but that is a very large question.

2269. In the case of those Colonies to which you referred, the settlements on the West Coast of Africa, I think that the Imperial Government still continues to pay a portion of their civil expenditure?—Yes, it does, I believe.

2270. Before any attempt is made to call upon them to pay for their military expenditure, you would, probably, think that they should be called upon to pay the whole of their civil expenditure?—I think so; but at Sierra Leone, I believe we do not spend anything of importance; at Gambia we do.

2271. Looking at the return from which I quoted before, I find that the force maintained in the West Indies, on an average of those five years, exceeds 4,000?—Yes.

2272. That force, I understand, is maintained almost exclusively for police purposes?—I consider it is; you must, however, admit foreign purposes into the calculation to some extent.

2273. Having reference to that object of keeping the peace, do you think that a garrison of nearly 1,700 men in Jamaica, is not an excessive garrison?—From any experience we have had, it is certainly beyond what is required; there has been no disturbance of consequence in Jamaica, to my remembrance, since I have been connected with the Colonial Office.

2274. Do you think any danger is to be apprehended to the peace of the Colony, if that force of 4,000 men in the West Indies were materially reduced?—I should be sorry to answer the question. I probably should not myself apprehend it; but I know that many would; and I know that in communities so excitable, and so strangely heterogeneous as these, a great fire is kindled by a very small spark.

2275. In the West Indies, I think, also a small part of the civil expenditure is paid by the Home Government?—I think the salaries of some of the Governors only.

2276. Passing on to the Cape, I find in the same five years, an average force maintained of 7,000 men?—Yes.

2277. And, apparently, at the expense of the Home Government?—Yes.

2278. Perhaps you can state, whether steps have not been taken for reducing that force materially?—I cannot speak within the last 12 months; but there has been a constant effort on the part of the Colonial Office to diminish the number of troops, and they have been as constantly increased again upon some apprehension arising.

2279. Has there been any attempt to call upon the Colony to contribute towards its defences?—It has been done in the most eloquent manner, and constantly repeated.

2280. Without any result?—Without any result in my time. I hear that Sir George Grey has succeeded in inducing them to expend something in militia; but I am not aware of the fact.

2281. We may take it, that, at the Cape, the principal object of maintaining so large a force, is to guard against the danger of a Kaffir war?—I suppose the whole, except the trifling garrison which we maintain at Cape Town.

2282. The danger of aggression from without is hardly to be considered?—I should think not.

2283. Do you think, practically, there would be any difficulty in announcing to the Colony, that it was intended largely to reduce their garrison, and that whatever measures were necessary for their own defence, they must be prepared to take?—It has been announced over and over again.

2284. Has not that announcement been followed by action?—It has been followed by diminishing the force; but that force has been increased again upon apprehension arising. There has been a continual succession of diminution and expansion at the Cape, ever since I had anything to do with it.

2285. In consequence of the demands of the successive Governors?—And upon the opinion entertained here as to the reasonableness of the demand. They are generally anxious for more troops; the statesmen here are anxious to keep the number down.

2286. In the case of the North American Colonies, I think you say that it would not be reasonable to consider the people of Nova Scotia responsible for the maintenance of an Imperial garrison like that of Halifax?—I think not.

2287. The same remark would apply more or less, would it not, to such places as Kingston and Quebec?—I consider the case between Canada and this country, as raising a different question from that between this country and Nova Scotia. As a matter between nations, for England and Canada are nations, I have already stated why the Canadians consider we ought to help them against the possible consequences of our own policy.

2288. You do not consider that that help would be sufficiently offered, if it were given when the time of its being required came?—That is a military question upon which I would rather not give an opinion; but I think the senti-

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ment respecting such help would be quite different; I think that the feeling that there is a force present is an encouragement, as far as it goes, to that portion of the population which prefers union with England to any other connexion. If the force were absent, probably that opinion would be to some extent shaken.

2289. If the entire Imperial force were withdrawn, I presume the Colony would say, "If we are left to protect ourselves, we claim to be the regulators of our own foreign policy"?—No doubt they might.

2290. *Chairman.*] The second paragraph in that letter of the 14th of March, which is the foundation of this departmental report, is, "That military expenditure, for purposes of internal police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a Colony and an independent nation in this respect; and the preservation of internal peace and order being properly thrown upon local authorities, both because it depends upon their own legislation and management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it." Do you think that, stated as it is in that paragraph, that is a sound principle?—It is a principle against which I know no abstract argument; but I cannot help saying that it does not appear to me a very practical one; the instance of the West Indies we have been discussing is quite within the principle, of course.

2291. Mr. *Childers.*] You would not apply the principle where England had made the materials for the disorder which she is required to redress?—That is what I mean.

2292. *Chairman.*] You would not apply it altogether to the West Indies, but would you apply that principle to the Cape?—I should not have thought of applying it to the peculiar case of danger from natives.

2293. You would not consider it as having reference to Colonies harassed by warlike native tribes?—I should not have read that paragraph as having anything to do with New Zealand and the Cape.

2294. I think I understood you to say, that with regard to the Cape, there has been no progressive reduction of the force there, and that it has oscillated from time to time?—Yes.

2295. With regard to the present state of things at the Cape, do you think that we may be said to be obtaining any insurance, as far as your judgment goes, against future wars, in the system we are now pursuing there?—Yes, I think you are, to some extent; but at the same time, I have great doubts whether it is a very effective or complete insurance. It is a very expensive one certainly.

2296. I presume that one main object of maintaining a force at the Cape of Good Hope is, that it is on the highway to our communications with India, and in the course of our trade in that part of the world; but that that is no reason, politically speaking, why we should keep a large Colony there?—Formerly, no doubt; but I fancy that the increase of the trade at the Cape, and more especially the production of wool, which has been very great of late years, make it now a profitable Colony.

2297. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] You think that the profit is likely to increase, and the expenses to diminish?—I do not see any chance of the cost decreasing.

2298. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given before this Committee by a gentleman who was 11 years in the South African Colonies, employed both in civil and military capacities, who in answer to questions put to him, has stated that he thinks the present system of warfare with regular Queen's troops, more cruel to the native tribes, than the old system, called the commando system; and in answer to a question in which he was asked whether, if the old commando system was put down upon the principles of philanthropy, that was a mistake, he said, "Certainly." Do you agree with him in that opinion?—I really could not answer the question, I have not knowledge enough of the details of the border warfare. The general opinion has been the other way; but upon what it is founded, I could not say.

2299. Do you know what has been done in the system of placing military posts along the frontier?—After the last Kafir war the military authorities, I think, came to the conclusion that the best mode of using the force they had was by distributing it between posts situated within comparatively easy distance of each other. Most of these are not under the Cape Government, properly so called, but in British Caffraria.

2300. Some

2300. Some evidence has been given before us, in regard to the conflicting interests of the colonists themselves, at the Cape of Good Hope, as regards peace or war, and the opinion has been expressed that in consequence of the immense rise of prices produced by the Kafir war, the western colonists were rather interested in having such wars. From what you know should you say that that is a correct view?—It is a question on which authorities have differed very much. Sir George Clerk, who went out as Commissioner to negotiate the withdrawal from the Orange River Territory, entertained that opinion; he thought that the wars were promoted, to a great extent, by the pecuniary advantages to the borderers. Sir George Grey appeared to be of a different opinion. I can only form mine upon the balance of opinions; and I do think that they have an interest in such wars.

2301. Do you think that the presence of an Imperial force in a Colony harassed by warlike tribes, tends rather to promote or to prevent wars?—Mine is an opinion which is worth but little on such a subject; but I am inclined to think that it tends to make them more sanguinary, and certainly far more expensive when they occur, but less frequent.

2302. Am I right, generally, in supposing that instead of having a progressive reduction in the Imperial Military Expenditure through the Colonial Empire, it would be more true to say that that expenditure has depended upon the breaking out or not of a native war; and that it has been an oscillatory expenditure, sometimes more and sometimes less?—If you limit that to two Colonies, New Zealand and the Cape.

2303. They are the Colonies in which the largest expenditure has been incurred?—Yes, according to the returns.

2304. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not the case that in recent times at the Cape and in New Zealand the Home Government has retained, through the Governor, the general control over native affairs, and has not left the colonists to deal with the natives as they pleased?—At the Cape the executive has never passed out of the hands of the Home Government; there is a Legislature, but the executive is responsible to the Home Government alone; in New Zealand what is called responsible government is established; and there, in theory, the Governor has always been considered as having a separate jurisdiction with regard to the natives, for which he was responsible to the Home Government; but as the Governor has had no money to carry on that separate jurisdiction beyond what might be voted by the Legislature, except 7,000 *l.* secured by the Civil List, he was almost as dependent as he could be upon his responsible advisers in that matter.

2305. But the policy pursued towards those native tribes has not been anything like so much under the control of the local government as ordinary matters of internal administration are?—Not so much, certainly; but in the last resort, it seems to me the Assembly have the best of it, and can do what they please.

2306. Nominally, the policy to be pursued with the native tribes has been in the hands of Her Majesty's Government?—Yes.

2307. Although, in reality, you think that that has been very doubtful?—Very.

2308. Do you think that if the policy had been pursued of leaving to the colonists at the Cape and in New Zealand to contend with the native tribes, and deal with them as they pleased, those two Colonies would have reached in the same time the point of progress which they have now reached?—With regard to the Cape, it is difficult to say. I have no doubt that New Zealand is far more populous, wealthy, and prosperous than she would have been if the colonists had been left to take care of themselves against the native tribes.

2309. New Zealand is a Colony about 20 years old, I believe?—Yes.

2310. And I think there was, for some years, a period during which the Home Government assisted the Local Government in its civil expenditure?—There was.

2311. Then came a period, I think, during which the Home Government made no contribution towards the civil expenditure of the Colony, but maintained the whole of its military expenditure?—Yes.

2312. Are you aware that the first step has been made towards calling upon the Colony to defray a proportion of her military expenditure?—The question is, will they do it?

2313. Have you any knowledge, from your familiarity with colonial history, of

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of the effects of the contrary policy pursued in former days towards the North American Colonies, according to which they were left to treat the native tribes as they pleased, and to defend themselves against the native tribes as they pleased?—Yes, I have always thought that a very remarkable part of colonial history. Undoubtedly the progress of the English Colonies in North America, when this country did nothing towards defending them, was extremely slow, from the circumstance that every man had to be a soldier as well as a settler. There is a work just published by Mr. Palfrey, "The History of New England," which brings the facts of that subject more before us than was ever done before. He shows why the population in New England did not increase in 20 years to more than 24,000; he puts it down mainly to that cause.

2314. Were great atrocities committed during that period by the natives upon the settlers, and by the settlers upon the natives?—There were such, but I do not think that that is a marked feature in New England history.

2315. Do you think it would be possible for a government, under the pressure of public opinion, and with the full knowledge that the public now has of all that happens, to allow colonists to deal with native tribes as they then dealt with them, or to suffer evils from native tribes that they then suffered?—I think that in this country, there would be great difficulty in overcoming the prevailing feeling upon the subject; how far, if once the thing was done, that feeling would run in a new channel, is a speculative question entirely.

2316. At all events, if that policy had been pursued of late years, the condition of the settlers in such a Colony as New Zealand, would have been far more insecure and more liable to outrage and atrocities than has been the case?—Undoubtedly. New Zealand, in my view, has always been a very fair parallel to New England in former days; there have been the same difficulties to contend with; both have been difficult countries to clear; there have been similar dangers to apprehend from the natives; and their practical distance from England, considering the means of locomotion possessed in the 17th century, not very different: and therefore I think the comparison may fairly be drawn between New Zealand and New England. Now I find that in New Zealand we have 70,000 English people after 20 years of colonization,

2317. That, I believe, has been attained at the cost of a very small amount of comparative suffering on either side?—Certainly; until the present war, there has been no difficulty at all worth speaking of between Europeans and natives. I mean since 1845.

2318. Is it not the fact that in the present war there have been hardly any instances of murder and massacre or suffering endured by native settlers and their families?—I am not familiar with the details of that war. I have heard of such cases, but I believe they are very uncommon.

2319. There is this distinction, is there not, between New Zealand and New England, that in the one case, the natives may be induced or compelled to fall back on a country practically without limit, and in the other case two races are cooped up within the limits of an island?—No doubt there is that difference.

2320. *Chairman.*] Have you known any instances in which the white race has been successful in preventing the extermination, gradual or rapid, of native races?—Yes, I have. The Spaniards succeeded in that. They have maintained, in great numerical force, the people as they conquered. But these were races somewhat farther advanced than those we have to deal with. The population of the great South American republics is now chiefly Indian.

2321. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] The Australians did not try, I think, to keep their native races alive?—Perhaps not; but it may be said that they were very untameable.

2322. *Chairman.*] Do you think that the various attempts which have been made in North America by a system of presents, and by an expenditure on roads, and various other matters of that kind, with a view of civilising the natives, have been attended with advantageous results?—In North America, with none that I am aware of, except in the case of two or three tribes who are remarkably intelligent, the Cherokees and neighbouring tribes, who appear to have become somewhat civilised. At the Cape, Sir George Grey and others seem to think that a great deal has been done.

2323. Would it be true to say, that the native tribes have been rather poisoned by contact with whites?—The general case has been that they have disappeared, or have remained only in very small and degraded remnants.

2324. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] The New Zealand races may be said to have been benefited to a certain extent, as well as to have suffered, by contact with Europeans?—I do not feel that I have materials for knowing how far that is a general fact; individual natives have become agricultural and wealthy, no doubt.

2325. Mr. *Marsh.*] The New Zealanders have increased in population, I believe?—It is said that they have decreased.

2326. Was there not a sort of irregular colonisation of New Zealand, commencing earlier than 20 years back?—Yes; but it was confined, I think, to the extreme north.

2327. Was there not a very serious war about five years after the regular colonisation in 1845?—In 1845, there was a serious war.

2328. In 1840 it was first colonised, I think?—I do not recollect the date.

2329. You say, that the Spaniards have saved the native races in some instances?—Yes.

2330. They went in very small numbers, did they not, and amalgamated with the natives?—The white population of South America is considerable, and although amalgamation took place to a certain extent, the great masses of the Indians in South America are of pure blood.

2331. There is no instance, I believe, of the English race amalgamating with other races?—I believe not.

2332. You say that in Australia the native population is so inconsiderable that there is no occasion to maintain troops there to protect the settlers?—None, I think.

2333. Are you aware that in Queensland there is a native police to protect the settlers?—I had not heard of it in Queensland in particular. There has been such a police in frontier districts of New South Wales.

2334. Are you aware that the cost of defending Queensland is now 15,000 *l.* a year?—I was not aware of it.

2335. Mr. *Childers.*] I think you say that you think the troops, which were stated by Lord Stanley to average 2,500 for the last five years in Australia, might be reduced?—I am not aware of any specific reason to the contrary.

2336. Has not that number been reduced one-half?—I cannot answer that; this return before me for 1858 gives, I think, about 2,500, but that includes Western Australia and Tasmania.

2337. Do you think that such a force as 1,200 or 1,500 is an excessive force?—There is a kind of force which you may call sentiment or parade force: what is sufficient for that is a matter of fancy. There should be also a nucleus for assisting the formation of native troops or militia.

2338. You admit that there ought to be a naval protection?—Yes.

2339. In connexion with that must there not be forts to defend the harbours?—I presume so.

2340. And men to garrison those forts?—It seems so, but they might be garrisoned by the local militia, for aught I know.

2341. Would you think it reasonable to call upon the colonists to bear the expense of garrisoning those forts which are to protect them against a foreign enemy connected with our own foreign policy?—With naval protection, I do not see that it would be unreasonable; there being no special foreign danger occasioned by our policy which menaces them. Distant dependencies must run the ordinary contingencies, which all communities run.

2342. Do you know anything of New Caledonia?—I know that the French have large establishments there.

2343. Do you know that they keep as many as 6,000 or 7,000 men and six or seven ships of war?—I was not aware of that.

2344. Do you think that that force does not require some counteracting force in its neighbourhood?—It may be so; but I should not imagine that the troops would be the cause of much danger to Australia.

2345. Do you know in round numbers what the Australian trade is?—I do not.

2346. Do you know that it is as much as 40 millions?—I was not aware of that.

2347. Are you aware that almost the whole of that property, when at sea and in the harbours, is British property?—Very probably.

2348. And that the interest which the colonists have in it whilst it is on

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board ship is very small indeed?—I hardly think that that follows from the fact of its being their property.

2349. Whilst it is in the harbours and at sea, is it not actually British property?—I dare say it is.

2350. Entirely insured at home, and by far the greater part of it held at home?—Probably.

2351. Do you think that if the troops in Australia were altogether withdrawn, British merchants would complain very much that their property was not protected?—Commerce is naturally sensitive, and no doubt they would complain.

2352. Would they not complain if one fourth part of their traffic was unprotected on the South American coast?—We have no military force on the South American coast.

2353. Is there not a considerable force of ships of war?—Certainly.

2354. Would not the commercial world complain if so large a trade as is carried on with Australia received a smaller amount of protection than South America?—The protection of our foreign commerce is wholly naval. I do not see that the necessity of naval protection in South America implies that of a mixed military and naval protection in Australia.

2355. We cannot put any forts on the coast of South America to support our navy?—No; but we have a large foreign commerce notwithstanding. If it is meant that the mixed military and naval power now maintained in Australia, ought to be the same in cost as the simply naval power required to insure an equivalent amount of trade in foreign states, of course that deserves consideration.

2356. With respect to New Zealand, you say you think it doubtful whether the policy with the natives was in the hands of the Home Government; the important part of that question is the land question, is it not?—Yes.

2357. Is it not the fact that the Home Government have scrupulously guarded themselves against any interference on the part of the local Legislature?—To this extent, that they have kept in the Governor's hand the power of receiving the sales from the natives; no native can sell to anyone but the Governor; but the Home Government have not kept in their hands the funds to make the purchases, and consequently every individual purchase becomes a compromise between the Governor and his responsible advisers. The settlers cannot be kept in order unless they get land, and they cannot get land unless three authorities concur, the natives, the Governor, and the Legislature.

2358. Has any important question arisen between the Home Government and the local Government as to the funds for purchasing?—Not to my recollection, any important questions, but various questions of detail have arisen. About three years ago a question of some importance was raised as to the mode in which the 7,000*l.* reserved to the Governor was to be supplemented.

2359. Has the Home Government as yet objected to the course of the Colonial Government that it did not put into its hands sufficient funds for native purchases?—Now and then I believe he has done so.

2360. On the other hand has not the local Legislature complained that all their proposed legislation with respect to the native land question has been rejected by the Home Government?—Yes, there have been many such complaints.

2361. If that is the case, is it not rather more than doubtful that the native policy is in the hands of the local government?—I think the great question always raised was as to the impolicy of dividing the duties and the responsibility.

2362. You say that the policy of calling upon the colony to pay anything towards the maintenance of a local force in New Zealand would be attended with great practical difficulties?—I should have added, if the call succeeded; the arrangements under which they should be made to pay a large proportion of the expenses for the troops there would be attended with great difficulty.

2363. For the last eight or nine years I believe they have paid two-thirds or three-fourths of their whole expenses?—Not so much as that.

2364. New South Wales and Victoria, at any rate, have done so?—Yes, that is correct as to those two colonies.

2365. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in arranging with the colony to pay for the whole of their protection against internal danger and to pay the whole of the additional charge which devolves upon the Home Government

ment in consequence of the high price of living there, provided the Government found the marine for external defences?—I do not think that any line can be drawn between the cost of the two purposes; but I have no doubt that it would be not at all difficult to invent various rough methods (Sir William Denison's is not a bad one) for apportioning that cost. But then, where the colony defrays the expenses of the troops, it will naturally wish to command those troops, and if you want to send a part of them to another colony, they may say, "No; we pay for them, and we want to keep them." I have seen symptoms of that difficulty beginning under the Australian arrangement.

2366. Suppose the Home Government undertook the garrisoning of forts for the defence of the harbour, and undertook the expense of the naval power which it provided, and the colony undertook the additional cost arising from the high price of living, and bore the entire charge of their internal defences, do you think that that arrangement would be difficult to carry out?—It seems to me a reasonable division and not a difficult one, subject to what I said, that if you divide the expense you will be urged to divide the control.

2367. Is not such a division as I mention, the one practically proposed by New South Wales and Victoria?—Yes, and acted upon, but for a short time only, namely, two years.

2368. Mr. *Marsh.*] Supposing that there were no colony in Australia, and we had the same commerce there as we have now, do you not think it would be desirable to have forts as we have at Hong Kong for the protection of our commerce, supposing we could get them?—It seems to me that it would be difficult.

2369. If we had the same amount of commerce, although it was not a British colony, do you not think it would be desirable to have forts?—If you suppose it to be inhabited by an inferior race like the Chinese, the forts would be useful; but if inhabited by European colonists not fellow-subjects with ourselves, I should think the forts would be useless.

2370. Would it not be desirable to have forts, for the protection of our shipping?—No, I think not necessarily so.

2371. Mr. *Childers.*] Do we not keep Bermuda for that purpose?—Bermuda is, I believe, thought of use to check the United States, and is also a convict station.

2372. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you not think that the discovery of steam, and the employment of steam in our navy, very much facilitates the defence of colonies by us, as compared with former times?—Undoubtedly; and of attack.

2373. Do you think that the system of fortifications which was necessary in those times for the defence of our distant colonies, is equally necessary now?—That is a military question, and I am not a military man.

2374. Mr. *Baxter.*] I understand you to say that efforts have been made by the Colonial Office, to induce the colony at the Cape to pay a portion of its military expenditure?—Yes.

2375. In what way have those efforts been made?—In despatches from the Secretary of State to the Governor.

2376. Are you aware of the Governor having brought the contents of those despatches before the colonial legislature?—I think that Sir George Grey has done so repeatedly.

2377. Do I understand you to say that the colony has refused to contribute any portion of that expenditure?—No, it has never refused, but it has done very little. I believe that more is done now than was done formerly.

2378. When you say more is done now, am I not right in assuming that the Cape colonists do not contribute a single farthing towards the Imperial expenditure for the troops in that colony?—I believe that now they contribute 30,000 *l.* for the border police.

2379. Considering the enormous expenditure to which this country is put in protecting the frontier of the Cape, and the immense advantage which the Cape colonists have derived from the expenditure for military purposes, do you think that a fair and just arrangement?—I think not; but, as I said before, I am not sure whether you can make them pay. No doubt, in our view, it is unjust that they do not pay more. We can withdraw the troops, but in what other way we are to make them contribute I cannot at all find out.

2380. Has the Colonial Office threatened to withdraw the troops if they do not

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not contribute something towards the expenditure?—To the best of my recollection, repeatedly.

2381. Can you inform us by what Secretary of State such a despatch was sent out?—I cannot from recollection.

2382. You are not confident, as I understand, that any Secretary of State has ever threatened to withdraw troops unless part of the expenditure was borne by the colony?—That is my impression; I cannot say more.

2383. Do you know any reason why the Cape colonists should not bear their proportion of the military expenditure?—I do not think that their ability to pay is as great as is supposed; but I see no reason why they should not pay something.

2384. You are not aware that men have made large fortunes out of the wars?—No doubt individuals may have done so, but I do not think that they are a wealthy community.

2385. As compared with Nova Scotia, what would you say of them?—They are no doubt more wealthy than Nova Scotia.

2386. As such, you think it fair that they should be called upon to pay some portion of their own military expenditure?—No doubt.

2387. Do you think that the Imperial Government should insist upon their doing so?—There would be no injustice in the case.

2388. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Do you think that the necessity for troops at the Cape is likely to diminish at any early period?—Yes, I am inclined to think it is; but it is a question which I must be understood to answer with uncertainty; I think that the force of that powerful combination which threatened our Eastern Frontier is a great deal broken, and that this is the result of many causes, but more especially intestine disturbances among themselves.

2389. You think that those internal quarrels would have produced the same result if we had not kept so large a force there?—I think it possible.

2390. Do you think that in the event of an amalgamation of the North American Colonies, the necessity of maintaining so large a force there would be lessened?—I think that if the North American Colonies do federate or amalgamate, it will in all probability be under such conditions as will render the slight tie that still subsists between them and us somewhat slighter, and in that case the probability is that it will not be deemed necessary to maintain troops there any longer. I do not think that you can well maintain in that country a few troops, if you maintain any.

2391. Your reason for thinking that the number of troops might be lessened, is your opinion that their connexion with the mother country would be rendered more slight, and not that the necessity for troops as a nucleus force against the United States for instance would be diminished?—The military reasons would remain the same.

2392. Mr. *Fortescue*.] On the supposition that their foreign policy would still remain not their own, but that of England?—If you act on that supposition, you must maintain troops there still.

2393. Are you aware that the number of troops now at the Cape is about one-half what it was in the year 1858, to which the return now before the Committee refers?—I am not aware of the number now.

2394. Lord *Robert Cecil*.] With respect to New Zealand, have you contemplated any mode of getting out of the dilemma of which you speak; would you concentrate the power?—I think it is a great question whether, if we had not the power over native affairs, we ought to maintain the troops; still, I am inclined myself to think that, even if you keep the troops, to leave the responsible government the whole of the control, taking away the distinction between the governor alone and the governor *plus* the responsible advisers, might be the best way out of it.

2395. If you allowed the colonists to deal with the natives, and to defend themselves as they pleased, do you think that they would act with the same moderation and forbearance, as the existing Government does?—Perhaps not.

2396. There would be, probably, cases of cruelty, and something like an internecine war between the two races?—I do not know that it would go so far as that. I should fear that two armed races standing in constant juxta position with each other, would every now and then be brought into conflict.

2397. And those conflicts necessarily of a very bloody character?—Not, perhaps, necessarily; but, of course, subject to the chance of being so.

2398. And

2398. And whatever there is now of a civilising tendency amongst the natives would be checked?—Yes.

2399. Do you not think that the feeling in England would be one of regret at the breaking down of the great experiment of civilization?—There would be that feeling, no doubt, with many; with many others a feeling of satisfaction at the saving of expenditure.

2400. The balance would be, on the one hand, the notion of having saved the money, and on the other, a regret at the loss of the races?—I do not go quite so far as to anticipate the loss of the race; but others may think so.

2401. If we continue the system, it must be for the gratification of our own sentiments of philanthropy and humanity?—Undoubtedly.

2402. Can you tell us upon what principle Ceylon receives aid and India does not?—I know of no principle in the matter; it is practice only, I believe.

2403. The Cingalese are as rich as the Hindoos, are they not?—I do not know that they are not.

2404. The Government is despotic?—It is Crown Government.

2405. It is therefore perfectly easy for us to withdraw our troops?—Yes.

2406. And you know no reason why we should not?—In India one part of the country pays for the other; whether Ceylon is in the category of the rich provinces of India which can pay their own way, or the poor provinces which cannot, I would not undertake to say; but I should rather think that Ceylon is comparatively rich; it is something like Java, although not equal to it.

2407. Supposing the troops were withdrawn from the Cape, do you think that the Kafirs would ever advance into the colony, or are the colonists competent to defend themselves?—If the Kafirs are what they were three or four years ago, I should say there was danger; my belief is, that they are a great deal broken down; but still, with such chiefs as Moshesh, and a few others, civilization at the Cape is by no means safe from a violent check.

2408. And the result will be a general emigration of the colonists?—I do not think that they would emigrate; I think they would hold their own, but after much trouble.

2409. Mr. *Adderley*.] You say, that if we called upon the colonists to contribute to a large extent men and money for their defence, as English subjects are called upon, the fear would be that they would claim the right to command those forces?—I spoke with reference to Australia, and not as a general proposition. The state of things in North America is so entirely different, and they must depend so much upon us if it came to the improbable event of a war between us and the United States, to defend them.

2410. I did not collect from your evidence that you had any other fear of the result of calling upon the colonists to contribute men and money than the difficulty of England retaining the command of the troops for which the colonists paid?—I spoke of the Australian colonies only, in saying that.

2411. In Australia, are you afraid that under those circumstances the colonists, having the absolute control of the troops in the colony, would act upon any policy foreign to that of England?—I am not afraid of that; I spoke merely of the practical evil of their interference with the command. I am told that in Victoria this difficulty has already arisen with regard to the control of that part of the forces for which they contributed, and which were sent the other day to New Zealand.

2412. In that instance to which you refer, the difficulty was immediately resolved into a financial question between the colony and the Home Government, which should pay for the transport of the troops?—I dare say it was so.

2413. You say that insurance against various kinds of danger, is the reason for keeping up those forces. Is that a conclusive reason for inflicting the cost of that insurance upon England?—It is not a conclusive reason; there are hardly any conclusive reasons in politics.

2414. Upon what principle, in any case, do you think that the insurance against colonial dangers can be inflicted wholly upon the English tax-payer?—I think it is not unfrequently expedient for this country to bear the whole cost of a force maintained in a colony; as a matter of justice or injustice, I have no opinion upon the subject.

2415. I understood you to limit that opinion, as to the Government assuming the whole expenditure, to the maintenance of the garrisons on the coast of Africa?

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Africa?—I was speaking of the second paragraph in this letter, beginning, "The general principle to be borne in view in negociating with the Colonial Governments on this subject." I did not think that paragraph of universal application.

2416. Do I understand you to say that in the West India Islands, England should assume the whole cost of the defences?—I said it may be doubted whether our troops are of much use there; but I do not think that there will be much advantage in trying to get the West Indian Colonists to contribute any material portion of the cost.

2417. Was your recommendation, that England should assume the whole of the defence in certain cases, with reference to the West Coast of Africa, made upon the same principle, as you say that England assumes the entire expense of a garrison like Gibraltar?— Yes, I consider them as posts only.

2418. Looking upon the West African posts as held by England solely for her own purposes?—Yes.

2419. You have mentioned the poverty of the West Indian islands as one reason why England should assume the whole expense of the defences?—Yes.

2420. On the score of their poverty, do you recommend that England should aid them in any of their civil expenditure?—Certainly not; unless there was a necessity for it.

2421. The plea of poverty on the part of the West India islands extends only to military aid?—I said that I do not think that what you could get out of them would be worth your while, considering that you have to deal with free legislatures. You would have to enter inter into all these discussions with impoverished bodies; and although there is much to be said in favour of it in principle, I doubt its being worth the nation's while.

2422. Do you consider that they are so poor that they cannot maintain their own internal defences?—No, I think they could do it.

2423. Then is it a claim *ad misèracordiam*, or in what sense is their poverty a plea for our maintaining the defences?—I think they are not so poor, that if pressed they might not find means to maintain their defences; but you must treat with legislatures not very manageable, and I doubt that being worth your while; I do not say that it cannot be done.

2424. You are aware that in some instances, Antigua for instance, it has been done?—The troops were withdrawn there; that you may do, no doubt.

2425. We have had before us the evidence of two West Indian ex-Governors to the effect that the small bodies of troops maintained in any of these islands are wholly valueless as a defence against external attack, and that their only use is for the maintainance of peace internally; supposing that evidence to be true, do you say that England should still maintain a force which is only valuable as against internal disturbances?—Certainly, if it is, on the whole, expedient for England to do so. That is the question. In Antigua, from which island the troops were removed, a rather serious disturbance broke out three years ago; the police were wholly ineffective to put it down, and the Governor sent to the Island of St. John for troops, so that we had Danish troops to keep the peace in an English island.

2426. Are you aware that, in consequence of the troops being withdrawn, they have since organised an efficient internal police?—I know they had a police, but they are rather afraid of an armed police, because they think that they must be blacks.

2427. Do you see the expediency of retaining black troops in the island, the cost of which is to be defrayed by England?—Yes, when men are put into uniform they change very much in character, and may be employed even in a riot amongst the blacks, particularly as they are not recruited in this particular island.

2428. With regard to the West Indies, you say that you draw a distinction between Trinidad and British Guiana, because we might withdraw troops from one as a Crown colony but not from the other as having a representative legislature?—Yes.

2429. That means that one colony would struggle against the new policy more than the other?—You could withdraw troops from both, but in Trinidad you might impose a tax to defray the expense of troops as a substitute for those that were withdrawn. In Guiana the Crown could not do that.

2430. Do you think the Crown more responsible in maintaining peace in a crown colony than a colony which has a representative assembly?—Certainly.

2431. The existence of a legislative assembly imposes upon the colony the practical liability of self-defence?—As a political maxim, yes.

2432. With regard to the value of these garrisons, I understand you to say that New Caledonia is strongly garrisoned by France?—I am so informed.

2433. Do you consider that, if England were at war with France, the large garrisons in New Caledonia would deprive England of the command of the seas?—That is not a very easy question to answer; in former wars, generally speaking, a strong garrison in a foreign colony was of very little use against a British force with command of the sea; but this is a difficult island for troops to make way in.

2434. Is it not, in your opinion, probable that the garrison would be prisoners of war if we had the command of the sea?—I think it very probable.

2435. Do you think that the 1,800 troops in Australia are looked upon by the commercial world as in any way conducing to their safety?—I should think only to a small extent.

2436. You say that in Newfoundland we have to watch the execution of treaties?—Yes.

2437. Do you mean by that answer that when England enters into treaties on behalf of any colony, that imposes upon her alone the whole cost of maintaining that treaty?—No, but the case of Newfoundland is a very peculiar one; frequent altercations arise between the inhabitants of the coast and the sailors in foreign vessels. That is totally different from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

2438. Was not that treaty entered into quite as much for the interest of Newfoundland as England?—No; the stipulations to which I refer were for the interest of France. They have liberty to fish on coasts not their own. We maintain the execution of the treaty, because we consider England bound to prevent the French from suffering from the colonists, and the colonists from suffering from the French intruders, which they would be in danger of.

2439. In New Brunswick, you speak of the troops being looked upon as in the nature of a guard of honour?—So far as I remember, they are very little more.

2440. Do you consider that it is for the interest of England to maintain guards of honour in the colonies?—It does not appear to me a question of much importance, but I think it is worth our while.

2441. Do you consider that the guards of honour are looked upon by the colonists as an undertaking on the part of England to defend the colonies?—I should be inclined to think that they were looked upon as a sort of pledge.

2442. In that way, do they not deter the colonists from undertaking their own defences?—Perhaps.

2443. You have talked of the troops in Australia being maintained by England, not for her own interests, but rather for sentiment and parade?—Partly I said; but I think they are still partly there to keep the peace; for instance, during the goldfield riots the troops were called out, and were useful as a police; that is the only instance I know of.

2444. With regard to Nova Scotia, do you think that that colony could not undertake to maintain the garrison at Halifax?—Yes.

2445. Is it, nevertheless, your opinion, that Halifax is garrisoned for Imperial purposes?—That is a military question, which I would rather not answer.

2446. Supposing it were the general opinion of the highest military authorities, that all that England wants in that direction, as an important post, might be managed by rendering Bermuda impregnable, should you think it worth while for England to spend a large sum of money in rendering Halifax also completely defensible?—No.

2447. When you say that Nova Scotia could not maintain Halifax, would the maintenance of Halifax by Nova Scotia, be a more wonderful effort than the maintenance of Boston, New York, and other large places by the American Colonies?—Halifax, according to this return, costs us about 200,000 *l.* a year, besides the incidental expenditure of maintaining the fortifications; I do not think that Nova Scotia could pay that.

2448. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] What is the revenue of Nova Scotia?—I think it is under 300,000 *l.*

2449. Mr. *Adderley.*] Halifax is of no more use to us than those large towns were in the last century?—Halifax, as far as we are concerned, is a post for

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the protection of our commerce, and is a kind of insurance against an American war. There were no United States in the time of the old American colonies.

2450. Do you think that the commerce between England and the early colonies was not so much open to attack as the commerce between England and America now is?—No, I should think not; there was no danger, except from France, and France could be kept in order, probably, better by measures taken on this side of the water.

2451. You think that danger from the United States now is much greater than from France and Spain in former times, and that there are reasons for the maintenance of posts now which did not exist then?—I think that the conditions of the problem are altered altogether.

2452. Although England had the monopoly of the commerce with those colonies?—Yes.

2453. And therefore was repeatedly exposed to the attacks of France and Spain?—The attacks of France; Spain could do but little.

2454. When you were asked about the object of maintaining troops in Canada, you said it was from fear of the United States, but you afterwards added, if Canada were against us, we should probably let her go; and if Canada were with us, we should not want troops; does not that rather militate against the proposition that England should maintain troops there?—Not according to my opinion, because I said that a middle course was far more probable; that part of Canada would be with us, and part against us, and that in that event the maintenance of the troops there would be useful to the loyal.

2455. You alluded to the fear of a rupture with America, in connexion with the Vancouver boundary?—Yes.

2456. Did you allude to that as an instance of English foreign policy involving a colony in war?—There is usually a party in Canada not very friendly to the English connexion, and anxious to exaggerate the mischief of foreign wars in which Great Britain might involve them. When answered that these wars concern themselves, "Well, but" say the objectors, "here is a war about Vancouver's Island, and when they are quarrelling about that, Canada will be the first battle field." They put that as the strongest case, to show that, whatever danger Canada incurs from the United States is incurred for English and not Canadian objects.

2457. Was it not much more a Canadian object which led England to occupy Vancouver's Island?—On the contrary. I look upon the occupation of Vancouver's Island as simply an Imperial object, with which the interest of Canada is not implicated. I cannot see the slightest interest that Canada had in the question.

2458. If wars had arisen out of the dispute about the Vancouver boundaries, should you have said that those were wars arising from British policy?—No, I think British colonial policy, in the common sense, would have had a great deal to do with it, but not Canadian policy,

2459. They would have had a sort of idea that, if they were disconnected from England, they would not be wholly free from troubles?—No doubt.

2460. When you spoke of the difficulty of keeping troops in the colonies, the colonies paying for them, which difficulty you say would exist in the division of command, is there any such difficulty in India, where we keep troops, India paying for them?—No, because they have no representative institutions.

2461. Then there is no difficulty in the case of Ceylon?—None whatever.

2462. Or of any Crown colony?—Or of any Crown colony.

2463. It chiefly attaches to colonies where there is a responsible government?—Where there are representative institutions; of course still more so where there is a responsible government.

2464. *Chairman.*] You have been asked whether Ceylon might not be treated on the same footing as the Indian territories. Can you tell me, with regard to that portion of the Indian territory called the Strait Settlements, whether they pay their own expenses?—The accounts are so mixed up that it is not very easy to disentangle them. My impression is that they do not quite pay their civil and military expenses. They pay their civil expenses, but they are aided by the Indian Government in respect of their military.

2465. Mr. *Childers.*] With respect to the Straits Settlements, is it not the fact that we purposely abstain from collecting all the revenue we might collect in order to make it a free port?—I believe that is so.

2466. You were asked about the expenditure in Australia some years ago, in

in the internal defences. Is it within your knowledge, that the principal difficulty, so far as the local government was concerned, was with reference to the Americans?—I have been informed so.

2467. And that since the Americans have almost entirely left the colony those difficulties had come to an end?—They have not been repeated.

2468. With respect to New Zealand, you said that the local Legislature, if it had the management of the native question, would not be likely to treat it with the same moderation and forbearance as it receives from the hands of the Home Government?—If I did say so, I must qualify it; for my general answer was, that on the whole, even if you do not withdraw the troops, still the responsible Government had better be trusted with the whole executive than with part of it.

2469. Your advice would be to put the native question entirely in the hands of the local Government?—On the whole, I think it would be better, but I repeat that I say so with considerable doubt.

2470. The New Zealand Legislature, so far, I believe, shows it is able and moderate in its conduct?—I am so little acquainted with the events of the last two years that I do not know how to answer that; so long as I was concerned in the correspondence with New Zealand it was so.

2471. Is there any colonial legislature which stands higher than New Zealand?—There is no colonial legislature under anything like the same circumstances, unless it be that of the Cape.

2472. Looking at the colonial legislature, do you think that there is anything inhuman or unsafe, in leaving them to deal with the native tribes?—I cannot disguise from myself that there would be dangers; the only question is, whether they are so great as to render unadvisable the change of police which I have suggested.

2473. Do you think that those dangers would arise from possible cruelties, or inhuman conduct, on the part of the colonists, in the mode in which they would carry on their warfare?—I think that possible.

2474. Even supposing that they were to act so inhumanly as some people think they would, do you think that irregular warfare is necessarily more cruel than regular warfare?—I should think it is on the whole. I believe the great cause of cruelty to be fear, and I think, if you remove the troops, the settlers would be more afraid of the natives than they are now, and therefore there would be a danger of that fear leading to excesses.

2475. Whether it led to greater cruelties or not, do you not think that in almost all instances, the matter would be sooner settled than by the system of regular warfare?—No, I think not; I think it is doubtful whether regular wars with the natives, are not on the whole more sanguinary; but I think bloody disputes would be more frequent.

2476. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] You think that the colonists would exact fearful vengeance for any injury inflicted upon themselves?—I have no doubt of it.

2477. *Chairman.*] You have spoken of the capacity of Ceylon to defend itself, and of the equity of calling upon Ceylon to defend itself. I find that the revenue of Ceylon is about 70,000 *l.* more than the revenue of the Cape; the revenue of the Cape being about half a million. Out of that revenue of half a million, I find that the Cape of Good Hope only contributes about 40,000 *l.* a year to its defences. Do you not think it fair that the Cape of Good Hope should contribute more than that?—I think it perfectly fair that they should contribute all they can; but I take it that the civil government is more expensive than that of Ceylon.

2478. Mr. *Childers.*] Is the expense of the government of the Cape increased by the circumstance that Natal is administered through the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope?—No, I think not.

2479. The chief officer at Natal is entirely subordinate, is he not, to the Governor of the Cape?—He is termed so, but in fact he is only under very general directions from the Governor of the Cape.

2480. *Chairman.*] The administration of British Caffraria and Natal is under the Governor of the Cape, as Governor in Chief?—Yes, but he is absolute in British Caffraria; in the domestic affairs of Natal his power is but nominal.

2481. Mr. *Fortescue.*] There is a popular assembly, is there not, in Natal?—A Mixed Council.

2482. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Which has refused votes for civilizing the natives?—I am not aware of that.

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2483. *Chairman.*] What they call the border police is the same, I believe, as has been described by another witness as Currie's Police?—Yes.

2484. The Cape Mounted Police is the only force paid out of the funds of the colony?—I believe so.

2485. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Did not the emancipation of the slaves impoverish the Cape at the time it took place?—I should think not to any extent.

2486. *Chairman.*] The cost of transport forms a large item in military expenditure; do you think that the practice of forming local corps might be adopted with advantage?—With advantage in some respects, disadvantage in others. It is said that a local corps is not so good in point of discipline. And there is convenience in so extended an empire in having an army which you can move here and there as you please.

2487. We understand that in the case of the Canada Rifles the desertions are much less frequent than in regiments of the Line?—I do not remember hearing that, but it seems very probable.

2488. If the alternative were between leaving the system, as regards our colonial military armament, precisely as it is, and the adoption of the plan suggested by the departmental report, would your judgment be in favour of leaving it precisely as it is?—Yes.

2489. But do you think that there is a possible intermediate course between leaving it precisely as it is and adopting the suggestions of that report?—I think that many things may be done with advantage and economy in different colonies, but I do not think that any general middle course can be struck between the one and the other.

2490. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that the system as it is has accomplished an adequate defence for the colonies?—That is a very general question, and is also a military one.

2491. *Chairman.*] Do you think that in many places it is desirable to maintain less force?—With the exception of what I have said concerning New Zealand and the Cape, I have no material alterations to suggest.

2492. Assuming that the difficulties and embarrassments stated by General Peel in that letter of the 14th of March 1859, exist, do you not think it desirable that there should be some rule bywhich the department should be governed?—If you had attained to such a rule, I think it would save a great deal of departmental trouble, no doubt.

2493. Do you not think that it would be attended, if you could attain it, with general advantages, politically speaking?—No, I do not think that, because I can hardly realise it to myself; the colonies are placed in such different circumstances, according to my view, that I cannot conceive the nature of such an arrangement.

2494. I am speaking of the possibility of some rule by which our dealings with different groups might be regulated; and I am supposing that each Secretary of State might find a rule practised; for instance, a rule was laid down by Mr. Huskisson, that a Colonial Governor should not remain in one position longer than six years; if some other general rules were laid down, do you not think that it would be a great advantage?—You would have so many different rules.

2495. Then you think that the matter must be left to the discretion of the Secretary of State for the time being to manage as he best can?—I think so; it is very possible that you might adopt a more regular system with regard to Australia than that which exists; I do not see much else that is to be done except withdrawing troops; that is another thing.

2496. Do you think that there are any circumstances in the condition of other colonies; for instance, North America, or South Africa, which render it impossible to adopt a similar rule with regard to them, to that laid down by Lord Grey, namely, that the Home Government would only allow each colony a certain number of troops, and that if that arrangement were not accepted, the troops would be withdrawn?—Not impossible, of course; but I have already stated my view of the respective difficulty in the different colonies, and I do not think you could draw any conclusion from one to the other.

2497. With regard to the West Indies, I suppose you think the possible consequences of a conformity with that rule about military expenditure, would lead to disaffection; do you think that it would be any great calamity if, in consequence of that controversy, we lost those colonies?—

2498. Mr.

2498. Mr. *Adderley.*] Why do you say that only part of the troops may be withdrawn?—You may withdraw them all; I was answering the supposition of making them pay part of the cost.

2499. Mr. *Baring.*] You draw a distinction between the two courses; one to withdraw the troops without correspondence, and the other to maintain troops there with a correspondence?—Yes, and in the latter I express a doubt whether it is worth the country's while.

2500. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Something has been said about the withdrawal of troops from Antigua, and some other West Indian Islands. Was not that a withdrawal, not from the West India Islands as a whole, but merely from one to the other?—I forget whether it was attended with a diminution of the whole force.

2501. The absence of troops from Antigua, when they are present at Barbadoes and Jamaica, might have a different result to the entire withdrawal of troops from the West Indian group?—Of course.

2502. Mr. *Adderley.*] Has there been a concentration of troops in the West Indies?—Yes, about seven years ago. I think the troops are now posted in Jamaica, Barbadoes, Trinidad, and Guiana.

2503. Mr. *Fortescue.*] With respect to New Zealand, do you not think that the Maories are more formidable than the Indians of New England?—No, I do not think so; and the Puritan settlers were not so well armed as our New Zealand settlers are.

2504. Then you do not agree with Sir George Grey in that respect?—He ought to know better than I do; but, speaking historically, I should say that the New England Indians were very formidable enemies.

2505. Do I gather from your evidence, that the system of withdrawing troops, supposing that were possible, from New Zealand, and leaving the colonists and natives to fight it out, would, on the one hand, not lead to those considerable wars of which we have had two instances; but, on the other hand, might be expected to lead to a constant state of alarm and exasperation between the two races?—That is the inclination of my opinion; but, I should add, I think that would have been the danger a few years ago much more than now, because the settlers are increasing so much in numbers. I think that the Maories must be put down in the course of a few years.

2506. Would not the effect of the change alluded to, as desirable in the administration of affairs in New Zealand, be to hand over one race to the control of a popular assembly representing the other race, and to which the native race has no means of admission?—Undoubtedly, but I was not comparing the case of England, or an English Governor governing New Zealand absolutely, with what takes place now. What I said was this: a divided government has been established in New Zealand. The Governor nominally manages native affairs by himself. He manages general affairs by his responsible advisers. And he is forced to go to his Legislature for funds for all purposes. I think this division so highly inconvenient, that it would be better on the whole, notwithstanding obvious objections, to have unity of government through responsible advisers. It is a different question whether it would not be better that England should have the absolute government of New Zealand altogether for native purposes.

2507. Are you prepared to advise that the Home Government should part with that degree of power which it still possesses in the Governor's veto, and to hand over the native races to the settlers?—I am glad I have not to decide the question; but if I were forced to decide it, I think I should so decide it.

2508. Do you consider that such a course would be in accordance with the spirit of the times and the notions under which we acquired the sovereignty of New Zealand?—I think it would be quite as much in accordance with the spirit of the treaty of Waitangi, as responsible government and free institutions are at all.

2509. Has there ever been a case yet in our Colonial history in which the Crown has suffered one race to be absolutely governed by the representatives of another?—Perhaps not in modern times; but responsible government has only existed anywhere some 10 or 12 years. If you go back to the old times of the English colonists, they never thought of making a distinction between native and other affairs.

2510. Would it not be handing over the natives to the government of a popular assembly elected by Europeans?—It would, and that is what was done in North America up to the seven years' war.

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2511. *Chairman.*] Do you think that having conceded responsible government to certain colonies we can, whether desirable or not, make an exception in regard to one department of affairs?—I have said I think it would be the source of constant difficulty, probably more disadvantageous than placing the natives under the uncontrolled management of the settlers would be.

2512. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you not think that there would be not only exasperation of feeling and liability to conflicts, but the ordinary danger of unfair legislation?—You can always prevent unfair legislation by the Crown disallowing in the last resort.

2513. Do I understand you to mean that, as we have already lost the power of fulfilling the terms of the treaty of Waitangi, you think we had better give up the nominal power which we still profess to retain?—With regard to the literal fulfilment of the treaty of Waitangi, I do not see that giving increased power to the responsible executive over native affairs would alter our position; with regard to its spirit, the danger began when free institutions were given to New Zealand.

2514. Do you not think that the native tribes may, to a great extent, be looked upon as independent of us, rather than as British subjects?—I should be sorry to think that; I do not think so.

2515. Have they ever fallen practically into the condition of British subjects?—I think they have, just as much as the natives of the outlying districts of our Indian empire.

2516–17. Are you prepared to hand over to the Colonial authorities the whole native policy, unless you can at the same time call upon them to supply the whole cost of any military operations to which that policy may lead?—Yes, I think so; I quite admit it is a choice of evils; but supposing that we are compelled to keep the troops there and to pay them, I still think, on the whole, the Colony would be better managed if there were no limit as regards native affairs.

2518. *Chairman.*] Do you not think that in cases of this kind, if the Imperial Government chooses to retain the power, the responsibility of defending a Colony may be said in certain instances to attach; but that if it parts with that power to the colonial legislature, the responsibility may be said to fall upon the colonial legislature?—As a general proposition.

2519. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] The power could not be wholly given up, unless the Governor's veto be withdrawn?—The Governor's veto is hardly exercised at all, except under the advice of his responsible council.

2520. Mr. *Adderley.*] You see some danger in the general proposition of one country making wars, and another country paying for them?—Yes, I feel it is a choice of evils.

2521. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You do not see your way to laying down any uniform system as a guide for the Imperial Government, in dealing with the military expenditure of the various colonies?—I do not.

2522. Do you think that the want of such an uniform system has been felt as a serious evil?—No, I think it is an evil of administration, but nothing more.

2523. You consider that it is an evil, the amount of which has been considerably exaggerated?—Yes; I have seen much stronger representations of it than I felt I could agree with.

2524. *Chairman.*] Apart from the question of uniform system, do I understand you to say that there are no remedies, or alterations in the present system which would be advantageous if carried out. Are you satisfied with the present system?—I do not consider it a system. If you apply that question to particular Colonies, no doubt improvements might be made.

2525. Without laying down any system, supposing that the Secretary of State could now do with regard to other Colonies that which Lord Grey did with regard to the Australian Colonies in 1851, do you not think that it would be desirable?—When Lord Grey did that, responsible Government had not begun. We then did comparatively as we liked with the revenues and executive administration of the Australian Colonies. Lord Grey was not fettered with that difficulty in laying down his principle, which would exist now.

2526. There are Colonies, I apprehend, now in much the same position as the Australian Colonies were then?—I think no Colonies of any consequence.

Jovis, 9° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Fortescue.	Lord Stanley.
Sir James Fergusson.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable *Henry George* Earl *Grey* (attending by permission of the House of Lords); Examined.

The Right Hon. Earl *Grey*.

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2527. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE your Lordship was Secretary of State for the Colonies, from 1846 to 1852?—Yes.

2528. In a book published by you, in 1853, entitled "The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration," I find a statement of the view which your Lordship then entertained, as regarded the principles by which the relations of Great Britain with the Colonies, in reference to military defence, should be regulated. May I ask whether, since 1853, you have seen any reason materially to alter the opinions you then expressed on that subject?—No; I see no reason to alter those opinions.

2529. In the introductory chapter to that book I find this passage: "Our military expenditure, on account of the Colonies, is certainly very heavy, including the charges for the pay of the troops stationed in them, the cost of barracks and ordnance works, that of transport, and the large proportion of the dead weight of the army which is fairly chargeable to the Colonies. This expenditure, I think, ought to be very largely reduced; and the Colonies, now that they are relieved from all that is onerous to them, in connexion with the mother country, should be required to contribute much more than they have hitherto done to their own protection. This would, in point of fact, be only a return to what was formerly the practice of this country." On the next page I find also this passage: "I believe it was not until the time of the great Revolutionary War with France, that nearly the whole burthen of the defence of the Colonies was undertaken by this country; but for the last 50 or 60 years this has been so generally done, and the charges of this kind borne by the Colonies have been so few and inconsiderable, that a sudden change of system could not have been safely effected. The importance of returning to a sounder system was not, however, lost sight of; and we endeavoured to establish, and by degrees to act upon the principle that Colonies can only look to the mother country for military support in any dangers to which they may be exposed from a powerful foreign enemy; that Her Majesty's troops are not to be expected to undertake the duties of police, to maintain the internal tranquillity of the Colonies, and that the Colonies ought to undertake to provide for the expense of barracks for such of Her Majesty's troops as may be stationed in them for their protection." May I ask whether that substantially conveys your opinion upon the subject?—Yes; including in the term "foreign enemy," savage tribes that are within the Colony.

2530. Am I to take it that those remarks apply generally to our military stations?—Undoubtedly, a different rule must be applied to those stations which are

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are maintained as garrisons for the general purposes of the empire, and merely as garrisons; I refer to such places as Gibraltar and Malta.

2531. Would it be a correct inference to draw from the passages I have quoted, and from the general tenor of your expressed opinion upon the subject, that the main ground upon which, in your opinion, the claim of those Colonies, not classed as military stations, to Imperial aid in their defence, is in the risk they run in being involved in wars of England with other powers?—I should hardly say that: I think that the very notion of a Colonial relation between this country and our possessions implies protection on the one side and obedience on the other, within certain limits. I cannot conceive how you can hold colonies without acknowledging the obligation within certain limits to protect them.

2532. Reference has been made by witnesses who have given evidence before this Committee to the arrangements originated by your lordship for the military defence of the Australian Colonies, which were contained in various despatches between 1846 and 1850. Those despatches have been laid before this Committee, and the arrangements therein referred to are said to have rendered the defence of those Colonies more efficacious and more economical, and to have been carried out to the mutual satisfaction of Great Britain and those Colonies. Could you mention any other colonies in respect to which you think similar arrangements might now be judiciously carried out?—I am hardly sufficiently acquainted with the actual state of our different Colonies now, to be able to express any decided opinion as to the measures which should be adopted with regard to reducing the expense incurred for their defence. It is to be remarked, that for a very long series of years this country has acted on the principle of taking their defence entirely upon herself, and the introduction of a different principle requires great caution, and to be proceeded with gradually. It was carried into effect, as far as I thought it could safely and properly be so during the time I held the Seals of the Colonial Department. I really have not the means, and I do not think any one out of office can have the means, of judging whether, since that period, the same policy has been acted upon so much as it ought to have been. My impression certainly was, that a gradual course of reduction of Colonial military expenditure ought to take place.

2533. So far as you are aware, have the arrangements originated by you, in reference to the defence of the Australian Colonies, led to any dissatisfaction or disaffection in those Colonies?—Not that I am aware of; but the Australian Colonies are certainly a very peculiar case; they are infinitely less exposed to the attacks of any foreign enemy, than any other portion of the British dominions, and there are no native tribes from whom the slightest danger can be apprehended. The only doubt with regard to them which, upon hastily looking over the returns before the Committee, occurs to me is with regard to Tasmania; in the first instance Tasmania was allowed a larger proportion of assistance than other Colonies, from the fact that there were a considerable number of convicts still there, but now convicts have ceased to be sent there for a good many years, and although it is true that there are a great many persons still in Tasmania who went out originally as convicts, yet on the other hand, Tasmania has the advantage of roads and other public works of very large value indeed, which have been entirely constructed for her at the cost of the mother country by the labour of those convicts. I think the time therefore has now come, when she ought to be placed on the same footing as the other Australian Colonies. That is the only point with regard to those Colonies which occurred to me on looking over the returns which have been laid before the Committee.

2534. Considering the amount of local revenue of Tasmania now, and the fact also that its prosperity has been mainly promoted by the commissariat expenditure of late years, do you think it reasonable to expect that Tasmania should do something now towards its military defence?—I think it ought to do as much as the other Australian Colonies.

2535. Despatches have been put in before the Committee, addressed by you to Lord Elgin in 1851 with reference to the arrangements for the defence of the North American Colonies. Before you left the Colonial Office had those arrangements been carried out?—They had not, and I should infer from what I observe in the papers laid before the Committee, that they have hardly since been what I should consider, completely carried into effect; at one time the garrison of

Canada

Canada seems to have been reduced almost as much probably as it could be, namely, to a single regiment of the line and the Canadian Rifles. But I observe that since the termination of the Russian war there have been three regiments of the line stationed there, in addition to the rifles; such at least is the purport of the orders given by Lord Taunton, then Mr. Labouchere. So far as I can judge from the returns, that arrangement still continues, but I do not know upon what grounds that change was made from the previous arrangement of having only one regiment in addition to the Canadian Rifles.

2536. Sir *George Grey*.] Have you seen the return which has been printed this morning?—I have not. I now see it appears by that return that the infantry of the line in Canada, is reduced to one regiment.

2537. *Chairman*.] In your Despatch to Lord Elgin dated 14 March 1851, the substantial proposals, I think, were that the garrisons should be reduced to two or three fortified posts of importance, probably only Quebec and Kingston, and also that the barracks and other buildings should be handed over to the Canadian Parliament. I think those were the principal points of your Despatch?—Yes.

2538. Do you know whether those arrangements have been substantially carried out?—That is a point upon which the Committee can get much more accurate information from those now in office than from myself.

2539. During the time you were in office were any proposals made by the North American Colonies in reference to a scheme for a communication between New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Canada, that is to say, a communication upon the Atlantic seaboard through those Colonies, which had some reference to arrangements for the defence of the provinces?—There were some communications upon that subject, they had reference originally to the military defences, but in the last year, I think, of Lord John Russell's administration, it was thought desirable in looking at the whole subject, to consider those two questions of railway communication and military defence together; and in pursuance of that certain Despatches, going very fully into the whole subject, were written by myself, and they were laid before Parliament; so that the whole information upon that subject is before Parliament.

2540. Can you say whether that scheme was a scheme which, in your opinion, would have been an advantageous one, under any circumstances, to have carried out?—Of course it was the opinion of that Government that it was desirable, or they would not have proposed it, both to the colonists and to Parliament.

2541. It appears from returns presented to the Committee that the Colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, do not now contribute anything towards their military expense. Do you think that they might be fairly called upon to do anything towards that object?—I am not acquainted very minutely with the present circumstances of those Colonies, nor do I know the reasons upon which the Government have abstained from pressing them for any contribution to their own defence; but I am not aware of any reason, supposing their means to be sufficient, why they should not so contribute. Undoubtedly, Nova Scotia used to be rather a poor Colony, but I do not know why she should not make some contribution, at all events, to her own defence.

2542. I believe Nova Scotia has now a local revenue of about 300,000 *l*. a year. Do you think that the question of the amounts of the revenues of these Colonies is an important question in considering whether they ought or not to be called upon to contribute?—I think that the amount of revenue is one important consideration; but it is necessary to look also to various other matters, the manner in which that revenue is raised, with what degree of pressure upon the population, what other sources of revenue could be found, and various other questions connected with the social condition of the Colony, require to be looked at before a fair judgment can be formed as to what contribution should be made.

2543. Do you think that there are any Imperial grounds connected with these Colonies, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which would place them on a different footing to Canada?—I think that the fortress of Halifax stands upon different grounds from most other North American Colonies. It is rather to be looked at as a place of the same character as Malta or Gibraltar, of which the

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possession is of importance, with a view to our general naval power, in order to have stations where our fleet, in case of emergency, can refit or obtain supplies.

2544. It appears that there is a military force in Newfoundland, called, I think, the Newfoundland Defencibles, and some evidence has been given before this Committee to the effect that it is desirable to have such a force there with a view to the disputes that have arisen with France on the Fisheries question. Do you think that such a force as that is of any importance to us, looking to Imperial interests, in watching our interests there?—I cannot conceive its being of the slightest use with reference to any of the disputes on the Fisheries question.

2545. I believe that the corps called the Canada Rifles are formed upon different principles from those upon which regiments of the line are formed. Are there any reasons why, in your opinion, the Canada Rifles are a more advantageous force in Canada than regiments of the line?—I think that the original formation of the Canada Rifles was projected by myself as long ago as 1839, when I was Secretary at War, and the main object of that particular description of force in Canada was to guard against the great evil of desertion. The extremely high rate of wages in North America, and the large bounties given for enlisting into the army of the United States, offered a great temptation to our soldiers to desert, and it was thought that by composing a force of older soldiers having early claims to pension, great security would be obtained against desertion. Unfortunately, changes were made in the original plan of the composition of the corps, which I believe materially diminished its efficiency.

2546. Do you think that artillery might be, in any case, advantageously substituted for infantry in the defence of the North American Colonies?—I think that that is more a military question than a question for myself to answer. There can be no doubt that artillery is, under certain circumstances, exceedingly useful.

2547. There were, I believe, enrolled pensioners stationed in the North American Colonies during the time you were in office?—There were.

2548. Do you think that a good system?—I think that the system was a very useful one in many respects.

2549. I believe they have been sent to New Zealand?—A corps was formed there; their time of service has expired, and I am not aware whether they are now kept up.

2550. Have you formed any opinion as to the mode in which our Imperial interests can best be protected in British Columbia?—I have not looked closely at that subject; I have always thought it exceedingly impolitic to go to great expense in forming a new establishment in Columbia.

2551. Evidence has been given before this Committee as to the class of defence necessary in some of the Colonies, particularly the West Indies, for protection against domestic disturbances; and it is stated that the troops have been useful in preventing domestic disturbance, rather than in watching against foreign aggression; do you think that the measure of liability of these Colonies to contribute towards their own defences is to depend upon the wealth or poverty of the Colony, or upon other considerations principally?—I think that the case of the West Indian Colonies is a very peculiar one. In the first place, it is to be remarked that the establishment of slavery in those Colonies was the act of this country, and that, therefore, the inconveniences that still exist from that institution having existed so long in those Colonies, ought fairly to be borne in part by the mother country. Then the change not only from slavery, but from a system of monopoly to a system of free trade, was necessarily attended at first with considerable pressure upon those Colonies. That is another reason for treating them with considerable indulgence. I know that at the time I left the Colonial Office the opinions I obtained from persons best acquainted with them were, that the negroes had made comparatively little progress in civilisation, and are of so excitable a disposition, and are so easily moved, that we shall not be safe against some great outbreak, without a certain amount of military force kept there for a certain number of years. The late Sir William Reed, a person of the soundest judgment, expressed that opinion very strongly: he said he thought that the black regiments might be trusted to a considerable extent, but that it never would do to leave those Colonies without a certain amount of white force to fall back upon in case of emergency.

2552. Evidence has been given before the Committee by a gentleman who is now

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now Governor of Trinidad, to the effect that recently the white troops were called out to act against the black troops; in your experience, have you ever heard of such a case as that?—I saw in the report of the evidence some account of insubordination on the part of the West Indian Regiments. I am afraid that those regiments have deteriorated since there has been a difficulty in recruiting them from Africa; the men who can be induced to enlist in the West Indies are less trustworthy than those that were obtained from slave ships; that means of supply has failed to a great extent. At the same time it is of great importance to keep up a proportion of black troops in the West Indies, because there are some posts which ought to be held, and some duties to be performed which are very deadly to white soldiers. In Jamaica, the white troops used to be kept constantly in the healthy higher grounds, ready to come down at the shortest notice; but all the active service in the unhealthy ground below was performed by black troops. Before that course was adopted the mortality in Jamaica was very dreadful; a calculation was once made by Colonel Tulloch, that a man incurred more danger from passing one year in Jamaica, than fighting, if I remember right, in three such battles as that of Waterloo.

2553. Are you aware where the highest per centage of military mortality was in those colonies?—As far as I recollect, the highest per centage of military mortality before 1837 and 1838, when attention was so much directed to it, was on the coast of Africa, and in Jamaica.

2554. Evidence has been given before us to the effect, that if the question were put to the colony of Trinidad, for instance, whether they would contribute towards their defences, or allow the white troops to be withdrawn, they would contribute rather than have them withdrawn; but it was stated at the same time, that Trinidad, being a Colony not possessing representative institutions, the question as to what they should do, would not be the expression of the wishes of the people. How far do you think that the existence or the absence of representative institutions in a colony, affects the question, as far as the Imperial expenditure is concerned?—I think it affects it a good deal in this respect, that the existence of representative institutions generally, implies a state of society very different to that in which representative institutions are impracticable. In Trinidad, I think it would be improper that any question should be put by the Government to the Colony. I do not know any means that the Colony has of answering the question. It is the business of the home Government to form its own judgment as to what is right, and to carry its decision into effect.

2555. With Colonies not possessing representative institutions, do I understand your Lordship to say that the proper course would be for the Government simply to announce its decision?—I think so, certainly; I think they should take the responsibility, and determine what is best both for the mother country and the Colony, and act upon their own judgment.

2556. I do not know whether you have seen some recent correspondence which has passed between Sir William Denison and the Secretary of State on the subject of Colonial defences?—No, I have not seen it.

2557. In the Colonies in which there are warlike native tribes, as, for instance, New Zealand and the Cape of Good Hope, do you think that the responsibility of the British Government in respect of the defences of those Colonies is affected by the question whether they were Colonies founded upon the encouragement of the Imperial Government, or do you think that an extra liability for the purposes of defence would attach to the Imperial Government by reason of the settlers being attacked by warlike tribes?—The only two cases of Colonies of that kind, so far as I know, are those you have mentioned, and in both I think the Government, and especially the House of Commons, must be taken to have decidedly encouraged colonisation, more particularly to the Cape; because the whole scheme of forming a settlement in the most exposed part of the Cape territory was originally brought forward by the Government, was sanctioned by the House of Commons, and was recommended, particularly by those gentlemen in the House of Commons who were then the great advocates for economy. Mr. Hume was one of the principal promoters of the original settlement of Albany.

2558. Do you allude to the settlement formed in 1819?—Yes.

2559. Looking back to the Acts of the Imperial Parliament on that occasion, you think that a certain measure of responsibility must attach to the Imperial Government in reference to the defence of the Colony?—I think a great responsibility; the Imperial Government not only founded that Colony, but did so in a

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manner of all others most calculated to increase the danger, and to diminish the power of the settlers to defend themselves; it did not place them in well-formed communities able to support each other, but by giving very large grants of land, and placing single farm-houses over an extensive district, it placed persons ignorant of the state of the country in a situation in which they were utterly incapable of defending themselves, and in which, without the support of the home Government, they must have perished.

2560. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Did not the Government, at the same time, take all the responsibility in defending the Colony?—I think, decidedly, and in the case of the Cape especially; great mistakes were committed, I conceive, in the mode of establishing those Colonies, which deprived the settlers of the power of defending themselves, and that made it more imperative upon the Imperial Government to undertake that task. I may contrast the manner in which those Colonies were formed with the original settlements of North America. We all know that those were very compact, that the territory was gradually conquered, and that the settlers were consequently capable of protecting themselves; but partly from the fact of its not being a wooded country, and partly from the circumstance that the warlike character of the Kafirs was not properly understood, the home Government made very large grants of land which rendered it impossible for the settlers to form communities capable of self-defence.

2561. *Chairman*.] With regard to those territories which may since have been added to our colonial dominion, or annexed to the Colonies; for instance, in the case of the extension of our South African territories; do you think that our responsibility to defend those territories applies equally to the territory so added as to the territories which were originally formed on the first foundation of the Colony?—I think so; because I think all those added territories are the natural result of the steps which were first taken; indeed, it was hardly possible when you had once began colonisation in that part of the world upon the principles you adopted, that you could check its extension over a wider territory.

2562. Then the abandonment of the Orange River Territory was the only means, probably, by which we could get rid of the liability we had then incurred?—The question of the abandonment of the Orange River settlement is one which raises a great many other considerations, and is one of extreme difficulty. I should rather not enter upon that at present.

2563. Do you think that, generally speaking, both with regard to the Cape and other Colonies, similarly situated, the presence in strength of Imperial troops has tended in the case of Colonies harassed by warlike tribes to promote or prevent wars in those Colonies?—I think that it has tended to check them, and to render them infinitely less destructive than they would have been. In the absence of Imperial troops, I am persuaded that both in New Zealand and at the Cape a war of extermination would be carried on by the Europeans and the native races against each other; it would, probably, end ultimately in the destruction of the native races, because the civilised man would be the more powerful in the end, but a frightful amount of suffering to both parties would be endured in the mean time, and I do not think that, as a Christian nation, we should be justified in incurring the responsibility of allowing such things to take place.

2564. Mr. Owen, who went out as assistant Commissioner, in the first instance, with Major Hogg, and was afterwards with Sir George Clarke in 1851, has given evidence before this Committee. He was asked this question, "You think that the present system has led to more bloodshed than the old commands system?" He says, "Certainly." The next question is, "So that if the old commands system was put down, upon principles of philanthropy, do you think that that was a mistake?" and his answer is "Certainly." I think I understand you to differ from Mr. Owen in that?—Mr. Owen's opinion in that examination is not given with a clearness which would enable me distinctly to say, whether I differ with him or not; and I think it is not convenient that I should give an opinion with respect to Mr. Owen's views, which I have not heard from himself, and upon which I have not had an opportunity of entering into an explanation with him. I think, if I were discussing the matter with Mr. Owen, I should find probably very little difference of opinion between him and myself upon it.

2565. Sir John Burgoyne has given evidence to the effect, that the very large expenditure going on for the fortification of the Mauritius ought to be, and must be

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be largely increased. Will you favour the Committee with your opinion upon the subject?—I totally disapprove of the whole policy of large expenditure upon fortifications in the Colonies. The experience we have had of the past seems to me to lead to the conclusion, that almost the whole of the money we have spent upon Colonial fortifications has been so much absolutely wasted; and that with respect to some of those fortifications, erected at great expense, the wisest thing we could now do would be to blow them up again.

2566. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Would you include Quebec amongst that number?—No, I should not; I think Quebec is a useful fortress, and also Halifax; but I think, that multiplying fortifications which, if sufficiently garrisoned, shut up men who are far more wanted elsewhere, and which, if not properly manned, may be taken and held against ourselves, is the most impolitic measure we can have recourse to.

2567. Lord *Stanley*.] As I understand, you are in favour of concentrating a colonial garrison at one important place, and not scattering them widely?—Quite so; and with regard to the Mauritius, I understood formerly, that all that was intended was to have a small citadel which a small garrison might hold for a short time until relieved, never contemplating that we could defend the Mauritius for any length of time if we were not in possession of the dominion of the sea. To spend money upon the Mauritius so as to be able to defend it against an enemy superior to us upon the sea, seems to me a great waste of money. I may also observe upon that point, that a very great change has taken place of late years in the value of these colonial fortifications. Sir John Burgoyne says, and says very truly, that the capture of the Mauritius in the last war was an object of great importance to us, because it was used as a refuge for privateers which inflicted infinite damage upon our trade, and that the value of the prizes captured by ships sailing from the Mauritius, during the early part of the revolutionary war was very large indeed. If we were to contemplate another war of that kind, it would no doubt be of great importance to prevent a harbour so well placed as the Mauritius for intercepting our commerce, from falling into the hands of an enemy. But circumstances have much changed: in the first place, by the agreement of all European nations, privateering has entirely been done away with; and not only is privateering done away with, but the point is now conceded that the neutral flag should protect all the property which it covers; and the consequence of that is, the moment war breaks out the flags of the belligerent powers will be almost abolished from the sea, and all trade will be carried on under neutral flags. We cannot expect that we shall have, as in olden times, enormous convoys of British merchantmen sailing at an immense expense under the protection of powerful fleets, when by the recent alteration in the law of nations, the same cargoes may be brought in Bremen or other neutral ships at peace charges. We must be prepared when another war takes place, to see the whole commerce of the country carried on under a neutral flag, and therefore it is not of the same importance as it was formerly, to take possession of every place which can be a retreat for privateers, and hold it against an enemy.

2568. *Chairman*.] You are doubtless aware that there have been projects for considerable works at the Bahamas?—I cannot myself understand the object of spending a single shilling on the Bahamas; I think it desirable to have one station in those seas where a fleet can obtain supplies, and be refitted after an action; but, with the possession of Bermuda, I cannot understand what we want with another station; and, upon the principle of not dividing your establishments, I should deprecate in the strongest manner a separate establishment at the Bahamas.

2569. Lord *Stanley*.] With regard to the garrisons at present maintained in the West Indies, I see by the last returns that the number of troops rather exceeds 4,000, of which 2,400 are maintained in the Windward and Leeward Islands; do you think that that number, or anything like that number of troops is required at present for the maintenance of internal tranquillity?—It seems to me a very large number; but, without considering the information which has been now obtained by the Government, and upon which they have come to the decision that that force is necessary, I should be sorry to express an opinion. I can only say that I think the force in the West Indies should be reduced to the minimum found to be sufficient, and that as much as possible should be done by naval force for the defence of those Colonies, by the frequent visits of ships of war to the different islands.

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2570. I suppose we may take it, as matter of general information, that there is no wide-spread disaffection and no insurrectionary movement in those Colonies?—Certainly. I think the only thing to be feared is some temporary excitement, which might lead to acts of violence which there ought to be means of suppressing.

2571. You think that there may occasionally be a riot amongst the black population?—Yes; and it is possible that the feeling of colour might break out again of animosity between them and the white settlers; it is possible, but I think that every year it becomes less likely.

2572. The Colonies set down in the return as the Windward and Leeward Colonies, that is the West Indies, excluding Jamaica, Honduras, and the Bahamas, are at the distance I think, of not more than four to five days' steam at the utmost?—I think not.

2573. Within that period of time, nearly the whole of the garrison of 2,400 men would be available at any spot?—I should think so; it is very unlikely that there would be any disturbance which a single company would not be able to deal with.

2574. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Provided you have the proper means of conveyance?—Yes.

2575. Sir *George Grey*.] Are you aware that of the force of 2,400, only 1,224 are infantry of the line, 120 artillery, and the rest consist of the Colonial Corps?—I was not aware of that.

2576. Lord *Stanley*.] With regard to the black troops quartered in the West Indies, are they maintained to your knowledge at the expense of the Imperial Government or of the Colony?—They are just as much Imperial troops as the white troops.

2577. With regard to the Cape of Good Hope, I observe that the present force maintained there, including Natal, is 4,800; do you think that that force is capable of further reduction?—I should think not; so far as I can judge of the corps, I should say that that is a very small force to keep there, and I think it would be very bad policy, and extremely bad economy, to reduce that force. It seems to me that at the Cape the object ought to be to maintain so commanding a force that no insurrection is likely to take place until measures of civilisation of the Kafirs can have time to work. I believe that if the plans of Sir George Grey, acted upon formerly in New Zealand, and which he is now acting upon, as I understand, at the Cape, are steadily pursued, we may, in the course of a very few years, see a great improvement in the Kafir population, and they may be, to a very great extent, civilized; and therefore the danger may become very much less. But whilst that process is going on, it would be exceedingly impolitic not to have so commanding a force there as to convince every Kafir chief of the absolute madness of any attempt to resist British authority. I think there is this further advantage in keeping a force at the Cape, that it is a station peculiarly well adapted for our troops to be maintained at in readiness for any emergency which may arise in any part of the world; since we have such a command of steam power, we could at any time send to the Cape and bring troops from thence to India or England in three months. In the meantime, it is a perfectly healthy station for troops; it is a station valuable for discipline, because there are duties to be performed by the troops which are useful in forming them, and in preparing them for war; and therefore I cannot put down as Colonial expenditure the whole cost of the force maintained at the Cape. We must have, somewhere, a considerable reserve of regular troops beyond those actually wanted for service during peace, and I think that some of the troops kept for this purpose are far better placed at the Cape, and are far more useful than they would be in country quarters in England or in Ireland.

2578. *Chairman*.] From the returns which have been put in, it appears that the Cape maintains only a police force, consisting of 400 men, as against a colonial expenditure of rather more than half a million. Do you think that the Colony might be called upon to do more for its own defence than it does now?—There, again, I do not think it is good policy to make undue pressure upon the resources of the Colony. The Cape is in a state of rapid improvement; the production of wool is increasing there very fast; it has natural advantages for various descriptions of products, and great efforts are making by the colonists at this moment to develop those resources, and improve the Colony. They are making railways; they are going to make a breakwater in Table Bay, and various

various other works of that kind are projected, and are only kept back by the difficulty of finding capital for carrying them on. I think it is much wiser for this country, with the view to the ultimate reduction of expense, not to press unduly upon the Cape Colony at the present moment, but to give them every facility for pursuing the policy on which they are entering, so that the Colony may in the course of a few years become so rich and prosperous, as to stand in little need of our assistance. It would be very bad policy to check the progress which is now making, for the sake of a few thousand pounds more or less of direct contribution to the military expenditure; especially because, as I have said before, I cannot regard the whole of that expenditure as incurred for colonial purposes. I regard the force that is kept there as a reserve force for the general purposes of the empire, stationed at a point the most convenient for keeping such a reserve with a view to any emergency, either of an Indian or an European war. Perhaps I ought to guard this opinion by qualifying it in one respect. I do not think that the large expenditure now incurred at the Cape for military purposes ought to continue, unless the Government retain complete authority in its own hands, of regulating the policy which is to be pursued towards the native tribes. It seems to me that it is the greatest blunder that can be committed that you should on the one hand tell the colonists that you will be responsible for the cost of war, and take upon yourselves the burthen of defending them, and that on the other hand they should have the power of regulating the policy which may make a war necessary or unnecessary. We have committed a fatal mistake in that respect in New Zealand, which I hope will not be repeated at the Cape.

2579. Do you think that we could carry further at the Cape the policy of recruiting our forces locally from Hottentots and other native levies?—I think not; I think that since the desertion to the enemy of the Hottentot Mounted Rifles in the Kafir war in 1851, it would be inexpedient to trust, to any great extent, to coloured levies at present. I am very favourable to the principle of having, within certain limits, coloured troops. I think that military discipline is a powerful instrument of civilization with regard to native tribes, but at the same time the recollection of that unfortunate event is still so fresh in the minds of the Cape population that I should be apprehensive of any very large extension of coloured levies; at all events, unless there is a considerable white force kept up at the same time.

2580. Evidence has been given as to the existence of a force called Currie's Police, which is a force maintained by the Colony; have you any knowledge as to the efficiency or otherwise of that force?—I know only what I have heard from the evidence. I have no doubt that it is absolutely necessary to have a local force; English soldiers would not have the necessary knowledge of the country.

2581. Lord *Stanley.*] In the event of large contributions towards their own defences being required from the Colonies at the Cape or New Zealand, do you think it better that those contributions should be in the form of local troops and local militia or volunteers, or any arrangement of that kind, or that they should pay a certain pecuniary contribution towards the maintenance of the Imperial troops?—I think that must depend a good deal upon the cirsumstances of the Colony; it very frequently is extremely unadvisable to require them to do it by local troops raised under their control, because labour is so excessively valuable in those colonies that an equal force provided by the Colony may probably cost much more than a force sent from England, including the expense of transport.

2582. Taking the case of another Colony, do you see any reason why, in Ceylon, which is geographically almost a part of India, the same rule should not apply as in India, that a dependency shall contribute the whole funds required for its defence?—I think it very desirable that Ceylon should, as soon as possible, pay the whole of its expenses, but in Ceylon they have had great difficulties to contend with. You are aware that in 1846 and 1847 Ceylon was in great distress; many of the coffee planters were ruined, and the change of our commercial policy affected Ceylon, in common with many of our other Colonies, very seriously. It has got over that now, and I believe it is much more prosperous in consequence of the change than it would have been without it; but still I think that we should not too hastily adopt the principle of requiring complete payment of her military expenses; whenever she can do it, she ought to do it.

2583. I do not ask whether we ought to adopt the rule this year or next year;

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year; but, looking at Ceylon as a permanent portion of the British empire, I ask whether that island must not and ought not to be ultimately put upon the same footing as India?—I see no reason why it should not, but we can only make these changes gradually and cautiously.

2584. Sir *George Grey.*] Is it the fact that any particular portion of a presidency is required to pay the whole cost of its defence?—I think that Ceylon would object to be put under the same system as India, and have a heavy land tax imposed upon it.

2585. Is not the whole revenue of India liable for the military force of India?—Yes.

2586. And local payment is not the principle adopted?—Certainly not; but Ceylon, I think, must be kept distinct from India; at least, it would be very inconvenient, when they have been maintained upon such different principles so many years, to unite them together now.

2587. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Should you be inclined to say that such small communities as Ceylon, the West India Islands, or Mauritius, are, in the nature of things, dependencies of a power upon which they will depend, and that they can hardly be called upon to perform all the duties of nations?—To a certain extent, I think, that is true, but I do not see anything in Ceylon to prevent its ultimately paying its own military expenses.

2588. Is there not this difference between Ceylon and the colonies possessing representative institutions, that in the case of Ceylon the Home Government, by its influence over the council, can, in fact, obtain such contribution as she may think right to ask, whereas, in the case of a colony with representative government, it becomes necessary for the Home Government to enter into negotiations for the purpose of obtaining the consent of the colonial government?—I do not think that the Government ought ever to enter into what would strictly be called negotiation; it ought to come to a determination as to what proportion the colony ought to contribute, and make that determination known to the colony. If the colony possesses representative institutions, it must be considered capable of judging for itself how far it could be without that limited protection, if withdrawn; but in the case of Ceylon, no judgment of that kind can be expected from the colony, and the question ought never to be put to it.

2589. In the case of Ceylon, England can obtain the contribution; but to a representative institution, she can only say, "We allot you such a number of troops and no more, and any others you require you must pay for"?—Yes.

2590. It comes to that, does it not?—Very much so, I think.

2591. Mr. *Marsh.*] I believe there is a large fleet generally at the naval station at Trincomalee?—I think that the station there is not much used.

2592. The fleet there would be available for the protection of the Indian commerce?—For the protection of the whole commerce of the empire.

2593. That is paid for by the Home Government?—I should think so; I have not referred to the Navy Estimates. I believe that the establishment at Trincomalee is a very small one.

2594. In your opinion, it is better to keep one garrison in the West Indies than to have a number of small ones; do you not think that a garrison of marines is preferable to one of common soldiers?—I do not see any advantage in that.

2595. Do you think that as many marines would be necessary to perform the duties which common infantry would perform?—I think there is a great objection to multiplying too much the demands upon our marines; it is not a force which is capable of indefinite extension, and much inconvenience might arise therefore from multiplying demands upon them.

2596. With reference to the Cape being a central station for Queen's troops, do you know whether, at the time of the Indian Mutiny, many troops were removed from the Cape?—I believe a considerable number.

2597. As regards the necessity for protecting our commerce, might not a difficulty in some cases be experienced in defining what is strictly a garrison for the protection of our commerce, and what is necessary only for the protection of a Colony, as, for instance, in the case of Halifax; that station protects Nova Scotia, and is also a great naval station for the protection of our commerce generally. Would not that remark apply to other stations?—Undoubtedly; but these are cases which the Government must form its own judgment upon after consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case.

2598. In

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2598. In such a case it would be fair that the Home Government should pay a portion of the expenses?—Yes, I think so.

2599. With reference to your Lordship's statement that the proportion to be paid by the Colony towards the military expenditure would depend upon the revenue, allow me to ask whether it must not also depend upon the taxation of the Colony; one Colony might have a large revenue and another a small one, and yet the Colony with a large revenue might be more heavily taxed than the other?—I have already said, that in judging of the ability of a Colony to contribute towards its own defences, you must consider, not merely the amount of its revenue, but the sources of that revenue, the general wealth or poverty of the inhabitants, and the demands also upon their resources in other ways.

2600. Mr. *Adderley.*] You say that you consider the general colonial relations to imply protection on the one side, and obedience on the other. Is that more so with regard to a Colony than between the Government and subjects at home?—The fact of belonging to one empire implies that all the subjects of that empire owe obedience to the Imperial authority, and have a right to look to the Imperial authority for protection; in an extended empire like this, where portions of that empire are at a great distance from the seat of Government, it is convenient, or rather it it is absolutely necessary that, in some respects, the management of local affairs should be transferred to local authorities, and that at the same time a portion of the duty of self-protection should be transferred.

2601. Is there anything in that colonial relation to exempt colonial subjects from furnishing men and money for their own defences?—Nothing at all.

2602. When you said that you had carried out the principle, which you laid down in your despatch with regard to Australia, as far as it could be safely carried out, whilst you were Colonial Secretary, allow me to ask, did you not in 1851 express your opinion to Lord Elgin that the same principle should be carried out in Canada?—I did; and to a certain extent it was.

2603. Your Lordship has referred to the North American colonies of the last century; was it not the principle of the defence of those colonies, as contrasted with the principle of defence of our present colonies, that those colonies undertook the primary responsibility of their own defence, England contributing; whereas, now England undertakes the primary responsibility and calls upon the colony to contribute?—I do not know whether that is quite a correct way of describing it.

2604. Until the Seven Years' War took place, was not the only way in which England contributed to the defence of the colonies by refunding to them part of the expense they had incurred?—At that time the whole state of the world was so different to what it is now, that you can hardly draw any comparison between the two; the colonies were not attacked upon their own ground by the great armies of civilized powers; it was not till later that attacks of that kind could be made upon them; their principal danger was from Indian tribes or from irregular forces of the French monarchy, whilst the regular armies of France and England were in Europe, the colonial forces of both powers were kept in America to a great extent.

2605. Your Lordship is aware that Canada was entirely defended by regular troops, whilst the English colonists were fighting with the militia?—I think that if you look at the number of French troops, you will find that they were very small indeed; we had a few regular troops in New York, I believe, and in some other places, I think, but they were very few.

2606. Is it your Lordship's impression that the Indians with whom those colonies had to fight were less formidable than the Maories in New Zealand or the Kafirs in South Africa?—Infinitely less; that comparison between the Indians of North America and the Maories of New Zealand has been well stated by Sir George Grey; he points out that the Maories have considerable skill in war; many of their fortifications could not be better designed by our own officers, and they have shown great power in adapting their measures to the resources of the country. Nothing is more striking in the history of the wars of North America, on the part of the Indians, than the want of any skill beyond that of each man fighting for himself. There was nothing like combined exertion, and nothing like fortifications which we had any difficulty in taking.

2607. Your Lordship will recollect the large number of Indians trained and drilled by French officers?—That is a different case altogether.

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2608. In a former answer, your Lordship referred to the first conflicts with the Indians in the early part of the 18th century?—I was speaking of the conflicts with the Indians on the part of the settlers. When the attacks were directed by the French, it was another case; but even then the Indians were very inferior to the Maories; and that is the opinion of Sir George Grey, who has studied the question.

2609. The evidence of Mr. Owen was to the effect that the natives of South Africa were not formidable until they were trained by conflicts with English troops?—That is one of the great misfortunes of conflicts with these uncivilized tribes; every war in which we are engaged teaches them something more, and that is one great argument for maintaining a considerable force there to prevent the outbreak of a war. When a rebellion breaks out which you are not strong enough to put down at once they soon acquire in the struggle more knowledge of war, and thus it will take a much larger force to suppress an insurrection, which had been allowed to establish itself, than would have sufficed to prevent its taking place.

2610. Your Lordship has expressed the opinion that Nova Scotia could not be called upon to maintain its own defenees on account of its poverty. Is your Lordship aware that the population and wealth of Nova Scotia alone is at least double the population and wealth of the New England Colonies when they took Louisburg and Cape Breton?—I have not made the comparison; but, no doubt, Nova Scotia is a colony which, as compared with others, has not such great natural resources; until within the last few years those resources have not been so much developed.

2611. When you say that Halifax is of the same character as Malta and Gibraltar, do you mean that, supposing Bermuda was rendered as nearly as possible impregnable, and we could not afford to render both Bermuda and Halifax impregnable, that Bermuda, so fortified, would render unnecessary the maintenance of Halifax?—I think, considering what a fine harbour Halifax is, it would be extremely impolitic not to have that so well defended as to be an available refuge for a fleet in time of danger.

2612. Your Lordship has expressed the opinion, that the first settlement of New Zealand, and of Albany, entailed upon the Government the liability of defending those places; did not some of the Colonies, founded in the last century by the Government, defend themselves; for instance, South Carolina?—No doubt; but I think the circumstances were different altogether.

2613. Would not the same reasons which you give for the liability of the Imperial Government to defend the new Colonies have applied in the case of South Carolina?—I consider that they had a great claim upon the mother country, but the mother country was not anything like so powerful as it is now, and could not make the exertions which it can now; and the dangers to the Colonies were not so great in some respects; they had not such formidable natives to deal with.

2914. Had not the Colonies this disadvantage, that there was no system of cheap emigration from England, nor had they such a population in England to draw from, and, therefore, that their resources were very inferior to those of the Colonies of the present day?—That might be the case.

2615. Your Lordship has expressed your opinion that it is desirable to concentrate our troops, to a certain extent, in the Colonies; would you extend that opinion, so far as to say it would be better to keep the troops altogether at home, and send them out to defend any particular parts in time of war?—I do not think that, in any case, the whole of our reserve of troops should be quartered at home. As I have already stated, I think that the Cape has certain peculiar advantages for maintaining a considerable portion of our reserve.

2616. We know that your Lordship considers the Cape a special case; but with reference to the North American Colonies and the West Indies, and other Colonies, do you think it better to keep the troops at home, and send them to those places when they are wanted than to scatter garrisons in time of peace through the Colonies upon the chance of their being wanted in time of war?—As I understand, the policy acted upon with Colonies of that kind is to maintain, not a force sufficient to protect them in time of war, but only to prevent disturbances in time of peace.

2617. In North America, I believe, there are now only sufficient troops to maintain the principal garrison?—If you have fortifications at Kingston, Quebec, and

and Halifax, there must be garrisons to take care of them, and the troops cost very little more there than they would at home.

2618. Does your Lordship look at the garrisons of Quebec and Kingston as capable of holding those places?—Not for any length of time unless relieved; but this holds good of all fortifications.

2619. Then in what sense does your Lordship look upon them as occupying those garrisons in time of peace?—For the mere protection of the works; it is absolutely necessary to have some sentries to prevent people doing damage to the fortifications.

2620. Do you think that the colonists could not find a sufficient number of men for that purpose?—The Imperial Government must, I conceive, keep up a certain amount of regular army, and I think that a portion of that army is better quartered in those fortifications than at home.

2621. Does not your Lordship think that garrisons being placed at those stations by England deters the colonists from providing the garrisons themselves?—I see no appearance of that; Canada did make considerable efforts in raising and disciplining a militia, and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have hitherto declined doing so, I believe, for the simple reason that they apprehend no danger at present.

2622. You will remember that in 1812, when the war took place, and in 1840, the rebellion, although Canada raised militia, she did not pay one farthing towards raising or organising those troops?—I believe that the system followed during the great war from 1793 to 1815 was a very extravagant one; we were borrowing large sums of money every year, and we did not seem to care how much was spent. But it is further to be remembered that the danger of Canada, during that war with the United States, was entirely brought upon her by our most impolitic conduct towards the United States.

2623. Does your Lordship see any reason why, during the Seven Years' War, Massachusetts raised 25,000 men, and paid them, and that, in 1812, Canada should allow us to raise and pay every soldier engaged in that war?—I think that the difference was, that in the one case Massachusetts felt that the quarrel was a great deal her own, and that, in 1812, Canada justly felt that that was a quarrel wantonly provoked by this country, and that Canada was only suffering from her connexion with us.

2624. Your Lordship thinks, that where the war is created by our Colonial relations, the Colony ought to bear the expense of the war?—I would rather not lay down any abstract rules beforehand; when the case arises, we must act according to the various circumstances that exist.

2625. We have the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, that the fortification of our Colonies is in its very commencement. Does your Lordship contemplate the possibility of inducing the House of Commons to undertake the enormous expense of such fortifications?—The House of Commons has shown so very lavish a disposition, in respect of fortifications, that it is impossible for me to conjecture to what degree of extravagance in this line it may be induced to agree.

2626. Why do you think that there will be a change in the system of warfare?—In the last century, the possession of Colonies, of which the trade was to be monopolized by the mother country, was believed to be a source of wealth to a nation. Hence, to wrest from each other their colonial possessions was regarded by European nations as an object of great importance; and it was considered almost a sufficient object for a war, to capture one or two sugar Colonies. But it is now generally understood that monopolizing the trade of Colonies is contrary to the true interest of both parties, and that nothing, therefore, is gained by conquering Colonies for this purpose. Since the great war of the French Revolution, quite a system of war has also been adopted; those wars, and the military genius of Napoleon, taught all nations that, in a struggle of that kind, instead of wasting your strength in attacking the outlying distant possessions of your enemy, your efforts should be directed to the main seat of its power. The consequence is, that future wars will probably be shorter and much more decisive, and that the whole struggle will be at home, or in the immediate vicinity.

2627. Your Lordship has expressed an opinion, to the effect that the Cape is a good depôt for troops. When the Indian mutiny broke out there was a force

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at the Cape amounting, I believe, to nearly 13,000 English troops. Do you recollect whether they were readily sent forward to the assistance of the Government in India?—I read the correspondence at the time, and my impression was, that Sir George Grey had made great efforts to send all the troops he could spare, and that he did send a very large number.

2628. *Chairman.*] I understood you to say, that in modern warfare the danger would rather lie at home, of hostile aggression?—I think so.

2629. By the last returns we have, I see that, exclusive of the troops employed in the China war, there are 44,581 in our dependencies, and that the Indian Army Commission has recommended that there should be not less than 70,000 in India. Do you think that that large drain upon our resources is attended with some danger?—I have no doubt that the demand for such a large British force in India is a serious drain upon our resources, but I do not see how it is to be avoided whilst we maintain our Indian Empire.

2630. Mr. *Adderley.*] Your Lordship has expressed the opinion that a large force should be maintained at the Cape, from fear of brutal warfare. I have made an extract from Mr. Montgomery Martin's account of the proceedings of the French troops in the wars between Canada and the Indians, in which I find that the French reinforcements sent from Europe, in February 1690, massacred the Indians, that they cut up the prisoners in pieces and made soups for the Indian allies who accompanied them. Does your Lordship anticipate that Dutch or British settlers in any part of the world could be guilty of any atrocities such as those?—That is a question which I cannot answer. I do not think that it in the least applies to the principle I have endeavoured to lay down. In those days a very different opinion was entertained with regard to what are the rights and claims of humanity, and I am sure that no British Government would now permit cruelties to be practised by British troops towards native tribes, and that no British officer would allow it. On the other hand, if you leave settlers to carry on a war of that kind, they suffer so much, and their passions get so excited, that they adopt the principle of shooting a black man as they would shoot a wolf. We have seen too much of that in Australia, where there is very little to fear from native tribes; there have been dreadful atrocities there, even to the extent of poisoning a whole tribe.

2631. There would be the danger of such atrocities on the part of settlers in the immediate neighbourhood of the natives; but would there be any such danger if the colonists formed a force of their own?—It is utterly impossible for the colonists to collect a regular organised force. I believe that a force of the kind which they could form, would be driven to adopt the system of indiscriminate destruction. The natives would be much less afraid of them, and that would lead to violence which would produce retaliation; and we see that when it is left to a struggle between settlers and natives, it is a process of extermination, by the settlers, of the natives. That has been the practice in the settlements of North America, and it is now going on in California; and where there is not some military authority to prevent it, it will always be the case.

2632. How can you account for the Dutch Islands, Java, and Sumatra, maintaining peace and tranquillity at their own expense, and yet sending in a surplus of tribute to the Dutch Government, the Spanish Settlements doing the same, and yet that there should not be a single settlement of England able even to find men or money for its internal defences?—In the first place, I should like to ascertain whether the fact is so, for I do not believe it; it appears on the face of the return, but that return does not include a great many things. With regard to the Dutch Colonies, I see that they put down a large revenue derived by Holland; but they do not put down the enormous indirect payment of Holland to those Colonies, to create that revenue by maintaining a commercial monopoly in favour of a particular company, which practically levies an immense tax upon Holland. If you put that on the other side, which you ought to do, it would very much alter the balance of the account.

2633. Mr. *Fortescue.*] With regard to the Dutch Colonies, I find in the Dutch Budget for 1858, that out of a total of Colonial receipts, of 9,800,000*l.* 5,300,000*l.* come under the head of "Profit of Sale of Colonial Produce." Does not that strongly confirm the opinion you gave just now, that the apparent tribute paid by Java to the mother country is probably not revenue, but profit derived from what is practically

practically the great commercial monoply in the hands of the Government?—Yes, and I think that Holland probably loses far more by that monoply than she gains by the apparent surplus; and I believe, also, that Spain loses infinitely more than she gains by her apparent tribute.

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2634. With respect to the Cape, do you say that the introduction of responsible government would make a difference in the responsibility as to the cost of their military defences, which ought to rest upon the Colony?—I think it would make a very great difference; it appears to me, that in this, as in all other cases, responsibility and power should go together. If we are to take the burden of war, we should have power so to direct policy that war may not be necessary. We have a striking example of that in New Zealand at this moment. I am convinced that this calamitous war in New Zealand arose from a mistake that was committed in altering the form of Government in that Colony, when we remained responsible for maintaining peace between the settlers and the natives. It is quite clear, from all Sir George Grey's despatches, that the natives were willing to submit to what they considered the impartial government of the Queen; but they felt that the revenue was derived, in a very large proportion, from them, and that it was unjust that they should be governed by the settlers, and the introduction of what was called responsible Government in 1854 in New Zealand, produced a feeling of general discontent among them. It is impossible to read the papers without seeing that what was called the native king movement arose from that, because when they were under the Imperial authority of the Governor, acting with permanent civil servants, the interests of the natives were considered quite as much as those of the settlers in all the measures of the Executive Government; but the moment you altered that, and the Governor was practically deprived of all authority, and the settlers became superior in the management of the executive and administrative affairs, the natives immediately perceived the consequence of that in the daily management of the Government. In cases of patronage, and various things of that kind, instances have come under my own attention, having been casually brought before me, in which they felt themselves much aggrieved by the conduct of the settlers; and the consequence of that was a rooted dislike to the state of things that then prevailed, and a determination to check it, and an attempt to form some kind of native authority to govern the parts of the island which were not occupied by British settlers. It has been perfectly clear, for several years back, that that state of things must lead ultimately to a collision. I have never, for the last five years, doubted that a New Zealand war was impending, and it was brought on by circumstances in which it is difficult to say upon which side the right may be; I think it is on the side of the settlers, but that is perfectly immaterial; it is quite clear that the dispute with respect to the purchase of land was only the occasion which led to the war breaking out, and was not the original cause of it. I do not think it wise or right, on the part of this country, to undertake to bear the enormous expense and burden of a New Zealand war, and to leave to the Colony the uncontrolled power of governing that country in such a manner as to produce collision with the natives; and I am sorry to learn that, in consequence of that war, no change has been made.

2635. You are aware that whilst responsible government has been established in New Zealand, and the whole revenue of the Colony, including the produce of the sale of waste lands, is placed at the disposal of the Colonial Parliament, that, nevertheless, the duty of purchasing land from the natives has been retained in the hands of the governor, and that the whole subject of the native policy has also been retained in the governor's hands. Do you think that it is practically possible to withdraw the subject of native policy from the control of the Colonial Parliament and the responsible minister?—I think not, and I think that the measure proposed last year in Parliament for creating a sort of native council would have led to still greater confusion than now exists. The whole subject of the natives is so indissolubly intertwined with the general administration of the Colony, and the interests of the two races meet in so many points, that the whole government must be arranged with a view to an impartial management of affairs with reference to both races; and the mistake, in my opinion was, not that there was not sufficient responsibility, but that in a state of society in which a greater amount of authority was required on the part of the Home Government, that system of responsible government was allowed to

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be established which deprived the Government at home of the authority which it ought to have exercised.

2636. Are you aware that the colonists take a view of the responsibility of the governor and of the Home Government, with respect to the native war, entirely opposite to that which you have stated?—I think it very possible, and I think it is perfectly clear that the present system is a bad one. You cannot divide the government; you must have one government for both races, and for the whole affairs of the Colony. I think, so long as the colonists expect us to have the burden of defending them, the Crown ought to have, through its officers, such an amount of authority as will insure the executive business of the Colony being transacted in such a manner as to guard against wars. I am confirmed in this, by observing that up to 1854 all the annual reports describe the best feeling existing among the natives with perfect confidence towards the Government, and the rapid progress of civilization; but that from the moment what is called responsible government came into operation, the native king movement arose out of that dissatisfaction which led to the present state of things.

2637. *Chairman.*] Your Lordship's view is, that responsibility should follow the power?—Certainly.

2638. And that if the Government of New Zealand claims to itself the power of dealing with this matter a corresponding degree of responsibility should follow?—They should not look for British troops to support a policy which they direct.

2639. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In the present state of things, supposing it to be impossible to retrace those steps that have been taken, should you be in favour of maintaining that small degree of Imperial power over native policy which is retained in the governor's hands, or would you be inclined to go farther and to hand over the entire control of native affairs to the colonial authorities, at the same time requiring them to contribute more largely than they have hitherto done, to the cost of hostilities which had grown out of their policy?—It is in vain to require them to contribute; I am persuaded that it is out of their power to contribute largely to the expenses. Any change of the kind you contemplate, it is impossible to give an opinion upon.

2640. Supposing it is practically impossible to obtain from New Zealand, in the present stage of its existence, any considerable contribution towards the cost of its defences, would you be inclined to maintain, and if possible, increase and strengthen, the degree of power over native policy, which the Imperial Government has reserved to itself?—Not only over the native policy, but over the general policy of the government of the island.

Lunæ, 13° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Fortescue.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Baxter.	General Peel.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Stanley.
Lord Robert Cecil.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Sir *Stuart Donaldson*, called in; and Examined.

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2641. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you were for many years a Member of the Legislature of New South Wales?—Upwards of 11 years.

2642. During a part of that time, I think, you held high office?—I held the office of Colonial Secretary in the first responsible Ministry, and subsequently I was Colonial Treasurer and Vice-President of the Executive Council.

2643. Were you in office at Sydney at the time that Sir William Denison's despatch of 1857, proposing contributions by that Colony towards the cost of the defences, arrived?—I was then Colonial Treasurer, and member of the Ministry.

2644. At that time, what was the actual footing upon which the Colony was in regard to payments of its defences?—Prior to 1856, I think, the whole of the military expenditure had been borne by the mother country, and, I think, about 1855 or 1856, it was suggested from home, and, in fact, was resolved by the home Government, that the Colony of New South Wales, and, I believe, Victoria also, should only be allowed two companies for the entire defence of the Colony, to be paid for by the home Government; and it was suggested in despatches that the Colony must bear any further expense for military defence if they chose to have more than two companies. Sir William Denison, then Governor General, laid before his Executive Council, of which I was a member, a proposal to this effect, that the expense for the military protection of the Colony, so far as the employment of land forces was concerned, should be borne, one moiety by the home Government and one moiety by the Colony, the Colony reserving, I think I am correct in saying, the right to name the amount of military forces they require. That was the general purport of the despatch. That, I believe, was acceded to by the home Government, and carried into effect. At the same time, it was proposed by the Executive Government of New South Wales that the cost of erecting and arming forts to be built for the defence of Sydney harbour should be borne by the Colony, and that a company of artillery should be sent to the Colony, and paid entirely at the expense of the Colony. That we thought a very liberal proposal at the time, and it was acceded to; the company of artillery arrived in due course, and within my recollection, at the time I was in the Government, a sum exceeding 65,000 *l.* was disbursed by the Colony upon the forts, and a considerable further sum was in course of disbursement for the armament of those forts.

2645. The whole of the cost of the fortifications created for the defence of Sydney Harbour have been defrayed by the Colony?—The whole.

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2646. And the Colony has also contributed one-half of the pay to the crews of the men-of-war which arrived in the ports of New South Wales?—Not exactly; a colonial allowance was made by the Government of New South Wales, while the ships were in harbour, and I think the same was done in Victoria.

2647. A good deal of evidence has been given with regard to that extra pay. Can you tell us how that originated in the Australian Colonies?—It originated shortly after the gold discoveries in 1852; an increase of pay was given to all the civil servants of the government and as an example of that, I may mention that the salary of the Governor General was raised from 5,000 *l.* to 7,000 *l.* a year; there was a general increase in the salary of the civil servants of 25 to 50 per cent., and at that time it was suggested that as the soldiers received a colonial allowance, it seemed unjust that the Navy should not receive some additional pay, partly on account of the enormous expense to which every one was put by the increase in the value of food, and partly to equalise the colonial allowances between the Army and the Navy.

2648. Can you inform the Committee whether the Colony of Victoria adopted the same practice in regard to the system for payment of its defences as the Colony of New South Wales?—I believe very much the same; they paid for the erection of their fortifications, and also one-half of the military pay, and I believe the whole of the staff. The staff was removed, I believe, in 1854 from New South Wales to Victoria, and Victoria took upon itself the payment of the whole of the staff.

2649. Apart from any disputes or questions which may have arisen in consequence of the removal of troops, and the pay of those troops during the time they were removed to other Colonies, with respect to which some evidence has been given before this Committee, do you consider that the arrangement generally has been attended with satisfactory results to the Colony?—I think so.

2650. You do not think that it has produced any feeling of disaffection or alienation?—I am sure it has not; the only difference of opinion which has arisen since that arrangement was made, was by the extreme democratic party advocating the withdrawal of the troops altogether.

2651. No disaffection has arisen so far as the pecuniary arrangements have gone?—I believe not; it was in the power of the Legislature to have recalled that arrangement if they had chosen, but they have not recalled it; for one year I believe there was a refusal to vote the Naval Estimates, because it was thought that the service done to the colony of New South Wales by the Navy was very small; but the sum has since been re-voted, I believe.

2652. Do you think that the Australian Colonies may be taken as having the will as well as the power to make considerable contributions towards their defences?—I believe that New South Wales and Victoria have; but I think that throughout the Australian Colonies there is a strong feeling that the exterior defences should not be charged to them.

2653. Do you say that the claim of those Colonies in respect of their defences mainly rests upon the perils in which they may be involved by the conflicts of England with foreign powers?—Yes; I think that principle is very generally accepted in the Colonies, that as they are not free agents with regard to European complications, they ought not to be left in a state of undefence, in case some enemy of the mother country should take advantage of their defenceless situation and invade them or bombard their towns; and that so long as the mother country is liable to be involved in European wars, and so long as enemies from without may do damage to the Colonial interests, it is felt that England is bound to protect the Colonies at all events on the seaboard. The question of military defence is rather more complicated in its nature.

2654. With regard to any purposes of internal police, or matters not belonging to external aggression, the Colonies are, you think, both able and willing to undertake their own protection?—I should say so at Victoria and New South Wales; but, when speaking of Colonies in which there are powerful native tribes, that does not hold good for a moment.

2655. Have you any knowledge of Tasmania?—Yes; I have been nearly all over Tasmania.

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2656. It appears that hitherto Tasmania has not contributed anything towards its defences?—I believe not.

2657. Do you think that now Tasmania is in a position to be able to contribute something towards its defences?—I think that Tasmania stands in a different position to New South Wales and Victoria; it is an island not capable of extension, and has very recently been a convict station. New South Wales, no doubt, was at one time a penal settlement, but not so recently, and I think that reasons may be given why military defences should be continued for some time longer in Tasmania.

2658. I suppose that Tasmania has derived considerable pecuniary advantage from the commissariat expenditure?—No doubt; all convict colonies do so at first.

2659. Do you know what is the revenue of Tasmania?—I cannot say from memory.

2660. Some evidence has been given as to the temporary withdrawal of forces from New South Wales; have you any recollection of the circumstances connected with that?—That, I think, must have occurred since I left the Colony; at the outbreak of the New Zealand war, while I was in the Colony, at the time of the Indian Mutiny, 1858, there was a desire expressed by the Governor General to remove to India the company of artillery with their field guns, and to make a contribution, in fact, out of colonial funds by paying for 100 horses, but the Legislature, by a large majority, objected to the removal of that company; in the first place they had paid the whole of the pay for those men, and also the expense of their deportation, and there certainly was a kind of understanding that those particular soldiers were to remain in the Colony, and without them the forts, which we had built at our own expense, would have been altogether denuded of protection. We had not a drilled body of artillery in the Colony, and this company was brought out there to defend, as far as they possibly could, the fortifications, and afterwards to act as a kind of normal class, or as a nucleus for instructing such colonists as might become artillerymen to man the other forts. The Colony was of opinion, notwithstanding the great demand which the home Government then had for troops, that they could not afford, after having brought those men out, to part with them. In the same year the 77th Regiment was removed entirely to India without objection on the part of the Colony.

2661. So far as your knowledge goes of the state of feeling in New South Wales, has there been considerable apprehension in consequence of the strength of the French naval force in New Caledonia?—Yes; I think there is a strong feeling that so long as the French are allowed to acquire colonies so as to form a cordon round Australia, England should possess a constant naval force of considerable strength, so as to prevent the possibility of the French landing upon the coast or destroying our ships.

2662. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you not think that the discovery and use now made of steam navigation would be of great advantage to this country, and a great impediment to other countries in all operations of that kind?—Undoubtedly.

2663. The French have no depôts for coals?—They have in New Caledonia; and, as long as they are allowed to do so, can draw any amount of coal from Australia.

2664. During the war their operations would be paralysed for want of coal?—To a great extent, except so far as regards the depôts which they may have formed.

2665. The circumstances under which you would have apprehended danger from foreign ships of war in former days are now very much altered?—To the extent that an English steam fleet should be more powerful than the French in those seas.

2666. Must it not always be more powerful from the advantage which the English have in maintaining depôts of coal everywhere?—Yes; there are coal mines in Australia which would supply our ships to any extent, but there is no reason why the French should not accumulate any amount of coals they please.

2667. Do you think it likely that the French would go to great expense in accumulating stores of coal with a distant view of hostilities?—Their Colonies extend from New Caledonia to Tahiti, and I think they would desire to keep a steam fleet there ready for action.

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2668. As we should have in the event of any such war a marked superiority in naval means, could we not take, and would it not be better to take, measures at once to arrest the naval power of France by destroying those depôts of coal, rather than by keeping a large fleet in Australia?—That is a military question which I would rather not enter into. We might, no doubt, take all their Colonies from them as we have done before, but the Australian Colonies would in the meantime, if there was not sufficient force to protect them, suffer in a short time from the outbreak of a war.

2669. Do you know anything of the present state of the French naval force in those seas?—From public report only.

2670. Is it considerable?—It is considerable; the last time I heard there were five powerful steam and sailing vessels at New Caledonia, and as many more at Tahiti.

2671. Is there a larger force than we have there?—Larger considerably than the force we have at the Australian stations. The objection we had to paying the batta to the naval force was, that we were frequently left for months together without a single ship in Sydney harbour.

2672. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Sydney, I believe, is not liable to bombardment?—It is within three miles of the sea; it was a disputed point whether the forts should be at the "Heads," or whether we should keep our defences near to the cove at Sydney, and the preponderance of evidence, backed by the opinion of Sir William Denison, an engineer of high rank, went to establish the propriety of defending the upper harbour, leaving the heads unprotected, although Colonel Gordon, also an officer of high rank, advised for fortifications, which were actually commenced at the heads; but it was found that to keep those forts up in sufficient strength to annihilate a fleet coming in would be so enormous that it could not be done, and it was also thought that ships, rushing in in the night, might get out of the way of the heads where the fortifications were, and bombard our town at leisure, and, therefore, the forts were put up in the harbour. By a cross fire it was found that they would command the anchorage for about four miles from the heads. That was the best plan. If forts had been built at the heads, it was found that a vessel might take shelter in what is called "Garden" Island, and bombard the town with success.

2673. *Chairman.*] Has your attention been called to a correspondence between Sir William Denison and the Colonial Office, on the subject of the military defence of New South Wales?—Only in a general way.

2674. I hold in my hands a minute of Sir William Denison on the organization of the military force required for the defence of the Australian Colonies, under date the 16th April, 1860, and in that it is suggested that some such arrangement as this should be made:—"That a regiment of Australian rifles, consisting of two battalions, would furnish a force which, when supplemented with a few companies of artillery, would be sufficient for the defence of all the Australian Colonies; for, when the railroads now in contemplation are completed, facilities will be afforded for concentrating a very large proportion of the force either at Melbourne or Sydney, as may be required, and the means of moving men from Melbourne to Tasmania, or elsewhere, are always in readiness." From your knowledge of the Colony, what is your opinion in regard to such a plan as that?—I should say that for the next 20 years it is perfectly chimerical; the railway between Sydney and Melbourne cannot by any possibility be finished in 20 years; nor even approach within 200 or 300 miles of completion; so that the idea of moving men from Victoria to Sydney by land, I consider quite utopian.

2675. Do you think that there is any other mode by which the defence of these Colonies might be combined; or must their defences be considered separately?—They must be considered separately; and no doubt the defence will lie in Her Majesty's navy.

2676. You look mainly to that as a source of defence?—I do.

2677. If the troops were withdrawn, do you think that the Australian Colonies would be in danger, if they were defended by a naval power?—I do not think there need be much apprehension from European powers seeking to invade or bombard the towns; but I think it desirable, considering the relationship between the Colony and the mother country, that the mother country should maintain a nucleus force in our principal colonies.

2678. You

2678. You look upon that as a means of aiding in the formation of a local corps?—It would form a most material aid in the formation of local corps or in their organization, and in assisting in their drilling and enabling them to be brigaded with troops, who know how to go through brigade movements, and as a nucleus and centre, in case of being called into the field.

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2679. Evidence has been given of volunteer movements in New South Wales; should you say, that in a short space of time we may hope that there may be the materials of defence so far as men are concerned, provided there is that nucleus which you speak of?—Yes. I have this morning received letters from two of the principal Colonies, New South Wales and Victoria, stating that in New South Wales there is an organised force of upwards of 1,500 men who may be considered as fit for action, and that there is in Victoria a force of between 4,000 and 5,000 men; and I think that if there were a nucleus of disciplined troops, they would be much assisted in time of war by the good feeling of the colonists themselves in the formation of a local corps.

2680. You think that, numerically speaking, we may look mainly to the colonists themselves for their defence, provided they have a nucleus of disciplined troops?—I think so, if properly aided by the naval force from without.

2681. Have you any knowledge of New Zealand?—I have, of course, heard a great deal of New Zealand for the last twenty years, but I have never been there.

2682. Mr. *Fortescue.*] When you say that you look to the local corps as an available means of defence, what species of corps do you mean? Do you mean volunteer corps, such as are now in formation in the Australian Colonies and in England, or do you mean militia, or a regular embodied local corps of the character of the Canadian Rifles?—I was at the time alluding more particularly to a volunteer force; no Militia Bill has been introduced into New South Wales, although it has been spoken of. I believe the time may come when a militia may succeed in both the Colonies, when the population becomes greater. There are a number of cases for which a local force will be necessary, arising from the peculiar political state of the country; the question becomes a nice one between the police duties of the military body and their military duties; I would not wish to confuse the two.

2683. What do you think of the possibility of forming a regular permanent local military corps raised in the Australian Colonies?—I think by-and-by it is possible, but not at this moment; there is not a sufficient number of people whose avocation would allow of it, or who have time to give to it.

2684. *Chairman.*] Although you do not think that, at the present time, there are materials for the formation of a colonial corps entirely for the defence of New South Wales, do you think we may reasonably look to the time shortly when even the number of Imperial troops now in the Colony may be reduced?—I think that the number now in the Colony is so small that you can hardly hope to reduce it; taking the year 1858 as a criterion, after the removal of the 77th Regiment to India, I do not think that you could reduce the number very much; and I think that if the Colony pays one-half, the home Government cannot complain. The staff has been done away with; but I think that a whole regiment in Victoria, and half a regiment in New South Wales, is not too much.

2685. Lord *Stanley.*] What guarantee is there for that arrangement by which the Colony is to pay one-half being retained?—Only the annual vote of the Legislature; but the good faith of the Colony must be taken to be good for something, and no doubt a desire to adhere to arrangements made by predecessors must be taken for something. The vote, however, must be given every year, or else the home Government will, no doubt, withdraw the troops. If the democratic party should become sufficiently powerful to refuse the supply, which is the pay of these men, it would amount to a declaration that they want no troops, and the Queen would then, I presume, withdraw them.

2686. General *Peel.*] You have said that there was an understanding entered into with the company of artillery that they were to remain in Sydney; who were the parties to that understanding?—I may have expressed myself unguardedly if I said that there was an understanding; I said that the local Governor, who arranged with the home Government for the transport of the company of artillery, gave the War Office to understand that those men would be permanently

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nently settled in the Colony, if it pleased the Government, and for that reason the men brought their families with them.

2687. The same company?—The same company.

2688. That, you say, was between the War Office and the Colony?—Between the local Governor and the Colonial Office here, which would, no doubt, correspond with the War Office; I am not sure what were the details of the correspondence. We wrote for a company of artillery, it was granted, and on the understanding that it was to remain; but it has been removed to New Zealand.

2689. Are you not aware, that no company is sent anywhere without being liable to be relieved?—No doubt; and that company of artillery has been removed with the consent of the Colony. The Colonial Legislature consented to their going, although they were paying them, and had also been at the expense of barracks which were built for them. When I said that there was an understanding, I meant that the intention of the Colonial Government was to get a company of artillery, which would form a nucleus for the defence of our forts, and be permanently established there.

2690. Mr. *Marsh.*] You say that the men looked forward to settling there?—Yes; and I know that great dissatisfaction was expressed when it was reported that they were to be removed to India.

2691. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that the Colonial Government has called upon the Home Government to refund the cost of transport from England to Sydney of the company of artillery, and that that application has been complied with?—Then it must be in consequence of the removal of the troops to New Zealand, contrary to the understanding with us.

2692. Mr. *Marsh.*] Are the troops in New South Wales all concentrated at Sydney?—There is a guard at Newcastle, which is 66 miles north of Sydney; some small portion of the troops may be at Paramatta, but I believe that the bulk is at Sydney.

2693. Are they an efficient protection for any of the other places?—No; I think there is only a corporal's guard at Newcastle.

2694. For the protection of the coast you must rely upon the naval protection?—Entirely.

2695. Do you know whether the French have a large convict establishment at New Caledonia?—I believe they have.

2696. You have been asked, whether they would not have difficulties with regard to coal; could they not burn wood and steam to Sydney?—They could do so; but I have not the least doubt that they have large depôts of coal at New Caledonia; they require it for their steam navy in those seas.

2697. With regard to Tasmania, I think you say that more troops are required there on account of its having recently ceased to be a convict establishment?—I said it might be thought so.

2698. Are you aware that there are still many bad characters in Tasmania?—Yes.

2699. Do you think it requisite to keep any extra troops there on that account?—My own opinion is, that it would not be necessary; I think that the police of the island would be sufficient to preserve order. When the Colony was a convict establishment, undoubtedly the Home Government was bound to find convict guards to the ships which took them out, and the depôts where the prisoners were kept, but now that transportation has ceased, I do not think that troops can be considered to act as police in any way, although a guard is sent to what is called Cockatoo Island.

2700. You do not think that extra troops are required in Van Diemen's Land?—No.

2701. Lord *Stanley,*] If Van Diemen's Land suffers some inconvenience from the aggregation of bad characters, has it not gained on the other hand in the making of roads, and the construction of public works?—Undoubtedly.

2702. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you think that it has gained much by the construction of roads?—Much more than New South Wales; Van Diemen's Land, I believe, has always been kept, even since it ceased to be a convict establishment, in the most perfect state of repair, whilst in New South Wales the convict labour was confined to a very small portion of the land.

2703. Do you know that the colonists of Tasmania used to give 6*d.* a day to every convict who worked on the roads?—I do not know that.

2704. You have been in South America?—Yes.

2705. You are aware that a considerable fleet is kept up there to protect our commerce?—I am.

2706. Supposing that the Colony of Australia were not in the hands of English settlers, and did not belong to England but to some foreign state, such as the South American States, do you think it would require more or less naval protection than it does now?—The question has two or three bearings; the naval protection on the coast of a foreign country, must be simply there as a defence of a floating commerce; the naval protection of a Colony in which there is enormous wealth on the shore which is British property, should be of a more extensive kind. If New South Wales were foreign to England, the land force would be much less; it is an undoubted fact that by far the larger amount of property on the shore and floating between the Colony and Great Britain is British property. It is the result of the employment of British capital.

2707. Is not that very much the case in South America?—Not on the shore. The very capital of our banks, amounting at this time to several millions of coin, may be said to be almost exclusively British property. That cannot be said to be the case in South America.

2708. Mr. *Childers.*] Do you think that the Colony, therefore, requires more protection?—It is entitled to more naval protection.

2709. Mr. *Marsh.*] On the ground that a very large portion of the property on the shore is strictly English property?—Yes.

2710. Whereas, in the other case, only ships and cargo would be English property?—Yes.

2711. Mr. *Childers.*] At the present time the arrangement with New South Wales is, that the Colonies shall pay the colonial allowances of the four companies there and of the artillery?—Yes.

2712. And the Imperial pay of the artillery also?—Yes.

2713. Has the Colony ever paid any part of the Imperial pay of the troops of the line?—Yes, they pay half the Imperial pay of the four companies which the Home Government sends.

2714. Has New South Wales any excess upon the number of troops allowed by the Home Government?—I think there has been a slight excess.

2715. There has been a company of artillery in excess?—Yes, no doubt, and the expense of their coming out was paid also by the Colony; the cost of erecting the barracks, and every other expense since they have been there.

2716. Is there any probability of the contribution being made part of a permanent act of the legislature of New South Wales?—I have some doubts of that; I think it will be continued by an annual vote of the parliament.

2717. You doubt the prudence of the Imperial Government applying to the Colonial legislature to make that a permanent provision?—I should doubt the legislature passing a bill to that effect. I do not think it necessary, because the course of the Home Government is so clear; if the payment agreed to be made is not made to the Imperial Government, they would have the right to withdraw the troops.

2718. You think there had better be an arrangement from year to year?—I think so.

2719. New South Wales bears no proportion of the colonial allowance to the staff, I think?—Only such portions as are resident at Sydney; I believe only a major of brigade.

2720. The head quarter staff?—It pays no portion, I believe, of the head quarter staff.

2721. Has New South Wales borne any portion of the charge for the navy on the coast?—Not of the Imperial pay.

2722. Has New South Wales any frigate of its own?—No.

2723. Nothing analogous to the "Victoria" at Victoria or Melbourne?—Nothing analogous to the "Victoria"* at Melbourne.

2724. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that British troops should only be kept in Tasmania for purposes of defence against an external enemy?—I think they should be kept there, for the same reason that they should be kept in New South Wales and Victoria, as a nucleus for the defence of the Colony, or to be used as a land force, where they may be called upon to act.

2725. Is there any reason, to your mind valid and sufficient, why that Colony should not pay a proportion of the military expenses?—I think that is involved in

* N.B.—The "Victoria" is a local man-of-war brig, built and paid for by the Colony of Victoria.

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in the question of a rule being laid down for all Colonies to contribute to their internal defence. I do not think that any general rule would hold good, but that the circumstances of each Colony must be taken into consideration. I take it that there are many Colonies which are not able to contribute, and Tasmania is one of those.

2726. Do you think that Tasmania is not rich enough to pay any portion whatever of its military expenses?—I do not go so far as that. If it were left to them to say what troops they would have, they would in all probability say very few; and then it would become a question whether it was policy in the Imperial Government to denude the Colony altogether of troops. I question whether a negotiation of that sort would be worth entering into; it would be a kind of cheeseparing arrangement altogether, because they would afford to pay a small portion only.

2727. I do not speak of any rigid rule; but I ask you, do you not think it fair and proper, if there is no reason why Tasmania should require troops for internal purposes, that she should pay a certain proportion towards her defences?—It seems to be so, on the face of it; but I think that involves an important question, with reference to the Imperial policy.

2728. You are not prepared to say, that the Imperial Government ought to be governed by the willingness of the Colony to pay?—It should be governed by grand principles and conclusions of policy, with regard to its Colonies, as to what force it would maintain for the protection of those Colonies. Having determined that, I think if the Colony is able to pay it should contribute; but then other questions must be taken into consideration, arising from external circumstances of a peculiar kind; because, for instance, in the case of New Zealand, the recent war was occasioned by the proceedings of the Home Government; it would be impossible to lay down any general rule.

2729. You do not consider that Tasmania is unable or unwilling to pay?—I do not say that she is unwilling.

2730. You say, that the extreme democratic party in New South Wales are opposed to the maintenance of any troops at all?—Yes. There has been a small party in New South Wales and Victoria, whose cry has been, for some years past, to "cut the painter," as the vulgar phrase goes; or to separate the Colony from the mother country; and they would rather have no troops at all, as they would consider that a step in that direction.

2731. It is not because they object to pay any portion of the expenses, but because they advocate a separation?—I think so. There is a very small party with whom that has been the cry for some time past.

2732. The general sentiment is, that there should be a certain number of British troops there?—Yes; and that is evidenced by the most popular legislature always voting the money.

2733. Did you hear the evidence of Captain Clark?—I did not.

2734. He recommended the substitution of an artillery force?—I think that is a military question, upon which Captain Clark would be better able to form an opinion than myself.

2735. With reference to the naval defences of Sydney, you say you think that the French force in those seas is at present much superior to our own?—I believe it is.

2736. But you do not say that the people of Sydney are seriously frightened by the French settlement at New Caledonia?—Only when there has been a probability of a war with France; they were so far alarmed at the news at the commencement of the war in Italy, that they thought it possible that England and France might be ranged on opposite sides.

2737. You do not, I suppose, advocate the maintenance of a large force to watch the force in New Caledonia?—I think that the general policy of Great Britain should be to keep, in every sea in which she has possessions, a force to balance the force which the French may have in that sea.

2738. You think that the British force in the Australian seas ought to be there for that purpose?—For that purpose, as long as the French keep a large force in New Caledonia.

2739. In the event of a war between England and France, or any other European power, do you think that the few British soldiers in New South Wales and Victoria would be of the slightest value for external defences?—Perhaps not; but for a descent upon the coast they would be of great value.

2740. Which descent is not probable so long as we maintain our naval superiority?

superiority?—Which descent is not probable so long as we maintain our naval superiority.

2741. If our force in those seas was decidedly superior to the navies of other powers, you think that there would be no use in our keeping soldiers in the colony for external defence?—Save and except for other Imperial reasons, it would not be necessary.

2742. You advocate, to some extent, the retention of British troops in New South Wales and Victoria, simply as forming a local military force?—Partly for that purpose, and partly that there may be some value attached to the maintenance of a force for what you may call the dignity of the Government, or the maintenance of the power of the Executive; beyond that, I think that the naval force may be relied on.

2743. You think that the colony would be much better pleased by an increase in our naval force, than by our keeping a considerable military force there?—I do.

2744. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You are aware that, in South Australia and Queensland, the imperial quota of troops maintained at imperial cost is only a single company. Supposing the same imperial quota were assigned to Tasmania, do you think that the colony would be inclined to pay for any troops beyond that?—I do not.

2745. Supposing the imperial quota to Melbourne and Sydney were reduced to, we will say, two companies in each Colony, what course would, in your opinion, be taken by the Colonial Government?—It is difficult to say; when it was thought that four companies were sufficient, they were willing to pay their share of the four companies in Sydney and in Victoria. If the Home Government were to fix the quota, it is very hard to foresee what they would do. There is a willingness, on the part of the Colony, to fall in with the wishes of the Home Government. The 77th regiment was sent the instant it was demanded, and the only objection I have heard was to the removal of artillery, because the Colony had paid for their deportation. I take it, that there would be a strong feeling that the navy ought to be increased.

2746. Assuming that the Home Government were to say that they conceived that New South Wales was not exposed to any great foreign danger, and that the navy was the best protection for the Colony, and would be maintained at a fair strength, and that for those reasons the number of imperial troops maintained at imperial cost at Sydney would be reduced to what might be called a guard of honour for the Governor, say two companies, would that cause any dissatisfaction?—I think it would amongst a very respectable class of colonists.

2747. Do you think that the maintenance of even a small number of British troops in the Australian Colonies tends to maintain the feeling of imperial connexion?—I do.

2748. So that you would prefer the assistance of the mother country being given in the shape of imperial troops, however small the numbers, to that assistance being given in the shape of money, as a sort of rate in aid, towards a local force?—Most unquestionably; it is very important to have a few of Her Majesty's troops on the spot.

2749. Are you confirmed in that opinion by finding that the small party in the Colony which is opposed to imperial connexion thinks to promote its views by an entire withdrawal of imperial troops?—I am.

2750. You say that there is little or no danger of a descent by an enemy upon a port like Sydney, provided the mother country maintains the command of the sea. Would it not be quite possible that, whilst the mother country maintained the general command of the sea, her preponderance at any particular spot might be wanting for a certain time, but still long enough to enable an enemy to inflict great damage upon Sydney?—It was certainly thought, until the fortifications were put up, that even a Paul Jones in a single ship might have laid the city under contribution; but it is considered that if we had a moderate land force, and a sufficient military force, aided by this company of artillery, which we are willing to pay for, no sudden surprise could take place. Undoubtedly, an overwhelming force with a fleet, when our own Navy was away from the coast, might inflict great damage. The Colony, however, does not suppose that the Home Government would so far neglect its Colonies as to allow a fleet to come in there.

2751. To that extent you think it necessary by some means or other to possess the means of defence against an external enemy?—Yes, I do.

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2752. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] There is no danger, is there, on any other part of the coast, except the capital?—I do not think that any nation would attempt to land a force on any other point; there would be nothing to gain.

2753. You know the other capitals very well?—Yes.

2754. They are all easily defended by fortifications, are they not?—I think they are; there are local advantages which are capable of being so added to by fortifications that they would seem to be easily defensible.

2755. Adelaide is out of reach of bombardment, I believe?—Adelaide is several miles up a shallow river.

2756. And Launceston?—Launceston is 40 miles away from the sea.

2757. Melbourne, also, is accessible through a very small passage only?—No doubt; but Williamstown would be open to fire from Hodson's Bay.

2758. Mr. *Marsh.*] Could not Melbourne be bombarded from Williamstown?—Yes, with the new guns, I dare say; it is possible; it is two miles off.

2759. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] There is a local volunteer corps, is there not?—Yes; there are some volunteers, and we relied upon the company of artillery to get up our local force of artillery.

2760. In case of any imminent danger, there would be the addition of the local force?—Yes; but the use of the local corps of artillery would be principally in the management of our great guns.

2761. For defending your fortifications, regulars, who are not artillerymen, are not of much use?—No.

2762. The use of regulars is principally for the purpose of forming a nucleus for a local corps of volunteers?—I think so.

2763. Mr. *Adderley.*] Is it not possible for New South Wales to form a nucleus for itself?—I have already stated that there are about 1,500 volunteers in New South Wales, but they are not of much use without regular troops to act with them.

2764. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think it possible for New South Wales to improvise troops of the character of those of our best regiments of the line?—Certainly not.

2765. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that in the course of time they would get a body of troops equal to our regiments of the line?—It is not in the nature of things that they should do so within the next 50 years, and then I think it doubtful; there is a great difficulty with the high price of labour, everyone is so independent.

2766. If they had to pay for the defence of their Colony, you think that they would still have to hire troops from England?—They would be very valuable at all times.

2767. Do you think that if they had to undertake the entire cost of their defence, they would still hire troops from England?—Not if separated from the mother country.

2768. If they had to pay the entire cost of their defences, you think that they would still have troops from England?—I cannot conceive such a thing as that, unless England threw off the colonies entirely. I have already said that there is a small party in the Colony which is desirous of getting rid of English troops, because they think that will tend to an entire separation of the Colony from the mother country.

2769. Are those men who have a taste for a reform in the government?—Yes, according to their own notions of reform.

2770. Is the amount of wages, which is considered such an impediment to recruiting, so much larger than in our manufacturing districts?—Undoubtedly; a shepherd in New South Wales gets, at this present time, from 35*l.* to 55*l.* a year, with a full ration of bread, flour, fire and lodging, tea and sugar, and as much meat as he can eat; 10 pounds of meat a week, each man. I pay that to many men at this moment.

2771. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware of an attempt that was made to recruit in Victoria 300 or 400 men for a regiment of the line?—I am not aware of that.

2772. And that it failed?—I am sure it would fail.

2773. Mr. *Adderley.*] As I understand, the wealth of the Colony is such that they would have no difficulty in hiring troops from England?—I think if that were rendered necessary by the mother country declining to defend her colonies, they would do so.

2774. *Chairman.*]

2774. *Chairman.*] By a return which has been presented to this Committee, I observe that there were about 10,000 volunteers in the three Colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. Do you know to what extent attendance is given at drill by those volunteers?—I recollect the volunteer movement in 1853 and 1854, and, as it may be supposed, the energy was greater at first than when the war ceased.

2775. How far may we take it that the numbers given here bear any proportion to those who give up a portion of their time to the defence of their country?—In times of profound peace, I believe that those numbers would be diminished.

2776. Do you think that this would be rather a paper return?—No; I think it is an actual return of the state of things at the moment. It was thought that the outbreak of hostilities in Europe would bring England into complications; but if profound peace were restored to Europe, and a complete feeling of safety came over the Colony, that return would diminish.

2777. Do you think we might infer that, in the case of an apprehension arising in the Colony, there would be as many as are stated in this return, 10,000, ready to defend the country?—They would be ready to take up arms upon an emergency. I think that the feeling is quite loyal and genuine, but in profound peace that feeling would slumber.

2778. In the event of the movement continuing, either in time of peace or in time of war, do you not think that there is reasonable ground to believe that there would be an increased number of individuals ready and willing to defend the Colony?—I think so.

2779. Mr. *Childers.*] Are you aware that the Australian Legislature empowers 10,000 to be admitted?—I am not aware of that, but I think I have heard of it.

2780. Are you aware that the discipline of those volunteers has been favourably reported of?—Yes, I believe so.

2781. And that the artillery practice is said to be the finest known?—I have heard that their artillery practice is very good.

2782. Have you any doubt that the success of the volunteer movement is mostly due to their being brigaded with regular troops?—I think very much so.

2783. Speaking of Tasmania, are you aware that the Colony has called upon the home Government for expenses due in respect of the convict establishment?—I have heard so.

2784. Until that claim has been in some way settled, do you think it likely that they will offer to pay any large contribution?—No; I think they will expect that old account to be settled.

2785. You think that question must be got rid of?—I think so, before you can treat Tasmania upon the same footing as New South Wales and Victoria.

2786. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have those claims been refused?—I believe they are matter of negotiation at present.

2787. Mr. *Marsh.*] You say that the separatist party in Australia is very small?—Very small.

2788. Was the question of separation ever mooted in the Legislative Assembly?—A motion was put on the paper in 1860, and there was immediately a counter motion that it should be burned by the common hangman, or something to that effect.

2789. That Legislature is ultra democratic?—Yes.

2790. Elected by universal suffrage?—By ballot. The Rev. Dr. Lang, who is well known, gave notice of the motion, and he said that his purpose was answered by having it put upon the paper of the Council. It was referred to the Speaker whether it should be put on the paper, but Captain Russell, a representative member, gave notice that it should be swept from the Council room and burned by the common hangman

2791. You have no doubt that the feeling was exceedingly strong?—The feeling was exceedingly strong amongst respectable people.

2792. *Chairman.*] You think that there would be an increased volunteer movement in the case of any emergency, such as a foreign attack?—Yes; I think that the feeling evinced in 1853 and 1860 would be revived whenever any apprehension was felt.

2793. You consider that there should be a certain number of British troops there

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there concentrated as an element in perfecting the organization of the materials in the Colony?—Not only that, but in case of an emergency to lead them, and form a rallying point.

2794. Would you, without desiring to diminish the force, certainly not to withdraw the force altogether, look forward to the time when they may entirely cease to be necessary?—I do not think that the force will ever cease to be necessary so long as the loyalty of the colonists is kept up by measures of conciliation originating from the mother country; it is only by taking steps which would alienate the good feeling of the respectable portion of the community that any strong party can arise desiring separation.

2795. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you not think that the presence of any troops in New South Wales inclines the Colony to lean upon England for its defence?—Not more than is necessary.

2796. The presence of troops there is looked upon as a pledge on the part of England to undertake the defence?—I think that she is bound to defend the Colonies from external aggression.

2797. *Chairman.*] Even if the Colony paid altogether for the troops, do you think it better that there should be a certain number of Imperial troops maintained there?—I do; I think that the duty of the mother country would be the same.

2798. Mr. *Adderley.*] You sympathise with the Colony in that respect, that it is considered a pledge on the part of England to undertake the defence of the Colonies, in case of emergency?—I think that undertaking would exist whether the troops were there or not. If we did not put the Home Government to one farthing expense, the same obligation would, in my opinion, exist.

2799. You would be then undertaking, practically, the defence of your own Colony?—We have shown that the defence does not exist in the troops, but in the naval force.

2800. As far as the English taxpayer pays for those troops, he would be defending New South Wales?—He would be defending his own property.

2801. Is that more so than the property in England may belong to New South Wales?—Possibly so. I should think it very odd if Newcastle and Plymouth were left to defend themselves.

2802. Does not Newcastle take its full share of paying for the troops?—No doubt; but if the policy of England is to hold Colonies, it is her duty to defend them.

2803. The taxpayers of Newcastle have no other country proposing to contribute towards her defences?—Perhaps not.

2804. Are not the Colonies in a different position to any other of the British dominions; from the fact of their having part of their expenses defrayed by the mother country?—No doubt; but they contribute much more liberally to the prosperity of England in proportion to their population.

2805. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You probably think that the taxpayers in Newcastle, and other parts in England, have control over the foreign policy of this country?—Certainly; which we have not; that is one of the causes of the difficulty, that we have no voice in the complications which may bring us under the influence of the quarrel. Newcastle returns Members to Parliament; the Colonies do not.

2806. So that the taxpayers of Sydney may find themselves involved in an European war by the action of the taxpayers of Newcastle?—Precisely; by the proceedings of the Home Government, over which they have no control.

2807. Mr. *Adderley.*] Besides that, you think that Newcastle derives a greater advantage from Australia than from the manufacturing districts in England?—Under the circumstances, peculiar to the Colonies, I say that one million of people in the Australian Colonies contribute very much more to the wealth and prosperity of England than any million of people in the mother country.

2808. Upon that ground you think they have a claim to be defended?—Partly on that ground, and partly from the property being so much British.

2809. *Chairman.*] You say that the defence of the Colonies must mainly depend upon the naval power?—Yes: we look mainly to the naval power.

2810. Do you think it reasonable that the Colonies should be expected to contribute to the cost of the ships of war in the Australian ports?—Not unless they have full control over the ships there, which is incompatible with the

control

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control of the Home Government over the navy. Troops on shore are different, because the Governor General is Commander in Chief.

2811. If they depend mainly upon the naval power, would they not rather contribute towards the cost of that than see it withdrawn?—That is a different question; but I think it is impossible for the Colony to have any control over the navy. The Imperial Government places its troops in the most commanding positions, with a view to the Imperial purposes. If you stationed a ship permanently as a block ship in Sydney harbour, they might be called upon to contribute; but so long as a ship is left under the entire control of the admiral on the station, who does not let her come into the harbour one day perhaps out of one hundred, it does not stand in the same position as soldiers do.

2812. Mr. *Adderley*.] You think that they ought to be called upon to pay for block ships?—If we took block ships, instead of erecting forts, we should pay for them.

2813. Of such a block ship the Colony would undertake the whole cost?—I think so, as they would of a fort.

2814. Mr. *Baring*.] A ship of that class would cease to be a portion of the Imperial force?—It would.

2815. *Chairman*.] In the case of foreign attack, I apprehend that the danger would be a common danger upon all the Australian Colonies?—Yes.

2816. Would not the most effectual mode of protecting them from those dangers be the stationing of a British naval strength in force in those waters, as a common means of defence of those Colonies, keeping the naval force of France, for instance, locked up in their own ports, as was done in the case of the Russian War?—That is a point upon which I could hardly express an opinion. If the argument is adduced, that the Colony should pay for a portion of the navy which defends them, it is manifest that that argument may go to the extent of saying that if you are at war with Russia, the Australian Colonies ought to pay for a portion of the fleet which blockades Cronstadt, and I cannot think that that proposition can be maintained. In a war like that the Imperial measures are taken with a great and grand object, and I do not think that any one would say that Australia ought to pay a portion of the expense of the blockade of Petropaulowski.

2817. Except that you think the presence of a strong British naval force in those waters is an essential ingredient?—Yes.

2818. Mr. *Adderley*.] Do you think it probable that such a Colony as New South Wales would volunteer contributions towards the expense of a general war in which England was engaged?—Possibly they might; but they have very small revenues, and it is not likely that they can do it. When a war costs something like 20 millions a year, it is not likely that a Colony, whose joint revenue is not above five millions a year, can afford to contribute much.

2819. *Chairman*.] Supposing in ordinary times that we kept such a force in the Australian waters as to maintain about 1000 men, and cost about 100,000 *l*. a year, and that the particular vessels should be changed as suited the Government and the convenience of the station, should you think it fair and right that the Colonies, all of which should derive protection from such a force, should contribute?—If kept exclusively as a Colonist force, it might be fair that they should contribute something; but a difficulty would arise as to the proportion that she should contribute. There is no federation of the Australian Colonies, and it is impossible to come to an arrangement amongst them.

2820. Your difficulty is the difficulty of apportioning the sum?—That is one great difficulty.

2821. Mr. *Baring*.] With respect to the payment of a naval force, I understand you to say that the Colonies would not wish to contribute, unless they actually saw the ships?—Yes; and that they should have some control over the ships.

2822. Would not an arrangement of that sort, if it were necessary for the Government at home to withdraw the force, give rise to considerable difficulty between the mother country and the Colony?—Yes; I think that is a difficulty. The Admiralty have a right to remove any fleet they may have, and the Colony find that a great objection to contributing, that they have no means of fixing any ships in the harbour or regulating the period of service which they shall afford.

2823. Any such arrangement for contribution, on the part of the Australian

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Colonies towards the naval defences, might occasion difficulties in the distribution of the general forces in England?—No doubt.

2824. Even in cases where it might occur, that the best defence of the Australian Colonies would be far away from the Australian Colonies?—Yes. It depends upon the country you are at war with.

2825. Mr. *Baxter.*] Has such a proposition ever been made to the Colony?—Not to my knowledge, nor would it be worth the grandeur of the Imperial Government to make such a proposition.

Mr. *Walter Brodie*, called in; and Examined.

Mr. *Walter Brodie.*

2826. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you were, for several years, a Member of the House of Representatives of New Zealand?—For four years.

2827. During what period?—From 1854 to 1858.

2828. What province were you an inhabitant of?—I was settled in the province of Auckland for nearly 20 years.

2829. In the year ending 31st March 1859, I find that the total Imperial strength of the troops in New Zealand, was 1,397, and the Imperial expenditure is given in the return as 112,358 *l.* Can you inform the Committee whether, during that time, there were any volunteer forces in New Zealand?—I believe not.

2830. There was no contribution, in any other way, from local funds, towards the expense of the Colony?—No; there was merely a police force, native and European, which was kept up at great expense.

2831. I suppose you are conversant with the details of the circumstances of the war now going on?—Yes.

2832. Under the most favourable circumstances, how soon do you think it likely that, with safety to the settlers, the force which is now there might be reduced?—I consider from what has lately taken place in the Colony, there must have been a great deal of bad management somewhere, or else one-half or one-fourth of the force would have been sufficient to quell disturbances in the first instance.

2833. Taking the force which is now there, and taking into consideration the present circumstances of the Colony, how long do you think it is likely before we can reasonably expect any diminution of the forces?—I am not aware of the number of troops there.

2834. The number of troops in New Zealand is stated to be 5,354?—If the natives of Waikatto were to rise in a body, the war would very likely continue for some years, in fact until the natives were annihilated.

2835. So far as your judgment goes, do you see your way to an early conclusion of the war?—We have looked forward for the last four mails hoping to hear something very decisive from the seat of war, but no satisfactory news has arrived.

2836. Have you formed any judgment yourself upon it?—After peace is proclaimed I should say it would require a force of 3,000 or 4,000 men in the Colony for two or three years.

2837. Reckoning the Imperial expenditure for 1,379 troops at 112,358 *l.*, we may reasonably expect then, that the force contemplated as necessary in the Colony for three or four years more, will involve an annual expenditure from Imperial sources of about one-half a million a year?—I should not have thought it would come to so much as that.

2838. The number of troops in 1859 being 1,400, and the expenditure in round numbers 112,400 *l.*, 5,000 troops for three or four years would cost surely as much as I have mentioned, namely, about half a million?—Of course it would.

2839. I suppose the Commissariat expenditure in New Zealand has been very large whenever war has been going on?—Very large indeed.

2840. In which of the provinces does the Commissariat expenditure mainly arise?—Up to within the last few months it has been in the province of Auckland; during the time the troops have been brought down to New Plymouth, the head station of the Commissariat Department has been removed there.

2841. I believe there are no troops in Middle Island?—Not any, and never have been. The native population in Middle Island is 3,000, and in the Northern Island it is 53,000; out of that 53,000 there are between 22,000 and 23,000 native adults capable of bearing arms.

2842. Lord *Stanley.*] How do you explain the proportion of those bearing arms being so large with regard to the rest of the population?—I give those figures from the census taken by the Government in 1858; there were 22,000 native adults over 14 years of age, and 11,000 Europeans over 12 years of age. The European adults have, many of them, never had a musket in their hands, but all the aborigines are brought up to arms from childhood for war purposes.

2843. *Chairman.*] You are referring now to the Northern Island?—Exclusively.

2844. Lord *Stanley.*] You say that the total population in the Northern Island is 53,000?—Yes.

2845. One half of them, I presume, would be women?—No; some 20 years ago there was a great deal of infanticide, and the female children were often killed, the males being reserved for fighting.

2846. You give it as your deliberate opinion that out of those 53,000, there are upwards of 20,000 male adults capable of bearing arms?—So the return for 1858 states.

2847. Mr. *Baxter.*] Is the native population of that island decreasing?—Very much.

2848. That disproportion may partly arise from the families being so small?—I should think so; the native population is not half what I can recollect it once to be.

2849. *Chairman.*] Do you know what the European population of Middle Island is?—I should say, about 33,000 or 34,000.

2850. I believe, up to this time, the Middle Island, in consequence of the native population being so small, has had no interest in the native wars?—Very little indeed, excepting that they would prefer seeing peace than war.

2851. Do you know anything of any correspondence between the Home Government and the Colony on the subject of the proportion of payment?—I believe that the colonial minister, Mr. Stafford, agreed, on behalf of the New Zealand colony, to pay 5*l.* a-head for every soldier in the colony since 1854, which, I think, was rather unjust to the colonists, because it was creating a debt of 40,000*l.* or 50,000*l.* by a stroke of his pen; and when it is taken into consideration that we are not allowed to manage our own native affairs, I think it is unjust to call upon us to pay any sum either for arrears or the present war.

2852. Do you say that you are not allowed to manage your own affairs?—We have appealed to the Home Government, and we have been refused the management of the native affairs.

2853. You are alluding probably to the reservation in the Constitution Act with reference to lands?—Partly that.

2854. What else do you allude to?—To the Territorial Rights Bill which we sent home two years ago, after it had passed both houses of the Legislative Assembly, conferring great benefits on the natives; but it was not approved of by Lord Carnarvon. The answer, I think, of Lord Carnarvon was, that it was the intention of the Imperial Government to keep the sole control of native affairs in their own hands, and that they would be responsible for any disturbance with the natives, and pay the naval and military expenses.

2855. Are you aware what proportion that 5*l.* per man would bear to the whole military expenditure per man, in any given year, for the colony?—I have not the slightest idea.

2856. You say you think 5*l.* per man too much for the colony to pay?—I do not think that the colony in its present position, taking into consideration that it is the infant colony of the Crown, should be called upon at present to pay anything. Give us the complete management of the native and land affairs of the colony, and I think that, in the course of time, we shall not require a single soldier in the colony.

2857. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Can you answer for the Parliament of New Zealand in asserting, that if the partial or nominal control over native affairs now retained by the Home Government is given up, the colony would be prepared to pay the whole expense of the Imperial troops?—I think that they would in two or three years after peace is proclaimed, we having the whole and sole control of native affairs and their lands.

2858. The Colony then would be prepared to pay the whole expense of the troops?—I should say so; the Colony being allowed two or three companies.

2859. Do you represent, in so saying, the opinion of the New Zealand ministry

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or the majority of the New Zealand parliament?—I think I state the feeling of the majority of New Zealand colonists, especially in the North Island.

2860. Mr. *Baxter.*] Then in that respect the Colony of New Zealand would be prepared to act more liberally than the Australian Colonies?—We prefer peace with the natives, to war, with a great commissariat expenditure.

2861. Mr. *Fortescue.*] It is the case, is it not, that responsible government is established in New Zealand?—It is to a certain extent, but would be wholly so had we the whole control of the natives and their land affairs.

2862. What control over the revenue of the Colony does the Governor possess?—He has not much control over the revenue of the Colony.

2863. It is the case, is it not, that the revenue is at the disposal of the colonial parliament?—Yes.

2864. Do you think that the Imperial Government can do much without funds?—The Imperial Government obtain whatever funds they require for the imperial government.

2865. It depends upon the colonial parliament, does it not, whether the Governor can obtain any funds for native purposes?—Yes; I think the great fault with the colonists has been, that they have been over liberal with the natives; we are granting them now nearly 20,000*l.* a year for native purposes, when the natives themselves are the richest people and the largest landholders in the Colony. If they want money to build churches or schools, &c., why not allow the natives to sell their land by public auction, or to private parties, and so realise?

2866. Is it not the case that the natives contribute largely to the customs' revenue?—Very largely; but who placed them in such a position? the colonists, and not missionary enterprise.

2867. Is it not the case that the natives are in no way represented in the colonial parliament?—They certainly are not represented in one way; but I do not think that they could be better represented than they are now, because there are those in parliament who take as much interest in the native question as in the European question; the requirements of the natives are never forgotten.

2868. Is it not the case that it is not legally possible for any native to acquire a vote?—I think that a native can acquire a vote just the same as any European; in fact, I know that hundreds of them have voted.

2869. Are you aware that it has lately been decided that nothing but the possession of freehold property will confer a vote, and that no native tenure of land is recognised by your courts?—No.

2870. You are not aware, then, that it has been decided that no native under the present state of the law can acquire a vote?—I am not; why not grant him a title, and give him a vote?

2871. Are you aware that the proclamation of martial law, which was the regular commencement of the present war, was issued with the advice and consent of the Executive Council of New Zealand?—I am not aware that it was.

2872. You are not aware that the steps which led to the present war were taken in Executive Council, and by the advice and consent of the Executive Council?—The Governor did ask the Executive for their advice, but their advice was not given in the way in which it is generally understood to have been given; it was given more as friendly advice, the Executive having no control over the affairs of the natives.

2873. Then I presume you have not referred to the Blue Book, in which are to be found the formal proceedings of the Executive Council on which the proclamation of martial law was issued as an Act of the Executive Council?—I have that which you have above referred to.

2874. Mr. *Adderley.*] As I understand, you think that the control which the English Government retains over native affairs in New Zealand is the sole ground why England should pay for the troops in New Zealand?—Certainly.

2875. If that relation were altered, and the English Government no longer interfered in native affairs, you think that the reason for sending troops to New Zealand would no longer exist?—I think so.

2876. Supposing that course were adopted, what description of force do you think the New Zealand Government would organise?—They have now a force of between 4,000 and 5,000 militiamen and riflemen; the Province of Auckland alone, as appears by the last return, had 1,700 militia and riflemen in two battalions, and 600 cavalry.

2877. Are

2877. Are they a regularly organised and drilled force?—I believe so; in fact, I know that they are; they are under the command of two officers of the army.

2878. Which, in your opinion, would be the best kind of force to deal with the natives, a force such as you have just described, or a force consisting of regular troops of the English army?—I should say a force of militiamen and riflemen.

2879. You think they are better fitted for native war than troops of the regular army of England?—A great deal more so; they know the character of the natives so well that they would be much more willing to follow them into the woods than the military would be, which has already been proved in the present war.

2880. The 20,000*l.* a year now spent in the civilization of the natives of New Zealand would then be paid from the Colonial Exchequer?—From the Colonial Exchequer, as at present.

2881. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you not consider that it is the duty of the Colonial Government to provide the means of enforcing law and order?—Yes.

2882. Are you not aware that in the greater part of the native districts of the Northern Island nothing can be said to exist in the shape of administration or government?—There is very little European law, for the simple reason that there is no force to maintain order; it has been known to the Government that the natives have sold wines and spirits, but they have not had the military force to prevent it. There is, in fact, one law for the white man and another for the native; a chief can imprison a settler for debt, but a settler cannot imprison a chief without the consent of the Governor.

2883. How do you reconcile that statement with what you said just now, that upon the re-establishment of peace you would recommend the withdrawal of the military?—I think that we should be able to manage the natives by ourselves; they would have more confidence in us, and abide by our laws.

2884. You think that they would have more confidence in the Colonial Parliament, in which they are not represented, than they have in the representative of the Crown?—I think they would have; if we managed their affairs, we would give them a title to their lands.

2885. And you think they have?—I think so.

2886. Admitting that in a considerable part of the districts of New Zealand there are none of the appliances of Government, no courts, no magistrates, and no effective police, do you think it possible to introduce anything like government into those native districts without considerable funds, and must not those funds be supplied by the New Zealand Parliament?—Certainly.

2887. Is it your opinion, then, that the sums voted for native purposes by the New Zealand Parliament at present must be largely increased before the native districts can be brought under the general government of the island?—For the purposes you state?

2888. I am speaking of the ordinary purposes of government?—No doubt the expenses would be a great deal more; but when the public knew that we managed our own native affairs, immigration would flow rapidly in, and cause an increase of revenue to meet the extra expenses.

2889. Would it not be necessary to pay magistrates and establish courts to assist the police force, and, in fact, to introduce all the ordinary appliances of Government, if the native districts of New Zealand are not to remain in their same independent position?—A very large sum of money is now spent in supporting a native and European police force.

2890. Is it not the fact, that whatever may now be expended, the native districts of New Zealand are left, in point of fact, without government?—A great many of them.

2891. If, then, law and order, and a recognised government, are to be introduced into the native districts, is it not essential that the Colonial Parliament should provide larger funds than it does now for the purpose?—Yes.

2892. Mr. *Adderley.*] I suppose that the establishment of an effective native government would not necessitate the interference of the English Government?—I do not think that there could well be a native government and an European government in the same Colony.

2893. Mr. *Marsh.*] Supposing that there had not been any troops in New Zealand, and the settlers had been allowed to fight it out in their own way, would the war have been over by this time?—We should never have had a war had

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had we managed the native affairs; the war of 1845 and 1846 was caused by the act of Captain Hobson, and the settlers lost 60,000*l.* or 70,000*l.* by Kororareka being burnt down.

2894. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Then you think that if from the first the settlers of New Zealand had been allowed to deal with the natives according to their pleasure, and the natives on the other hand had been allowed to defend themselves as best they could against the settlers, both races would have been in a more prosperous condition than they are now?—I think so.

2895. And that New Zealand would have advanced in 20 years to its present point of progress?—Well, I think it would, as every war throws the Colony back many years.

2896. Mr. *Adderley.*] How do you think that the settlers would have dealt with the natives?—I think there would have been a far better understanding with the natives than there is with the Imperial Government. The whole cause of this war is in the land question. I was present when the Treaty of Waitangi was brought down for the natives to sign, and the question was put to the natives, through the interpreter, Mr. Clarke, "The Queen wishes to have the pre-emptive right of the sale of your lands; will you allow her to have it?" "Yes," they said, "but supposing anyone will give us more than you, will you allow us to sell it to the white man?" Captain Hobson hesitated a little time, but seeing that the natives were determined, he said that they would, but that was never put into the treaty. The present bitter feeling on the part of the natives is, that they are not allowed to sell it to whom they like, the Crown having acknowledged them to be the owners of the soil.

2897. Mr. *Fortescue.*] I believe you have been for many years a strong advocate of the system of free sale from the natives?—I have, for the benefit of the native and the Colony generally.

2898. You are aware, I suppose, that whenever the government has collected the opinions of those gentlemen in New Zealand who are best acquainted with the affairs of New Zealand, the great preponderance of opinion has been against your opinion?—I believe there has been a majority, but that majority has been produced by the accession of a number of colonists recently arrived.

2899. Are you not aware that the Governor, within the last two years, has taken the opinions of a great many persons, missionaries and others, who have been long settled in the Colony, upon that point?—I am.

2900. And that the great majority of opinions has been against the system of free purchase?—The Governor has been so advised, but I consider that the advice of bishops and missionaries was the worst advice he could obtain in the Colony, which you must be well aware of by the last four or five mails from that Colony.

2901. Are you aware that before the treaty of Waitangi great abuses took place in the sale of land obtained by individual settlers from the natives?—I do not know of any abuse; I know when parties went from New South Wales and bought scores of thousands of acres of land at a very small price, for guns and other articles of merchandise, and when the native said he wanted so and so, he had it in return for his land.

2902. You are aware, I suppose, that the right of pre-emption was reserved to the Crown for the purpose of protecting the natives from undue influences on the part of individual settlers?—I cannot say that I am.

2903. That is notorious, is it not?—I do not think so; I do not know of any case of bloodshed previous to the treaty of Waitangi, which emanated from the sale of the lands.

2904. Were there not sales which had taken place before the establishment of the Government which would not bear investigation and were disallowed?—A great many people who had large claims did not come down from Sydney and put in those claims within the limited period allowed, but the natives, previous to the treaty, had as much right to sell their lands as any one else, or why have the Government granted titles to the early settlers?

2905. *Chairman.*] Do you know anything of Tasmania?—Not much.

2906. Do you know enough of it to form an opinion as to whether it is able to contribute anything towards its defences?—I should say that Tasmania is in a more healthy position than New Zealand, the native population of New Zealand being so very great, whilst the native population of Tasmania consists, I believe, of only six or seven tribes, and they cost the Imperial Government something like 800*l.* or 1,000*l.* a year.

2907. Is

2907. Is Tasmania, in your opinion, able to contribute something?—I should think it ought to. It has been, of course, a penal settlement for many years, and there are a great many freed convicts in the island at the present time; but a great deal of money has been made in the island out of the commissariat expenditure.

2908. Has not a great deal of money been made in Auckland out of the same source?—Not in proportion. I believe that at one time the commissariat expenditure in Tasmania was nearly 1,000*l.* a day.

2909. Do you not think that one great cause of the prosperity of Auckland results from the commissariat expenditure?—I do not think so; no doubt it has been a great advantage.

2910. If Auckland were the seat of Government, would it possess so many advantages as some other provinces?—Auckland is the best position for the seat of Government, because it is in the centre of the native population, and has easy communication between the east and west coasts.

2911. From your experience, do you say that the wars have been economically carried on, or otherwise?—Looking at what little has been done during the last year, I should say that the wars have been very expensively carried on, and with but little judgment.

2912. In what way?—I may mention that some four or five months ago we had a report that there was to be a fight, and General Gold went into the field with about 1,600 men, and 70 or 80 teams of ammunition and stores; upon halting near a bush, he was fired upon, and the troops were withdrawn, and the whole expedition was abandoned; it was afterwards discovered that there were only 30 or 40 natives there to oppose him and his 1,600 men.

2913. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that the Colony, if left to itself, would conduct the wars more economically?—Yes; I do not think they would ever go to war.

2914. *Chairman.*] Do you think that the Colonies are, more or less, likely to involve themselves in war when they know that the home Government pays the bill?—We would rather have no wars than the heaviest commissariat expenditure. In war, a few are benefited; but in peace all thrive, and the Colony flourishes.

2915. Mr. *Marsh.*] I understand you to say that the new colonists are in favour of the old system of land purchase?—Yes.

2916. I need hardly ask you which of the colonists are likely to be the best judges?—The older colonists.

2917. Do you think that in political matters missionaries, however excellent they may be, are the best judges?—Certainly not, quite the contrary; and I think that has been clearly proved in the present war.

2918. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you not think that they are good judges of what the natives wish?—Not more than some of the old settlers; they are good judges when their own interests are at stake.

2919. Are you aware that the home Government have been, over and over again, assured by the highest authorities, that it is the decided wish of the natives to maintain the system of Government land-purchase, and that the contrary view, so much advocated by yourself, has always appeared at least to be held by a small majority of the settlers in New Zealand?—I believe that the information sought by the Governor has been obtained from men of high standing, such as Bishop Selwyn, and others; but I do not consider that they are the proper parties to appeal to. Bishop Selwyn himself states, in one of his letters, that New Zealand was taken possession of for the whole and sole benefit of the natives, and so long as Bishop Selwyn adheres to that opinion I do not think that he is a proper person to give an opinion upon a subject like that.

2920. Has the Colonial ministry recommended to the Home Government the abandonment of the Crown right of pre-emption?—Not perhaps in those words, but in words to the same effect they have. When the Territorial Rights Bill was sent home, it was considered that it would be of great advantage to the natives; but it was not approved of. Lord Carnarvon stated, that so long as the Imperial Government paid the navy and military expenses, they would not allow it to go out of their hands.

2921. That Bill, I believe, did not put an end to the Crown's rights over native land?—No, the Government might go on purchasing as usual.

2922. It only enabled the Government to issue Crown titles for land to natives, which Crown titles, when once possessed by a native, would entitle him to sell to

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any buyer?—Yes; certain lands, I think, were reserved to the children of the natives.

2923. On the whole, you give it as your opinion, speaking, as you suppose, for the colonists of New Zealand, that if the colonists had the power of dealing as they pleased with the natives for land, the Colonial Parliament will then be prepared to undertake the whole expenditure of any forces which may be necessary to keep the natives in order?—I should say they would, if we are allowed two or three companies.

2924. The Colony being allowed two or three companies as an Imperial quota in the same way as is done in the Australian Colonies?—Yes, allowing an extra number of companies, according to our native population.

2925. You believe that in saying so you were giving the opinion of the New Zealand Assembly?—I think I am giving the opinion of experienced colonists, especially of the North Island.

2926. Mr. *Baring.*] I understood you to say, that in your opinion the war was carried on at too great an expense?—At too great an expense from the instance I mentioned.

2927. That was simply the fact of an expedition not having succeeded?—Not having succeeded; they were frightened back by a few guns having been fired at them.

2928. That is your opinion of the military proceedings?—That is the general opinion of the Colony.

2929. Are you a military man?—No.

2930. Have you any military knowledge which you can bring to bear upon the subject of that military expedition?—Certainly not, because I am not a military man.

2931. Have you any suggestions to make in regard to the civil part of the expense?—No; I think that to take out 1,600 men, on the day I referred to, and to do nothing, was a very expensive way of going to work.

2932. Have you any suggestions to make about the expense, except giving your opinion as to the success of that expedition?—I have not.

2933. *Chairman.*] Have you anything to say about stores which are sent out to the Colony?—If the colonists were expected to pay a proportion of the transport, and I think that great alteration ought to be made; only three or four months ago two ships were taken up for Auckland, the "African" and the "Mersey," and the Government sent down to take up 600 or 800 tons freight in those ships, for military stores; there were a great number of wooden forms, and chairs and tables, sent out in those ships, the freight of which alone came to more than those things could be made for in Auckland. If a letter had been sent to Auckland the previous month overland, they could have been made before the "African" and the "Mersey" could have reached Auckland. The charges that were altogether paid must have been something enormous, according to the value of the furniture.

2934. Mr. *Baring.*] How many tons measurement would that be?—I do not know.

2935. Mr. *Marsh.*] The tonnage would be very great, in proportion to the size?—Very great.

2936. General *Peel.*] Was it what is called barrack furniture?—I do not know; I went down to see the stores, but they were blocked up.

2937. How do you know that they consisted of chairs and tables?—I was told of it by my own agent, and if you refer to papers in the War Office you will find what I say is perfectly correct.

2938. When was it?—I think it was in January of this year, or the latter end of December 1860.

2939. Mr. *Baring.*] Have you any other suggestion to make as to the expense connected with the New Zealand expedition?—No; I did not expect to be examined here to-day. I think that they will have to resort to starving the natives out; there is no knowing when the war may terminate; it all depends upon the tribes in the interior.

2940. My question applied simply to the expense?—I think that the Commissariat officer out there is a very careful man; I think he is rather too much so in some things, as he is getting his supplies from Sydney in place of the colonists, and perhaps at not less expense. Under the present circumstances of the war, I should have thought he would have assisted the colonists so long as imposition was not attempted.

Jovis, 16° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Fitzgerald.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Fortescue.
Mr. Baring.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Marsh.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Ellice.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

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2941. *Chairman.*] YOU are Secretary of State for the Colonies?—Yes.

2942. I believe in 1853 you were Secretary of State for War, and also Secretary of State for the Colonies?—Yes.

2943. Having held office before and after the separation of the two departments, should you say that any practical inconvenience has resulted from that separation, so far as the arrangements for the defence of the Colonies are concerned?—I should be unwilling to say that no practical inconvenience had been felt. I think that a great deal was felt at first; but, as generally happens in these matters, things have adjusted themselves to the altered state of circumstances, and I think that the inconvenience to the department is now more than counterbalanced by the advantages to the public generally.

2944. Has your attention been called to the Report of the Departmental Committee on Colonial Defences, which was presented to Parliament last year?—Yes, or rather to the Reports.

2945. In the letter which in fact forms the subject-matter of the reference to that Committee, this principle is laid down by General Peel, "That England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign civilized nations, and (in less proportion) of formidable native tribes, but in no case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should assume the whole of such defence." Do you concur substantially in that opinion of General Peel?—No, I cannot say that I do; I think it is a theory which looks extremely well on paper, but I do not think that it is one which will bear minute examination, or which can be carried into practice.

2946. In the paragraph which follows, General Peel says that he thinks, "that, as a condition of Her Majesty's aid, the Colony should contribute its share by maintaining, at its own expense, a local force, or, if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the imperial garrison;" should you say that that is generally correct?—It is not an easy question to answer in a single sentence, because I differ from the position which is assumed throughout that letter, namely, that one rigid rule can be applied to the whole of the Colonies of the empire. I think that to be an entire fallacy, and therefore I cannot answer it generally. No doubt Colonies ought to contribute in some form or other, generally speaking, to their defence. As regards the question of local force, that is a matter which must be decided according to the exigencies and the circumstances of the different Colonies; I believe a local force is good in some, and very far from good in many others.

2947. Supposing a Colony had the power, financially speaking, of aiding in its own defence, do you think that then it would be safe to lay down the principle that some attempt ought to be made by the Imperial Government to induce such a Colony to make some efforts?—I should say, certainly, that Colonies, properly so called, (and by that, of course, I mean to exclude all Im-

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perial garrisons, unless under certain other peculiar circumstances, such as, we will say, exist upon the coast of Africa), ought to contribute, in some form or other, to their own defence.

2948. It appears from a despatch which has been laid before the Committee, addressed in 1851 by Lord Grey to Lord Elgin, then Governor General of British North America, which despatch conveyed instructions concerning the military arrangements in Canada, that the Imperial garrisons in that Colony were to be reduced to two or three posts considered of importance, Quebec and Kingston being particularly specified; and that the cost of maintaining the barracks and canals then in charge of the Ordnance Department were to be made over to the Canadian Parliament. Can you say whether those arrangements have been since carried out?—Certainly, in the spirit, and almost in the letter, they were carried out by me at the close of the time of my holding the two offices of Secretary of State for the Colonies and Secretary of State for War together. At that time there were four regiments of the line and the Canadian Rifles in Canada. The exigencies of the country being very great, I thought it a good opportunity for carrying into effect those arrangements, having been in private communication with Lord Elgin for some time previous to the breaking out of the war as to the best mode of carrying them out, and inducing the Canadian Government to make their militia an efficient force, which it was not at that time in any sense. When I quitted the Colonial Office, and went to the War Office, the arrangements were still incomplete, but they were completed by Sir George Grey a few months afterwards; those arrangements being, that three out of the four regiments should be withdrawn, leaving only one regiment of the line and the Canadian Rifles holding the posts of Quebec and Kingston. At the same time the detachments were withdrawn from nearly all, if not all, the outposts, and the whole of the Ordnance lands were handed over, after having been roughly valued, to the Canadian Government, upon the distinct understanding that, as a return for that valuable property, they were to maintain a militia force, and to train it annually with a view to the defence of the Colony.

2949. I presume that those instructions of yours were conveyed in the Despatch which has been laid before the Committee, dated August 1854, and addressed to Lieutenant General Rowan, commanding the forces?—I think so; I will not say that that Despatch contains all that was done, because a great deal of the preliminary arrangement passed in private correspondence; but I believe that the official completion of the arrangements was almost entirely carried out by Sir George Grey, and not by myself. As I said before, all the arrangements, so far as official form is concerned, were incomplete when I left the Colonial Office.

2950. I am right, am I not, in saying that the substance of the arrangements which were then carried out was, that two regiments of infantry and three companies of artillery were in that year withdrawn from Canada?—Yes.

2951. And that the force in the Colony was directed to be reduced to one regiment of infantry, two companies of artillery, and the Canadian Rifles?—That was so.

2952. In a Despatch which has also been laid before this Committee, dated May 2d, 1856, addressed by Mr. Labouchere to Sir Edmund Head, I find the following passage: "Orders have been given that five regiments should be directed to be stationed in British North America, of which three are allotted to Canada. That would appear at first sight to be a considerable increase, instead of a reduction; are you aware on what ground that increase was made?—Not being in office at the time, of course I am unable to speak positively; but I have always imagined that one of two causes must have brought that arrangement about, and that it had nothing to do with the defence of the Colony. I should say that it either arose out of anticipated differences at that moment with the United States, consequent upon the dispute with that country upon the recruitment question, or that it was a matter of convenience, with a view to the location of regiments which were withdrawn from the Crimea, and for which there were neither barracks, nor other adequate accommodation in this country. I have only given the answer as wishing to imply that I look upon it as one of the instances in which the increase was occasioned more by motives

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of imperial policy than either at the demand or from the requirements of the Colony.

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2953. Sir *George Grey*.] Mr. Labouchere, I think, states, that the amount of forces to be kept in any Colony may vary occasionally for military or political reasons?—Quite so; in my answer I said I imagined that the measure had been adopted as a matter of imperial policy, and not with a view to any demands on the part of the Colony.

2954. I think Mr. Labouchere also stated, that, although the amount of troops in Canada might be more or less at a particular time, the Government still placed their main dependence upon the well-proved loyalty of Her Majesty's Canadian subjects?—Yes; a confidence which I have every reason to believe was perfectly well founded at that time, and is certainly so at this moment.

2955. *Chairman*.] From returns which have been laid before this Committee, it appears that, besides an imperial force now stationed in Canada of 3,118, including the Canadian Rifles, there are now 4,456 militiamen and volunteers in Canada. Are you aware whether those returns represent the actual numbers of the militia who would be available in case of emergency, or are those returns to be regarded merely as paper returns?—I am not able distinctly to answer that question, for I was surprised myself when, looking over that paper this morning, I perceived the strength of the militia so small as is represented; there can be no doubt that, in the event of a war, a much larger body than that would speedily be available. Whether the figures given in the return represent the number of militiamen who answered to the call, and came out during the short training they had last year, I am unable to say, but I rather imagine that that must be the case. As regards the preliminary part of your question, I may be excused for remarking that you have stated the number of imperial forces as considerably higher than that at which it now stands. The return which you have quoted was, I think, for the year 1858 or 1859, prior to the withdrawal of the second regiment of the line, which took place upon the accession of the present Government to office, or almost immediately afterwards. The force at the present moment of all arms in Canada amounts only to 2,220. I may be excused for remarking upon the paper from which I have quoted as distinct from that which was quoted by yourself, that it has a very important bearing upon the inquiry in this Committee, inasmuch as most material changes have taken place, not merely in Canada, but in other Colonies. In the Cape of Good Hope the force is reduced in the present year to rather less than one-half of that which appears in the return for the year 1857.

2956. In reply to Question 76, Mr. Elliot stated, that the existence of a Canadian militia had not the smallest influence in determining the force to be kept there: will you inform the Committee what, in your view, are the Imperial purposes for which we keep a force in Canada?—The defence of the Colony against foreign aggression is one of them.

2957. The frontier line between British North America and the United States extends, I think, to something like 3,000 miles, does it not?—Yes.

2958. Should you think that force adequate for the protection in any way of the North American Provinces in the event of aggression?—Certainly not, by many thousands; but of course it is not necessary with a view to the defence of any country, to keep up in time of peace such a force as would be adequate to resist aggression in time of war; it is necessary, however, as I conceive, to hold certain military posts, and to form a nucleus for troops, and for the extension of a force which we may think it necessary to pour into the country in time of war.

2959. In the event of invasion, it would be necessary to increase that force?—Very greatly, either by the addition of imperial troops, or by the organization of large bodies of militiamen, or in all probability by both.

2960. It appears from the returns laid before this Committee, that the total cost of our defences in respect of the Colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland for the year ending 31st March 1859, was about 170,000*l*., and it appears from another paper laid before the Committee, that, with the exception of a sum of 92*l*. given in the return, those Colonies do not contribute anything towards their military defences; I wish to ask you whether you think, looking at their prosperity and their general resources, they are able to do anything towards their own protection?—Undoubtedly they are able to do some-

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thing towards their own protection. I should not speak of their prosperity as very striking; on the contrary, I should speak of the lower provinces of North America as poor Colonies; their revenue is not large, and the people, although thriving, are not rich; but if your question applies to whether the Colonies should bear any proportion of the expenditure you have quoted, assuming the figures to be correct of 170,000*l.*, I should reply, that I do not think they should be called upon to defray any portion, or any large portion of that sum, for this reason, that the whole of that force, with the exception of a very few men, is concentrated at Halifax. In New Brunswick I think there is a force which does not exceed 100 or 150 men. In Prince Edward Island there is not a single man, and the whole of the remainder, amounting to about 1,800 men, are quartered in Halifax, which I look upon unquestionably as an imperial garrison, and to which it would be manifestly unjust to expect the Colony of Nova Scotia to contribute, or at any rate contribute largely.

2961. The Colony of Nova Scotia, as appears by the last returns I have seen, has a revenue of about 300,000 *l.* a year; do you think that the imperial importance of Halifax is a sufficient reason why that Colony should be entirely defended at the cost of this country?—I have not said entirely; but I think it is a reason why a very small proportion of the charge should be allotted to the Colony. I look upon it much as if you were to say that because Portsmouth is in the county of Hampshire, Hampshire should be called upon to pay for the expense of the garrison at Portsmouth. Halifax is not kept up for the benefit of Nova Scotia; but, rightly or wrongly, according to the particular views which men may entertain, it is kept up for imperial purposes. It is an important military post; it is still more important as a naval station, inasmuch as by its natural capabilities it is certainly one of the finest, and in all probability the finest harbour in the world.

2962. There is a small force mentioned in the Army Estimates for Newfoundland, which appears to be borne upon the strength of the imperial army, called the Newfoundland Fencibles; for what purpose is that maintained, is it against possible aggression, or for the maintenance of order?—I should say it was for mixed purposes; no doubt principally for the maintenance of order in the Colony; but that rather involves a further statement, which is, that when there is disorder in the Colony, it generally arises out of quarrels between the English settlers and the French fishermen, and therefore it is desirable to have a certain force at command in the event of any disturbances of that sort. I should think undoubtedly that it is a mixed purpose, partly Colonial and partly imperial; but considering our obligations by a series of treaties with the French, by which they are allowed to exercise important rights upon our shores, the exercise of which rights is of course exceedingly distasteful to the inhabitants of Newfoundland, and is to be maintained by us in consequence of the obligation of treaties, I should say, that the object of keeping any forces there is more imperial than local.

2963. I presume that such a force as that would have no reference to the possibility of difficulties with France in reference to the fishery question?—Not with France as a nation; but with French fishermen, riots in fact, or disturbances which are likely to arise from the animosity which inevitably springs from an impression which exists there, that by the treaty with this country the French exercise rights to which they, the settlers, are alone entitled.

2964. In 1849 a report was presented to Parliament of a survey for a military road or railroad connecting the British American Provinces, which, I think, had previously been the subject of inquiry by Lord Durham, Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Grey. Was that scheme brought under your consideration when you were in office in 1854?—Yes, it was, several times.

2965. Am I right in supposing that the only access by railway into the heart of Canada during the seven months that the St. Lawrence is closed, is through the State of Maine, by way of Portland?—That is correct.

2966. Do you think that in practice inconveniences may arise from that state of things in an Imperial point of view?—Certainly it is desirable for the development of the resources of the provinces and for Imperial purposes that an independent railway should be made, but of course that, like all great railway schemes, is a question of money.

2967. Did that proposal at any time assume the form of any arrangement by which the Colonies were to take upon themselves the cost of their defences on the understanding that they should have some assistance towards the cost of constructing

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constructing their railways?—I do not recollect any proposal by which the Colonies were to take upon themselves their own defences. I recollect that there were various proposals which never came to anything like an agreement, by which the Colonies were to do certain things and to bear certain expenses, and the Imperial Government was to guarantee a loan for carrying out those railways. That has been a matter of frequent discussion. I do not say that no proposal has been made as to the self defence of the Colony, but it was not so during my time, nor do I recollect that it was so with any other Secretary of State.

2968. Do you think that a federal union of the North American Provinces would tend to facilitate the arrangements for the more efficient and economical defence of those provinces?—That is a very important political question, and I am rather disinclined to answer it in any sense which should imply, on my part, before a Committee of this character, the advocacy of a federal union. The Committee are perfectly well aware that various schemes have been proposed, some for a federal union, some for a legislative union, and it is a question which has been much discussed, and in which opposing interests in Canada and the Lower Provinces are materially involved; and I would rather not answer the question except to this extent, that of course any plan which threw the Government of all those countries into an united power would facilitate arrangements for the construction of railways. It would obviate the necessity of mutual financial arrangements which at present are inevitable in the various Colonies through which the line must pass.

2969. I do not know whether there are now any Imperial troops at the Red River Settlement?—At this moment there are, but there is only a small detachment of Canadian Rifles, which has been ordered to return to head quarters. The arrangements for their return are not yet completed, in consequence of the time of year not having arrived, and also of the short period during which they can be removed, by the way of Hudson's Bay from the Red River Settlement.

2970. Evidence has been given before the Committee as to a certain number of military engineers sent out to New Westminster in British Columbia; can you inform the Committee of the substance of the arrangements made in regard to those men as to the source from which the cost of sending them out and keeping them there was to be defrayed?—I believe that the arrangement made by Sir Edward Lytton was that, for a time not strictly limited, those men were to be paid out of Imperial funds, and they have been so paid up to the present time; but I consider that the arrangements were such, that it would be the duty of the Colonial Office to cease proposing a vote to Parliament as soon as the finances of the Colony will allow of this expense being paid from Colonial funds, because the men were sent very much more for Colonial than for Imperial purposes. The engineer force was selected under the impression that it would facilitate road-making and other operations of that kind in the Colony.

2971. It has been stated that a very large cost apparently, considering the number of men, was incurred; I think it has been said that about 60,000 *l.* has been spent in respect of those engineers; they were sent out, I think, across the Isthmus?—They were.

2972. I suppose that must have increased the expense?—Off hand, I could not say; but I should think not. I should think the expense would be much about the same, unless it was difficult to make arrangements at the time for their conveyance northwards from the Isthmus.

2973. Do you know what has been the kind of employment of those men since they have been out there?—It has been a mixed military and civil engineering duty. I do not myself think that it has been a very fortunate experiment as regards the progress of road-making.

2974. I believe that, in a Despatch to Sir James Douglas, in September 1859, you stated that the regimental pay would be borne by Great Britain, but that you expressed the hope that the Colonial pay and allowances would be borne by the Colony?—Yes.

2675. What is the exact meaning of that Colonial pay and allowances. Is it to be assumed that in that as in other Colonies, the practice will be observed of giving increased pay?—Certainly, that was the object, and it is more necessary in that Colony than almost in any other, on account of the expense of living, and the extreme difficulty there is in obtaining supplies of all sorts.

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2976. As I understand, some arrangements have been entered into by the Imperial Government by which the cost of sending those troops out was hereafter to be defrayed by the Colony when the Colony might be able to do so; am I correct in that?—Without having the papers before me I should not like to be too positive, but I have no recollection of any such understanding. Looking at the time which has passed, and to the invariable result of all understandings of that sort, I could not hold out the smallest expectation of any reimbursement by the Colony of money already expended.

2977. Mr. *Ellice.*] Has any estimate been laid before you by the projectors of the railway by the coast round from Halifax to Quebec, to connect those Colonies, which would incline you to believe that there would be sufficient traffic on that railway to repay the capital that might be invested in it?—No estimate has been laid before me during the two years I have now been at the Colonial Office, but estimates were laid before me when I was there seven or eight years ago, and my impression at that time certainly was, that none of those lines could pay as independent lines, but could only pay as part of a greater scheme which was at that time the one most favourably entertained. From Rivière du Loup down to St. John's or Halifax, or any other southern terminus, I cannot imagine that any such line as that by itself could pay.

2978. Then if those lines are constructed, the projectors must depend upon Government assistance?—When you say Government assistance, it must either be from the Imperial Government or from the Colonial Government, or from the Companies possessing lines in Canada, which might think it worth their while to assist the formation of a line which should give it a British Port.

2979. According to any information you have received, have the lines hitherto constructed in Canada been remunerative to the capitalists who have invested their money?—I fear not, generally speaking.

2980. You would not be of opinion that these other lines would be remunerative to the capitalists engaged in them, unless assistance was given to them by the Colonial Treasury or the Treasury at home?—Not at present; I am not saying what might not be the case, when the resources of that great country are further developed.

2981. Sir *George Grey.*] With reference to the question of the North American Colonies contributing anything toward their defence, is it not the case that in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island every adult male is enrolled in the militia, and is liable to be embodied in case of attack?—Yes, that is so; and when I said they contributed nothing, I meant they contributed nothing to the expenditure of the regular force stationed there; not only is there a militia enrolled in all those Colonies, but the enrolment for the militia has been made use of without calling them out for the formation of a volunteer force. I am glad of the opportunity of being able to state that there is a very earnest spirit of volunteering in the whole of these Colonies, even in Newfoundland at this time. Last year there were four good companies formed; in Nova Scotia there were about 2,000 volunteers; a very excellent and well-drilled battalion in Halifax, besides companies in various other parts of the province; in New Brunswick there were a greater number of independent companies, and in New Brunswick the militia organization was availed of, that is to say, that all the volunteers were what they call volunteer militiamen, which is not the case in the other provinces. In Prince Edward Island there were also a considerable number of companies. By the return I see that there are 5,500 for Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, there being 4,456 in Canada. I should imagine, from what we have heard since, that although our returns may not give any number greater than 1,006 for the whole of British North America, in fact the number very considerably exceeds that at the present time, although we have not received any official information of it.

2982. *Chairman.*] You think it would not be at all an exaggerated expectation for us to form, that there would be at all events in the British North American Colonies 10,000 volunteers and militia ready and willing to submit themselves to discipline if required?—Ten thousand would not represent one-tenth of those who would come forward upon occasion. The Colonies themselves, although unwilling to pay large sums out of their comparatively small revenue for military purposes in time of peace, when they have roads and other works

works to construct, which exhaust their available resources, whenever there has been any threat of war have invariably shown the best spirit and the greatest readiness to come forward and assist the Imperial Government. Nova Scotia, which, although possessing a revenue of 300,000 *l.* a year, is not only a poor Colony, but has a debt of 1,000,000 *l.* upon which to pay interest, besides railways to keep up and complete, and roads to make, voted upon one occasion 100,000 *l.* to assist New Brunswick, when it was expected that New Brunswick would be invaded.

2983. Do you not think that the facts you have been mentioning afford good ground for believing that so far as the *personnel* of a force is concerned, those Colonies have abundant materials for their defence, and that it is not a want of men from which they suffer?—Certainly; but at the same time those men may be available, in cases of great emergency, although where the rate of wages is so very high, they are not willing in time of peace to devote any large portion of their time to military defence.

2984. I apprehend in all cases of a volunteer force there is a certain amount of sacrifice even in this country?—Yes.

2985. It would be the case also in the Colonies?—Yes.

2986. Evidence has been given in respect to the local corps in various Colonies; do you think that in reference to the North American Colonies, both with a view to economy in saving the cost of transport, and also with a view to securing a force less likely to desert than regiments of the line, we might look within a reasonable time to these Colonies to provide entirely the *personnel* of their forces?—I cannot imagine that they can ever be in a position to provide by volunteers a force for those services for which Imperial troops are required in British North America. That force consists of a regiment of Canadian Rifles, which is a local force, and three regiments of the line, one being quartered in Canada, and two in Nova Scotia. I cannot conceive the state of things in which great forts like Quebec and Halifax can be maintained by a volunteer force. I think that a volunteer force may be called upon for the defence of the Colony, and that the spirit which has shown itself in raising 10,000 or 15,000 men would show itself to a greater extent in the event of an emergency; but I cannot anticipate that any volunteer efforts can supply the place of the present amount of Imperial troops.

2897. Mr. *Roebuck*.] In the present condition of North America, do you think that the defences of the Colony could be safely confided to the Colony?—Not exclusively. I should say it would be impossible to entrust the defence of the Colony to the volunteer forces, unaided by any Imperial troops; but as I have said before we must in all probability meet large efforts on the part of the Colony by corresponding assistance from home.

2988. Do you think that the difficulties are merely those belonging to an army, or do they not belong also to the political condition of the Colony?—Of course the political condition of the Colony must form an element in the consideration; but if I rightly understand the question to refer to the spirit of the people themselves, I do thoroughly believe it may be relied upon. If, on the contrary, you mean that in the present state of a neighbouring country, Canada might be the scene of hostile incursions by filibustering parties, which is not an uncommon consequence of the state of excitement existing there now, then no doubt for the purpose of meeting aggressions of that irregular kind, an organized regular force is better, and is more trustworthy than a volunteer force; when I say more trustworthy, I mean it is more under command.

2989. Have you ever considered the consequences of a confederation free from slavery, upon the political condition and the political opinions of Canada?—Yes, I have considered that very frequently.

2990. Under those changed circumstances, supposing they were to occur, do you think that we could in any degree, or in any large degree depend upon the Colony for its own defence?—Those are very speculative questions with regard to what may arise hereafter; all I can say is, that I believe that at the present moment, there is not a population more loyally disposed to the British Crown than the Canadian population; and when I speak of them, I speak not only of the English but quite as much of the French portion of the population.

2991. This Committee has reference to a future state of things, and what I

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wish to elicit from you is your belief as to the safety of any legislation which should confide the defence of the Colony in great part to the Colony, and therefore I ask your Grace whether under present circumstances, and in the possible future of that country, it would, in your opinion, be safe for us to legislate so as to confide that defence to themselves?—Those are all questions of degree. You have put your question in two different forms already, one referring to partial defence, and the other I think to exclusive defence.

2992. Largely?—Largely, I think you might; but I do not say entirely. I think one of the duties which devolve upon the mother country is the defence of a Colony. I do not know what advantage a Colony would find in its relative position, if the mother country did not protect it. Just on account of the peculiar position of Canada, I think the Imperial Government is bound to keep up a certain amount of force in time of peace, and a much larger force in the event of war with those parties who would be aggressive. Canada stands in a different position from any other Colony we have; take, for instance, Australia, upon which I understand some questions are to be put presently; the real defence of Australia must be by our fleet, but the fleet can do little to assist Canada, except it is by sending small vessels up the St. Lawrence, and nearly the whole assistance to be rendered by this country to Canada, must be of course by a land force.

2993. *Chairman.*] Assuming that Halifax, Quebec and Kingston are to be garrisoned in sufficient strength, would you mainly regard the presence of a portion of British troops in the North American Colonies, besides those garrisons, as available for the purpose of forming the nucleus for a force which might be recruited in the Colony, or do you think we can never look to the time when a force may be recruited within the Colonies for their own defence? Evidence has been given by colonists that they have regarded the presence of a certain number of British troops as available for improving the discipline of other forces to be organized in those Colonies?—I look upon a certain amount of Imperial military force as essential for all those purposes; and as regards the future, if I may combine the question now put with one put just now by another member of the Committee, I should say, so far as I can anticipate events, that I cannot imagine the time in which, if I had the honour still to be Secretary of State, I could advise for Imperial interests the maintenance of a lesser force than that now maintained in North America. I believe it is now reduced to its minimum. I could imagine various circumstances in which I should advise an increase of that force. The payment is another matter altogether: but that I have already expressed my opinion upon; I am now speaking only of the amount of force.

2994. Do you think that there are any circumstances in regard to the organization of the Canadian Rifles which would make it desirable that such a force should be increased, or do you think that we should increase our regiments of the line when necessary?—I think, as a general rule, a local force is not very desirable or so efficient as one which is periodically relieved from home. A local force becomes identified with the population; they lose a great deal of their military discipline, but in Canada there are special reasons for that particular force. The propinquity of the United States and the high rate of wages have caused desertion from the British army to a great extent; if a regiment goes over to North America with a number of recruits and unmarried men, it is very likely to have its ranks diminished by desertion very soon after it gets there. The formation of the Canadian Rifles is of a totally different character; it is formed of men who are allowed to quit a regiment which has been sent to Canada, generally speaking when the regiment leaves the colony, and are permitted to enlist in the Canadian Rifles, and the result is that they almost always do so, for the purpose of marrying and settling there; they are, generally speaking, the *élite* of the men, and I may mention that they are more decorated than any other five regiments in the service together; there is hardly a man amongst them who does not wear three, or four or five medals, and I should look upon it as an advantage if another regiment of Canadian Rifles could be formed; but then arises the question which has been so much discussed, namely, the payment. When I was in Canada last year, I privately asked several public men whether they did not think that another such regiment would be advantageous. They all said it would, and they would be glad to see it; but when I asked if they would like to pay for it, they with one voice said " no, certainly not."

2995. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Canada, at the present time, governs itself?—Yes.

2996. It excludes, if it pleases, as it has pleased, English goods by large duties; if they were to have a majority of the defences of their colony under their own control, in what way would they be distinguished from an independent State?—The distinction would be infinitesimal almost; the great distinction now is, the maintenance of Imperial garrisons.

2997. So that the colony now is simply a cost to this country?—I cannot allow that by any means; such an opinion would strike at the root of all colonial possessions in any part of the world. Without entering into the discussion, I must be excused if I do not, by my silence, admit the position that they have excluded English goods by their legislation; that their tariff is higher than, either for their own sakes or for English manufactures, would be desirable, I admit, but I do not think that it has been imposed for protection purposes, but on account of the financial position of the country.

2998. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you say that there are volunteers in Newfoundland?—Yes.

2999. And that the troops are sometimes employed in putting down riots between English and French fishermen?—I do not say that they have been recently so employed, but I think that is a reason why it is not desirable to leave the colonies without a force of that description.

3000. Volunteers would be a bad kind of force to put down a riot of that description?—Certainly.

3001. And a very undesirable force?—Certainly.

3002. Do you know why troops were sent to the Red River?—In consequence of an apprehension entertained by the Hudsons' Bay Company that disturbances were likely to arise on the part of the Indians, and I think also some of our neighbours.

3003. Was it partly to protect the Indians?—To maintain order.

3004. What is the form of government at present in British Columbia; have they a free government?—They have not.

3005. Is it not to come into operation within two years or five years from the time of the passing of the British Columbia Bill?—There is no particular form of constitution which is to come into operation in two years, or any definite time; I am not certain whether you are not speaking of the Bill as originally proposed.

3006. When the Government is made free, do you think it probable that you will more easily get them to pay for those engineers than at present?—I should imagine that it would be much more difficult; at the present moment, if the funds are there, we can pay ourselves. In the second case, we should have to ask.

3007. Mr. *Roebuck.*] You have been asked whether the railway between Canada and Nova Scotia would be a paying railway. Is its being a paying railway or not a sufficient and sole reason for the making of that railway, in your opinion?—Certainly not; I have always thought that great political interests are involved, and it was this alone which induced me to take so much pains with the subject as I did seven or eight years ago. I never imagined that it was likely to be a paying line under existing circumstances.

3008. The remuneration ought not to be the sole consideration for making the railway?—I think not; but then if you are going upon any other principle the question is who is to find the money.

3009. Mr. *Adderley.*] I understood your Grace to say that the only remaining feature of dependence in Canada upon England is the distinction of Imperial garrisons?—I do not think I said the only one. What I intended to say was, that I thought the distinction between a colony and an independent country, if you withdraw all notion of defending it, would become infinitesimal.

3010. I understood you to say that the continuance of the cost of the defence of the colony upon the English tax payers is to keep up that remaining feature of dependence?—It is not a question of dependence, but a question of colonial empire. Of course, if it is considered that the continuance of our colonial empire is of no consequence, then there is no justification for the continuance of military support; but that is a large question into which I would rather not enter before this Committee. I believe that the retention of our colonial empire is of importance to us.

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3011. I presume that when you asked the question in Canada, as to the advisability of an increased force of Canadian rifles, and you found an unwillingness on the part of the Canadians to pay, that implied that your Grace was of opinion that they should pay more than they do?—I do not think it implied that opinion; my opinion was, that a second Canadian regiment was preferable to a regiment of the line. I do not expect that his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge would be willing to reduce the army to 99 regiments, but that if there was to be an additional regiment in Canada it would have to be paid, not by an increase to the Army Estimates of this country, but by the Colonial Legislature of Canada. My question applied to the superiority of the Canadian regiment over any regiment of the line for service in that country; and I was anxious to see a second regiment of the same kind. I collected therefore the opinions of people, and I found that they concurred with me, but when I said we cannot raise another regiment at the expense of England, are you ready to pay for it, they all said "No, our arrangements have been made with the English Government, you reduced our force to so and so, upon certain conditions; we have fulfilled those conditions, and we are not inclined to pay for another regiment."

3012. The only objection to another regiment, which they considered necessary, was to paying for it?—They did not consider it necessary, nor do I. I said that for service in Canada, I considered the Canadian rifle regiment is better suited than any which could be sent from this country. I could see no means of forming a second regiment, except by getting Canada to pay for it; to that they objected, saying it was not an expense calculated in the arrangements made in 1854.

3013. That reluctance to pay on the part of any Colony for that which they hoped England would pay for them, has been the great difficulty in accepting a local force in any of them?—No doubt; but I have already said I must not be supposed to be a general advocate for the raising of a local force. When I speak of the Canadian rifles, I speak of them as a special instance. I do not wish to see the Cape rifles or the Ceylon rifles abandoned; but I do not wish to see any great extension of that force.

3014. When you say that Novia Scotia voted a large sum to assist New Brunswick, does not that indicate that when danger is felt, and they have to trust to themselves, money will be forthcoming?—Certainly.

3015. When you say that the Colonies have always come forward readily when necessity arose, has it not invariably been at our expense that they have so come forward?—The very instance you have just been quoting, is an instance to the contrary.

3016. Does your Grace know of any other instance?—Certainly; in former days, in the last war with America, the provinces came forward; what was done afterwards as to payment I do not remember.

3017. Every farthing I believe was paid by this country?—I am inclined to think that was not the case, but without looking back, I could not be quite positive about it; I am sure they were always ready to find men.

3018. When you say that Colonial troops could never do what our troops do, as for instance, in holding Quebec and Kingston, and similar posts, do you think that the garrisons we have placed in those two posts, really hold them in any practical sense?—I think they would be able to hold them for a considerable time until it was possible to relieve them.

3019. Does your Grace think that 1,300 troops in the garrison at Halifax could hold that place in the first instance against any attack by a foreign enemy?—It is very presumptuous in me to express an opinion on military matters, but so far as I can judge, I should think they certainly could, aided as they would be by a considerable volunteer force, which is ready to give them assistance, although I adhere to the opinion that I expressed just now, that no volunteer force could hold such a place by themselves.

3020. You think that Nova Scotia is unable or unwilling either in men or money to furnish the garrison for the protection of Halifax?—If you are speaking of time of peace I should say so decidedly; if you are speaking of time of war, I have already said they would be ready to afford men, and the money would be matter for arrangement between the mother country and the colony. In time of peace they would be unwilling to supply volunteers for the maintenance of the garrison, because they would cease to be volunteers, and must

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must be converted into regular soldiers, instead of living by the large wages which they earn by their industrial pursuits at this moment.

3021. You said it would be as hard to inflict upon Nova Scotia the whole cost of keeping up the garrison of Halifax as it would be to inflict upon Hampshire the expense of keeping up Portsmouth. Keeping up that parallel does your Grace think it fair to impose upon Nova Scotia its share of the expense of the Imperial fort at Halifax, as Hampshire bears its full share of the cost of defence in England?—I think it might be perfectly fair. It is extremely difficult to argue those questions upon principles of business, and it is a very small ground to take. If you ask them for their contribution, which contribution is to be raised upon the principle of the amount of benefit which they derive, it would be so ludicrously small that it would be worth nothing to the estimates of this country, and I think it would be a very pettifogging and weak argument; it might reduce the expense by some few pounds, and it would not be worth while to ask a poor colony like Nova Scotia to contribute it. It would be a flea bite to the Imperial Government, and it would be the source of grumbling and discontent on the part of the Colony. I look upon Halifax as an Imperial post, quite as much as I do upon Gibraltar or Malta. Supposing Halifax, instead of being in a Colony, was a rock in the sea, I think that England would consider it worth its while to maintain it as an Imperial post.

3022. Mr. *Marsh.*] Just as we do at Bermuda?—Precisely.

3023. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is your Grace of opinion that possessing Bermuda and going to great expense, as we now are, in making it impregnable, it is necessary to have another fortress in that part of the world?—I consider the two to be so dissimilar that I cannot look upon the one as an equivalent for the other in any respect whatever. Halifax is a great naval station, but Bermuda is a very bad naval station; it is a military post which you keep up for military purposes, but the ships which can go into the harbour of Bermuda are only small ones; a first rate ship of the line can hardly get into Bermuda; even such a vessel as the "Nile" was obliged to lie off Bermuda last year for several days waiting for a quiet sea before it could go into the harbour. In Halifax all the navies in the world can be sheltered. In that magnificent harbour called the "Bedford Basin," you might fight a naval engagement, and in the other two harbours any number of vessels might ride in safety.

3024. You consider that a fair ground upon which Her Majesty's colonial subjects should be exempted from any contribution to this Imperial defence to which British tax payers are liable?—I think that Halifax is maintained for Imperial purposes, and I think that the troops which appear in the return under the head of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are, so far as Nova Scotia is concerned, almost, if not quite (I believe quite), confined to Halifax, and never go beyond the bounds of the garrison. It would be perfectly fair, no doubt, to call upon them to contribute something; it is an advantage to them that the military spend money there. The troops are ready in the event of any local disturbances, and in the event of any filibustering expeditions, there would be these troops to suppress them; and, therefore, if it became a question of mere fairness, I cannot deny that it would be perfectly fair that some portion should be contributed by Nova Scotia; but I doubt its being worth the while of this country to enter into a long, litigious, and unfriendly communication with them, their Legislature no doubt resisting, upon a point which would involve pounds, shillings and pence, to a very limited amount.

3025 Do you think that such an arrangement could not become to without a long and litigious correspondence?—Yes, I do think so; these colonies have Legislatures of their own, and they are as punctilious about their rights as the House of Commons of this country; it no longer rests with the Governor, Lord Mulgrave, or Sir Edmund Head, to put his hands into the colonial funds and pay a small sum towards the military expenditure, but he must go to his Parliament and ask for a vote, and I am sure they would refuse it.

3026. You consider it difficult to get a Legislature, or any individual person, to pay for that which other persons are disposed to pay for?—As a general rule, no doubt that is so, and for that reason I do not think that it is very desirable for the Secretary of State to enter into what are called negotiations with a colony upon the question of expense. It will come to very little in many cases, and to nothing in most, and would create a strong feeling of disaffection

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which is not worth purchasing at the price of the small amount you would get. I do not say, therefore, that you are to submit to the continuation of a large expenditure, but you must make use of the means within your own power, that is, you must reduce the military force to such an amount as you believe necessary.

3027. The withdrawal of troops would, of course, cut short all negotiations?—Of course it would, because you are then acting upon your own responsibility.

3028. In the last despatch from Prince Edward Island, we find that Mr. Dundas says, that in consequence of the troops being withdrawn, that colony is wholly defenceless. I understand your Grace to say, that there is now a considerable force of volunteers there; does your Grace attribute the raising of that force to the fact of the troops having been withdrawn?—Certainly not; because in Halifax, to which place the troops were taken, the spirit of volunteering is stronger than in Prince Edward Island.

3029. There is an expression of alarm on the part of Mr. Dundas, as to the defenceless state of Prince Edward Island: was not that the cause of the volunteers being raised?—Certainly not. The force for Prince Edward Island was withdrawn by me in 1854, and the reason was, that the Crown had corresponded for some time with the authorities of Prince Edward Island, in order to induce them to take the necessary measures for the suppression of desertion, which was very flagrant, in the island, and we found them so impracticable, because they were only too glad to get soldiers to desert, in order to increase the number of settlers, that the only resource we had was to withdraw all the troops. There was no attempt made to raise any force of volunteers until the spirit which arose in this country extended itself over the colonial possessions of the Empire, and then, but not till then, Prince Edward Island took it up with all the rest.

3030. In a despatch from Sir Edmund Head to your Grace, in August 1859, I find it stated that the Militia Act had been made permanent, but that he regretted to state that the state of the finances rendered necessary a reduction in the sums allowed for drilling the volunteer corps, and for establishing them. May not that reduction account for the smaller return of militia, which seemed rather to surprise your Grace?—If I am right in my conjecture, it would explain the smaller number called out. What Sir Edmund Head alluded to was, that in the previous year, a certain sum had been voted for a certain number of days' training, and that a lesser sum was voted in the year to which he referred, for a smaller number of days' training of the same force. It was an economical measure to meet the financial position of the colony.

3031. In a despatch from your Grace to Sir James Douglas in September, 1859, I find that you laid down the rule that regimental pay in British Columbia should be borne by Imperial funds; colonial pay and allowances by colonial funds?—Yes.

3032. In an answer given by your Grace to-day, you said that you hoped that those payments would cease as soon as the colony could pay more. Do you anticipate that the colony will pay altogether for the troops sent there by England?—Yes, for the engineers, I think it is quite possible. I said I was not without hopes that before long, the votes in our estimates would cease.

3033. Do you mean that the regimental pay, and also the extra pay, should be borne by the Colony?—Yes; but with the condition that the engineers remained there, because I am by no means certain that it would be found desirable to continue this service in the Colony. I think it possible that the force might with advantage to the Colony, and to the mother country, be withdrawn.

3034. Sir Alexander Bannerman, Governor of Newfoundland, states in one of his despatches, that if the fishery question were clearly defined, he thought that the ships of war upon the station would be needless, and that a cutter or two, for police purposes, during six months in the year only would be required; are steps being taken to define that fishery question, so as to permit the withdrawal of ships of war, and the reduction of the force on that station to a police cutter or two?—The negotiations with the French Government have been going on for a considerable time; when I left England, in July last, there was so little in my opinion remaining to be done, that I was induced to hold out to Sir Alexander Bannerman the expectations that within another post or two,

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two, the treaty might come out signed and ratified; subsequent negotiations have been protracted at Paris. So far as the English Government is concerned, every thing was brought to a close about this time last year, and it still hangs over in Paris; but I hope that in a short time definite arrangements may be made, in which case Sir Alexander Bannerman's expectations will be in the main carried out. He was not then, and is not now, aware of the stipulations of the treaty.

3035. Mr. *Fortescue.*] With respect to Nova Scotia, do you think that if in time of peace the announcement were made to them that every Imperial soldier was to be withdrawn, it would make any practical difference, or would induce them to raise a greater local force, or to offer a contribution towards the cost of maintaining Imperial troops?—I think it might produce just this difference,—that it would cause the whole volunteer spirit to cease; I am certain it would not induce them to contribute a single shilling towards the support of the force, even if they saw the ships in the harbour ready to sail, and to carry them all away to-morrow.

3036. You have no doubt that Nova Scotia for example, would make very great exertions in time of actual danger?—I have no doubt of it; I have no doubt that so long as the Imperial government shows a disposition to support them in time of peace, and to prevent war, that they would in time of war, behave generously and properly towards supporting the Imperial Government in their own defence, and in maintaining the general interest of the empire.

3037. One great distinction between Hampshire and Nova Scotia is, that Hampshire through her representative, directs the Imperial policy?—Certainly.

3038. While the taxpayers of Nova Scotia are liable to find themselves involved in a war in which they have had no voice, by the action of the taxpayers of Hampshire?—Certainly.

3039. Mr. *Baxter.*] I understand your Grace to say that you think at some time the military force in the North American Provinces may be reduced?—No, I do not anticipate the time.

3040. Do you think that the time will come when the military expenditure of that force will be reduced by a contribution on the part of the Colony?—I cannot myself foresee the time. You are right in drawing the distinction in my answer between the maintenance of a force, and who should pay for it. I say I do not see the possibility of diminishing it, I can more readily look forward to the time when it may bear a larger proportion. As a practical question, I cannot anticipate the time of diminution; it is quite possible that altered circumstances may produce it.

3041. You think that the time may possibly arrive?—I think it may, but it is a speculative question, because I think it would involve a great change of political relationship throughout North America.

3042. You do not think that it would produce any serious discontent in North America if we asked for a contribution to the Imperial military expenditure?—It would not produce any great discontent if you are prepared to submit to a negative. I cannot anticipate anything but a negative, and it is a very undignified position I think for the Imperial Government to stand in, that it should go begging to Nova Scotia to pay a certain small sum, and then be content with their saying "no," because you have no means of enforcing it.

3043. Is there any special reason why you should expect a negative from the North American Colonies, when such an answer has not been given by some other Colonies?—Where any answer in the affirmative has been given, it has been under favourable circumstances for making the proposition, and where they had objects of their own to meet, and where also they had a large surplus revenue, as in the case of the Australian Colonies.

3044. You anticipate a negative from Canada, in consequence of their revenue being small?—Not merely that, because a short time ago the revenue of Canada was very prosperous, and I think that the feeling was equally strong then. They have been accustomed to the maintenance of a much larger force at Imperial cost, and when that force was reduced, and certain arrangements were made with them, they considered that a bargain was entered into, and they are not now willing to re-open that bargain.

3045. Do you consider that any sufficient reason why Canada should refuse to contribute, at a time when her revenue is prosperous, seeing that the Australian

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Colonies have been willing and anxious to contribute. The situation of the Colonies is very different. They say "Of what use is this military force to us, except as a Colony of Great Britain? If we are involved in war, we must have British troops to defend us, because if we are involved in war, it must be by the act of the mother country; we cannot be so involved by any army except from the United States; it would not be a quarrel with us, it must be some such question as San Juan, or the recruitment dispute with reference to the army in the Crimea, which involves us in the war; we shall suffer enough then, and we are not inclined to pay in time of peace for the preservation of that relationship, which would bring upon us so much mischief by and by." That is the way in which they argue.

3046. Has there been any correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Colonial Government upon that subject?—Not since 1854. It was then that these arrangements were made, and by them the Imperial expenditure was much reduced. The Imperial expenditure for military purposes in British North America must have been at that time something like a million a year. Previous to 1854 there were four regiments of the line, and the Canadian rifles in Canada, and a large force of artillery, besides the force in the Lower Provinces, and it is easy to calculate that that must have entailed a very heavy expense upon this country. It was reduced with the understanding that the Colony was to do such and such things; and they consider that is an arrangement that ought to be binding, and they are not willing to re-open it.

3047. Do you approve of the Imperial Government undertaking the erection of new fortifications in Canada?—No. We have engaged to keep a certain force there; and if we built increased fortifications, it would involve an increased force.

3048. You think that the expense of any further fortifications should be borne by the Colony itself?—I should doubt the policy of erecting any further fortifications. It is an enormous line of frontier, and it is impossible to say where an attack would be made. Most of the towns are not naturally very defensible, and I think it is far better to leave their defence to the emergencies of war.

3049. Do you think that there is a strong desire in Canada for the maintenance of British troops in Canada?—If you withdraw the military force there now they would look upon it as an abandonment of them. I do not think there would be any very loud outcry; but it would materially alter their feelings, not on their own part so much, as in the apprehension that you were going to desert them.

3050. Do you think that that feeling would be altered if we asked them to pay one-half of the expense?—I have said that if you are to be content with a simple negative it would not; but if it is to be merely the commencement of a long wrangle with them, resulting in the same conclusion, it would produce a great deal of ill feeling.

3051. *Chairman.*] Since 1854, the time when the arrangement of which you spoke was made, it appears that the force in the North American Colonies has not been in a state of progressive reduction, but rather fluctuating?—I have already stated in answer to some questions in the early part of my examination, that that was done without any communication with the Colony, and for Imperial purposes. It was a convenience to us to send those troops there; they were not required by the Colony, and beyond the towns and villages in which they were placed, which no doubt derived advantages from the commissariat, I do not think that the Colony wished a single man. As regards the arrangements made with the Colony in 1854, the force at present there, and in British North America throughout, is the same that was stationed there as part of the bargain with the Colony in 1854.

3052. Do you think it correct to say that we have consulted our own Imperial convenience in regard to those arrangements, and that if we had not an Indian mutiny, or a Russian war on hand, it would be more convenient to us to keep a certain portion of our troops in Canada; but if on the other hand we had severe duties to perform in other parts of the world, we must send our troops there?—Frequently that has been the case, and looking at it as a question between the mother country and the Colony, it would not be fair to take the figures before you, and to charge the whole of the military force against the Colony,

Colony, as if it were sent there for Colonial purposes. The same answer applies to many troops sent to the Cape of Good Hope.

3053. Sanitary considerations would in some cases also operate?—Frequently; it is always the practice when a white regiment has been some time in the West Indies, to send it to British North America, or some more healthy climate.

3054. Some despatches have been laid before the Committee, addressed by Sir William Denison to the Government at home, in reference to carrying further the arrangement made by Lord Grey in 1851?—Yes.

3055. I observe that in these despatches, Sir William Denison suggests that in accordance with the practice adopted with respect to the naval survey of the Australian coast, the cost of the military defences of these colonies should be shared equally between the Imperial and the Colonial Government. Do you concur in that view?—I think that a great deal may be said in favour of the arrangement, but I doubt whether it is one which could be permanently adopted; and I should greatly doubt its being one which could be extensively carried out; that is to say, I doubt whether it would be applicable to many other colonies besides the Australian.

3056. The Australian Colonies, I understand, contribute very largely?—Two of them do, namely New South Wales and Victoria.

3057. It appears, however, that Tasmania contributes nothing towards its defences, and the reason which has been given to the Committee for its non-contribution is, that Tasmania having been recently a penal settlement, lies under special circumstances which exempt it from the ordinary rule. It appears that seven years ago transportation to Tasmania ceased. Would it be right to say that the ground upon which that exemption had been permitted to continue is, that in Tasmania there are still convicts who have not completed their sentence?—That has been the ground.

3058. Do you think that now, considering the large extent to which that Colony has been enriched by convict labour, and the commissariat expenditure, it is necessary to continue it?—I think that it cannot continue much longer. I think that the time is rapidly approaching when a change should be made, and that Tasmania should be put upon the same footing as the other Australian Colonies.

3059. Some evidence has been given with reference to a correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Colony of Victoria, in which I understand the Colony undertook to pay the whole cost of the military expenditure, if Great Britain would bear the cost of transport. Did any such correspondence take place during your tenure of office?—Not during my tenure of the Colonial Office, but I believe that such a proposal was made.

3060. Do you happen to know what the result of that correspondence was?—I do not; the danger of any such arrangement as that is, that it becomes practically a colonial local force, and you lose the power of removing it, which is so essential.

3061. Has the question occurred to you whether it would be possible at all; I think you say that Australia mainly depends upon the naval force?—Yes.

3062. Do you think it possible for any arrangement to be made by which these Colonies should contribute towards the cost of a naval force?—I think that the only mode in which it is possible to accept from them a contribution towards their naval defences would be in the shape of a money vote to the Admiralty. I think it undesirable that they should have Colonial ships, which would necessarily be much more under the local control of the government of the Colony, than under the Admiral on the stations; upon the whole, I look with great disfavour upon anything which could give these Colonies the power of ordering our ships about, or of interfering with the proper responsibility of the Admiral.

3063. You think that the power must be retained in the hands of the Imperial Government?—I think so; because it would be impossible, either at their expense or ours, to defend the Colony by ships retained, if we may say so, for the service of each colony; it must be done upon a larger scale. I have frequently had to state to the Colonists that in truth our Channel fleet constitutes a defence to Australia, because any large fleets which could attack that Colony must come from Europe, and therefore it is much better to deal with a fleet by a concentrated force than to keep ships scattered over the

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world, with a view of defending any part which it may not be the intention, perhaps, of the enemy to attack, and which, in these days of the electric telegraph, they would take care not to attack if ships were stationed there.

3064. From the correspondence which has passed between the Colonial Office and those Colonies, have you any reason to believe that there is any widespread apprehension of attack from the French forces in New Caledonia?—I can hardly say; there have been alarms at times in the Australian Colonies, and not unnaturally; from their peculiar position and their immense wealth they are very sensitive. At the time of the Russian war they were equally apprehensive, although there was no great reason for it.

3065. With reference to New Zealand, it appears that up to the present time New Zealand has not contributed anything towards the cost of its own military defence; but evidence has been given before this Committee of some proposed arrangement that the Colony should pay a certain sum per head per annum for the troops sent out?—Yes.

3066. Has that arrangement been concluded?—It has been, in fact, finally concluded; but I hardly know whether, under existing circumstances, it is possible to carry it out in its present form. It was a proposal made before the breaking out of the war, and it was concluded either immediately before or immediately after.

3067. I see, by a return which has been laid before the Committee, that the force now in New Zealand is stated at 5,354, borne upon the strength of the Imperial Army?—Yes.

3068. Taking the data which have been laid before the Committee as to the cost of the number of troops that were employed there in 1859 it would seem that, in round numbers, the probable cost during the current year would be about half a million. Do you see any means by which that expenditure can be reduced in any way, supposing that there is no sudden termination of hostilities, but that the war should continue?—I am afraid that it cannot be materially reduced. We are constantly in communication with the Governor with a view of keeping down the expenses, and compelling the colonists to pay as much as possible of the cost of the war; but we have the troops there, and some one must pay for them, and we know pretty well what generally happens with regard to any arrangements that are made in such wars.

3069. Do you think that in any future wars there is reasonable ground for believing that the arrangement which you speak of as not completed may be carried out, charging a per-centage?—They have agreed to it.

3070. I understood that the arrangement could not practically be carried out, in your opinion?—What I meant was that all those expenses were very much mixed up. The expenses of militia and volunteers, all of which ought to be paid by the Colony, and many other military charges become so involved in the balance of accounts, that I very much fear if the war continues we shall not derive much advantage from the arrangement. After all, it is but a small contribution.

3071. Would it be an extravagant calculation to assume that every British soldier in New Zealand costs this country about 100 *l.* a year?—I should think that that would be very little, if at all, over the mark.

3072. The contribution, then, would represent one-twentieth?—Yes, that is what the contribution amounts to.

3073. I observe, on reference to the Reports on the past and present state of the Colonial Possessions, that no reports have been received from New Zealand since 1854. Can you say whether there is any reason for that?—You speak of the Colonial Blue Books. I really cannot; I discovered the circumstance, and wrote to the Governor, calling his attention to it, and begged him to be more punctual in supplying us with the information.

3074. Sir *George Grey*.] The present garrison of New Zealand is 5,354, is not that four times the usual number of troops maintained there and rendered necessary by the war?—That amount of force is rendered necessary by the war; but I think you are hardly correct in saying that it is four times greater than is ordinarily maintained there; it is four times greater than the amount of force which was there a year ago, before the war broke out; but I believe it was then at a much lower point than it has usually been.

3075. Was not the garrison generally two regiments?—Yes; but there was only one there then.

3076. One

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3076. One was sent to India?—One was sent to India, and would not have been replaced if the war had not broken out.

3077. You do not consider that the present amount of force should be maintained there permanently?—Certainly not.

3078. Is it not the case that, excluding New Zealand, the force in Australia is much less now than it has been for the last 10 years?—Very much less.

3079. Mr. *Marsh.*] With reference to colonial war ships fitted out by the Colony, do you not think that they would be much more costly to the Colony than if they voted a contribution to the Admiralty?—No doubt, and much less effective.

3080. Do you not think that it would be much better to allow the Admiral to have complete command of all the shipping at the station, instead of placing it under the control of the Governor of the Colony?—I do not think he is subordinate to the Governor of the Colony; I agree that it is most essential that the Admiral alone should be the judge of where his ships should be; it is quite right that the Governor should have the power of making demands upon him, but it should rest upon the responsibility of the Admiral whether he complies with those demands.

3081. Then the Governor cannot order him about?—To the best of my belief, certainly not.

3082. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] When you say the expense of a soldier in New Zealand is about 100*l.* a year, do you include in that the cost of transport?—No.

3083. You speak of the expense only which would fall upon the War Department?—Yes.

3084. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that the remark which you made as to colonists not supporting any part of a naval force, would apply also to their keeping block ships in their harbours as part of the local fortifications?—If they are stationary block ships it is a totally different thing, and they would, I believe, be very desirable, because the natural means for building forts in the sea do not in all instances exist, and therefore block ships would be a much more efficient defence than any other.

3085. You think it better that England should keep her fleet in the Channel rather than scatter it over the world; do you not think that the same remark applies to the army?—In the first place you have not quite correctly quoted my statement. What I said was, that I conceived that a Channel fleet is in reality the best defence for the protection of the Australian Colonies, inasmuch as they could only be attacked by a large fleet, which must proceed from Europe, and that it is far better that we should have the means of intercepting that fleet before it proceeded to attack Australia, or any other of our dependencies. I said that would be preferable to sending two or three ships to one place, and two or three to another, more especially, as with the electric telegraph, so extended and so extending, it would be an inevitable consequence that an enemy's fleet would take care to avoid those colonies in which they knew that we had a sufficient force, and attack those where we had few or none. The question with reference to the army stands upon totally different grounds. You may keep your army in England, but if an attack is intended upon Australia or anywhere else, that army can be no defence whatever to the Colonies.

3086. As a question between concentration or dispersion, does not the remark equally apply to the army. Would not the military attacking force come from Europe, and would not England be equally able to intercept it, or to arrive at the same place with reinforcements?—We might intercept them with our fleet; but the transport of troops would hamper our operations, because although under some circumstances the transport of troops in time of war is an unavoidable duty, for the navy it is a dangerous one.

3087. Would it not be equally dangerous to the attacking party?—Much more so to the defending party.

3088. I take it then to be your Grace's opinion that although the concentration of the fleet is a good naval policy, yet the concentration of the army would not be a good military policy?—It is a question of degree; I say I do not think that the two stand upon the same footing. I am not an advocate for the dispersion of our troops; on the contrary, I would concentrate them as far as I possibly could, and I have always acted upon that policy. In 1854 I withdrew a great number of our troops from the West Indian Colonies, and concentrated them as far as the circumstances of the West Indian Islands would permit; but

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I think you may carry that to an extent which would leave the Colonies entirely at the mercy of an enemy.

3089. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Although you would concentrate a fleet in the Channel, I do not understand that you would do that to the exclusion of squadrons in all parts of the world?—Certainly not; I was putting it as an extreme case, that when the Australian Colonies asked for a gun-boat here and a corvette there; I said for their own sakes we were in the habit of refusing such applications because I looked upon the Channel Fleet as the best defence; but of course you must keep an Atlantic Fleet, a West Indian Fleet, and a North American Fleet, and others besides, for the defence of your Colonies and for the protection of your commerce.

3090. Mr. *Adderley*.] I asked whether the remark which you made with reference to the navy, did not equally apply to the army as far as it went?—In my opinion it does not; I think that the concentration of both is desirable, but that the concentration is much more possible in the case of the navy than it can be in the case of the army.

3091. I do not know whether your Grace can answer any question of detail as to the alarm felt of a possible attack of New Caledonia upon Australia. It has been stated in evidence already, that the French keep a force there of 5,000 troops, whereas in one of Sir William Denison's recent Despatches, that force is represented at 500. It has been stated also that there were several ships of war, whereas Sir William Denison says there is only one corvette. Which of those statements is correct?—I believe neither of them. I believe that Sir William Denison's statement was nearly true at the time he wrote. I believe that at the date of that Despatch of his, the French force amounted to 600 or 700 men, and probably only one corvette; but since that time the French have reinforced New Caledonia; and I am not able to say what it amounts to, but I believe it is not 5,000. I think that two not very strong regiments have been sent there, and that the naval force is now greater than one corvette. They have a considerable number of small vessels in those seas.

3092. In the recently printed papers from New Zealand, I find that Colonel Gore Browne quotes Mr. Labouchere's Despatch of 1859 in these words: "It is not unreasonable to infer that in the case of a necessity arising for the defence of the Colony against aggression, or for the preservation of public tranquillity, the Imperial Government does not require a guarantee for the repayment of war expenses, but that the question is tacitly to be left for future adjustment between the mother country and the Colony, according to particular cases." The Governor then proceeds to give his own opinion. I believe the finances of the Colony are quite unable to meet such a demand; war causes expenditure, and at the same time destroys the means of defraying it, so that the settlers, though ready and willing to incur loss, and submit to hardships of war, necessarily depend upon the mother country they aid in their difficulties. I would ask your Grace whether the case has yet been decided as to the contribution which you have told us is the share which the Colony is to bear of the expense of this war, and also whether you think that the general proposition is the basis of our arrangements with that Colony, that we are to undertake the defence generally in case of war?—The arrangement as to the contribution 5 *l.* per man was made irrespective of the amount of force to be stationed in New Zealand, although it was undoubtedly proposed at a time when it was much smaller than it is now. I apprehend that that contribution would continue, and that that is the only contribution to which we have any distinct claim. At the same time that arrangement was advisedly made a provisional one and it was quite understood by the Colony, that it was open to revision and reconsideration at any time by the Imperial Government. As regards the other general question I think I have answered that I do consider the relationship of the mother country to a Colony does entail upon the mother country the duty of defending that Colony. The question was put in general terms, and if I am to answer it in equally general terms, that is the only answer I can give.

3093. Do you think that applies to wars with native tribes?—Undoubtedly it does; unless you are to return to the old commando system, which I do not think this country would ever tolerate. If you give liberty to every man to carry his rifle and to shoot every native he sees carrying off, however small a portion of his property, that might perhaps obviate the necessity for sending regiments.

3094. It

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3094. It has been stated by a witness before this Committee that the natives of New Zealand are much better riflemen than the colonists, and also that if England had not undertaken the war with the native tribes, there would have been no war at all; does your Grace agree with that?—Certainly not; in the first place, I cannot conceive who can have stated that the natives are better riflemen than the English. I disbelieve the assertion because so far as we are in possession of any information the amount of ammunition which the natives fire away ineffectually is beyond all precedent, either in savage or civilized warfare. They are described as firing from the hip, or anywhere where they can place the gun. In answer to the other part of the question, I do not believe that this country has been the instigator of New Zealand wars; on the contrary, I believe that the Imperial policy has tended to avert them, and that every Secretary of State has done everything he could, and so has every successive government, to prevent the recurrence of a native war.

3095. I meant to say that the effect of the evidence appeared to be, that if the Colonists had to defend themselves they would have prevented the war?—I do not believe it.

3096. I learn from the debates in the New Zealand Parliament, that the members for the Southern Island have declared that they have no interest in the war, and they decline to contribute men or money. Do you think that that is a good system, that such a war should be fought by the men and at the expense of the taxpayers of England, whilst one-half of the Colony itself declines, on the score of having no interest, to contribute either men or money?—I do not think that is a good system; but it is the consequence of the measure which was adopted when a constitution was given to New Zealand, which divides the responsibility and interests of that Colony into several parts. It is almost an inevitable consequence that those disputes as to interest in a war should arise.

3097. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Does not the same thing arise in all representative governments, and might not Scotland say that she has no interest in the wars carried on by England?—I was alluding to the provinces of New Zealand; each of those provinces has local interests, and, being divided into different provinces, the separate interests are not amalgamated as in other Colonies.

3098. Is not the south a remarkable instance of that in America?—Certainly.

3099. Mr. *Adderley.*] Your Grace will allow that every resident in New Zealand has a greater interest in the war than an English taxpayer?—No doubt.

3100. *Chairman.*] Does not the difference partly arise from the fact of there being scarcely any native population in the Middle Island?—That is the ground of their assertion, no doubt.

3101. Mr. *Baxter.*] You have spoken of a proposition by Victoria to pay the military expenditure of troops in the Colony. Was any answer sent to that proposition?—It was before my time, and I really do not know.

3102. Do you know whether they made any conditions?—No doubt there were conditions; but I should not like to express off hand an opinion upon the subject.

3103. *Chairman.*] Would you not qualify the statement you made just now as to the responsibility of the parent State in reference to wars in which a Colony might be involved by reason of the aggressive acts of warlike tribes, by limiting it to those cases in which the parent State had given the first encouragement to emigrants to settle there?—If no steps are taken by the British Government to recognise British settlers, such as those in New Guinea, as British subjects they would have no claim, but if your question applies to New Zealand, I think that the Colony has as great a claim as any other, because, although the original colonists were not authorised by the Government of this country, subsequent events have identified the Government with the Colony.

3104. Mr. *Roebuck.*] May your opinion be stated in these terms, that the mother country, having assumed the Government of the Colony, takes upon itself all the responsibility of its defence?—Certainly.

3105. Mr. *Adderley.*] Does the fact of the Colony, having a representative Government, alter that relation?—Not in the slightest; in the event of war with hostile tribes, or with civilised nations, that may form an important element in the bargain which you make with them, when you give them responsible Government, as to the amount of troops, or who shall pay for them; but I do not think that it alters the relative positions of mother country and Colony.

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3106. Mr. *Roebuck.*] No responsibility given to a Colony gives it the responsibility of declaring war?—Certainly not.

3107. The power, therefore, of declaring war imposes upon the Government the responsibility of protecting the Colony from the cost of war?—Certainly.

3108. Mr. *Adderley.*] You would not say that England declared war with the Maories or the Kafirs?—Of course not; that is a technical difference.

3109. *Chairman.*] Are there not three classes of dangers to which Colonies are subjected, and against which the parent State is responsible for protecting them, namely, foreign aggression, domestic disturbance, and the aggression of warlike tribes; should you say that that is a correct statement of the classes of dangers to which Colonies are exposed, and against which the parent State is called upon to protect them?—No doubt it represents the different dangers to which a Colony is exposed, but as regards the claim upon the mother country, it is mostly, if not altogether, confined to the first and last of those three. Although, no doubt, Imperial troops would be used for the suppression of internal commotion in the event of there being any, I do not think that that is one of the duties which devolves upon the mother country.

3110. We have heard that the troops were sent from Nova Scotia to Sydney, to act in case of a riot?—The troops being there you could not confine them to barracks, and allow the mob to fight it out.

3111. Sir *George Grey.*] In this country, troops may of course be called upon to aid the police?—Quite so; but I believe every Secretary of State has resisted the position that troops are kept in the Colonies to do the duties of the police.

3112. *Chairman.*] It is a different thing to use the troops for such purposes, if they happen to be there, from sending them there for the purpose of suppressing such disturbances?—Certainly.

3113. Mr. *Marsh.*] You say there is some risk incurred in sending troops by transports in time of war; is it not more expensive in time of war, than under ordinary circumstances?—No doubt it is, but I do not know that I should attach great weight to that economical view of the question; my answer applied more to the question of efficiency than the question of expense.

3114. Mr. *Fortescue.*] As regards New Zealand, would you not be inclined to say that the more the local government is allowed to assume the control of the local policy towards the natives, the stronger is the claim of the Home Government to colonial contribution towards the cost of wars which may be the result of that policy?—Certainly.

3115. *Chairman.*] Although there has been a reduction at the Cape, in the strength of the Imperial army during the last six years, since the German legion was sent out, it appears that there are at present 4,788 British troops at the Cape?—Yes.

3116. Would you say that the main object of those troops is to afford security against the outbreak of another Kafir War, or what do you suppose is the main object of keeping so large a force there?—That no doubt is the main object; it is the peculiar position of that colony to be surrounded by warlike tribes, which, although weakened and more civilized and much better affected towards us than they were, are very powerful, and have exhibited a considerable amount of hostility.

3117. A portion of that force consists of the Cape Mounted Rifles which, I believe, is a force borne upon the strength of the British army; evidence has been given that that force is now recruited from a different element than formerly; have you any knowledge of the present constitution of that force, and whether it is of a satisfactory nature?—I do not think that its nature is very unsatisfactory, but I believe it is not quite so efficient as it was; those who understand the Colony best are of opinion that the mounted police force is in many respects better than the mounted rifles, the reason being, that the rifles are a regiment with an army organization; they have their commissariat, and if a detachment, however small, is ordered off, they must have all their commissariat arrangements or they would starve; whereas the mounted police force is constructed on a system of individuality, and if you order one of them off, he carries with him his provender and provisions, altogether independent of farther aid; they can maintain themselves in the post to which they are sent.

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3118. With the exception of that mounted police called, I think, Currie's Police, of about 400 men, there is no force maintained at the cost of the colony?—I believe that is so.

3119. The cost of the military defences of the Cape is borne by the Imperial Exchequer?—Yes.

3120. I think it has been stated that on the average of the last 10 years, with or without Kafir wars, the Imperial cost for defending the Cape Colony has amounted to something between half a million and three quarters of a million sterling per annum?—I should think about that.

3121. Do you see any means by which, consistently with what would be the interests of the Colony and of the empire, that cost can be reduced?—As regards the interest of the Colony, I hope that a state of things is arising which will enable us materially to reduce the amount of force still further; it has been reduced to a smaller amount than it has been for many years, but I think it may be reduced by the policy pursued out there of frontier defences, and by measures which have been taken, some at the expense of the British Government for civilizing the natives and preventing wars; I think that those measures have prevented another Kafir war within the last six or seven years, but it must always be borne in mind that an increase in the military force frequently takes place in that Colony as much for Imperial as for Colonial purposes. The Cape is an admirable station for troops; it is a very central and a very healthy station. In the event of an unquiet condition of the world it is a good place for a reserve of troops. If we had a sufficient force it would be the best point from which to send troops to New Zealand, and in short to a great many of our Colonies; I am not saying that a force ought always to be kept up for that purpose, but if you were able to reduce the force for colonial purposes, it may be desirable at times for Imperial interests to keep up a larger force there than you have now.

3122. For Imperial purposes, and looking at the value of the Cape as protecting the course of our trade and so on, it would not be necessary to maintain so large a South African Colony as we now have, unless there were other circumstances which altogether apart from Imperial considerations bind us to it?—Certainly not; most of our Colonies which are not limited by the sea have gradually extended, not only without the intention, but contrary to the intention of the Imperial Government. It is a process of growth which is uncontrollable.

3123. Do you think it possible that any contrivance of frontier posts, with a frontier line of about 1,000 miles, the greater portion of which is liable to incursions from Kafir tribes, can afford us any guarantee against the recurrence of a Kafir war?—I should say not absolutely against a Kafir war, but I think we may render it improbable by a good line of policy steadily adhered to.

3124. Are the frontier posts all along the line of the frontier of the Cape?—To a certain extent you may say they are all along the north-eastern frontier, but they are more thickly placed where the tribes are more hostile.

3125. We have had some rather conflicting evidence before us upon the question of whether it is the interest of a certain portion of the Cape colonists, the western colonists, to keep up the agitation, as far as they can, of Kafir wars for the sake of the pecuniary advantage they derive from the expenditure. From your official knowledge should you say that that has been the case?—I should say to a certain degree it has; but I think that the charge against the colonists has been exaggerated. In every community some men must reap large advantages from a war expenditure, and may be sufficiently selfish to wish it; but I do not think that that remark applies very strongly to the Colonies. With reference to New Zealand, I do not think that there is any desire there to provoke war; on the contrary, I think that their interests are as much opposed to war as ours.

3126. Do you think that the presence of an Imperial force in the Colony tends to make the colonists less circumspect in their conduct towards the natives?—No doubt, to a certain extent, that must be the tendency.

3127. Do you think that we are likely to follow the line of policy which was adopted as regards the Orange River sovereignty?—I do not; the tendency is all the other way I am sorry to say.

3128. In a military point of view, do you think that any inconvenience arises from the association of Natal with the Cape Colony, and from its being still

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governed by the Governor of the Cape Colony as Governor in Chief?—That government in chief is not so very material as you suppose: the power is no doubt greater than in the case of Canada with the Lower Provinces; but at the same time the Lieutenant Governor has, for all practical purposes, an independent government.

3129. Mr. *Fortescue.*] And he corresponds directly, does he not, with the Secretary of State?—Yes, and that is the broad distinction; where they are dependent governments they correspond through the Governor in Chief.

3130. Lord *Stanley.*] I think you spoke of the Cape as a half-way house to India. Do you consider that it has retained its importance in that respect since the improvement of steam navigation?—Certainly not; if I used the expression it was simply in reference to troops. I consider that, in our connexion with India, it is less important than it was half a century ago.

3131. At the time that the Cape was taken possession of, it was considered, was it not, that no vessel could go to India without touching there?—Yes.

3132. You spoke of the Cape as an advantageous station for a reserve of troops?—Yes.

3133. You did not mean that they would be more serviceable there than in any other part of the world for European service?—I only say that in a disturbed state of the world, when you may be expecting difficulties in New Zealand, or India, or anywhere else, that then it is a healthy good station at which to keep a reserve of troops, and that that has been the policy occasionally before. I think, therefore, that it is not right, whenever you find an increased force at the Cape, to lay that to the charge of a disturbed state of the Cape.

3134. As regards India, in which case your argument applies most strongly, is it the fact, taking into consideration the absence of any telegraphic communication between India and the Cape, that troops could be more readily made available from the Cape than from home by the overland route?—If you could insure the overland route under all circumstances, certainly not; but when the mutiny broke out it was of the first importance to us that we happened to have at that moment a force of 11,000 men at the Cape. It enabled Sir George Grey to send off to India a very considerable force which arrived, and was of the greatest possible value, before any troops could arrive from England.

3135. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is not the climate of the Cape very good for seasoning troops?—No doubt.

3136. Would it not be very advantageous to pass troops through the Cape to India instead of sending them direct from Europe?—If consistently with the arrangements at the Horse Guards such a system could be adopted, I believe it would be attended with considerable advantages.

3137. And with no danger of desertion?—None whatever, or very little.

3138. *Chairman.*] Do you think it possible to keep at the Cape, but at the charge of the Indian revenue, any portion of the 70,000 troops now considered necessary for garrisoning India?—Not being Secretary of State for India I would rather not express an opinion upon that. I think it is a matter well worthy of the consideration of the Indian Government.

3139. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that, although the cost would be defrayed by the Indian Government to the Cape, the same troops ought to be paid for by the English Government?—I consider that troops kept at the Cape, with a view to Imperial purposes, ought not to be charged to the Colony.

3140. Do you extend that opinion to all the troops now at the Cape, the expense of which is defrayed by us?—I do not say that now the Cape is increasing in wealth the Cape ought not to bear some portion of the cost. I consider that the force kept at the Cape is so very largely for colonial purposes that we have a strong claim upon the Cape, within reason of course, for assistance, stronger than we have upon Canada for a contribution towards the very limited amount of force kept there, as I maintain, for Imperial purposes.

3141. You consider it an unsatisfactory state of things that at this moment the transport of troops to the Cape, and their maintenance there, is entirely paid by England?—Yes; I think that the time has come when the Cape ought to make a contribution; and I have been in correspondence with the Governor of the Cape upon the subject for the reduction of the Imperial expense, and with a view to obtaining a contribution from the Cape towards the cost of the troops maintained there.

3142. You have given it as your opinion, that for native warfare the mounted police

police force, which is paid for by the colonists, is the best force?—For the preservation of the peace, but not in the event of a Kafir war; in that case regular troops must be provided. For the preservation of peace and the prevention of outrages, I consider the police far the most efficient.

3143. *Chairman.*] Supposing a large force, say 4,000 or 5,000 men, were still maintained at the Cape, do you think that some equitable arrangement might be made by which, whenever the troops were called out for colonial purposes, a proportion of their cost should be borne by the Colony?—I think that some arrangement of that kind would be very equitable.

3144. Mr. *FitzGerald.*] Is the mounted police a military force?—I do not know how they are dressed; they are a quasi military force, the great distinction being that they have not the same military organization as a regiment has; they provide their own horses, and they provide for themselves and their horses.

3145. Have they Her Majesty's commissions?—They have not.

3146. *Chairman.*] Do you not consider that there exists in the Colony the *personnel* for a force which might be employed in frontier wars?—They have volunteers lately raised; but I do not think that they would be able to raise any other local force, for the reason which I have stated exists in other Colonies, namely, that the demand for labour is so great that it is impossible to keep soldiers in the form of a local force.

3147. May I ask you, whether you think that Ceylon might not be advantageously placed on the same footing with the Indian Presidencies, and the forces paid out of their own revenues?—I am not prepared to say, that after a short time it may not be so. Ceylon has lately become exceedingly prosperous, and its revenue is rapidly increasing. In the Presidencies, the sphere is very much larger, and the richer districts counterbalance the poorer ones.

3148. Lord *Stanley.*] The prosperity of Ceylon, I think, dates within the last six or seven years?—Within less time than that, I think.

3149. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given about fortifications. I would ask you, whether you think that the works which, as appears from the Army Estimates, have been in progress in the Mauritius, are necessary?—I think that it is very desirable to have a well-considered plan of fortifications in the Mauritius, but I think that it is very easy indeed to overdo it. I am not in favour of a very extensive system of fortifications for the Mauritius. The Mauritius must in the long run depend upon the fleet; and although I think it important that we should have a certain amount of fortification to enable the troops we maintain there to hold their position until relieved by a fleet, still I should be sorry to see fortifications carried too far, because I should look upon them then rather as a source of danger than as a protection to the Colony.

3150. Have you seen Lord Grey's evidence upon the subject of fortifications?—I read it very hurriedly, the night before last.

3151. Some evidence was given also as to fortifications in the Bahamas. Do you think that the rate of expenditure on colonial fortifications is satisfactory, or do you think that we have been overdoing it?—I do not think that we have been; but I think that there is a tendency to do so. I do not see the advantage of fortifications in the Bahamas; when I say that, I mean, any extensive system of fortifications. I have myself been the instigator of a fortification, so to call it, which is for the protection of the coal-mines of Sydney, Cape Breton, which I look upon as very important; they are exposed to the attack of a privateer, which could, without landing, destroy the works, and deprive us of the use of coal during the first year of a war. At my suggestion, but at the expense, in the main, of the proprietors of that mine, a small battery is to be erected; it will be no expense to the mother country, beyond a grant of guns; but I thought it desirable. At the same time I should be sorry to see fortifications carried to such an extent as to require an increase of troops, without which increase they would be a source of danger rather than of safety.

3152. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you not think that the application of steam to navigation makes it less necessary to provide our distant Colonies against any attack from without, it being more difficult for foreign vessels to reach those Colonies?—Certainly.

3153. Lord *Stanley.*] According to the last returns, the present force in the West Indies is 4,500 men?—Yes.

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3154. Will you state whether you consider that so large a force is necessary for their defence, and for what purpose it is maintained?—At the present moment it could not, I think, be greatly reduced; it has been much reduced at different times. Upon the breaking out of the Russian war I reduced the force considerably, and also concentrated the troops which were left there; and I should hope that before long a further concentration might be possible. I should consider it a more perfect system if the troops were confined to two posts, say Jamaica and Barbadoes; but I am not sure whether that course could be adopted, looking at the prevailing winds and the difficulties which encircle the Colonies, without a system of telegraphs. If our West Indian possessions could be united by an inter-insular telegraph, the concentration of the troops would be desirable.

3155. Would it not be a more economical and efficient mode, if you had an inter-insular telegraph, to keep steam-vessels at their stations, paying for their expense by reducing the troops to a proportionate extent?—Yes, I think that might be made an economical measure.

3156. By steam, the Bahamas might be reached from Barbadoes, in two days and a half?—Yes, I should think so.

3157. And from Antigua, in about the same space of time?—I should suppose so.

3158. No great mischief could take place before the troops arrived there?—Not if the police on the other islands were made efficient.

3159. I believe it is a recognised rule of colonial policy, that troops should not be used for local police?—Yes; but where you have small posts of troops in the West Indies the tendency is not to make the police so efficient as it should be.

3160. Mr. *Marsh.*] Would there not be great difficulty in laying down a telegraph cable on account of the cutting of the coral reefs?—I should think not.

3161. Mr. *Adderley.*] I see that the troops have been employed in Honduras against a Spanish attack?—Not against a Spanish attack. I am anxious to take this occasion to correct what I understand has been stated by some witnesses before this Committee, that so far as the West Indies are concerned troops are never wanted for any other purpose than for the suppression of disturbances. That is not the case, they have been wanted for other purposes, and the instance to which you refer is one; it was an attack by the Santa Cruz Indians, who having entered Belize, committed various outrages there, and upon the superintendent sending four English officers to demand satisfaction, those officers were ill-treated, and I believe escaped with their lives with some difficulty. Application was immediately made to the Governor of Jamaica, who sent off two vessels with 350 men on board. Those troops, therefore, in that instance were not called upon to suppress disturbances amongt the subjects of the colony, but to resist foreign aggression.

3162. Lord *Stanley.*] Amongst all the West Indian Islands have you not named the only one in which attacks from native tribes could be apprehended?—Yes; but by no means by others. The instance I am now about to give was also at Belize, but it might have occurred at any other. Last year the Filibuster Walker was about to make an attack somewhere, and troops were sent to Belize, and luckily arrived 24 hours before he appeared there, in consequence of which he went on and attacked another place. That attack might have been contemplated upon any other Colony. I do not know that Belize is the only one, because Guiana is to some extent in the same position.

3163. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are there not American settlements in that part also?—Yes.

3164. Does it not afford a contrast with our system that the American settlers have never any protection from federal troops, but defend themselves?—There may be American settlers, but they are not settled upon territory which the United States claim. They are American subjects exercising their calling in the territory of another power.

3165. It is the fact, is it not, that they not only defend themselves, but are rather aggressive?—I am not aware that they can be considered aggressive. Some of their proceedings are very questionable, but outrages have generally been committed by filibusters from the United States.

3166. Sir *George Grey.*] Are they not in the same situation as Englishmen settled in territories without the encouragement of the Government?—No doubt.

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3167. Mr. *Adderley*.] But they are able to defend themselves?—I have not heard that they have had to defend themselves.

3168. *Chairman*.] Evidence has been given before this Committee as to a change made in the system of recruiting the West India regiments: I wish to know whether you think that the present system is advantageous?—Decidedly not so advantageous; the regiments are not so good now as they were, but at the same time I am perfectly willing to say that my own impressions are favourable to the black troops, notwithstanding that there are different opinions. Some West Indian Governors believe that they are not to be trusted, but others who have had the greatest experience, lean to the opinion that they are perfectly trustworthy. There is no instance, that I am aware of, of anything like disaffection among them; nor have any of the quarrels taken the form of quarrels between black and white, or between one class of the population and another. They are very excitable as well as very simple people, and are liable to rows and disturbances which more steady soldiers might not be; but almost all the disturbances that have taken place have arisen out of quarrels about women, and matters of that kind. They are now dressed as Zouaves, and that dress is said, in one of the reports I have received, to be most effective with the female population, so that the rows are more frequent. Upon the whole I have great confidence in the black troops; a great deal depends upon the officers, as was the case with the sepoy regiments. If these men are well commanded they are good troops, but with the small number of officers we have, and the necessary absence of many from ill health, they are not efficiently commanded. There are so many officers away on leave, and others sick, and those who are not sick are so wearied with the duties that they have to perform, that they have not a fair chance. So far from considering them bad troops, I may mention that the matter is now under consideration between the Commander in Chief, the Secretary of State for War, and myself, whether we should not make an arrangement by which we should be enabled to increase the number of officers, thereby making these regiments more efficient.

3169. Mr. *Adderley*.] Do you not think that the last despatches from the Governor of Antigua show an unwillingness on the part of the Colony to raise volunteer forces?—I do not; there is a very great zeal throughout the whole of our colonies to form a volunteer corps. We have the most favourable reports from many of the West Indian Islands, and some of them support even yeomanry corps. I am not sure whether Antigua is not one of the islands in which a yeomanry force exists.

3170. The returns laid before the Committee of the force in the British dependencies from 1851 to 1861, exhibit considerable fluctuations, and not a progressive reduction; do you think that that is a correct statement?—The tendency for many years past has been reduction; but of course it must be taken into account that we have had new colonies starting up; New Zealand, for instance, is a modern Colony.

3171. Looking through the list, I observe that between 1851 and 1861 there has been in some a decrease, in some an increase, and in others decrease and progressive reduction?—I have not lately made that comparison; but speaking generally, I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to this fact, that the increase is in those which, although termed Colonies, are actually military stations, and that the decrease has been in those which are Colonies properly so called. I think that the public are frequently under a misapprehension upon that point. In the return now before me, I find that the present amount of military force in what are called Colonies, is stated at 44,581; but if you subtract from that number those troops which are in purely military stations, and those which are maintained at the expense of the colonies, you will find that the real force maintained at the expense of this country is very little more than 20,000. The whole amount of force being 44,581, there are at this moment in the Mediterranean garrisons 17,350; in Halifax, which I have already said is distinctly an imperial garrison, 1,819; in Bermuda, which stands in the same position, 1,071; at St. Helena, 756; and in the Mauritius, where the force is maintained almost exclusively for imperial purposes, 1,970. That gives a total of 22,986, and if you subtract that from 44,581 it is clear that we maintain in the Colonies, properly so called, a force of only 21,595. That includes three regiments sent to New Zealand for the special purpose of the war. I believe that that number of 21,595 in-

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cludes the Ceylon force, and other small forces not paid out of the Imperial Exchequer.

3172. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you consider the Ionian Islands an Imperial post?—Distinctly so; it is not even a Colony.

3173. *Chairman.*] Although we might consider a portion of the force at the Mauritius of the same nature as that maintained in the Mediterranean garrisons, should you think it right to subtract altogether the force at Halifax and the Mauritius from the Colonial force, seeing the troops are maintained there not exclusively as garrisons?—Some allowance should be made; but as to that there is a very good test. In New Brunswick, where troops are more especially required, on account of the character of the population of St. John's, the number of troops, I think, is 150; and in Halifax and the Mauritius all you would want for Colonial purposes, would be just some small force as a guard of honour to the Governor, and for the preservation of peace in the event of any local disturbance; probably a couple of hundreds of men would be more than sufficient.

3174. Looking at these returns, should you not say, distinguishing, if you please, the garrisons from colonies, that it would be more correct to say that there had been a fluctuation in the amount of force rather than a progressive reduction?—No doubt there has been an oscillation; but taking any dates within the last 20 years, omitting new colonies formed since, I think you will find that, upon the whole, a smaller force has been maintained in the colonies than formerly.

3175. Do you think it correct to say that the force which we keep in the Colonies is kept there, in a great measure, for colonial purposes, that is to say, that we find it necessary to maintain a standing army of some amount, and that as we have colonies in which some portion of that army can be placed, we consult our own convenience as to where we station the troops?—That is perfectly true, no doubt.

3176. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not the fact that the whole force in the Colonies in the present year is not greater than it was 30 years ago?—Speaking from memory, I should say decidedly so.

3177. Although in the mean time there has been an immense accession to our Colonial empire?—Immense.

3178. Mr. *Adderley.*] I understand you anticipate a great increase of our Colonial empire; do you think that our present system of undertaking the defence of our Colonies, as contradistinguished from the old system of leaving the colonists to defend themselves, has not thrown upon this country a proportionate increase of expenditure?—I have no apprehension of any extension of our Colonial empire, that is to say, the acquirement of any land not now belonging to us, in any other Colony than the Cape; civilization in the territories already belonging to us will no doubt go on; but I do not apprehend that any unavoidable extension, as far as it goes, need entail or ought to entail any increased military expenditure; any extension in the shape of acquisition of territory ought to be with a view of preventing, and not inducing war.

3179. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Has not our Colonial empire extended within the last 30 years, without a corresponding increase in our military force maintained in the Colonies?—Certainly it has.

Lunæ, 27° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Arthur Mills.	Mr. C. Fortescue.
Mr. Adderley.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Baxter.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Marsh.	Sir James Fergusson.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Rear Admiral *Erskine*, called in; and Examined.

3180. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you command a division in the Channel Fleet?—I command a division in the Channel Fleet.

3181. What commands have you held on foreign stations at different times?—I have commanded two sloops of war and two line-of-battle ships in the West Indies for eight or nine years altogether, and I have had charge of the Australian station for three years; I have also commanded ships in the Mediterranean and Baltic.

3182. Did you ever turn your attention at all to the comparative cost of military and naval defences in our West Indian Colonies?—I have seen the returns which have been made from time to time, and I have contrasted the expenses per head of soldiers compared with those of a naval defence, and I think I can give pretty nearly the amount.

3183. Now, taking the West Indian Colonies, including the Leeward Islands, such as Guiana and Jamaica, can you give any evidence as to the cost per man in all or any of these Colonies?—I find that the cost per man in Jamaica, including barracks and all expenses, amounted to about 80*l.* per head; and in the Windward and Leeward Islands, 101*l.* per head. That includes Barbadoes, Granada, St. Vincent, &c.

3184. I think I understood you to say that you had gone into the subject with a view to compare the naval and military force?—Just so.

3185. Have you at all considered whether by any means the defence of the West Indian Colonies might be provided for more efficiently, as well as more economically, by a naval than by a military force?—As far as the external defences of the West Indian Colonies go, it appears to me that a naval defence is the only defence that is worth considering at present; because the troops, except in Jamaica, are so very much dispersed, that they could never form any efficient defence against such a number of troops as an enemy would bring to any particular point. There are no fortresses of any consequence; at least, there were not four years ago. I do not know what they may have done since then. There are no fortifications of consequence in the West Indies, with the exception of a few forts in Jamaica, and those would not be able to stand a regular siege.

3186. Do you know what the naval force at present is on the West Indian station?—It is impossible to say exactly what is on the West Indian station, because it is conjoined with the North American, but the two together are 223 guns and 2,895 men; but that includes the floating battery at Bermuda, which cannot be moved from it.

3187. Evidence has been given before this Committee of the fact that the troops in the West Indies are considered as employed more to avert the consequences of internal disturbance, than as against a foreign foe; now looking to the maintenance of the internal tranquillity of the Islands, and the general purposes of the defence, could you suggest any means by which our naval arrangements might be modified, or altered in any way so as to meet the necessities of the case, and dispense with a portion of the military force?—Supposing it were determined to adopt naval means alone, for the defence of the West Indies, I see no difficulty whatever in keeping a body of marines at any one barrack, which is now occupied by troops, which could be moved about by the command of the officer on the station.

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3188. What suggestion would you make as to where that force should be stationed?—At present I should suggest the most healthy situations, which I believe would be Barbadoes to windward, and Jamaica to leeward.

3189. Can you make any estimate of the cost per man on the West India station, assuming that the defences were mostly or entirely naval?—Yes, the naval expense may be considered pretty nearly the same upon all stations, because the provisions are generally supplied from England, with the exception of fresh provisions, and I find that calculating wages, provisions, freight, wear and tear of ship and engines, stores, including masts and rigging, and all increased ordnance stores, current departmental expenses, and share of non-effective services at home, the highest cost would be 106*l.* per man. But I find in to-day's paper that by a return of the estimated cost of the whole African squadron during the last year, the Admiralty have only calculated that 5,443 men have cost 458,423*l.*, which is not quite 85*l.* per man.

3190. Does that include the same items?—Wear and tear of ship &c., I presume, but they probably omitted the share of non-effective services, I am not sure; but if one says 100*l.* per man, or 106*l.*, I am sure it would be the maximum. I mean that if it were proposed to add 1,000 men and two 50-gun frigates, 106,000*l.* would be the amount you would have to add to the estimates.

3191. Have you considered what number of men you think necessary for the defence of the West Indian Colonies, on your system, supposing it was entirely a marine force?—I should not like to give an opinion upon the subject. It is such an extensive station that I should not like to say without much greater consideration; but, considering now that the total is about 4,000 men, I should think that two-thirds of a naval force would be far more efficient for the protection of the islands than the same number of troops stationary there.

3192. Do you think that with a view to the contingency of a foreign invasion, supposing such a contingency to be possible, the troops now stationed on these islands are of the slightest use whatever?—I should think not the slightest.

3193. You know Bermuda, I think?—Yes, I do.

3194. Are you aware of all the schemes which have been projected from time to time within recent years for an increase of the fortifications in Bermuda?—There was a very extensive increase proposed in the year 1857. A plan was given to me to read, because I was then in command of a 90-gun ship, and I was ordered to leave as many of my heavy guns as I could spare, for the purpose of forming the additional fortifications, and I think it included an addition of nearly 200 guns to the present fortifications. Every beach was proposed to be defended by strong batteries, and every entrance that a fishing boat could take, with the exception of one, was proposed to be shut up. There was a naval officer on that Commission, Admiral Mundy, who is now in the Mediterranean.

3195. Should you be of opinion that, if at any time, we were to lose our naval supremacy, Bermuda would be of the slightest use to us?—I cannot see what advantage it would be to retain Bermuda, except as a mere depôt for our ships which might be employed against the Coast of America.

3196. The value of Bermuda depends upon our maintaining our naval force?—I think so.

3197. Should you apply the same remark to Halifax?—Halifax has an harbour, certainly; but Halifax, from its proximity to the United States, of course, is put in a different category.

3198. Have you been in British Guiana at all?—Never.

3199. I think you said you had been on the Australian station?—Yes, I was there for three years.

3200. Can you tell me what is now the naval force on the Australian station?—The naval force on the Australian station, at present, is one ship of 21 guns, one of 15, and two of 17, altogether mounting 70 guns, and manned by 795 men. There are besides, three ships ordered home, but I believe at this moment they are kept, in consequence of the New Zealand war; they would amount to nearly 50 guns and 600 men.

3201. Have you made any comparative estimate of the present cost of the military defence of any of the Australian Colonies, and what you think might be the cost of defending them efficiently by a naval force?—Yes.

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3202. Do you know what is the total cost per man incurred by the Colony, and that incurred by the Imperial Government, in New South Wales, for instance?—Yes; in New South Wales the total cost per man is 141 *l.*, of which the Colony pay 80 *l.*

3203. And in Victoria?—In Victoria the amount is as high as 157 *l.*, of which the Colony pay 106 *l.*

3204. Now supposing that these two Colonies, and the Australian Colonies generally, could be effectually defended by a naval force, have you made any estimate of what would be the cost per man of such naval force?—I should say about 106 *l.* per man; that is exactly the proportion which Victoria pays for a soldier to the Imperial Government; provisions used to be excessively cheap, and coals are not particularly expensive.

3205. Have you made any calculation of the comparative cost of any of the other Australian Colonies?—In Tasmania it is 127 *l.*, and the Colony pays nothing.

3206. Now, in the event of the Australian Colonies approving of such an arrangement, and the Imperial Government adopting it, do you think, looking at it as a naval officer, that there would be any difficulty in securing the defence of the Colonies against foreign aggression by a naval power?—Not in the least.

3207. What should you say would be the greatest danger to which these Colonies are exposed, so far as your knowledge goes?—The only possible danger would be from France, because she now possesses New Caledonia.

3208. What force has France there?—I am not aware, but I think she has 400 or 500 troops.

3209. You do not know how many guns?—I have tried to discover, but I have failed in discovering what amount of force she has there.

3210. But at all events you think that the main, in fact the only danger that the Australian Colonies have to apprehend from foreign aggression, would be from that source?—The only possible one I should think, from their great distance from any other nation.

3211. In the event of any dispute between this country and France, and that dispute spreading to our Colonial empire, in what way should you think it most probable that the colonists would be likely to be punished?—As every ship which leaves New South Wales or Victoria, now carries a very considerable quantity of gold, the object of course would be to cut off our gold ships.

3212. Do you think they would be much more likely to cut off our gold ships than to attack Sydney?—Clearly; I do not see what they could gain by attacking Sydney.

3213. You gave, I think, a general answer that you thought, that supposing we should have a sufficient naval force to protect the West Indian Islands, and the Australian Colonies, that the cost would not be more than two-thirds of that now incurred in their defence?—In some cases, I do not think it would be quite so much; for instance, at Bermuda, at present the estimated cost is 100,336 *l.* with 1,188 men as a garrison; in addition to that, one must add "The Terror," a floating battery, which is an immovable vessel, and can only move up and down in smooth waters; the whole of the expense would then be 106,700 *l.*; now, I should think Bermuda would be much more efficiently defended by five ships with 10 guns, and 100 men each, which would only cost 53,000 *l.*

3214. Then you think it may be said generally, that a seaman with his movable fortress costs about two-thirds of the cost of a soldier with his fixed fortress?—Not taking them in equal numbers; numerically, the men at Bermuda cost 84 *l.* a head, whereas I have taken 106 *l.* for the navy generally, although I believe it to be an over estimate.

3215. You think that the practical result would be, supposing adequate provisions were made for the defences, that the cost of a naval power would not be more than two-thirds of the cost of a military power?—I think not.

3216. Do you know whether the Cape is now used as a place of call for ships, as it used to be formerly?—Comparatively little.

3217. Have you any acquaintance with any of the Eastern Colonies, Ceylon or the Mauritius?—None whatever.

3218. Mr. *Marsh.*] Your calculation, I think, is 106 *l.* for each sailor; that includes coal and everything connected with the ship?—I can give you the items. *Vide* Appendix.

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3219. I want to know, with regard to your estimate for the soldiers, does that include the dead weight of the non-effective service attached to it?—It does.

3220. With regard to forts in Bermuda, how many soldiers would it take to defend them in case of foreign attack, the forts in contemplation and those already built?—I think the estimated garrison was to be at least 5,000 men, after the fortifications were complete.

3221. You mentioned just now that a certain number of small vessels would be quite as effective as this?—Perhaps not so effective as 5,000 men, but more effective than the present garrison, which is only 1,188.

3222. Now, you have had some experience, no doubt, in moving military forces by sea; there is some difficulty in getting them on board, and so on; there is more difficulty than in moving marines, is there not?—There is a divided responsibility, and the military and naval commanders must agree between themselves upon that point.

3223. The governor of each Colony has the command of the military force?—Yes.

3224. But not of the naval force at all?—No.

3225. Then, supposing you had to defend the West Indies, it would be desirable to take troops from one part to another, where an attack was supposed to be meditated?—Yes.

3226. In that case, if there were military to be moved, the governor of the island from which you wished to take them might refuse to allow them to go?—Certainly.

3227. But if they were marines they would be taken at once?—Certainly.

3228. I need not ask you whether that is not a great advantage with regard to the defence of the West Indies?—Certainly.

3229. Now, do you think that a frigate, with 250 men, could enter the harbour of Sydney, if there were 500 soldiers defending it?—With steam, I think, she certainly might, though she might not pass up to the town.

3230. But supposing you were there with another frigate, with 250 men?—

3231. Marines, I suppose, are very good artillerymen?—They are trained to it.

3232. Have you any means of ascertaining what sort of artillerymen the soldiers of the line are?—I believe they are all trained now to batteries.

3233. Should you think they were as efficient as marines?—No, I should think not, because the marines' drill is constant.

3234. Do you know the number of troops that are now at Sydney?—Nine hundred, I think.

3235. Do you think they would be sufficient to prevent a frigate from entering the heads, or from landing men at Botany Bay?—From landing men at Botany Bay, certainly not; with new batteries they might prevent a frigate from coming up to the town.

3236. But they could not prevent a frigate from landing men at Botany Bay?—Certainly not; it would be impossible.

3237. But a frigate with 25 guns could?—Certainly, it could prevent another frigate coming in.

3238. There are other places on the coast of Australia likely to be attacked, such as Newcastle, to which the military at Sydney would afford no defence?—No, there would be no defence without a naval force.

3239. A naval defence would be most complete?—Yes.

3240. Whereas the military in New South Wales can only defend one point the same amount of money expended upon naval defences would defend the whole coast?—I think so; at this moment the force in Victoria is reduced from 1,800 men to a few men, a regiment having been removed to New Zealand, so that Victoria is denuded of troops altogether, and has not the means of defending any portion of her coast.

3241. Supposing that the Colony of Australia, with its present trade of something like 40 millions a year, were in the hands of a foreign power, do you think then that a naval defence of our commerce with Australia would be required in a still greater degree than it is now?—It would be necessary to keep up a greater force, because we must calculate upon the foreign naval force.

3242. Do

3242. Do you think it would be desirable under these circumstances to have fortresses, with marines or soldiers at certain points, and dockyards also, as we have at Hong Kong?—That has been our experience.

3243. Do you know what it costs to protect our commerce with South America?—I do not remember what the squadron in the Pacific is; but it is a much larger squadron than that in Australia, whilst the amount of our trade I should think with South America, is not one-half.

3244. Do you consider that the military stationed in our Colonies adds at all to the real strength of the nation?—In such Colonies as I have been speaking of, so far as I know, the military forces are employed purely for police purposes.

3245. But supposing the same amount of money, or even two-thirds of the amount of money, were expended upon the naval defence of the Colony, would not that add considerably to our power as a nation?—To our naval power, decidedly.

3246. Mr. *Adderley.*] You mean in case of hostilities with any foreign power?—Yes.

3247. In time of peace no such convoys of merchandise are required?—We always require to keep up a squadron in South America, because there are so many powers constantly in a state of revolution that it is necessary to have a force there to prevent any improper interference with our trade. The same thing would happen if Australia were in the hands of another nation.

3248. We are at a certain expense in defending Canada; but supposing Canada were incorporated into the United States, would our expenses be increased or diminished in time of war?—Your expenses must increase, because you must have your territory protected in the event of the Americans committing any aggression upon your trade, which now there is no apprehension of.

3249. If Canada were incorporated into the United States, the only difference in time of peace would be, that we should no longer have to garrison it?—I may give as an instance, that we have a dispute with Spain now, I believe, for detaining two of our vessels at Gibraltar, nearly under the guns of the fortress; and the result has been, that we have had two frigates sent out there to protect our trade.

3250. When we are at war with any state, I presume that we are at greater expense than during a time of peace. The question is, whether a Colony would be more expensive in time of peace if it were independent?—The example I have just given is in point. We are at peace with Spain, but our trade is liable to interference upon points of dispute as to smuggling, and we have considered it necessary to protect our trade by two vessels, mounting 76 guns, and manned by 950 men.

3251. Supposing Bermuda to be made impregnable, at whatever cost, do you consider it important to English interests to maintain Halifax also?—That is a question connected with Canada and the United States, which is a different thing.

3252. In what sense would Halifax be important to England, supposing Bermuda to be made impregnable?—To defend the whole of our North American coast, I presume, The distance between Bermuda and Halifax is 700 miles; and Bermuda is valuable merely because Halifax very frequently used to be closed in the winter time by ice.

3253. In what sense would Halifax enable us to defend the American coast?—It possesses an excellent harbour.

3254. Supposing Bermuda were made impregnable, and were of sufficient size to shelter a naval force in winter, should we not have as good a harbour in Bermuda as in Halifax?—My plan would not include the fortifying of either place. So long as we maintain naval supremacy, we can hold them both.

3255. Do you consider that the garrison of 1,200 men at Bermuda, and the garrison of 1,200 at Halifax, are useless?—Not entirely useless. I do not know Halifax so well as I do Bermuda; but 1,200 would make a poor defence at Bermuda, if we had no naval force to assist it.

3256. You consider that a fortress imperfectly manned is worse than no fortress at all?—I think so, because it is liable to be taken by surprise, and then it becomes a weapon in the hands of the enemy, and the stores fall into the hands of the enemy.

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3257. Supposing that considerable expense must be incurred in making Bermuda and Halifax safe, do you think it necessary for Imperial interests that both should be maintained?—Yes; Bermuda will hold but a small fleet.

3258. You think that in the case of danger of an American war, it is necessary for us to have both harbours so as to maintain a sufficient number of ships in case of war?—Yes.

3259. Putting out of the question Colonial interests altogether?—Yes.

3260. What would be the use of 2,000 Marines, as you have suggested, in the West Indies?—I was merely asked whether they were necessary for police purposes.

3261. What sort of service do you contemplate for those Marines?—Police service.

3262. You do not look upon them in the light of a garrison necessary for a fortress in the West Indies, but as a police force in case of internal disturbances?—They would be of course also available for manning such batteries as it might be thought desirable to man, to prevent slight cases of insult and aggression; but certainly not for conquest.

3263. If you treated them as garrisons, and supposing the fortresses to be taken by an insulting enemy, do you think it would be difficult for us to retake them?—Not so long as we have the command of the sea.

3264. So long as England has command of the sea, fortresses in the West Indies are useless?—Generally speaking they are.

3265. If taken by an enemy the enemy probably would find themselves prisoners of war?—As soon as we had recovered the supremacy which we had temporarily lost.

3266. I presume you would add, as an advantage to a naval force over a military defence, that men on board ship are in better health than those on land?—I think the mortality is least amongst sailors, especially since the West Indian and North American stations have been united, because ships are now occasionally sent for health to the colder part of the station.

3267. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you consider that the presence of a squadron supersedes the necessity for troops in the defence of a depôt?—Not if it is fortified.

3268. But you would rather have a squadron of small vessels than a land force?—Yes.

3269. All I understand you to mean thereby is, that if you had a small squadron, a land force would not be required?—I have compared the small squadron at Bermuda with the small garrisons there at present, and I say that one half of the expense would furnish a more efficient defence afloat than the military force does on shore.

3270. That is why one is to supersede the other?—Yes, supposing there are no fortifications.

3271. I think you said just now that you did not think it worth while to maintain a land force unless you could fully garrison a fortification?—I think that the small garrison of Bermuda makes it a source of danger rather than a protection.

3272. Does not the presence of a small force act as a nucleus around which the inhabitants of the Colony may rally?—The inhabitants of Bermuda number only about 8,000, and I suppose out of them very few hundreds would be available for the defence of the Colony. It must be considered as a mere garrison.

3273. Your answer referred simply to Bermuda, and not to Colonies in general?—Not to large Colonies, but to all the Colonies in the West Indies.

3274. If, from the presence of a hostile naval force in those waters, a squadron was drawn away to a distance, and there was no land force on the spot, would not the Colony be liable to attack?—Certainly; but it would be recoverable again as soon as possible.

3275. The loss of the Colony in the meantime would be greater from not being able to stand an attack for a short period?—Yes; if it could stand an attack long enough to enable us to reinforce it, it would be useful.

3276. Where there are fortifications, you would not wish to remove the land force, because there is a squadron in those seas?—On the contrary, unfortunately, when you have fortresses it is necessary to garrison them.

3277. It

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3277. It is to the advantage of the Colony that there should be strong fortresses for the purpose of making a temporary defence in case of the removal of the squadron?—Very extended garrisons are difficult of defence. Supposing the Government had agreed to the immense increase of fortifications at Bermuda as proposed in 1857, and to be completed in 1858, I think we may assume that from 1858 up to 1861, the garrison would still have been 1,188 men only, and I think that Bermuda would then have been weaker, and would have been a much greater prize to an enemy than it is at present.

3278. Your system of defending a Colony in the absence of large fortifications, which you regard as an extravagant mode of protection, would result in a fleet only which would be liable to removal?—Certainly.

3279. You would, therefore, contemplate the possibility of the Colony suffering capture and recapture in consequence of the absence of the squadron?—Supposing a Colony to be attacked, it is quite certain that the attacking force would not go to the stronger part of the Colony to effect a landing; for instance, in Jamaica the attacking force would never come to Port Royal. I think that the 1,700 men in Jamaica afford no protection to the Colony.

3280. Do you not lay some stress upon the loss of prestige, which would attach to a country which altogether lost a Colony?—I think we should equally lose the Colony if the garrison were insufficient.

3281. But we should not lose the possession of the Colony in the same sense if there was some place holding out till it was relieved?—Certainly not, but I think there is not a place in Jamaica capable of standing a siege.

3282. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do I understand greater economy or greater efficiency to be the object of your plan?—Both.

3283. But you think it would lead to greater economy?—I think it would.

3284. Do you mean that, although the cost of naval defence is considerably greater than that of a military defence, the smaller number of men in the squadron would reduce the cost per man?—I think so, in such Colonies as I have mentioned, the West Indies and Australia. The cost of soldiers in Australia is nearly one-third greater. In Victoria the cost per man is 157*l.*, whereas for a seaman it is only 106*l.* The average cost per soldier is 84*l.* or 85*l.*, and that of a sailor 106*l.* In Australia we are expending 5,110,000*l.*; and, supposing it were possible to substitute a naval force, that would provide 500 guns and 5,000 men, which would be a most preponderating naval force.

3285. Do you mean that the increase of the naval force to that amount, in substitution for troops, would bring up the cost to the present amount?—That is what I mean.

3286. You propose, at Bermuda, Halifax, and Australia, to substitute an increased naval force for the troops now in those Colonies?—Not at Halifax.

3287. You except no other place?—No. At Bermuda and in Australia I think it is perfectly possible to substitute a strong naval force.

3288. Bermuda, I believe, contains an important dockyard?—Yes.

3289. And large naval stores?—Yes.

3290. Do you propose to leave them without a garrison?—If you wish to defend it effectually, you must have a very large garrision. There is no difficulty in making Bermuda nearly impregnable, but the difficulty is that there is never a sufficient garrison.

3291. You propose to withdraw troops from Bermuda, and to substitute for them five ships; would you keep those ships always in the harbour?—No, there is not the least occasion to do so.

3292. During the occasional absence in time of war of those ships, and in the absence of soldiers, would not the dockyard and naval stores of Bermuda be at the mercy of a single enemy's cruiser?—I never proposed to defend Bermuda with only five ships; I say it would be a more efficient defence than 1,188 men in the garrison.

3293. Do you propose that the ships should always be in the harbour of Bermuda, or off the harbour?—A certain force should remain at Bermuda if it is to defend Bermuda.

3294. Do you think that practically possible?—Perfectly, or by cruizing so near as to be available in the event of an enemy appearing.

3295. In time of war is it not absolutely certain that men of war would be moving about, from one point to another; would it not be impossible to rely

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rely upon their remaining permanently in the harbour?—It would depend upon the commanding officer at the station.

3296. You think it would be possible, in time of war, to keep a sufficient naval force at Bermuda to defend the harbour and dockyard?—Quite possible.

3297. Would it be probable?—Yes, or the ships might be cruizing about, because the method in which you defend any colony, by naval means, is by looking carefully out and ascertaining whether any enemy is approaching you. Several of those vessels would be adding to our strength by giving us notice beforehand.

3298. *Chairman.*] At the time of the war with Russia, was not the closing of the Baltic a better defence to this country than if we had dotted sergeant's guards along the eastern coast of England?—Of course it was.

3299. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is not the plan you have proposed directly the reverse of the plan just described; I understood you propose to scatter a naval force in small squadrons over different points, and that at each point the naval force would remain stationary, and would not therefore be available for the general purposes of the war?—My plan is not to scatter a naval force. You send out small ships to bring you intelligence, but I should keep a force concentrated at Bermuda, supposing that the defence of Bermuda was the principal object.

3300. I understand you to say that you wish to maintain the defence of Bermuda, or Sydney, or Melbourne, or Jamaica, against the chances of insult or damage, even from a single enemy's cruizer, in the entire absence of troops, by means of the constant presence of men of war, which must be stationed at different points?—I think they ought to be concentrated at certain points, but a naval force is moveable, whereas a military force is not.

3301. The ships being concentrated at one point, you would leave all other points to the risk of injury and destruction from even the smallest force which an enemy might bring against them?—That is unavoidable, as it is at present; no enemy would attempt to land at one of the small Windward Islands, where there is but a single company; in many of the islands there is only one company of two or three artillerymen.

3302. Would you say that a very moderate amount of force, and a very moderate amount of fortifications, would be sufficient to protect such places as Sydney and Melbourne and Bermuda against attack; I do not say from a powerful expedition, but from a single enemy's cruiser?—Yes, a very little amount of force would be sufficient to do that.

3303. Your plan would not provide against such a contingency?—Mine is a general plan. I do not say that at certain points there might not be a small force employed to prevent an enemy's cruiser entering (for instance, the harbour at Sydney), but no troops that you would keep at Sydney would prevent an enemy landing at Botany Bay; the outer line of defence would depend upon the navy.

3304. Your opinion is against fortifying and garrisoning these Colonies to such an extent as would protect them against military expeditions; would you not fortify them even with small garrisons and moderate fortifications, which, during the inevitable absence of the men-of-war, would protect them from insult and injury from small hostile forces?—I think there would be no objection, if the Colony chose to pay for them. Perhaps you will allow me to refer to a letter I have received from an officer just arrived from Australia, to show the danger of such fortifications being left without adequate garrisons. He says there was a great discussion between the naval officers as to the proper position of the battery, and adds: "The question will be, wherever they may be erected, how to man them. The military force being contributed to by the Colony, the desire is to keep it at the lowest possible strength. They failed in their militia artillery, and are now getting up the popular force of volunteers." It appears to me, from that letter, that Sydney is not a bit stronger than it was before they put up the new batteries of 45 guns.

3305. Would you advise the people of Sydney to erect no batteries whatever, but to rest upon Her Majesty's ships?—No; I should advise them to pay for a large military force, if they choose. But the question put to me was with reference to the comparative value and expense of naval and military defences, and I say that I believe that the naval is more efficient and less expensive than the military force.

3306. You think it would be equally to the safety of the Colony that it should have no military defence whatever?—No, certainly not; I have dwelt upon the danger of fortifications with insufficient garrisons. At this moment an enemy could attack Sydney in spite of the new fortifications as easily as before, and would of course be so much the stronger, and would be in possession of great military stores.

3307. That is upon the present plan?—I am assuming that the forts are built upon the best possible plan, but are not garrisoned.

3308. Is it not possible to erect such moderate forts at Sydney as to protect the harbour from destruction by an enemy, during the occasional absence of an English fleet?—Certainly.

3309. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that fortifications at Bermuda imperfectly manned are a source of peril to the Colony?—I think so.

3310. In the event of war, would not the best thing be to destroy them altogether?—That is a difficult question to answer, but I think we should have been much wiser never to have begun them.

3311. If there were no fortifications, is it likely that any enemy would visit Bermuda for hostile purposes?—I do not think that Bermuda would be of great advantage, except to a country that has the dominion of the sea.

3312. So long as we have fortifications there incapable of resisting a proper force, they would hold out a strong temptation to any power to possess itself of those fortifications?—Yes, I think so.

3313. Would the same remark apply, in your opinion, to places similarly situated?—I think so.

3314. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would it not be a matter of great importance to an enemy to destroy the dock-yards and naval stores at Bermuda?—No doubt.

3315. Would it not be almost done as a matter of course if opportunity offered:—So long as we are supreme at sea, it could not occur.

3316. Do you think it possible during war that we should be supreme at sea every day, and at every point?—Yes, if you make the points necessary to guard few; there is no reason why we should not be always superior at Bermuda, to any force likely to be brought against us.

3317. Mr. *Baxter.*] How many ships would, in your opinion, form a sufficient defence to the dock-yards at Bermuda?—Three or four line of battle ships is more than the whole United States of America could bring against us.

3318. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would it not make those men of war of comparatively little use to keep them stationed near Bermuda, and not capable of being moved about freely?—Yes, but it is a more economical defence than the other, and therefore you would save so much money.

3319. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that the garrison of 1,300 men at Bermuda is an adequate defence for the dock-yards?—No, I think not, and that was the opinion of the commission which sat in 1857.

3320. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you mean that the forts at Bermuda are no sufficient defence against an enemy's cruiser coming in to shell the dockyards?—I can hardly imagine it possible that a single enemy's cruiser would attempt to shell the dockyard, so long as the floating battery is there.

3321. You are assuming the entire absence of any garrison?—I think we should have saved an immense deal of money, and been quite as strong at Bermuda, if we had never fortified it at all; it is only available as a naval depôt; and you can defend it much more economically by a naval power than by military means.

3322. *Chairman.*] Lord Grey, who has given evidence before this Committee, said, in answer to Question 2565: "The experience we have had of the past seems to me to lead to the conclusion that almost the whole of the money we have spent upon colonial fortifications has been so much absolutely wasted; and that with respect to many of those fortifications erected at great expense, the wisest thing we could now do would be to blow them up again." Do you agree in that opinion?—Yes; I think that many of our colonial fortifications might be destroyed with great advantage.

3323. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In giving that opinion, are you speaking of the overgrown fortifications beyond the amount of the garrison which can be spared for them, or do you speak of all fortifications?—Of overgrown fortifications, not sufficiently garrisoned.

3324. Sir *George Grey.*] Your opinion is that fortifications that are so extensive

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sive that probably this country would not be likely to spare a sufficient garrison for them in time of war would be a source of danger rather than of strength?—Yes.

3325. Mr. *Marsh.*] Is the cost of marines as much as 106*l.* per man?—Assuming that there is an increase in the number of marines, I think not.

3326. £. 106 includes able-bodied seamen, who get higher wages than marines?—Yes.

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3327. Mr. *Adderley.*] I THINK you are at present Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education?—Yes.

3328. And you were for some time connected with the Government at Sydney?—I am afraid I was more connected with the opposition than the Government.

3329. During what years?—I was a Member of the Legislative Council from 1843 to the end of 1849.

3330. Will you give us your general opinion as to the fitness of such a Colony as New South Wales to undertake its own defence, first as against internal riot, and secondly against foreign attack?—Confining myself to the peculiar circumstances of New South Wales, and leaving out of the question anything that is common to it with the rest of the Colonies, I do not think it desirable to retain any troops at all there. The Government of New South Wales, which has been established about five years, is responsible to an Assembly elected by universal suffrage. There has been a general election every year since responsible Government was introduced, and the existence of each successive Ministry has been exceedingly short; and the measures taken by those Ministries, particularly by the one now in office, have been such as to shake the confidence of the residents in the Colony in the stability of property. A considerable debt has been accumulated, and the Government has introduced a measure with regard to the occupants of Crown land, which is in the highest degree reprehensible. I do not think that a Government of this kind is fit to be entrusted with the disposition of Her Majesty's troops for any purpose whatever. As an illustration, I may mention that there have been lately at a place called Lambing Flat, disturbances beween the gold diggers and the Chinese. The gold diggers wanted to drive away the Chinese, and troops were sent down to repress the disturbance. So far the Colonial Government did its duty, but the Prime Minister went down to Lambing Flat himself, and in order to appease the diggers, made to them certain promises, which promises I am informed were never intended to be fulfilled, and indeed cannot be fulfilled. Suppose that the men, finding themselves deceived by the non-fulfilment of those promises, break out into a new riot, I do not think it desirable that Her Majesty's troops should be employed in putting down such a riot occasioned by the bad faith of the Colonial Government. The Government of New South Wales is placed on a far more democratic basis than the Government of the States of the American Union. In America the democracy is settled on the land, and has an interest in the preservation and prosperity of the country. In New South Wales a great proportion of the voters are not settled on the land, but are in the receipt of wages, and they have no interest or feeling identical with the prosperity of the country whose destinies are virtually entrusted to them. The consequence is, that there is a state of downward progress; that each Government falls below its predecessor in respectability, and that there is a kind of ostracism of men of property and intelligence.

3331. Putting out of the question the democratic nature of the Government of Australia, do you not see some objection to any community that is self-governed being protected by another power?—When a Colony has received self-government, that is, when it has a ministry responsible to a freely elected assembly, the Colony though nominally a dependency of the Crown, and subject to the legislation of the British Parliament, has really for most purposes become a foreign power, and as such should in the first instance be charged with the duty of its own protection and its internal police. The governing power resides in the Prime Minister of the day, and he must dispose of the military force; a limited monarch, in the case of a democratic form of Government, where there is no aristocracy interposed between him and the people, has

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has a tendency to become either a cipher or an autocrat. In the case of New South Wales, the Governor has become a cipher, and would have little real power as to the disposition and employment of the troops, or as to anything else. It seems to me that the people of this country ought not to be taxed for maintaining the external defence or internal police of such a Colony in time of peace.

3332. Do you think that the relations of such a Colony as New South Wales with England impose upon England in the first instance, the task of defending that Colony, with some repayment from the Colony, or do you think that New South Wales should in the first instance bear its own expenses, making claim of repayment upon England, as its mother country, in certain cases?—Speaking with regard to the Australian Colonies which are situate in a temperate latitude, inhabited by Englishmen and Irishmen, in a climate in which they can labour out of door without injury, and under institutions in which they can govern themselves, I do not see that any duty is imposed on the mother country to defend such a Colony in time of peace from interval riot, or from such insults from foreign nations as no country can be wholly secure from; as regards receiving payment from the Colonies for military assistance, it appears to me to be unworthy of the dignity of this country to take money from some Colonies, because they are willing to pay it, and not from others, because they are unwilling to pay it. Thus New South Wales and Victoria pay largely, while Canada does not pay at all; I think it is indispensable that the Imperial Government should mete out equal justice to all its dependencies. But, I object to payment altogether; it is puting our troops more in the position of mercenaries, than if I were a soldier myself I should like. They are virtually serving a foreign Government which hires them from the Government which they are bound to serve. If the Colonies pay for those troops, they will consider, and very properly, that they have a right to use them; and they may and will be used upon occasions which we should think objectionable, but the money would stop our mouths, and we should have no right to complain.

3333. Do you see the necessity of England keeping a small body of troops in Australia either in the way of guards of honour to the Governors, or for the purpose of maintaining the Imperial prestige?—I think that for every purpose, for that of prestige as well as for that of defence in time of peace, the Imperial troops are better away. I cannot help looking forward to a period which may arrive when some of those Colonies may wish to separate from the mother country. The presence of troops and garrisons in those Colonies would form on such an occasion a formidable obstacle in the way of an amicable separation. I hope if ever any one of our Colonies deliberately expresses a wish to separate from the mother country, it will be met in a very different spirit from that in which the separation movement has been met in America. If an insult were offered so the English flag, or a small detachment of our troops were cut-off in such a Colony, such a feeling might be raised among the people of England as might render an amicable separation next to impossible. Thus, in America the Southern States were permitted to declare themselves independent, to organize a government, to pass laws, to adopt a flag, and the people of the north took little account of it; but the attack upon Fort Sumter lit up a blaze which has involved the whole union in one conflagration, and has I fear rendered civil war inevitable.

3334. From what you have said, I presume you would not recommend that troops should be kept in Colonies by England by way of retaining the dependance of any Colonies who might wish to separate from us?—I offer no opinion as to the policy of retaining the whole or any part of our Colonial empire. If a Colony can only be retained by the presence of troops, if their withdrawal would involve a dissolution of the existing state of society, or the destruction of the white race, to withdraw those troops is of course the same as giving up the Colony, and giving it up to destruction; on that I offer no opinion. But I can imagine nothing more impolitic than for England to act over again her American errors of the last century; colonies are no longer desired for the monopoly of their trade. Instead of taxing them as our forefathers claimed to do we, in the matter of this military expenditure, permit them in a great degree to tax us; I hope we are above the vulgar notion that the mere extent of territory over which our flag waves is any increase to our strength. It therefore seems to me that a Colony which is ill-disposed to this country, is

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not worth retaining; of course if the Colony succeeded in the struggle it would it would have been better never to have attempted to coerce it; but even if the Colony failed, I should think that a country reconquered, wasted by fire and sword, with its old hostility against us embittered, would be one of the most worthless possessions which any nation could have.

3335. Do you think that the Australian tax-payers being called upon to take their share in the defence of their Colony, as English tax-payers take their share of the defence of this country, would incline Australians to assume a position of independence towards us?—This is not so much an Imperial question as a question between inhabitants of different parts of the same empire. The Empire of England of course consists of the United Kingdom and of its dependencies. The question is whether the people of the United Kingdom should be taxed for the benefit of the people of its dependencies. It is exactly the reverse of the question of the last century, which was whether the people of the dependencies should be taxed for the benefit of the United Kingdom. I am against taxing the Colonies for the benefit of the mother country, or the mother country for the benefit of the Colonies. Looking at the case of New South Wales with the eye of a former Colonist, I do not think that any measure so obviously just would lead to permanent discontent. When I lived at Sydney there was no income tax; there were no assessed taxes; there was no excise, except on spirits, which probably was rather a benefit than a burthen. Profits were large; wages were very high; the mildness of the climate renders fuel almost unnecessary, except for cooking, and enables people to do with very little clothing. And it does appear to me that to tax the labourers of Leicestershire and Dorsetshire, for instance, to relieve such a community from a taxation required for its own defence, would be a crying injustice to those who had to pay it. I believe the good sense of the Colonists would acquiesce in this view. Of course they would complain, and would endeavour to retain the subsidy out of the Imperial funds which they now have, but when they found that their complaints were in vain, I think they would acquiesce. By their connection with the mother country the Colonists lose the power of making war and peace, and they run the risk of being involved in war, in consequence of some quarrel in this part of the world, with which they have nothing to do. Those are the disadvantages to the Colony of its connexion with Great Britain; but those evils are much lightened by the remote situation of our Colonies, and by the fact that the mother country is the greatest naval power in the world. On the other hand, the advantages they gain by being part of the British Empire are enormous; they are relieved from the necessity of keeping up a large force at any time on land; they are absolutely relieved from the expense of keeping up a navy. There are no people who enjoy more security in time of war. England is better defended, but she is more exposed; she lies nearer the enemy. In case of war between England and France, the difference between her risk and that of Australia may be expressed by the difference between 21 miles, the distance from Dover to Calais, and 15,000 miles, the distance from England to Australia. I apprehend that the Colonists would consider these things, and would recollect that by the guarantee, as I may call it, of this country in time of war, they are enabled to apply their revenues entirely to their own local purposes and the satisfaction of the requirements of a new country. If England were merely a foreign power to them, it might deal with them in a very different manner from that in which she has dealt with them hitherto. They have now the weight of England on their side; they might know what it was to feel the weight of England against them.

3336. Is there in your mind any other reason, except that of our Colonies being subjected to our foreign policy, why we should assist them at all?—The French are said to have 5,000 men in New Caledonia, at this moment; we have but few troops in New South Wales, and we have a territory there of 1,000 miles of sea coast. It is ridiculous to suppose that the troops we can spare in time of peace would be a defence to such a territory, and it is more ridiculous to suppose that the troops we can spare in time of war would be sufficient; because in time of war the present conditions of warfare are such that we must recall our troops to defend ourselves at home. The changes introduced into warfare render this island more liable to invasion than it was before. Our troops can do little to defend the Australian Colonies, but the Colonies rely upon their presence almost as much as if they were a sufficient guard; and it has hitherto,

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hithorto, at least till within the last two or three years, prevented them from drilling their own men, and from enrolling sufficient militia or volunteers. Any one who spreads out a map of the world, and looks at the dominions of England, will consider it very strange that we should send people from England to defend the Antipodes, while we leave the young men of Australia to grow up without the knowledge of arms.

3337. It has been laid down as an abstract proposition by a high authority that the relation between the mother country and the Colony is, obedience on the one side, and protection on the other; do you think that that relation exists between England and her Colonies, or that there is as little of real protection on the one side as there is of obedience on the other?—I think that so long as England is the greatest naval power in the world she will be a great protection to her Colonies. Were she unable to protect them by her fleet, I do not think the wish to be united to England would long survive. When the Colonies get no advantage from the union with England, they will be inclined to separate. But what I submit to the Committee is, that the motives which induce our Colonists to remain united to the mother country are sufficiently overwhelming without our furnishing a force for their external defence and internal police, which they are perfectly able to pay for themselves.

3338. *Chairman.*] You think that these motives are sufficiently strong to induce the Colonists to retain their allegiance whether the troops are there or not?—I do think so; I am not presumptuous, I believe, in saying that if I had remained in Australia I might have looked forward to filling the post of Premier there, and I am sure that that is the advice I should have given the Colonists.

3339. The circumstance of the Colonies being subject to our foreign policy, does not, in your opinion, give them any claim to call upon us to undertake their internal defence?—I do not think that the Colonies have any claim of any kind. "Claim" is a judicial word. The whole matter seems to me to be one of expediency, to be settled by negotiation. We are not, as I think, bound in any way. If we are to pay, what the Colonies are to be paid should be settled, as nearly as possible, in the same way as if we were treating with a foreign country. The position of those Colonies which have self-government seems to me very much to resemble the position of Hanover, from the accession of the House of Brunswick in England, until the male line succeeded on the accession of Her Majesty.

3340. I understood you, just now, to say that the Colonies have not the right to make war and peace; and that the circumstance of their being subjected to our foreign policy, gave them some claim upon the mother country?—I think that being subject to our foreign policy gives the Colonies fair ground to ask for assistance in time of war. The negotiation with the Colony ought, in my opinion, to be like that with a foreign country, only that the *ultima ratio* with a foreign country would be war, and with a Colony would be separation. The question is, how much we are willing to sacrifice to avert separation, and how much they will submit to do for themselves without separation.

3341. To what extent does the fact of any Colony being involved in our foreign policy give it any claim?—I think I have already answered that question. I do not recognise that there is any claim. Claim implies some distinct right *ex debito justitiæ*. With regard to those Colonies which have responsible Governments, I do not think that there is any *debitum justitiæ*.

3342. In answer to any claim on their part, can it not be said that they have involved us in colonial wars?—I do not think that it would be any good ground, in negotiating with New South Wales, on announcing the withdrawal of troops, to say that we had been engaged in war in reference to Colonies, we will say, in North America. Australia has not been attacked; and I believe that, except in the riots of Ballarat some years ago, no shot has been fired in anger on the Australian Continent.

3343-4. Do you think it material to consider, in undertaking the native war of New Zealand, whether it was caused by English or colonial policy?—Whoever created the New Zealand difficulty, we having troops in the Colony, and having undertaken its defence, without reference to the ground upon which the quarrel arose, are bound to do that for which we placed the troops there. That is one evil of placing troops in a Colony under a responsible Government. You are placing the troops at the disposal of the Minister of the day; that is a thunder-bolt in the hand of a child. A large military expenditure is a popular

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thing in a Colony. Even a war in a remote part of the Colony will be popular in parts where it is not carried on, on account of the money which is made out of it. The country may suffer, but the towns often get a great advantage. I think it is a great want of prudence on the part of the Imperial Government to place the power of commencing wars, in which it will be obliged to take a part, in the hands of persons over whom it not only has no control, but who are often directly interested in getting up a war. And I would also say, that the small Colonies struggling into existence ought not to expect to be able to take things with so high a hand, and to resent every injury as boldly and rapidly as a country like England. If the New Zealand settlers have a quarrel with the natives, in which the natives are doing anything which they ought not to do, it may be a perfect *casus belli*; but I think it much better that war should not necessarily ensue; much better that these young communities should learn that there are many things which they must endure, and that it is better to put up with a great deal of injury than rush immediately to arms. If the Colony had to bear the weight of those conflicts it would learn to endure, to procrastinate, to intrigue, to sow differences among the native chiefs, and practise all the arts which the weak must exercise when they deal with the strong; but so long as the wars they commence must be fought out at the expense of the mother country, there will always be war when there is a pretext which will hold water. It is neither wise nor natural that young communities should be armed with the strength and power of old ones; the tendency is to make them reckless and overbearing.

3345. Do you think that the presence of Imperial troops in a Colony tends to promote or to prevent war?—I have no experience on the point. It is easy to see that, so far as the presence of troops intimidates the tribes, it has a tendency to prevent war; but so far as it relieves the colonists from the responsibility of war, it tends to promote it.

3346. Mr. *Adderley*.] Has not England great difficulty in maintaining a proper check upon military expenditure in the Colonies?—I have no practical experience on that point; I have seen what expenditure on fortification is in New South Wales, where, after an enormous waste of money, Sydney was left utterly defenceless.

3347. Do the views you have expressed apply equally to New Zealand, the Cape of Good Hope, and British North America?—I have not official knowledge to answer the question; I have rather laid down what I consider the abstract theory, but it must receive many modifications. In New Zealand, where there is war, we must fight it out, but having done so, we ought to give the colonists to understand that we are not going to be responsible for another war. I believe that the absence of our troops would do more than anything to prevent war. I have no peculiar knowledge with reference to the Cape, where the Governor is Prime Minister; but there is a harbour there which may be wanted for Imperial purposes, and which ought, perhaps, to be defended by Imperial troops. So long as we choose to have an Algiers in the south of Africa, as France has in the north, I presume we must occupy and defend it in the same way.

3348. Lord *Stanley*.] Are you aware that the seat of war between the natives and the colonists of South Africa is beyond the limits of Cape Colony altogether?—Quite so. As regards the American Colonies, there is the question of Halifax, which may be considered a garrison; but with that exception, I think the Colonies would be better without troops. I look upon the garrison of Quebec as likely, some day or other, to become analogous to the garrison of Fort Sumter. The citadel of Quebec is not a fortification that would bear the attacks of modern warfare.

3349. Mr. *Adderley*.] Do you think our undertaking the garrisoning of Quebec may be quoted against us, as Canada extends, as a reason why we should equally undertake to garrison the future fortresses of the extended Colony?—We do not seem to care much about precedents, as we make some Colonies pay, and some not.

3350. You say that the relation of the Colonies to England should be something like that which existed with Hanover?—I said I thought it was so practicall .

3351. Is not that very much the relation of the early American Colonies to England, and was not that relation very different to that which have lately

lately assumed?—If we go back to the reign of Charles the Second, I think we should find that relation. There was then no question of taxation or military occupation as there was in the reign of George the Third. I remember reading in Evelyn's Diary that the Committee of Trade and Plantations was established very much for fear that the North American Colonies should declare themselves independent.

3352. There was not till the latter part of last century, any transmission of troops to those Colonies, I believe?—General Braddock's expedition, I think was the first.

3353. Do you know that General Braddock's expedition was provisioned by the Colony?—I was not aware of that.

3354. Supposing the Colonies were called upon to depend upon their own internal recources as you suggest, could they take any part in the naval defence of the empire?—I do not think that England could ask the Colonies for any naval assistance; the contribution would be very small, and I think they would very much repine at it. If England did not supply the naval force, I do not think the Colonies would fit out ships for themselves.

3355. With reference to the fortifications of Sydney, when you suggest that New South Wales should be called upon to bear the cost of making them, do you include block ships and such floating batteries as may be necessary parts of such fortifications?—I think that it should be a Colonial force entirely, excepting in the case of an Imperial garrison, such as Halifax, which is supposed to be valuable as a harbour. If Sydney Cove were considered a valuable station for Imperial purposes, it might not be reasonable to throw its defence wholly on the Colony.

3356. *Chairman.*] Politically speaking, should you say that where a Colony had, from its general resources, the means of bearing a considerable proportion of the expense, it would be an advantage, or a disadvantage, to that dependency to have its defence provided from external sources?—There is a pecuniary advantage, but many countervailing evils. I look at the Colonies as young nations educating themselves, and it is very much to be regretted that they should be educated in a one-sided manner. If we go on in the present system there is risk of reducing the Colonies to the same position to which the Britons were reduced by the Romans, when they left them to the mercy of the Picts and Scots.

3357. Do you not think that the resources of the Australian Colonies would enable them to defend themselves?—I think that a certain amount of money could be got out of a colonial community, but beyond that the people will not pay. A certain sum of money may be obtained from the Australian Colonies, and the sort of Government they now have will get it; and the question is, whether some of that should be employed in their defence, or whether it should be expended in matters which I am afraid would not always bear investigation.

3358. Some evidence has been given before the Committee as to apprehensions entertained, or supposed to be entertained in the Australian Colonies, of an attack from France at New Caledonia, and it has been stated that it was our duty to protect them from such possible aggression; do you think that that was real apprehension in New South Wales?—I think it was perfectly real and genuine.

3359. Would you say that the risk, whatever it may have been, of such an attack was greater or less than the risk which our North American Colonies might be supposed to experience, of an attack by the United States?—An attack on the American Colonies has been tried twice. During the century that Canada has belonged to us, the Americans have had no reason to rejoice that they ever put their feet on Canadian soil. In Australia this has not been tried. The colonists are not trained to arms; but they are a pastoral people, and were they trained they would make as fine soldiers as any in the world, and in that case an attack by such a force as France has in the Pacific would be madness.

3360. It has been stated before this Committee that there are 10,000 volunteers in the Australian Colonies. Should you say that we might reasonably infer, from the circumstance of so large a body of volunteers having enrolled themselves, that there are materials for the defence of the Colony, supposing it to be necessary?—I have no knowledge of the nature of the volunteers; it would depend upon what kind of people they are. There are bad elements in the

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the population of the Australian Colonies as everywhere else. I think the origin of the volunteers in Australia has arisen from the parent movement in England; for I have observed that whenever a movement takes place in England, it finds its echo at the antipodes, and I believe the volunteer movement there to be a response to the volunteer movement in this country.

3361. Do you think that there is reason to suppose that there will be the materials in Australia for the defence of the Colony, if necessary, considering the large number of men who have enrolled themselves as volunteers?—I have no doubt you will find plenty of people to volunteer. There are no people better mounted than the Australians; they make excellent sailors and are full of spirit. The particular industry of Australia is favourable to the development of the volunteer movement. The sheep and cattle can be left in few hands without absolute ruin; whereas the agricultural people find it almost impossible to engage in war at particular seasons of the year.

3362. Admiral Erskine has given it as his opinion that the attack of an enemy would probably be upon the ships laden with gold rather than by a descent upon the shores. Do you agree in that opinion?—Admiral Erskine is so good an authority that I could not presume to offer an opinion either in confirmation or contradiction. I should think that Sydney might be well worth a visit, by an enemy. When I was there it was quite possible to bring a line-of-battle ship within 20 yards of the town.

3363. Do you think that there would be in time the means of defending it?—I believe there would be the means of defending it against any force which was likely to be brought against it. The defence of such a place as Sydney is a question of fortification. I apprehend that the proper thing to do is to fortify the narrow inlet from the Pacific Ocean into the harbour, which I believe is capable of being fortified in such a manner as to make the entrance of a foreign ship into the harbour very difficult.

3364. Sir *George Grey*.] Your opinion is, that for police purposes and for defence against internal disorders, a colony ought to be left to provide its own means of defence?—Certainly.

3365. Do you apply that universally, including, for instance, the West Indies, or Colonies in which there is a mixed population?—I referred to the West India Colonies when I said I did not wish to enter into the question of withdrawing troops, where such withdrawal would occasion the dissolution of society. That really would not be a question of withdrawing troops, but of the separation and destruction of the Colony.

3366. You have assumed the case of a desire on the part of a Colony to separate from this country, and you have stated your apprehensions of the evils which might ensue from the occupation by British troops of a post in that Colony; but take the case of a Colony desirous of maintaining its connexion with the mother country, and asking for assistance against foreign attack; what, in your opinion, would be the duty of the mother country?—In case of actual war it is the duty of this country, if it can, to assist the Colony, as being part of Her Majesty's dominions. It is our pleasure to have an empire on which the sun never sets. We ought as far as possible to be able to meet the necessities that such an empire imposes upon us; but after we have done all we can, we must in case of war dispose our troops on the most valuable and most important points. The duty of defending the Colonies must always be taken with this qualification.

3367. You draw a broad distinction between defence against internal disorder and defence against foreign enemies?—Quite so; I do not think we are called upon to supply the Colonies in time of peace, or perhaps in time of war, with a force sufficient to protect them from insult.

3368. Do you draw any distinction between an isolated Colony and a Colony which has a long boundary bordering on a foreign country?—I do not. I think that a Colony with a long boundary stands especially in need of protection, and that our maintaining troops there acts only as an opiate to put the Colony to sleep, and it prevents them from getting the only adequate protection for themselves.

3369. Lord *Stanley*.] Taking the case of such a Colony as Canada, and supposing that unfortunately differences arose between this country and the United States, do you not think that the population of Canada having nothing to do with the cause of the quarrel, would have a claim upon England for protection in

in a war which they had not brought on, but in which they nevertheless found themselves involved?—I think so; they have twice been involved in such wars, once when General Montgomery went to Quebec, and again in the war of 1812.

3370. Do you consider that such a state of things as I have contemplated as possible would limit the rule you laid down as a general rule, that when a Colony once has responsible Government, it ought to provide its own defence? —War is an exception to all rules. The Colony ought to be defended as part of the Empire so far as the wants and necessities of war will permit. Unless there is some such reason to vary the rule, the rule should be that in time of peace there should be no Imperial troops in the Colony.

3371. Would you apply that to a Colony situated as Canada is, no less than to a Colony circumstanced as the Australian Colonies are?—Much more so; because the frontier of Canada is so extensive, and the defence so difficult, being exposed to attack by a steamer crossing in a few hours from the American coast. It would be deluding the Colony to hold out to them that we could do anything important towards protecting so long a line of frontier as that. If it is to be protected at all, it must be protected by themselves.

3372. Mr. *Marsh*.] You say the connexion of the Colony with the mother country saves the Government the expense of naval protection: does it not also save great expense in diplomatic agents?—Certainly; but I think the Colonial Legislature will not object to pay for diplomatic agents, if they have the posts to give.

3373. Your opinion is that England should allow the colonists of New Zealand to fight it out themselves with the natives?—Not speaking of the present war.

3374. You think that if England did that, they should allow the colonists to do it in their own way?—We cannot claim to control unless we assist.

3375. Mr. *Baxter*.] Would you withdraw the garrisons from Quebec, Kingston, and Halifax, in time of peace?—Halifax stands upon a separate footing: I should see with great pleasure the garrisons of Quebec and Kingston withdrawn.

3376. Would it not be better to keep a moderate force in Canada, as a nucleus of British force, than to send troops out when war broke out?—I think not; I think it would be better to keep the nucleus in England. The general practice now is when you send troops to the Colonies, to keep the nucleus or depôt in England, to feed them.

3377. If Australia wished it, would you send out a force to man the garrisons?—It would depend upon the form that the war assumed. If France in a war with England struck at the heart of the empire, England, I should hope that the Government of the day would be inclined to keep every man in England, and even to recall the troops from the Colonies. We should think that we could afford to lose a place like Sydney, but London we could not afford to lose in an Imperial point of view.

3378. In your opinion the maintenance of troops in the Colonies has had the effect of preventing the colonists trusting to their own resources?—In Australia, until the late volunteer movement, it had. Canada has raised a militia which has often behaved gallantly, but that, I think, arose from the nearness of danger, and the obvious inadequacy of our forces for their protection.

3379. Is not the militia of Canada comparatively insignificant?—It was very considerable in the war of 1812, and did great things.

3380. The militia of Canada has not been enrolled for many years?—That is true.

3381. In the other provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, they had no defensive force of their own?—Still I could not say that Canada did nothing for her own defence, because she acted most creditably in time of war.

3382. You think that Canada would have provided the force if no British troops had been kept in the garrisons?—I think so.

3383. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Have you any reason to think that Canada, in case of actual danger, would not now make the same gallant efforts as she made before?—I have no doubt she would come forward gallantly, as she has always done.

3384. Do you think that that remark applies also to the Australian Colonies? —I have nothing to fall back upon; there has been no bloodshed in Australia, except that shed by the soldiers at the row at the diggings.

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3385. Do you think that the large sums voted for military purposes in New South Wales, and during the active volunteer movement which has been going on there, afford no evidence of a spirit of self-defence?—I have no doubt there is a spirit of self-defence in the people of Australia, and that when they understand that they must rely upon themselves, they will defend themselves. There are no braver people in the world.

3386. It has been alleged by them that the presence of a small force of Imperial troops in the Colony is a great assistance and encouragement to the organization of a local force, and they ask that on that account, totally irrespective of the party upon whom the cost is to fall, such a force should be maintained there. Do you think that that opinion is well founded?—I am not a good judge of such matters; but I have no doubt the Colonists will allege everything they can to keep the troops. The argument used to be the convict population, and in some places the native tribes.

3387. We have been told that there is a small party in New South Wales which is in favour of separation from the mother country, and is anxious to get rid of the presence of the Imperial troops?—There is a gentleman who was always for separation when I was in Australia, and before I went there, namely, Dr. Lang. I do not know what particular tactics he now pursues; but as far as I was aware, there was no party for separation when I was in Australia. I correspond with very intelligent persons in the Colony, and I never heard a suggestion of such a feeling.

3388. Do you think that the entire withdrawal of the troops from the Colony would not encourage the tendency to separation?—I think not. At first, there would be an outburst of discontent, and a repining; but I think the colonists would sit down and calculate what they gained and what they lost by connexion with Great Britain, and make up their minds that, although diminished in value, the thing was still worth retaining.

3389. I understood that a considerable portion of your reason for wishing to see the troops removed from the Colonies was an anticipation of the desire of separation. Do you think that that is a near or practical consideration?—It is impossible for me to say. In some Colonies it is a very near and practical consideration. In Australia things are in such a state, and the existing Government is so violent, that I should not be surprised at anything that happened in the next few years.

3390. Has that had a tendency to produce disloyalty towards the Crown?—Not at present, but it has produced the greatest possible disloyalty towards the Queen's Government in New South Wales, and if that Government is armed with the Queen's forces, paid for out of the Imperial funds, or out of the funds of the Colony, so that the strength of the Empire is really exerted in favour of the Government of the day, the Imperial Government must participate in the unpopularity of the local Government, and the step may not be very long from that state of things to separation.

3391. You mean that British troops should not be used to put down internal movements against the Government?—Yes. For instance, there is the greatest discontent in the interior of New South Wales with regard to laws which are now being passed as to the occupancy of Crown lands; and should those laws pass, I do not doubt they will encounter a certain amount of at least passive resistance, which the remoteness of situation, and the reckless character of a portion of the population employed in the interior parts, may render very formidable.

3392. The greater part of your evidence, I understand, has reference to Colonies to which responsible government has been granted?—Yes.

3393. Would you have given anything like the evidence you have, with respect to the presence or absence of Imperial troops, if no responsible government had been granted?—When I was in New South Wales we were in the highest state of discontent for many reasons. We wanted to govern ourselves, although, perhaps, we were as well governed from home. We were very warm upon the question of the renewal of transportation; and if troops had not been there, there might have been very serious riots. So long as a Colony is governed from home, and the will of the Colonial Minister is substituted for their own will, the Government must be armed with force, for the people will not submit willingly to an absentee Government.

3394. Has the introduction of responsible government into Australia made any

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any change in the control which the Australian Colonies has over their foreign policy?—Not legally and technically.

3395. As regards foreign policy, are not the relations between those Colonies and the mother country exactly upon the same footing as they were before the introduction of responsible government?—My view is, that being governed almost entirely by themselves they have really become a foreign power, and that their position has become that of an independent Government.

3396. Have they any greater control over their foreign policy than they had before?—They have no control; it is under the control of Her Majesty.

3397. Whatever the military relations between the Colonies and the mother country were before the introduction of responsible government, do they continue the same now, so far as protection against external enemies is concerned?—It would have been much better to have left the Colonies to defend themselves long ago; but you cannot use troops for the purposes of internal coercion, as it was necessary to do before the establishment of responsible Government without employing those troops for external defence.

3398. It is the case, is it not, that the Australian Colonies have no farther power to involve the mother country in war with an external enemy than they had before?—I think they have further power, for the Governorship has become almost a sinecure, and the Prime Minister may take measures which may compromise us with a foreign government, for instance, with the Government of France in New Caledonia. That person is not removable at Her Majesty's pleasure, but only at the pleasure of the local Parliament.

3399. Sir *James Fergusson*.] You think it probable that no British statesman would offer opposition to the secession of the Colonies?—Not armed opposition.

3400. I presume that it would be thought by most British statesmen undesirable that the secession of an important Colony should take place?—I cannot say; there is a difference of opinion upon the subject.

3401. It is not, as a matter of course, thought desirable?—No.

3402. Assuming that it is thought right to maintain the relations with the mother country, do you not think that an amicable feeling would be improved by the presence of a small body of troops?—I do not think so. If there is the least disposition to separate, a small number of troops, instead of being able to restrain the movement, would offer to demagogues a ready means of committing the Colony by an insult on that sign and symbol of Imperial pre-eminence and protection. The real inducement to the Colonies to remain united to the mother country is not the few troops which they see, but the vast power which they they do not see, but which is behind; I had rather see the Governor's guard composed of colonial soldiers.

3403. Supposing the matured will of the Colony to be in favour of secession, would it not be perfectly easy to remove the troops before any movement took place?—In Boston much blood was shed before independence was declared, and I think it undesirable that the feelings of the colonists should be embittered by the recollection that blood has been shed. I think the troops would be but a target.

3404. In your view of the probable policy of this country as regards secession, the case of Fort Sumter is hardly a parallel case, is it, because there the Federal Government was resolved to prevent secession. In your view, the Home Government of this country would not be desirous of preventing it?—The Federal Government would have no power to prevent secession, unless it was backed by the feeling of the people of America. The feeling of America slumbered until insult was offered to the Stars and Stripes at Fort Sumter, and then it was not in the power of the Federal Government, had they desired it, to restrain the people.

3405. Your objection to the presence of troops applies more to the presence of a sufficient number to protect the Colony, than to the presence of a small force as a nucleus?—My opinion is, that the presence of a small force does not give the protection required, but that it deadens the spirit of the colonists to which alone they can look for real protection; probably every soldier there prevents 100 colonists from taking up arms and drilling.

3406. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Considering that we have every reason to believe that the present feeling of the North American Colonies is one of warm loyalty, should you not think that we should have sufficient notice of such an entire revolution of feeling, as you contemplate, to give us ample time to change our policy?—I cannot tell; perhaps not.

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3407. Assuming that our object is to maintain and encourage the connexion existing between the Colonies and the mother country, do you give it as your opinion that the presence of Imperial troops has no tendency to prolong that connexion?—I think it has rather a tendency to shorten that connexion; it seems to me that the only way to maintain the connexion is to leave it to the good sense, and to the interests of the Colonists, and that any attempt to substitute for that, the appearance of a protection which is unreal, only tends to create disappointment; besides there is the danger which may at any time arise of insult being offered to the flag.

3408. Your opinion is the same even in the case where Imperial troops are kept in the Colony at the earnest desire of the Colony itself, the withdrawal of which troops would at all events produce at the time a great feeling of dissatisfaction?—There are two parties in every Colony, and it is very difficult for them both to be long desirous of the same thing.

3409. You have no reason to think that British soldiers are now maintained in any Colony against the wishes of the Colony?—On the contrary, they would be glad to see 10 times as many.

3410. *Chairman.*] Is that in consequence of an increase in the commissariat expenditure?—Yes, and the upper classes think that it makes society more agreeable; the young ladies are frantic upon the subject, and people who keep public-houses are always glad to see our soldiers.

3411. Sir *George Grey.*] Are you aware that Victoria has undertaken to pay all its military expenses above a fixed amount?—That is so; they require a very vigorous police in Victoria; they have strange people collected together, who require a strong hand, and with the high rate of wages in Australia, they find it a great expense to collect a police. I dare say our army is the best and cheapest support that society can receive under the present conditions of New South Wales and Victoria; but I do not think that is the proper destination for British troops.

Sir *Charles Clifford*, called in; and Examined.

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3412. *Chairman.*] YOU have held the office, I believe, of Speaker of the House of Representatives in New Zealand?—Yes.

3413. From when?—From the time of its being first called together until last November.

3414. How long has that been?—Six years.

3415. Previous to that time, I believe you held other offices?—I have been a settler in New Zealand for 18 years, was Member and Speaker of Wellington Provincial Council, and in 1844 I was a Member of Governor FitzRoy's Council.

3416. Which of the provinces are you specially acquainted with?—Wellington, Nelson, and Canterbury; I have been a good deal in Auckland.

3417. What is the present revenue of New Zealand?—It is divided between the ordinary and territorial; the ordinary revenue is about 220,000*l.*, and the territorial revenue about 240,000*l.*, making a total of 460,000*l.*

3418. Can you state, without going into minute details, what are the principal items of expenditure?—The expenses of the general Government, and all relating to law, police, and customs. Most of the other items of Government expenditure are defrayed by the provinces. There are two separate Governments in New Zealand, the general and provincial governments.

3419. The principal items of expenditure with the Federal Government are with respect to the administration of justice and police?—Yes, and Customs.

3420. The total Imperial military expenditure for New Zealand, given in the Return, voted here, ending 31st March 1859, is 112,358*l.*, and the Colony at that time, it appears, contributed nothing. I believe some arrangement has been in progress for some time, embodying a proposal for a contribution upon the part of the Colony towards its military defences; will you tell us the nature of that?—I believe that has resolved itself into a vote for 5,000*l.*; I believe it was considered that the rate of payment alluded to for the troops, 5*l.* per man, would amount to about 5,000*l.*, and that the Government intended to devote this sum to lessening the cost to the British Government of the barrack accommodation and in the erection of new barracks.

3421. What proportion of payment per man does that bear?—It was calculated, I think, at 5*l.* per man for the number of troops at that time in New Zealand, before the war broke out.

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3422. Since the war has broken out, do I understand that those arrangements have been cancelled?—I do not think that they have been cancelled, but they have been rendered impracticable by the enormous expense which it would have entailed upon the Colony, and which it could not afford.

3423. Do you know what the amount would be, calculating the present strength of the Imperial troops in New Zealand?—I do not; but I have made a calculation upon the colonial assets and liabilities, which would not leave anything like a sum sufficient to pay the troops now in New Zealand.

3424. The troops in New Zealand, according to the last return, are given at 5,354?—Yes; I may perhaps be allowed to say, in reference to a former question, that in the last session of the Assembly, although the question was not broached in that particular form of 5 *l.* per man, still being willing to do their utmost, they took upon themselves a debt, towards payment of military expenses, which amounts to more than the 5,000 *l.*; they are raising a loan of 150,000 *l.* in this country, the whole of which will be swallowed up by the expenses consequent upon the war.

3425. Can you state any of the important items in which the money will be expended if it is so raised?—In defraying the cost of arms for militia and volunteers, 30,000 *l.*; the relief of the inhabitants of the province of Tarranaki, from the distress occasioned by the war, 25,000 *l.*; in defraying the expenditure arising out of the native insurrection generally, 45,000 *l.*; repairs of barracks, and new barrack accommodation, 5,000 *l.*; expenses incurred by volunteers called out for actual service, including a bonus to officers and men in Her Majesty's ships, on service in the Colony, 29,000 *l.*; purchase of ammunition for the militia and volunteers, 2,000 *l.*; leaving a small balance of about 12,000 *l.*

3426. Was that calculated upon what would be the cost for 12 months?—Those are items that were then necessary to be expended.

3427. Items which you consider now already due?—Already due.

3428. Is the loan raised upon the revenue of the Federal Government?—Yes.

3429. Has any arrangement been made between the Federal Government and the provinces, as regards the apportionment of the loan?—Of course it ranges over the general revenue of the Colony, and takes precedence over every provincial loan.

3430. The result then will be, that that cost, or that proportion of the cost of the war, which is represented by that loan, will be borne equally by the middle and northern islands?—Clearly.

3431. And that the provinces of Nelson and Canterbury will bear the same proportion as Wellington and New Plymouth?—In proportion to their customs revenue.

3432. Will you state whether, supposing this war to be terminated, you think it probable that the Colony of New Zealand has resources and strength enough to contribute any considerable proportion towards its defences in time of peace?—I think it depends very much upon the assistance given to it under the present circumstances. Now it has resources which are quite capable of being developed, so as to enable it to support itself and all its internal police, putting aside external aggression; but at present those resources are not developed for want of population. If the natives were allowed to gain any head, and if the war is not concluded within a short time, the population of the North Island will decrease instead of increasing; and therefore, at the end of the war, the Colony would not be so capable of providing for its own defence as it was before the war commenced.

3433. You think that a considerable Imperial expenditure is necessary, in order to enable the Colony to hold its ground, so that it may, at some future time, bear a proportion of its own cost?—Yes.

3434. The commissariat expenditure, I suppose, is principally in the province of Auckland?—In Auckland and New Plymouth.

3435. There are no troops at all I think in the Middle Island?—No.

3436. And never have been?—There never have been any stationed there.

3437. From your long experience of New Zealand, is it your opinion, supposing the war to be shortly concluded, that for a period of time it will be necessary to maintain a considerable force in New Zealand?—Any statement of mine would be a mere matter of opinion; but, from what I believe to be the general character of the natives, I think that this war originated, and is now being carried on from a firm belief in the native mind that they are superior in arms and are superior soldiers altogether, to the British. They acknowledge our intellectual

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intellectual but not our physical superiority; and as soon as they are convinced of the physical superiority of the British, I think they will at once acknowledge their rule, and be perfectly content, especially when they see that they are to be treated as justly after the war as they were before. Under these circumstances, it will require a very small force indeed to keep the whole Colony in a state of peace and quietude.

3438. You look to the favourable conclusion of the war by a process short of the extermination of the Maori race?—Very much short of it.

3439. You think that the interest of the settler and the natives may be so harmonised as to admit of their continuing to live side by side in peace?—I am sure of it.

3440. Have you formed any opinion as to the mode by which the military expenditure in respect of the war might be diminished, supposing the view which you have just expressed to be the correct one?—There can be no diminution until a favourable conclusion of the war.

3441. You think that we must be prepared for a continuance of the same strength in New Zealand, supposing it to be now between 5,000 and 6,000 men?—I think that, at any rate not less than two regiments would be required for some limited period after the conclusion of the war.

3442. Do you look forward to the time when New Zealand will be able to defend itself against the possibility of disturbance with the native troops?—Yes, I look forward to the natives becoming in perfect accord with the Europeans.

3443. From your knowledge of New Zealand, for the last 18 years, do you think that we can look forward to the time when the presence of an Imperial force will no longer be necessary?—A few garrisons probably may be required.

3444. In answer to Question 2634, Lord Grey said, "I do not think it wise or right, on the part of this country, to undertake to bear the enormous expense and burthen of the New Zealand war, and to leave to the Colony uncontrolled, the power of governing that country in such a manner as to produce constant collision with the natives, and I am sorry to learn that in consequence of that war no change has been made." Do you agree in that opinion of Lord Grey's?—No, I do not; I think that in consequence of the government of the natives being entirely reserved by the Home Government, the Home Government is liable to all the expenses of the war, and that they ought to leave the Colony in a state of peace, before they expect the colonists to take upon themselves the onus of paying the expenses of any future war. I think the chance of future wars would be lessened if more responsibility was thrown on the colonists, whose interest it is to live in harmony with the natives.

3445. Do you think that the reservation in the New Zealand Constitution places the Imperial Government in a position of responsibility, in regard to any collision that might arise with the natives?—Certainly. The British Government having reserved the management of native questions, and having previous to the war withdrawn a regiment, against the remonstrances of the Colonists, should be held responsible.

3446. The Parliament of New Zealand has self-government in every sense of the word?—So far as Europeans are concerned.

3447. As a matter of fact, have the natives votes in respect to the members of the Federal Legislature?—On the same footing as Europeans; any native may have a vote if he can show that he possesses a house worth 5*l.* in the country or 10*l.* in town, or freehold held under grant from the Crown.

3448. There are natives who vote?—Yes.

3449. In those provinces which you know, what is the total number of natives who vote?—I do not know; there are some, but not many.

3450. Do you know whether they are numbered by tens or hundreds?—I think there are only one or two districts in which there are natives to any extent on the electoral roll; I do not think that they are in sufficient numbers at present to affect an election.

3451. Should you say that, as far as you know, there are 20?—More.

3452. One hundred?—I should say there might be, but I cannot tell with any exactitude.

3453. I suppose it may be taken that the natives generally do not vote?—They do not, to affect an election.

3454. Beyond the items of expenditure that you have given us, are there any other large returns of annual expenditure?—The expenditure on the natives comes outof the ordinary revenue.

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3455. In what way is that money spent upon the natives?—It is generally spent through the Native Department.

3456. What is the amount of it?—There is the Civil List. There is a minimum sum in the Constitution Act, which the Colony is obliged to vote for the natives, and that is 7,000*l.* Besides that, there are voted for schools for the natives and for education, 7,000*l.*; there are salaries to the native chiefs for good behaviour, 1,000*l.*; for a native conference, or a kind of native Parliament, 2,500*l.*; the expense of the Native Department and the salaries of its officers is nearly 2,000*l.*; the vote for medical purposes, vaccination, and other matters, 2,000*l.*; the assessors, a kind of native magistrates, who sit on the Bench with the police magistrates, receive 2,000*l.*

3457. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are those additional items of expenditure?—No; the two latter sums are included in the 7,000*l.* of the civil list. The votes for native expenditure amount to 21,830*l.*

3458. *Chairman.*] I will read to you an answer given by Lord Grey to Question 2635. He is asked "Do you think that it is practically possible to withdraw the subject of native policy from the control of the Colonial Parliament, and the responsible minister, and Lord Grey says, "I think not, and I think that the measure proposed last year in Parliament for creating a sort of native Council, would have led to still greater confusion than now exists." What is your opinion in regard to that?—I do not consider myself competent to give an answer upon that question of the native Council. It is a very moot question. Its use would depend greatly on the hostile tribes being represented equally with the friendly ones.

3459. Then Lord Grey says, "The whole subject of the natives is so indissolubly intertwined with the joint administration of the Colony, and the interest of the two races meet in so many points, that the whole Government must be arranged with a view to an impartial management of affairs with reference to both races, and the mistake in my opinion was not that there was not sufficient responsibility, but that in a state of society in which a greater amount of authority was required on the part of the Home Government, that system of responsible Government was allowed to be established, which deprived the Government at home of the authority which it ought to have exercised." From your knowledge of the by the system of responsible Government, do you think that the Government at home has been unduly deprived of the authority it ought to have exercised over the natives?—No, I do not.

3460. Do you think that the reservations of authority on the part of the Imperial Government are sufficient to enable them to control events so as to guard adequately against native wars, or do you think that under the present system it rests with the Colony to deal with the matter, so that it may bring about these wars?—I think if it were left entirely in the hands of the Colony itself, the Governor exercising the ordinary control which he is enabled to do on other questions, there would be less chance of war than there is at present.

3461. You think that if there were more responsibility, and the local Government were, in the strongest sense of the word, a responsible Government, the chances of war would be less than they are now?—I think they would.

3462. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Will you explain how the proportion of the revenue between the Federal Government and the Provincial Government is arranged?—The general Government has the whole of the ordinary revenue, with the guarantee of giving back to the provinces, I think, three-eighths; and the whole of the territorial revenue is taken by the provinces, for the purposes of Government, and for reproductive works, such as roads, emigration, &c.

3463. Then the whole of the revenue derived from the sale of waste lands is distributed amongst the provincial Governments?—Yes, according to the amount raised in each province.

3464. Is it not the case that the surplus of the ordinary revenue, after the wants of the civil Government have been supplied, are distributed in the same way?—Yes, by the Constitution Act.

3465. In what part of the island is the territorial revenue raised?—By far the greater portion of it in the Middle Island, which is not affected by the native question. I think that the entire land revenue for the last year, in the Northern Island, was only about 50,000*l.* or 60,000*l.*, and the residue of the 240,000*l.* was raised in the Middle Island.

3466. Those portions of the Colony in which the native difficulties, and consequent

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sequent expense, are greatest, supply the smallest proportion of revenue from the sale of their lands?—Very much the smallest proportion.

3467. Have you stated the expenditure incurred during the last year for volunteers and militiá?—A sum of 6,317 *l.* was voted.

3468. Independent of the loan?—Independent of the loan.

3469. Would you be inclined to say that if any change of system, at the conclusion of the war, should result in the management of native affairs being handed over in a greater degree to the responsible minister, it would be necessary, for the purpose of introducing something like government into the native districts, that funds for that purpose voted by the Colonial Parliament should be considerably increased?—I think decidedly so; and the view taken by the Parliament of New Zealand during the last session, shows that if they are not too much crippled by the expenses of this war, they will gladly increase the vote in reference to natives, if they could see any well-defined policy for their government.

3470. The interior districts of New Zealand have been, I believe, to a great extent in an independent state, and there has been hardly anything like government?—Because the law cannot be extended to them in any appreciable extent.

3471. The introduction of the machinery of government would entail a considerable expense, which must be provided for by the Parliament of New Zealand?—Yes.

3472. You are of opinion that Parliament would be prepared to vote the necessary funds for the purpose?—I am; provided always, that the Colony is not crippled by the expense of the war being thrown upon them.

3473. Mr. *Adderley.*] Have you formed any opinion as to the probable duration of the war?—No; I think it depends much upon circumstances that one can hardly foresee.

3474. I have received letters from some of the public men in the Colony, both in the Government and in the opposition, which show that they have very little sympathy with the war; is that your opinion?—No, it is not; I think there is great sympathy with the war through the whole of New Zealand.

3475. Do any of the provinces, except those in which the war is raging, take any interest?—A very great interest.

3476. What interest, and how do they show it?—I can say that in all the provinces they have been very anxious to subscribe for the benefit of those who have suffered by it. They have raised corps of volunteers, and each separate Settlement has done all that it can to prevent the necessity of troops being brought away from the seat of war. In the Middle Island, previous to the war breaking out, a political question was mooted very strongly amongst those who took the lead in politics for the separation of the two islands; but the instant the war broke out they with one accord ceased to entertain that question, and it was entirely given up as a political question, and agreed to be laid aside until the war was successfully concluded.

3477. Have those in the Southern Island contributed towards the war?—I do not think that they have been called upon to do so, beyond the share they have in the votes of the Assembly.

3478. Is there a feeling in the Colony that England has involved them in war, and that if they had been left to themselves they would have avoided it?—Many people hold that opinion.

3479. They think that England has undertaken larger responsibilities towards the natives than they would have done?—That is the opinion of many.

3480. If England concludes the war, and then alters the Constitution Act, so as to give to them the government of the natives, they would willingly undertake their own defence, would they not?—Upon the successful conclusion of the war, and the settlement of questions that have arisen, and which will arise out of the war, New Zealand being put into a state of peaceable relations with the natives, I think it will be quite possible for the Colony to volunteer to take care of its internal peace altogether.

3481. Do you think that they contemplate remaining at peace with the natives under these circumstances?—I think they have never had any other intention; they feel it to be their interest.

3482. Do they feel that they would be able to keep peace?—That question is difficult to answer; for this reason, that it is impossible to say in what way the war may end; if the war ends in a perfectly peaceable solution of the question, and the natives, as I believe they will, become perfectly content to remain under British

British laws, and they are convinced that they will be justly treated, and that there is no use in appealing to arms, then I think there will be very little risk of any future war.

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3483. What sort of force would the Colony, in your opinion, organise for the purpose?—Under the present circumstances of the Colony, it would be very difficult to organise a force for any other purpose than for the defence of particular places. It would be difficult to organise a moveable force. The European population is comparatively much dispersed, and the natives, having great facilities for rapid movement, could almost, without preparation, attack any settlement.

3484. *Chairman.*] Would they be purely provincial forces that would be raised?—Provincial forces for the defence of their own settlements, but under control of general Government.

3485. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you not think that they would soon adopt a system of concentrating those forces upon any point attacked?—It would be almost impossible, from the fact that you can seldom tell where the attack will be made; the points to be defended are so far apart as to prevent much co-operation, and the settlers are so scattered, that if you take them from their agricultural pursuits to attend to militia duties for any length of time, you cause great detriment to the resources of the Colony.

3486. Are volunteers bound to serve away from home?—Within a certain limited distance.

3487. What is that distance?—I think not more than 30 miles from home. Similar to the militia.

3488. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given upon the subject of volunteer corps in the Middle Island; do you know whether they have been entirely the result of spontaneous effort on the part of the settlers, paid for by themselves, or whether there has been any vote from the provincial funds?—Entirely spontaneous, with the exception of the cost of arms; the Federal Government has found arms.

3489. With reference to the degree of interest felt in the war, do you think that that is measured by the fact of whether there was or was not commissariat expenditure going on in the provinces?—I do not think that that had anything to do with it; any feeling of that kind, if it existed at all, is confined to so small a class as not to affect the question in the least.

3490. The Commissariat expenditure, I understand you to say, would be almost entirely confined to Auckland and New Plymouth?—Yes.

3491. Mr. *Adderley.*] Which kind of force is most efficient for native warfare, a volunteer local force or troops from England?—It is difficult to say. It would depend on the service they were employed on.

3492. Which proved most efficient in the last war?—They have been so mixed up together, that one has seldom acted without the other.

3493. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The Colonists place reliance, do they not, on the presence of regular troops?—Yes, certainly.

3494. *Chairman.*] Do you know of any instance of Colonists in the Middle Island desiring the presence of regular troops?—I have heard wishes expressed that troops should be stationed in some of the provinces, but by no great number of the population.

3495. Do you think that, on the part of some of the population, there would be a positive aversion to the presence of troops?—I do not.

3496. Sir *George Grey.*] What would have been the effect of the Colony being left, from its first commencement, to its own resources, without the presence of any British troops?—That is a theoretical question that is very difficult to answer; I think that in any case troops would have had to be forwarded from England.

3497. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think that the settlers could have maintained themselves without the presence of troops?—I think not.

3498. If the settlers had been left to fight it out with the natives, do you think that New Zealand would have reached anything like its present point of progress?—I think, to a great extent, it would, from the fact that the native question is confined to one-third of the Colony; the settlement in the Middle Island, from which the largest exports are derived, has succeeded without any troops at all.

Jovis, 30° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. A. Mills.
Mr. Adderley.
Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Baxter.
Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Childers.
Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. C. Fortescue.
Sir George Grey.
Mr. Marsh.
Lord Stanley.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable Lord *Herbert*, of Lea (attending by permission of the House of Lords); Examined.

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3499. *Chairman.*] YOU are Secretary of State for War?—Yes.

3500. It appears from a return received from the Adjutant General's Office that the number of troops in the British dependencies borne on the strength of the Imperial army, between 1851 and 1861, has fluctuated; would those fluctuations be accounted for by the circumstance that the Imperial force in India, China, or elsewhere, has been from time to time increased by the withdrawal of troops from other Colonies?—Just so.

3501. Is it your opinion that the proportion of British troops stationed at any time at any particular point has been governed by measures of Colonial or Imperial necessity?—That is a wide question. When there is an Imperial necessity to concentrate a mass of troops upon any given point, the rest of the Colonies are starved, without reference to their wants at the time, as was the case at the time of the Russian war, when we denuded the Colonies almost entirely of troops.

3502. During the time of the Indian mutiny and the Crimean war those fluctuations took place, and I was led from that to suppose that the changes might have been considerably influenced by the circumstance that the troops were wanted elsewhere?—Just so.

3503. I suppose that would equally apply to the state of things in the year 1860 and the current year, in regard to Hong Kong; for the year 1860, I observe that the number of troops for Hong Kong is given at 10,818, and in 1861, 7,999, but that the average of the five years preceding has been something over 1,000?—Yes.

3504. From that same return, received from the Adjutant General's Office, and dated 14th May, it appears that the strength of the Imperial troops in Canada is 2,220, and the same number was given by the Duke of Newcastle, in reply to a question put by the Committee on the 16th of this month; on the following day, Mr. Baring, in answer to a question put to him in the House of Commons, said that the Commander in Chief in Canada had some time since represented that the military force in Canada was below the amount at which it stood some years since, and that it was intended to send one battalion, which would restore the military strength to what it has been; presuming the answer to have been accurately reported, would that have been a correct reply?—The force in Canada had been reduced by the Duke of Newcastle, when he last came to the Colonial Office, to one battalion of the line and the Canadian Rifles; but, upon a representation made the other day in a private letter from the General commanding in Canada, the Government thought it advisable to send an additional battalion, and it is now under orders to go; the apprehension being, that in consequence of the war in the United States, a large population would turn its attention to the use of arms, and upon the termination of hostilities between the two contending powers, there would be a large mass of military power not very well in hand probably, and therefore that it is well to have some larger force in Canada to prevent filibustering incursions, not on the part of the United States Government, but on the part of the population itself.

3505. Can

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3505. Can you tell us when that letter from Sir Fenwick Williams was received?—I do not recollect the exact day, but it was at the last Cabinet we held before Whitsuntide.

3506. In Canada the same state of things appears for the last four years to have existed in respect of the fluctuations from time to time as have existed in other Colonies. Should you say that the principal object of our maintaining troops in Canada at all is for the purpose of defending the Colony against the contingencies of external hostile aggression from without, or for the maintenance of order within?—Canada is one of the few Colonies which is coterminous with a very powerful State, and there is, therefore, a necessity for maintaining some kind of nucleus of a force in case of hostile aggression.

3507. It has been stated by the Duke of Newcastle in his evidence, that he would consider the present number of troops in Canada entirely as a peace establishment, and that in the event of war it would be necessary to pour in a much larger number of troops?—Certainly.

3508. Has your attention been called to the circumstance that, during six or seven months in the year, we have no means of communication with the heart of Canada by railway, whilst, through the State of Maine by way of Portland, there are means of throwing troops into Canada in the event of a war with the United States?—Yes.

3509. Do you not think that, in the contingency of hostilities from that quarter, there would be considerable difficulty in reinforcing our peace garrisons in Canada, so as to protect the inhabitants against foreign aggression under such a state of things?—Certainly.

3510. Would it not, for instance, be rather a difficult thing to carry out our policy of protecting the Colony, supposing dangers to arise with the United States?—I understand you to mean that we ought, therefore, to have always in Canada a force sufficient for the purpose of defence, without trusting to reinforcements when the emergency arises.

3511. My question is rather whether there is not some inconsistency, in your opinion, in our policy in maintaining at considerable cost a peace establishment there, which would practically be of no use for the defence of a long frontier of 3,000 miles, without considerable reinforcements, which we should have a difficulty in supplying?—We have one or two strong places to maintain, and they form a nucleus for recruiting the militia, and for volunteer corps. You have now a considerable force of volunteers there.

3512. We have it in evidence, that there are of militia nearly 5,000 in Canada; and the Duke of Newcastle, from his official knowledge, and from his recent experience in Canada, has told us that, in his opinion, there are the materials for a much larger force of militia in the Colony. You think that in that state of things, we have good grounds for believing that the Colony has within itself a considerable element of *personnel* for its own defence?—A very considerable element.

3513. Would you look forward to the time when the necessity for sending troops to that Colony may cease, or at all events be greatly diminished, by reason of the increase of the local power?—I think you might, although of course I have no means of speaking of their contributions towards the defences. I do not think we have had a garrison lately, which we could still further reduce. One battalion of the line, and the Canadian Rifles, is as small a force as you can maintain there.

3514. But still you think that the fact of there being so considerable a spirit of volunteering there, and so large a number of men ready to enrol themselves as militiamen, would furnish a ground for thinking that the colony has a very large means of self-defence, as far as men are concerned?—Yes.

3515. With regard to the Canadian Rifles, we had some evidence from the Duke of Newcastle, and he expressed an opinion very much in favour of the constitution of that corps for the purposes of the colony, with reference to the circumstance that they were less likely to desert, and upon other grounds. Do you concur with him in that opinion, that if possible, it is desirable that that local force should be increased, or substituted if possible for regiments of the line?—If it were not for the difficulty of merging regiments of the line into local regiments of that kind, I think it would be a good thing to do.

3516. Is the cost of a corps, organized as the Canadian Rifles are, more than that

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that of a regiment of the line of the same strength?—It is rather more, because there are more married men; with that exception there is no difference.

3517. I apprehend that one great reason for preferring a corps constituted as the Canadian Rifles are is, that they have not the inducement to desert?—No, they are within reach of an annuity for life; the young soldiers, when they go out there, are in reach of large wages.

3518. We have heard that there is a very large per-centage of deserters in the North American Colonies, and I think also at the Cape, and in some of the Australian Colonies. Do you know of any means by which our system could be altered so as to obviate that state of things?—You will find that it is diminishing. I think that the public are rather misled by the returns of desertion which are laid before the House of Commons; the number of instances given do not prove that so many men have deserted. There are men who desert over and over again.

3519. Lord *Stanley.*] You put a soldier down as deserting if he is absent for more than a day or two?—Just so; and if he deserts 10 times in the year he appears in the list as 10 deserters.

3520. *Chairman.*] I think, in answer to some question, it was stated that the average number in Canada for five years was 130 or 140. Do you think that number would represent those who had not been recovered, or would it be a *bonâ fide* numerical return of desertions?—Yes, I think so; there are immense facilities for deserting. We are upon the frontier, and there is an immense demand for labour, and very high wages are given. I may illustrate it by saying, that in the United States the army, I believe, deserts in the proportion of the whole in three years.

3521. Some evidence has been given as to the arrangement made for sending troops to British Columbia in 1857. Have you any official knowledge of those arrangements?—There was a demand upon us, and we sent some Sappers.

3522. Do you know whether any arrangement was made as to the mode in which they should be paid for. Were the expenses to be borne upon the Imperial funds?—My impression is, that the expenses were to be borne upon the Imperial funds.

3523. Do you know why they were sent?—It was thought that in a young Colony they would be available in assisting in the construction of roads and buildings.

3524. Has any report been received as to what they have done?—I believe the Colonial Office have received some report, and that upon the whole they doubt the policy of having sent them out.

3525. I think it has been stated that the troops in the North American Colonies are now at Halifax, Quebec, Kingston, and Montreal?—Yes.

3526. Are there any other posts at which troops are now stationed in British North America?—A detachment of Canadian Rifles went up the Red River, but they are coming back again.

3527. I suppose there are some at St. John's, New Brunswick?—Yes, a small number.

3528. Evidence has generally been given with regard to the organization of these local corps in the Colony; speaking of the Canadian Rifles, and the Cape Rifles, and the Newfoundland Fencibles, is it your opinion that where there is the material in the Colony for the formation of such corps it is desirable, as far as possible, to increase them and to substitute them for regiments of the line?—It depends a great deal upon the climate. The reasons which exist against local corps in India do not apply in temperate climates, but then there are some disadvantages; the discipline is more relaxed, and men have not the same ties with home, and are apt to get discontented and internally disorganized occasionally.

3529. The total cost of transport to and from the dependencies, including what is called intercolonial transport, amounts, in round numbers, for the year ending March 1859, to about 200,000 *l.* Financially speaking it would, I presume, be a great advantage if, as far as possible, we could save that expense by forming local corps?—Yes.

3530. Can you name any Colonies in which that could be largely extended?—In most Colonies labour is extremely dear, and wages very high, and I have no doubt it is very difficult to raise men.

3531. In a Minute from Sir William Denison on the organization of the military

military force required by the Australian Colonies, and dated, I think, in 1860, he suggests the formation of a regiment of rifles, and gives an estimate of the cost; have you had your attention called to that?—I recollect reading it.

3532. Can you form any opinion as to whether that appears practicable or otherwise?—They raised a certain number of men in Australia for the augmentation of a certain regiment, but they did not raise as many as they expected, and it has ended in those men being absorbed in the regiment and going away with it.

3533. As far as it has been tried, you think it has not succeeded?—I think it is the impression in the Colony that it has not succeeded.

3534. Some evidence has been given before this Committee in regard to the mode in which the Cape Rifles are recruited as distinguished from the mode in which they used to be recruited; have you formed any opinion upon the subject as to whether the Cape Rifles have deteriorated in their constitution?—It is stated that they have to a certain extent, because they have a smaller number of men recruited on the spot, and acquainted with the country; they are now recruited almost exclusively from England. Sir George Grey has made proposals for reducing the number of Cape Rifles, and substituting a certain number of police for them.

3535. What is your opinion in regard to that police force, which I believe is called Currie's Mounted Police?—I hear that they are extremely effective; that each man provides his own horse, and forages for him, and has his own commissariat; but the objection to that is, that being police and not soldiers, and therefore not under the Mutiny Act, they resign if exposed to service which they do not like; for instance, if they get shot at as soldiers would be.

3536. From what you have heard, and from your official knowledge, should you say that there is generally in our South African Colonies the material for a considerably larger local force than we have now, so as to permit a reduction of the Imperial army there?—As far as the evidence, the Cape Mounted Rifles were rather a popular corps; but having failed in their recruiting, I think it shows that the recruiting field is a very limited one.

3537. You think they have gone so far in that direction that they have no unexplored field for recruiting to which they can go?—Apparently not; there are great difficulties in the way of raising levies amongst some of the African races; for example, the Ceylon corps was formed exclusively of Malays, but when that system was no longer adopted, it was proposed to send to Africa for Kaffirs; but in Caffraria, where the ox is a wild animal, the consumption of animal food by the natives is so great, that it was found impossible within reasonable limits to keep them as soldiers; a pound of meat per diem, which was the amount allowed to each soldier, would not satisfy a Kaffir, who generally eats two or three pounds, and it was found that the expense would be so great in feeding them, that they could not be maintained as soldiers. That would apply just as much in South Africa itself.

3538. Mr. Owen, who was sent out as Commissioner with Sir George Clerk, and who also commanded Hottentot levies, has given evidence to the effect that irregular forces are in some respects, for frontier warfare, to be preferred to regular troops?—I should think so.

3539. We have some evidence with regard to the West Indian regiments, as to the mode in which they are now recruited, as compared with the system upon which they were formerly recruited, when the men were brought from the coast of Guinea; what would be your opinion as to the comparative efficiency and satisfactory character of those regiments now as compared with former years?—There certainly is not in the West Indies the same dependence placed in them as when they were unconnected with the population which they were meant to keep in order, that I think there is a great deal of exaggeration upon that subject, and generally speaking, that so long as in the West Indies they can by disparaging the black troops, have white ones substituted, they will disparage black troops, but if they find that they are no longer to have white troops, they will be contented with black troops.

3540. What, in your opinion, is the particular function of troops in the West Indies?—They are more for police purposes, I apprehend, than for anything else.

3541. You do not look upon them as a defence against foreign aggression?—No. I think that the complaints against the black troops originated just after the time of the Indian mutiny, when a great deal of blame was cast upon the authorities

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in India for not having known that the fidelity of the sepoys was not to be depended upon. The result of that was, that commanding officers wrote and said their troops were not to be depended upon. Each appeared to think that if they turned out faithless, it was as well to show he was aware of it, and had given the Government due warning. If nothing happened, it did not matter.

3542. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] How many Governors did that?—I do not recollect.

3543. Mr. *Childers.*] Did the Governors or the principal military officers make those reports?—Some of both.

3544. *Chairman.*] Do you think that we could now at all safely, supposing that the black regiments were not to be depended upon, attempt continuously to garrison the West Indies with white troops, considering the high per-centage of mortality there?—Certainly not.

3545. The Departmental Report which was presented to Parliament has been the subject of examination before this Committee. I wish to ask whether you generally agree in the principles laid down by your predecessor in the War Department in the letter which led to the appointment of that Committee, that principle being, that the Colonies ought to assist as much as possible in their defences?—I believe that all Secretaries of State for War hold that opinion, more or less.

3546. I think that the authors of that report, and Sir William Denison also, in the despatches which he has written, recommend that a Colony should be left to bear the primary responsibility of its own defence, and that the mother country should only assist by a contribution. Do you think that plan in principle a good one?—Yes; habit and custom go for so much that it is impossible to lay down a rule which you can carry into effect immediately.

3547. Without saying that a rigid uniform rule is to be at once applied to all the Colonies, or that all the Colonies are to be put upon the same footing precisely, or are to be dealt with as if they were all in similar circumstances, do you say that the principle therein enunciated is a principle to be aimed at?—Certainly.

3548. The total amount of our Imperial military expenditure in respect of the dependencies administered through the Colonial Department for the year ending March 1859, as given by the return put in before the Committee, is 2,852,264 *l.*, including in that a portion of departmental expenses, recruiting expenses, and non-effective services. In the current year I presume that the New Zealand war will cause a considerable addition to the Imperial expenditure?—Yes.

3549. It appears from a further return we have before us there are now nearly 7,000 more troops in our dependencies than there were in the year to which that return refers. Looking at those facts and figures do you think it would be an extravagant estimate to say that during the current year our Colonial military expenditure will be at least 1,000,000 *l.* more than it was in the year to which that return relates, including the New Zealand war, where the force is again quintupled, but excluding the China occupation?—That depends upon the estimate we may form of the cost of the New Zealand war; that is an exceptional circumstance.

3550. The number of troops given for New Zealand is 5,354; calculating that, exclusive of transport, the troops will cost 100 *l.* per man, that will give half a million additional expenditure.

3551. Mr. *Childers.*] As I understand, some of the troops now in New Zealand are drafted from other Colonies?—Yes.

3552. *Chairman.*] Would not the circumstance of the China war, and the employment of nearly 8,000 troops in that service, so far balance the excess occasioned by the New Zealand war as to render the current year a fair one upon which to base our calculations?—No, I do not think so; the garrison we have in China ought to be in England, and when I disembodied the militia I reckoned upon having it at home; the force in New Zealand ought also to be in England. I think that the necessity for the distribution of our forces in the last few years is much altered. I should accumulate all the forces that it is possible to accumulate at home, and keep as few men as possible in the Colonies.

3553. That would be a very great alteration of our policy as compared with the last 10 years, would it not?—To a great degree.

3554. If I correctly apprehend your view, it would be this, that instead of keeping the troops, as we have done, for the last 10 years, scattered about our dependencies, you would concentrate them at home?—Certainly.

3555. Mr.

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3555. Mr. *Fortescue.*] The China force, I believe, was not formed by drawing troops from the Colonies, but by sending troops from England?—By intercepting troops which were on their way home from India.

3556. It does not affect the comparison of the troops in the Colony one way or the other?—Not at all.

3557. *Chairman.*] The last return for the strength in 1861 exclusive of Hong Kong is 44,481. That return is rather above the average of the last 10 years. Should you say that you see your way in future years to a further reduction of that number?—One hopes that this state of things in New Zealand will not continue, and when you come to an addition of 4,000 men in one Colony, it is a large addition. The force at the Cape has been a great deal reduced, and I think may be further reduced. We are abolishing 11 posts which we now hold, and that will make some reduction in the cost. Sir George Grey, whom I consulted upon the subject last year when he was in this country, has been applying himself to the question of a reduction in the cost of maintenance of the force at the Cape of Good Hope, and I have no doubt he will succeed in effecting a further reduction.

3558. It has been stated in evidence by Sir John Burgoyne, Admiral Erskine, Admiral Elliot, and others, that notwithstanding the great cost of our Colonial garrisons, none of them, except the Mediterranean fortresses, are in a state of tolerable defence, but are dependent upon our command of the sea. Two systems of defence have been recommended, one, that of keeping permanent small stations, and the other, the withdrawing of the garrison in time of peace, but occupying those stations in time of war?—The great fortresses, such as the two Mediterranean fortresses, Malta and Gibraltar, and one or two others, I should garrison to the utmost. I think that the difference between peace and war in many of the Colonies would be, that instead of maintaining a force in them in time of war, we should withdraw it. I see no use in maintaining isolated battalions; either we have the supremacy of the sea, in which case they are useless; or we lose the supremacy of the sea, in which case they are caught in a trap.

3559. It has been stated by some witnesses that in the Bahamas we have spent since the general peace two millions of money, and that we have never kept up a force there sufficient to resist the crews of two frigates; do you approve of that expenditure of money?—All I can say is, that if I were asked to do it I should not do it.

3560. Have you seen the report of the evidence given before the Committee by Sir John Burgoyne?—I have not.

3561. As matters stand at present, should you say that the Colonies—for instance, the British North American Colonies, and the West Indies, contribute as large a proportion, either in men or money, towards their defence, as, considering their revenue and their resources, and their power generally, they may fairly be expected to contribute?—North America, I should say, does not; the West Indies are under peculiar circumstances; we have interfered with their domestic laws.

3562. You think that the circumstance of our having interfered with their relations upon the question of slavery renders theirs a peculiar case?—Yes.

3563. The Colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, we hear practically, do nothing in the shape of contributions towards Imperial expenditure; do you not think it reasonable that we should take some steps towards making those Colonies contribute?—Yes; but the only rational way of proceeding is to say, "You shall have very small garrisons."

3564. You think we should say that they shall have no troops, or a certain maximum of troops?—Yes.

3565. And you think that that would be better than entering into bargains with them?—Yes; I think that we should get the worst of the bargain by passive resistance.

3566. Do you think that there is any advantage in placing the Mediterranean garrisons and other dependencies, which are treated purely as military stations, under the War Department?—Gibraltar is so already, but not Malta.

3567. Nor Hong Kong?—No.

3568. Nor St. Helena?—No; Malta is very nearly so, because at this moment the same officer is Governor and Commander of the Forces.

3569. What do you say of the Ionian Islands?—I think there would be an advantage in having the same arrangement as regards identity of command, but

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I have no anxiety to have the government of the Ionian Islands at the War Office.

3570. Do you think that difficulties arise with regard to that class of dependencies different from those which might arise with regard to others, from the circumstance of their being administered by the Colonial department?—I think not.

3571. Some evidence has been given as to the system of Colonial allowances; are we right in supposing that those Colonial allowances originated in rich and liberal Colonies giving extra payment to the troops, and that then the Imperial Government was compelled, in other cases to follow the example, in order to avoid discontent amongst the troops?—I do not know of any case of Colonial allowance given by the Imperial Government except at the Cape. The cost of transportation is so great, and the cost of provisions increased so much in the interior, that complaints were made that the health of the troops was suffering in consequence, and we were obliged to give them some extra allowance, trusting to the Legislature to reimburse us.

3572. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Has that trust been fulfilled?—We do not know yet.

3573. *Chairman.*] In consequence of our supplying Armstrong guns to the Mediterranean garrisons, will there be any large increase in the cost of stores for those garrisons?—No; it will be merely the substitution of one kind of ammunition for another. They are well supplied with stores in the Mediterranean garrisons. I ought to say that the Armstrong ammunition is more costly than the other.

3574. A return has been given showing the expenditure incurred for the year ending March 1859, distinguishing the different items of pay, allowances, provisions, arms, stores, barracks, and fortifications. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in appending such a return to the annual Estimates, showing the amount of Imperial expenditure in the Colonies?—I should think it might be done, but I cannot say positively without making inquiry.

3575. Do you think that there are any Colonies in regard to which the principle upon which Lord Grey acted in 1851, in regard to the Australian Colonies, might be advantageously applied; it has been stated that in consequence of the residuum of convict population in Tasmania that Colony is exempted from contribution?—That exemption must cease in course of time.

3576. I think it is now about seven years ago since transportation was discontinued, and during that time there has been a large commissariat expenditure in Tasmania?—I cannot speak to the interior of Tasmania. I have no means of judging of the effect of the residuum of the convict population still left there, but in the course of time Tasmania must be put upon the same footing as the other Colonies.

3577. Looking at the prosperous condition of some of our Colonies, do you not think that it would be wise, politically speaking, if they were taught to rely rather more upon their own defence?—Yes. If all our Colonies could have been founded upon the Indian principle, it would have been of great advantage.

3578. Even now, do you think that, so far as we can do so, we should be conferring a boon upon some of our Colonies by throwing upon them the burden of defending themselves?—As far as that can be done.

3579. Lord *Stanley.*] Do you consider it a good principle that has been acted upon of late, in Australia, to obtain certain contributions from Colonial Legislatures in aid of the maintenance of Imperial troops; does it not give the Colonial authorities the right to control the movement of the troops?—It does to a certain extent; but I do not think that is of any serious disadvantage. In the case of the navy, great disadvantage would result from limiting the operations of a ship to the Colony, but a battalion that is sent to the Colony must remain there, and so long as the troops remain, the Colony pays; when they are withdrawn, the Colony ceases to pay for them.

3580. Which do you think is preferable, to say to a Colony which is willing to pay a certain amount towards its own defences, that it should contribute in the shape of part payment for Imperial troops, or that it should raise a Colonial force of its own to serve as a part of its garrison?—I think one is possible, namely, the payment; but I doubt the practicability of the other; they have not the material for troops. Then there is an advantage in troops passing through a Colony, not only to the army, but to the Colony.

3581. What is the advantage to the army?—You get a change of station, and it

it is of great importance to have healthy Colonies to which troops can be sent after serving in unhealthy Colonies.

3582. I suppose that the cost of a Colonial force is much greater than that of maintaining Imperial troops, on account of labour being so highly paid?—It is not a question of cost, but a question of levying the men at all; the Colony will not pay more than the mother country does, and the only question is, whether they can succeed in raising the men. In point of fact, our troops receive much larger pay than is generally supposed.

3583. In the case of the West Indies, I think the force maintained there upon the average of some years past, has been about 4,500?—I think something of that kind.

3584. You have stated that a large proportion of that force must be considered as maintained there for purposes of police?—Yes.

3585. Do you think that it is the duty of the Imperial Government to provide for the police of the West India Colonies?—No; but it is a very mixed employment, and it is difficult to draw a very distinct line between military and police employment; in point of fact, in time of peace, there is no military employment; it is merely precaution against possible war.

3586. Do you not think that a considerable reduction of troops might take place in the West Indies, and that then the Colonies would exert themselves to provide police at their own expense?—I would rather not give an opinion upon that point, because I have no knowledge of the internal state of the Colony to lead me to form a sound opinion upon it.

3587. In reference to the proposed increase of force in Canada, I understood you to state that the reason assigned was, the danger of disturbance from the population of the United States?—Yes; and that whenever the war ceases, a large population which has trained itself to arms, will be diverted from its ordinary pursuits, and ready for anything.

3588. So long as the war continues, there is rather less danger of such disturbances?—Yes.

3589. And therefore the provision is made for the end of a war which is beginning?—No one can state when it will begin, or when it will end.

3590. Can you tell us what number of men would be required for the effective defence of the three Imperial positions in British North America; Kingston, Halifax, and Quebec?—I could tell you that by reference, but I could not say off-hand.

3591. Sir *George Grey*.] According to the return laid before the Committee from the Adjutant General's Office, it appears that there are now about 4,000 men in the West Indies. Do you know what proportion of that force consists of white troops, and what proportion of black troops?—We have three black regiments, of which a portion is on the coast of Africa; there is a very small white force. In Jamaica there are six companies of the 14th Foot; the Windward and Leeward Islands have a certain number of companies of the 14th Foot divided between them, and a battalion of the 21st Foot.

3592. Does the whole white force in the West Indies consist of only two regiments?—Two regiments.

3593. *Chairman*.] All the black and white troops are borne upon the strength of the Imperial army?—Yes.

3594. Sir *George Grey*.] With reference to that same return, you were asked a question as to the apparent increase of military force in the British Dependencies; is it not the case that after deducting the Mediterranean garrisons, and the additional force in New Zealand, on account of the war, there is a smaller force in the British Colonies at the present time, than in any year since the conclusion of the Russian war?—Yes.

3594. Has your attention been called to a return signed by Sir John Burgoyne, and which purposes to be a rough estimate of the cost of completing works in progress, and of new works necessary to place the undermentioned foreign possessions in a reasonable state of defence, in addition to the sums in the estimates for 1861-62, exclusive of armaments and ordinary barracks, and of such occasional improvements as art and science may from time to time render necessary?—I have not seen it.

3596. He says that the sum necessary for the Mauritius is 250,000*l*. Has any decision been arrived at by the Government to lay out any such sum as that?—None; I wrote to the Mauritius some time ago, and asked the Governor and

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the commanding engineer, the commanding officer, and the admiral, to meet and draw up a plan for the defence of the Mauritius, but putting this restriction upon them, that they were to bear in mind that there would be no augmentation of the garrison, which consists, I think, of about 2,000 men. They have sent home a plan in which the only dispute between them is, whether it requires 4,000 or 5,000 men. That is utterly useless for our purpose.

3597. Are the Committee to understand that this is merely a return of what is necessary according to Sir John Burgoyne's private views, and is not a return upon which the Government proposes to act?—Certainly.

3598. That return has not been sent to the Committee with your authority?—It has not; I think there are 11 places in the Mauritius at which an enemy could land; there are two great ports, and they propose to fortify those, and to erect batteries at each of the 11 landing-places; the island is about 100 miles round, and it is quite clear that any expedition which could land at all, would be sure to run into the batteries, and then you would have your means of defence converted into means of attack in the hands of the enemy.

3599. Do you agree with several witnesses who have been examined, that it is unwise to erect fortifications which cannot be sufficiently garrisoned?—Certainly; the tendency since the peace has been to build fortifications abroad, and to neglect them at home, thus leaving the vital parts undefended, and defending, at great cost, the extremities. I believe that that policy has been entirely wrong. I should spend as little as possible upon fortifications abroad, and strengthen our fortifications at home, where there is a very small extent of sea between us and a possible enemy.

3600. Are we to understand that that return in no degree expresses the decision of the Government as to erecting fortifications?—Certainly; Trincomalee is a place which it has been said it would be very desirable to defend, but it is always accessible to an Indian force.

3601. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you have stated that our Colonial possessions are more easily defended by a fleet than by garrisons; that is the case at home, is it not?—Yes, but our own shores are accessible when a distant Colony is not.

3602. With reference to the mounted police at the Cape, you say that inconvenience arises from their not being under the Mutiny Act?—I am told so.

3603. Would there be any difficulty in putting them under the Mutiny Act?—Yes; you would have a difficulty; for instance, in putting the London Police under the Mutiny Act.

3604. Do you not think that they would enlist if they were under the Mutiny Act?—That I do not know; it ties a man down, and imposes upon him severe conditions which he would rather be without.

3605. The coast guard, I believe, has been put under the Mutiny Act?—Yes, I think so; but they were accustomed to it before.

3605. I suppose you cannot give us the extra cost of the ammunition for the Armstrong guns?—Yes, I can give it to you if you wish it; it depends upon the calibre of the guns; it is much greater than the other.

3607. So far as that is concerned, the expenditure in the Colonies will be rather more than it used to be?—Yes.

3608. With reference to the cost of Colonial corps, is there not a Colonial corps in Canada?—Yes; the Canadian Rifles are a Colonial corps.

3609. Do you know whether they are paid more than other troops?—No; the difference is that there are more married men, and therefore they cost rather more.

3610. Mr. *Childers.*] Are you satisfied with the sufficiency of the black regiments?—I have heard very different reports for and against them; but I understand from the Colonial Office that they have received some very strong opinions from persons upon whom they can rely in favour of the black regiments.

3611. As a question of money, do you think we get fair consideration for the amount which these regiments cost us?—Yes, I should say so; we get no value for white troops; the mortality and suffering are so great that we ought not to continue to send them.

3612. Lord *Stanley.*] Has not the mortality greatly diminished of late years?—Yes, with care.

3613. Since the system was adopted of quartering white soldiers on the hills?—Yes, it has made a great difference.

3614. Mr. *Childers.*] You say you are, on the whole, satisfied with the present arrangements

arrangements under which some of the Colonies grant contributions in aid?—Victoria, for example.

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3615. You think that the principle upon which these grants are made is satisfactory?—I think so.

3616. Do you think that these Colonies have been fairly treated in the manner in which credit has been given them for their contributions?—I know what you mean by that. There is a difficulty about the matter, in this way: we estimate for troops abroad, and when the troops are in India we mention in the list the amount of force necessary, and the sum of money to be paid, but in the column for cost we leave a blank, because India pays the whole. We have no certainty with regard to any other Colonial contribution that we shall get it every year. India pays the cost of the transport of the troops to India, the cost of the troops while in India, and the expense of their transport back. If we did not apply for money for the troops in other Colonies, and a change of view, or change of government took place in those Colonies, we might find ourselves short of that amount of money. If we had any permanent arrangement with the Colonies it would be much better.

3617. My question was whether Colonies which have largely contributed have ever had fair credit for it in the proceedings of the War Office. For instance, at a time when the Colonies came forward very liberally and offered to pay the whole amount of the Colonial and Imperial expenditure, it may be within your knowledge that the only answer was a request that they would pay something more, and that led to a withdrawal of what they did pay?—I was not aware of that.

3618. Do you think that the arrangement is satisfactory under which, in the Army Estimates, no mention is made of the very large contributions in aid from the Colonies?—That is a Treasury question which the House of Commons has imposed upon the Government, but I think that the system of payment into the Exchequer is wrong in principle. The Colonies, instead of paying for what is really a part of the military expenditure, make a contribution to the general revenues of this country, which may be spent upon the improvement of London, or anything else. I think the estimate is what the public judges by, no one looks into an account, every one wants to know what is to be spent in the following year. The Army Estimates are much larger than the real cost of the army.

3619. If the Colonies did not pay very large sums in aid of the Imperial expenditure that expenditure would be greater than it now is?—The Colonies do not pay very large sums.

3620. Those contributions from the Colonies do not appear in the Estimates, nor in the payments to the Exchequer?—There has been an error in that respect, and I hope that it will be set right.

3621. With reference to the present state of affairs in New Zealand, have you erected a separate command?—Yes.

3622. Is that to continue only during the war?—No limit has been fixed at present, but I should think it would be only for the war.

3623. You have at present an Australian command, and a New Zealand command?—Yes.

3624. But you have no troops in Australia?—Yes; General Pratt is going out, and more troops will be there whenever the war in New Zealand ends.

3625. Are you sending back the General in command before he has any troops to command?—There are 1,109 troops there.

3626. Is that a sufficient force for a separate command?—We should not send out an officer expressly to command 1,109 soldiers, but it is a very exceptional state of things, and we hope things will return to their original state, and in that case there will be no separate command in New Zealand.

3627. Has not the sending out a General been an unnecessary expenditure?—I think not; we have a very able man there.

3628. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Do you consider it wise expenditure to keep a certain portion of troops in a Colony where there are not any important military posts to represent the Imperial authority, as well as to serve as a nucleus for defending local authorities in case of danger?—Yes, to a certain extent.

3629. You think it proper that a certain number of troops should be kept in the Colony to represent the Imperial authority?—Yes, it is said you should have the English flag flying and the red coat with it.

3630. Mr. *Adderley*.] On what principle would you have a small body of

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troops, in the sense of representing Imperial power?—I do not attach much importance to it, it is a sentimental view.

3631. Is not the sentiment likely to be more dangerous in inducing the Colony to look upon it as a pledge on the part of England to exempt it from the task of self-defence?—Not if the force is small enough.

3632. What amount of force would you keep there?—It must be different in each Colony; but the Colonies which are neither fortresses nor have native tribes, nor are conterminous with any powerful state, will require a very small force, if any.

3633. I am led to understand that troops are under orders for Canada, in consequence of a request from the Commander in Chief in Canada; some time since that, the military force in Canada should be restored to its former strength; may I ask whether I understood you just now to say, that that request from the Commander in Chief arrived in England just before the Whitsuntide holidays?—The request to restore the garrison to what it formerly had been, is of old date, but was always refused; just before Whitsuntide, His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge put into my hand a private letter from General Williams, in which he spoke of the disordered state of the population on the frontier, and said he thought it of importance that we should have some additional strength to prevent incursions.

3634. Do I understand that it is not the intention of the Government to restore the garrison to its former strength, but that the additional troops now about to be sent out, are sent for temporary reasons?—For temporary reasons.

3635. We find it stated in the "Times" of this morning, that reinforcements are to be despatched immediately to the Cape, to augment the British force now serving at that station, namely, 860 men of all ranks, the names of the regiments being given, together with the proportion of officers for each regiment; may I ask whether that is the case?—Not that I know of; there may be a relief going out, but no augmentation.

3636. On the contrary, I understand from your evidence already given, that the force at the Cape is about to be reduced?—The expenditure at the Cape will be a great deal reduced.

3637. You said just now that Canada being conterminous with a powerful state, is a Colony in which we should retain a nucleus of force in case of hostile operations. Mr. Lowe, in his recent evidence, in answer to Question 3371, gave it as his opinion that the greater the exposure of a Colony to such danger, the greater was the necessity for making the Colony self-reliant?—I think that is an extreme view of the question.

3638. In answer to Question 3405, he gave it as his opinion that for every soldier we sent out to such a Colony as Canada, we prevented 100 colonists from taking up arms; do you take the same view?—It is impossible for me to say upon what data that opinion is formed.

3639. Do you think that the troops we send prevent the colonists from developing their own resources?—If you maintain a large garrison, you give them an excellent excuse for not raising any militia of their own. Since the garrison has been reduced, there have been embodiments of militia.

3640. We understood you to say that this country could not safely reduce the garrison below one regiment of the line and the regiment of Canadian Rifles?—I think it is full low.

3641. Do I understand from your answer, that you do not consider that so small a garrison as that would have a mischievous effect in preventing Colonies from developing their resources?—No; I think a small force like that would be a nucleus, around which they would rally, and which would assist them in their military organization.

3642. Are you not afraid that a small force would be withdrawn in case of war?—It depends upon the power with whom we are at war.

3643. Supposing we were at war with a European power, do you not think it very likely that England might be obliged to withdraw the garrison from Canada?—I doubt whether we should withdraw so small a garrison as that.

3644. Mr. Lowe stated that the principles he would act upon in time of peace would be to have no Imperial troops in any Colony, but only in case of war?—My opinion is rather the reverse of that.

3645. What would you do in time of peace?—In the case of a Colony which had no native tribes to contend with, and which was not adjacent to powerful neighbours,

neighbours, I would not keep any garrison beyond that which would be necessary upon the flag and red coat principle.

3646. Do you think that Her Majesty's subjects in the Colonies cannot hoist her flag and wear red coats as well as those in England?—I do not think they can; they cannot get the men.

3647. Do you think that they could not hire them?—Not to the same extent.

3648. You think that our sending them troops has inflicted upon us the necessity of hiring mercenaries in time of war?—No.

3649. During the Russian war, when we raised a German Legion, and nearly quarrelled with America upon the question of enlisting; do you not think that we should have been less in danger of that if our garrisons had been kept at home?—Certainly.

3650. Mr. *Fortescue*.] That is upon the assumption that there are Colonial garrisons to be called home?—Yes.

3651. Mr. *Adderley*.] Have you sufficient knowledge of the condition of the Canadian Militia and Volunteers, to say whether they are generally speaking a well-organized force?—I have not.

3652. Although, in your opinion, a rigid principle cannot be laid down with reference to Colonial contributions for the use of Imperial troops, yet you would not think it right to receive contributions from Colonies which are willing to contribute, whilst you receive none from other Colonies?—I should be glad to receive assistance from wherever I can get it.

3653. Do you not think it an objectionable system to receive contributions from Colonies which are willing to pay, and to exempt from contributions Colonies which are unwilling, although evidently able to pay?—Yes.

3654. You say that the process of developing Colonial resources for self-defence, cannot be carried into effect immediately. The gradual introduction of such a system would not, I presume, be open to objection?—No.

3655. Do you see any objection to the use of the regular force of the British army in Colonies such as Australia, for purposes of local Government, such as putting down local riots?—They can make no claim upon us to use the troops in such a manner as that.

3656. Do you consider that a proper service for British troops to be engaged in?—All service is good for British troops; they do it all exceedingly well, and it makes a variety for them.

3657. Do you see no danger to the discipline of the British army in its employment for the suppression of local riots by a Government which has the complete command of its own policy unconnected with this country?—If British troops were used for political purposes in a Colony it would, no doubt, be very objectionable.

3658. You were asked just now whether you generally concurred in the principle laid down by your predecessor in office, which led to the Departmental Report. May I ask whether you agree especially in the distinction there drawn that England should assist in the defence of Colonies against the aggression of foreign nations, but that the military expenditure for internal police should be defrayed wholly from local funds?—If you can draw the line.

3659. As regards that distinction, what is your view with reference to native tribes, such as the Kaffirs and Maories; do you regard them as foreign nations, or do you consider wars with them in the light of internal wars, the expense of which the Colony ought to take upon itself?—I think they partake of both characters; it is impossible to put them sharply into one category or the other.

3660. Do you think that the distinction which has been drawn justifies the Cape of Good Hope in throwing the entire cost of Kaffir wars upon England?—I do not; but you must recollect, that if you adopt the contrary system, you cannot let your people have their throats cut, when a battalion of troops, if sent out, would prevent it.

3661. Not if you had good reason to believe that they would not allow their throats to be cut?—I am presuming that the time came when they are cut.

3662. What is your general opinion as to the expenditure upon such fortifications as are necessary in Colonies; is that a charge properly falling upon the British Treasury?—I am against them altogether. You allude to such as the Bahamas.

3663. I exclude simply Imperial fortresses, and refer to such fortifications as

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are necessary in harbours, or at seats of Government of Colonies, properly so called?—I should say that the expense is not properly chargeable upon the Imperial Exchequer.

3664. Do you generally think that our expenditure in defending the Colonies is diminishing, and may be looked upon as in course of progressive reduction?—I think it is.

3665. Supposing our Colonies to increase either in number or in territory, as we may suppose that Canada and South Africa very likely may, would you still expect our expenses upon the present system to diminish?—I think that the tendency is not to extend our Colonies; the Colonial Office is always on its guard against accessions of territory, and in South Africa we have given up territory.

3666. Supposing Canada to increase towards the Pacific, do you think that our undertaking the garrisoning of Halifax, Quebec, and Kingston would entail upon us the necessity of garrisoning any other fortresses along that frontier?—I cannot speak of that.

3667. Sir John Burgoyne, in answer to Question 1432, states broadly that most of the Colonies are in an unprovided state, and require new projects altogether. Is that your impression as to the state of our Colonial defences?—No. I do not agree with Sir John Burgoyne that each Colony is to be defended separately, upon the assumption that an overwhelming force will attack it, as I understand he assumes in his evidence.

3668. Even the fortifications which we have in some of the Colonies we can hardly afford to garrison?—Just so.

3669. Do you not consider that there is great danger in fortifications which are inefficiently garrisoned?—Very great.

3670. Do you think that we could undertake to put those in an efficient state and garrison them sufficiently with the forces we have at home?—Certainly not.

3671. I understand you to lay down the principle that you would accumulate troops at home instead of dispersing them in the Colonies?—Yes.

3672. Supposing the expenditure in the New Zealand war to amount to half a million in this year, will not that be in excess of the military expenditure, as compared with what it would be if the Colony bore the expense of its own defence?—Yes; if you could get a Colony to bear the expense of so large a force as there is in New Zealand.

3673. In answer to Question 2237, Mr. Merivale said, "If all Canada were against us, we should not want the troops; if, as probably would be the case, there was a great division of sentiment amongst the population, a division of troops would be an encouragement to the legal side." I wish to ask you whether the employment of British troops in Canada for the purpose of turning the scale in favour of British connexion is a proper ground for retaining our forces there?—It would depend very much upon the relative proportions of the two parties. If Canada is bent upon leaving us, leave us she will.

3674. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Do the Colonial Estimates bear any proportion of the civil expenditure of the Mediterranean garrisons?—Of Malta and the Ionian Islands.

3675. Do the War Estimates bear any of the civil expenditure?—None.

3676. Not of St. Helena?—No.

3677. You have given it as your opinion that the public look a great deal more to estimates than to accounts; do you not consider that an erroneous idea of the cost of the Colonies is given by including in the Colonial Estimates that which is strictly military expenditure?—To some extent. You can hardly put the civil government of Malta upon the Army Estimates.

3678. Has it any other but a military object?—The principal object no doubt is military. At home, part of your government is for military purposes.

3679. Have you received suggestions for manning the garrisons in any part of the world with marines?—In some places the garrisons have been composed of marines; but a marine force is more costly than troops of the line.

3680. It is less liable to injury, is it not?—Yes, I apprehend it is. It has the advantage of sea service and land service.

3681. Still you think that, on the whole, it would be costly?—It would be costly on that account; a marine costs more than a soldier; he has free rations on board, and in other respects is more costly.

3682. You do not yourself order deductions to be made, but you order the Governors to examine into the expenditure, I presume?—In concert with the Colonial Office.

3683. And

3683. And in concert with the Colonial authorities?—Yes.

3684. The details of the deduction are furnished by them?—No; I think if that were the case we should have none at all.

3685. Is there not a difficulty in checking the only person who knows anything about the real state of a Colony?—Yes, but they act very fairly upon the whole; a certain amount of pressure is put upon them.

3686. You think it perfectly impossible for any authorities to lay down any general rule as to the expense of those two Colonies in which there are native tribes, New Zealand and the Cape?—I think so; Colonies could not bear the expense of a war in which half a million of money is spent in a year.

3687. Is it your opinion that wars are favourably regarded in the Colonies on account of the increase of trade occasioned by them?—I think it was the case at one time at the Cape; I do not think that it was the case in New Zealand, because the Colonists have suffered terribly by the war.

3688. Are not all these wars much more the result of passion than of interest?—Yes; but very often passion assumes the form of interest.

3689. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Admitting the truth of the principle that Imperial troops should not be used for police purposes, do you not think that there is a considerable difference between purely English communities and dependencies, such as the West Indies, the Mauritius, and others, which have been in some cases conquered from a foreign power, and which are inhabited to a great degree by foreign and mixed populations?—Yes, that is the case in the Mauritius.

3690. You think that the duty of preserving order in such populations is not exactly local, but is more Imperial than in the case of purely English communities?—Yes, the elements of disturbance are more Imperial.

3691. A plan has been proposed according to which every Colony should defend itself by means of a local corps, raised for its own purposes, confined to that particular Colony, and to which the Imperial Government should contribute by way of a rate in aid; do you consider that that would be a good bargain for the Imperial Government?—No; I think that that is going the wrong way to work. The Colonies cannot give men, and may give money.

3692. Do you think that, in that case, England would be contributing towards the maintenance of an inferior force, and of which she would be able to make much less use in time of need?—Yes.

3693. Mr. *Baxter*.] Am I right in assuming that you think that both the numbers and the cost of Imperial troops in the Colonies ought to be diminished?—I think they could be; but when you look into each individual case, you find that the field over which you can diminish is smaller than you might expect; the principal force is in the garrisons; there are 13,000 men at Gibraltar and Malta alone, and that is a force which you cannot diminish at all; in time of war you would increase it.

3694. In Colonies, properly so called, you think it possible and desirable that both the number and cost of troops should be reduced?—Yes; I would keep them at the lowest possible level.

3695. Do you look to the probability of a reduction at the Cape?—Yes, I think it is still capable of a reduction.

3696. You think that the circumstances of the Cape Colony are such that it ought at all events to contribute a certain proportion of the cost of its military defence?—Yes.

3697. *Chairman*.] You say that the rough estimate put in by Sir John Burgoyne must be taken as representing his individual opinion?—Yes.

3698. When Sir John Burgoyne was examined before this Committee he was asked this question: "Can you give the Committee any idea of what should be the additional expenditure in order to complete those works at Mauritius in the mode which you think desirable?" and his answer was, "I could not tell you off-hand." I wish to ask you whether, in order to supplement Sir John Burgoyne's evidence, he was the proper functionary for me to apply to?—He was the proper functionary as to works now in existence, or new works in progress.

3699. Taking that estimate of his in the sense in which it was intended by him as a supplement on his evidence, and taken as his individual opinion, I apprehend that as Chairman of this Committee, I adopted the proper course in asking his opinion?—Yes.

3700. Mr. *Baxter*.] Do you say that in the event of a war the garrisons of such fortifications as Bermuda and Mauritius, and other places of a similar

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character, ought to be withdrawn?—I would not say that the garrison should be withdrawn from the Mauritius; the Mauritius is very valuable to us, and it is a very difficult Colony to keep in order. At the time it was in the hands of the French we lost enormously by the ships which issued from it. I do not think that you ought to desert it, nor do I think that you ought to expend 250,000 *l.* upon it. It should be defended by a fleet.

3701. Generally speaking, you think that we should concentrate our forces at home?—Certainly.

3702. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] I suppose it would be easy to reconquer a Colony?—In the former war we could have taken every Colony.

3703. Mr. *Fortescue.*] After you had retaken a Colony you would probably find your fortifications and arsenals destroyed?—Yes.

Sir *Charles Clifford* called in; and further Examined.

Sir *C. Clifford.*

3704. *Chairman.*] YOU wish to add something to your evidence, I think?—When the Committee adjourned upon the last occasion, there appeared to be an idea that the tendency of my evidence was to show that the Middle Island had not contributed, according to its funds, to the expenses of the war. I stated that the largest portion of the land revenue was at present derivable from the Middle Island, which is the case; but I look upon it that that land revenue cannot in any way be applied towards payment of the expenses of the war, or any expenses of that nature. In the first place, the revenue derived from the sale of waste lands may be looked upon as capital, which, if not reinvested in productive works, such as emigration, or surveys, roads, and other means for facilitating communication with different parts of the Colony, would soon cease to exist; emigration would fall off, and land sales would diminish. Originally, by the Constitution Act, the whole of the land revenue of both islands was liable to the charge for extinguishing native titles. The native claims in the Middle Island having all been purchased, the inhabitants felt jealous of having their money taken to purchase land in the North Island. An arrangement was therefore made and ratified by the Assembly, that the New Zealand Company's debt of 260,000 *l.*, which had been imposed upon New Zealand by the British Government, should be taken entirely by the Middle Island, and that the North Island should borrow a somewhat similar amount to purchase its own lands, thus freeing the Middle Island from that charge. For these reasons it would be very unjust to consider those funds at all available to meet the expenditure occasioned by the war. The only other fund that New Zealand possesses is its ordinary revenue, amounting to 219,600 *l.*, from which is to be deducted the expenditure on account of the general Government, of upwards of 163,000 *l.*, leaving only about 56,000 *l.* to be divided, according to the Constitution Act, amongst the various provinces for defraying the expense of their municipal government. The Government of New Zealand, feeling it impossible to apply the funds at their disposal for the purpose of defraying any extra expenses consequent upon the war, and feeling also that they were called upon to do their utmost in the way of contributing to those expenses, have incurred a further debt of 150,000 *l.*, and beyond that I think it is evident that the Colony has not the means to contribute

3705. Mr. *Fortescue.*] It is the case, is it not, that the expenditure to which you referred upon the last occasion, as appearing upon the estimates for the present year for native purposes, and for the war, will be derived from the general revenue to which the Middle Island contributes its share?—Yes.

3706. The Middle Island also bears the burden of the 150,000 *l.* loan in common with the rest of the Colony?—Certainly; the Middle Island bears its fair share of the burdens of the Colony.

Jovis, 6° die Junii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. A. Mills.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Marsh.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. C. Fortescue.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Adderley.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *William George Anderson*, re-called; and further Examined.

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3707. *Chairman.*] YOU told us, on the former occasion, that you are Principal Clerk in the Treasury?—I am.

3708. In reply to this question, which I asked you when you were last under examination, "Will you procure by a future day and produce before the Committee some clear explanation of the system which now exists, and the recommendations of your department, as to how it should be conducted in future?" you stated you would be in a position, shortly, to produce such information; can you now produce it?—We are not quite ready with the information necessary to arrive at a proper decision upon the question; the War Office have been preparing various detailed statements, and until we receive those it is impossible to lay any plan before the Committee. It will be necessary also to consult the authorities of the Treasury on the subject before any official plan can be submitted for the approval of the Committee.

3709. I understood you to say, upon the last occasion, that as far back as July last the question had been referred by your department to the War Department, and that no action had been taken upon that?—The War Office authorities have not yet finally answered the question put to them as far back as July; it has been necessary to refer to the Colonies for information, and I believe that they will be prepared very shortly to give an answer to the Treasury question.

3710. Can you carry the matter any further now than when you were last before us?—I am afraid not; I can only state, shortly, my own opinion, which is, that all those contributions should be paid into the Exchequer, and that the full charges should be voted upon estimate. At present the Army in some of the Colonies may be considered to be in the pay of two masters; the troops receive a certain portion of their pay from the Colonies, and another portion from the Imperial Exchequer. I think it would be clearer, as a matter of account, and perhaps better as a matter of principle, that the soldiers should have to deal simply with one paymaster.

3711. Are we to understand you to say that there is a difference of opinion between the departments as to the mode in which the Treasury Minute of 1848 should be acted upon?—The principle laid down in that Treasury Minute was quite clear, and is in accordance with the opinion I have just expressed. I do not know that there is anything on record showing that there is a difference of opinion between the departments. We know, privately, that certain persons entertain different opinions upon the subject.

3712. Looking at the time which has elapsed since the matter was referred to the War Department, I presume there is some difficulty in coming to a conclusion?—I believe that has arisen from the necessity of referring to the Colonies for information, and not from any delay on the part of the War Office in dealing with the question.

3713. Mr. *Baring.*] Has it not arisen from the case having reference to Victoria, and also that the war with New Zealand has made great changes in respect of troops in the Australian Colonies?—I believe so. So far as I have been able to learn the cause, that is it.

3714. *Chairman.*] Referring to the answer to which I called your attention just now, in your former examination, can you say whether you will be able, shortly, to produce before the Committee any memorandum which may be

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printed in the Appendix, as the result of the determination of the authorities? —I believe that the War Office authorities have nearly completed, perhaps by this time have quite completed, the information which would enable us to prepare a memorandum; but it must, of course, be brought under the consideration of the authorities of the Treasury before any public Minute can be made upon the subject. Until it shall have been rendered to the Treasury, we shall not be in a position to deal with the question officially.

3715. Have you any further information to give, or suggestion to make, upon the subject?—Nothing; I adhere to the opinion I expressed before, that these sums should be voted in full upon the Estimates, and the full contribution from the Colony paid into the Exchequer. Mr. Whiffin, the Assistant Accountant General, has prepared a great deal of information, which he will lay before the Committee.

3716. Mr. *Baring.*] You propose that a statement should appear upon the face of the Estimates, giving the sums which are, nominally as it may be said, annually voted in the Army Estimates?—Yes. I should propose that the Estimates should contain the full charge, whether payable ultimately out of the Imperial revenue or out of Colonial revenues; and that a statement should appear on the face of the Estimates, for the information of Parliament, showing the amount which reverts to the Imperial Exchequer, in the shape of contributions from the Colonies. That would give Parliament all the information it could require, and would very much simplify the public accounts.

3717. Would you give the estimated receipts from the Colony, or the receipts for the last year?—I should give the estimated receipts from the Colony; these could be stated with accuracy, as they depend upon numbers.

3718. Does your opinion extend to the repairs and construction of barracks, and charges of that sort, being borne by the Colony, without appearing upon the Estimates?—If it is a money transaction between the two departments, it should appear in the Estimates; but the barracks, I believe, belong to the Colonies, and are therefore repaired by the Colonies. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details to state how that is.

3719. You would have no objection to an arrangement by which the Colonies should pay for the construction and repair of barracks, without passing the sum through the ordinary accounts?—I should have no objection to that; I only object to the arrangement with regard to the troops; if they receive pay from the Colonies, and also from the Government, out of Imperial funds, the gross expense should be laid before Parliament in one account. At present there is no public account in which those expenses are combined.

Mr. *Henry William Sharp Whiffin*, recalled; and further Examined.

Mr. *H. W. S. Whiffin.*

3720. *Chairman.*] WHEN you were last under examination, you were asked to procure for the Committee a return of the actual payments during the period of 10 years, which have found their way into the Imperial Exchequer from the Colonies, towards Colonial defence. Have you such a return that you can now put in? —From the year 1853 down to the present time, I have, so far as relates to the Australian Colonies. (*The same was handed in.*)

Vide Appendix.

3721. Has any decision been arrived at by the War Department as to the mode of acting on the communication received last July from the Treasury, with reference to Colonial payments?—Not that I am aware of.

3722. Have you any information to give to the Committee upon that subject? —No communication has been made to the Treasury in answer to that letter.

3723. Do you know why there has been a delay in the settlement of that question; some explanation has been given of the cause of the delay?—I believe that the delay was occasioned in consequence of the withdrawal of the head-quarter staff and the troops from Victoria for service in New Zealand, consequent upon the recent outbreak, thereby rendering an immediate decision on the question raised inexpedient.

3724. Has the question of how some scheme may be drawn up been before you?—It has recently.

3725. Mr. *Baring.*] I believe that when that letter was received by the Treasury, you were not in your present position?—I was not.

3726. *Chairman.*] Is the subject now being considered by the department?— Certainly.

3727. But

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3727. But nothing has been matured?—Nothing has been matured.

3728. Mr. *Baring.*] There would be ample time to make any arrangements previous to the Estimates for next year?—Yes; this is the best time to do anything which may be necessary.

3729. No arrangement could be made until the Estimates for next year are submitted?—No.

3730. With respect to the return which you have just handed in, showing what contributions have been paid into the Imperial Treasury by Victoria and New South Wales, have you any general observations to make; have any portions of the receipts from Victoria been credited to New South Wales?—There has been a confusion between New South Wales and Victoria; sums paid by Victoria have appeared in the Estimates and annual accounts of Army Expenditure as a contribution from New South Wales.

3731. What is the reason of that?—New South Wales and Victoria have been looked upon as one Colony, being in the same military command.

3732. Have you made any comparison between the sums either voted or expended by the Government of New South Wales and Victoria with these results?—Yes. I have a statement showing the amount voted for the pay and allowance of the troops by the Colonies of Victoria and New South Wales from the year 1853 down to the year 1860, and showing also the amount expended for Imperial purposes. In the year 1853 Victoria voted 90,000*l.*, 10,000*l.* of which only was paid over for Imperial purposes, the rest having been spent in the Colony.

3733. When you use the expression, "Paid over for Imperial purposes," you mean paid to the credit of the Imperial Exchequer?—Yes; only 10,000 *l.* has been paid over to the Imperial Exchequer, and so on year by year down to the 31st December 1857.

3734. With reference to the excess of money voted by the Colony, as compared with the sums credited to the Imperial Exchequer, how do you suppose that that sum has been expended?—It has been paid direct to the officers, and there is a very large amount also for passage-money and other services paid for by the Colony on the spot.

3735. I suppose there is no doubt that a great deal more money has been paid by the Colony than that for which credit is given to the Colony in those years?—Yes; Victoria voted 490,000 *l.* from 1853 to 1860, and only 100,000 *l.* of that has actually been paid over for Imperial purposes.

3736. That is paid into the Imperial Exchequer, and appearing in the accounts as so paid?—Paid over to the Imperial Exchequer.

3737. For the pay and allowances, and other charges in respect of Imperial troops?—Yes.

3738. Was not a new arrangement made in 1858 with the Colony of Victoria?—From the 1st April 1858, Victoria was to pay for all troops above four companies.

3739. Has that been done by the Colony?—Not yet; statements are being prepared showing the amount due by the Colony, and it appears that up to the 31st March 1860 there is a sum of 16,000 *l.* due by the Colony, irrespective of clothing and provisions.

3740. Is that for the payment of troops above four companies during that period?—For the payment of troops above four companies, from the 1st April 1858.

3741. What payments have been received during that time from Victoria?—The whole of the money paid by the Colony has been paid to the officer commanding at Melbourne.

3742. For what?—For Colonial allowances to the troops and officers. The Colonies have not voted anything for Imperial purposes since 1857.

3743. You mean that Victoria has voted nothing for the pay of the troops?—They have only voted the Colonial allowances.

3744. Whereas under the arrangements they should have paid for all troops above four companies?—Yes; so far as I can ascertain, they have made no provision in their estimates for that payment.

3745. That is a claim which it is proposed to refer to the Colony?—We are now preparing an account showing the amount due from the Colony.

3746. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Under that arrangement the Colony will pay the Colonial allowances of the four companies?—They will pay the Colonial

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allowances for all the troops, and the Imperial pay for all above four companies.

3747. Have you looked into the question whether at any time the House of Commons has voted money for the payment of troops, whereas in the Colonies the Colonies have actually paid for those troops directly, and have not paid the amount of the allowances to the Exchequer; and therefore money has been voted by Parliament which was unnecessary for the payment of those troops?—That is the case in New South Wales; the Colony provides the Imperial pay of a battery of artillery, and we include the whole expense upon the Army Estimates, and deduct the amount for the pay and allowances as a portion of the sum deducted for "men wanting to complete."

3748. Although the total sum for the pay and allowances of those troops appears in the detailed statement comprising Vote 2, yet a sum equal to the pay and allowances is deducted from the total of Vote 2?—Yes.

3749. So that in reality the sum is not voted?—The sum is really not voted, because we make a deduction as wanting to complete. That remark refers also to the sappers and miners in Southern Australia.

3750. For what reason is that course pursued?—The principal reason is to enable the House of Commons to vote the number of men, so as to bring the entire number under the Mutiny Act.

3751. That course, I believe, is pursued with respect to troops expected home from India?—Yes, in the same way; otherwise those troops would not be included in the Mutiny Act.

3752. Have you prepared a return showing the expenditure for the year 1859–60?—Yes. (*The same was handed in.*)

3753. *Chairman.*] What is the total strength in Hong Kong by that return?—China has been omitted in this return, as also in the return for 1858–9, because it is in an abnormal condition.

3754. Would that return for 1859–60 considerably vary from the return of the previous year, in consequence of the circumstances of the China war?—China has been altogether excluded from this return, and from the return for the year 1858–59.

3755. Do you know whether the expenditure of Hong Kong is not very much more in 1859–60 than it was in 1858–59?—It is considerably more, as the state of war has brought into the China command an immense number of troops which are not generally there.

3756. Mr. *Baring.*] It has been suggested that a return should be prepared and laid upon the table of the House of Commons, with the Estimates, showing the estimated expenditure for military purposes in the different Colonies. Do you anticipate there will be any difficulty in preparing such a return?—None whatever; and it would be of great assistance.

3757. *Chairman.*] You mean a return prepared on the same basis as that laid before the Committee, distinguishing the cost of barracks, their pay and allowances?—Such a return could be prepared without difficulty, with the exception of that portion of this return which gives the amount of departmental expenses and non-effective charges.

3758. Mr. *Baring.*] It would be difficult, I presume, to give any satisfactory return as to stores?—The stores estimated for are for general service, and it would be impossible to state on the Estimates what portion would be applied to the use of any particular Colony. In this return we give merely the value of stores issued by our storekeepers at the various stations.

3759. *Chairman.*] You believe that you could not give, from year to year, a correct statement of the stores in each dependency?—That might be furnished by the storekeeper to each Colony at the end of the year. If he gave a statement of the stores issued by him for Colonial purposes, a value might be put upon those stores and added in the next year's Statement or Estimate.

3760. Mr. *Baring.*] Have you a statement of the different rates of Colonial allowances given at the different stations?—I have. (*The same was handed in.*)

Vide Appendix.

3761. *Chairman.*] That is a return of what is paid by the Colonies; have you any return for the five Colonies in which allowances are paid out of the Imperial funds?—There is a fixed allowance of 5 *s.* a day in the Australian Colonies; 3 *s.* a day at St. Helena and at the Cape.

3762. Since giving me the answer, which you did just now, have you referred to the return of the strength at Hong Kong for the year ending March 1859–60?

1859–60?—Yes; I find that on the 31st March 1859 it was 1,400, and in 1860, 10,818.

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3763. Hong Kong being excluded from the return of 1860, will be in effect excluded from both, and there will be a considerable difference in the aggregate amount for the two years?—China is excluded from both returns.

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3764. *Chairman.*] YOU are Chancellor of the Exchequer?—I am.

3765. You have also held the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies?—I have been both Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, and also Secretary of State for the Colonies, but each for a short period, and at remote dates.

3766. Some evidence has been given as to a Report on Colonial Military Expenditure prepared by a Departmental Committee, in which the Treasury, the War Department, and the Colonial Office were represented. In consequence of the bearing of the question referred to that Committee, on the revenue and expenditure of the country, I presume that the concurrence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be necessary for its appointment?—Yes; I think that the presence of a Treasury officer on that Committee is conclusive evidence of what, in point of fact, is reasonable and obvious, that the Treasury should have a share in any such measure.

3767. Was your attention called to the existence of that Departmental Committee on your accession to office?—It was; in fact, the report was then in preparation, and was, I think, presented at no long period after my accession to office.

3768. Without asking for any expression of opinion on your part as to the report or memorandum appended to it, I may ask whether, in your opinion, it was a proper subject to be referred to that Departmental Committee?—Yes; I am glad to see it placed under the examination of competent persons with a view to its being brought more fully under the notice of the public, because I think that one of the greatest difficulties, and perhaps the greatest difficulty of all attaching to the subject, is the uninformed and immature, and generally indifferent state of public opinion upon it in this country. Until there is a great power of public opinion in this country brought to bear upon it, I doubt very much whether justice can be fully done.

3769. Some evidence has been given by Mr. Anderson of the Treasury, and also by Mr. Whiffin of the Accountant General's Office, with reference to the payments made by the Colonies towards their own military expenditure. Has your attention been called to the irregularity and paucity of those payments on account of military expenditure?—Yes, but I should distinguish between the smallness of the payments and their irregularity. I do not think that, on the ground of irregularity considered simply and alone, we have any ground to complain, so far at least as I am informed; but in point of fact the amount of the payments made by the Colonies which go directly in relief of the British Exchequer, and with respect to which there is a clear understanding, is very small. If I may refer to a paper which has recently been presented to Parliament, I should state that that paper, although I have not the slightest reason to doubt its accuracy, is yet a paper which I think unless largely developed by explanation would lead to very false conclusions. The paper is No. 290, and is a paper moved for by the Chairman, and is entitled, "A Return showing the forces stationed in the British Dependencies, and the expenditure incurred in their defence by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectiveiy, during the year ending the 31st March 1859." I have not the least doubt that the return corresponds with the precise terms of the title, but I think that those who look to the return, and see the total of 324,000 *l.* at the foot of the column of Colonial Expenditure would naturally, but without doubt very erroneously, infer that the whole or the great bulk of that sum was paid in relief of the British Exchequer, which I take to be very far indeed from being the case.

3770. Can you call our attention to any particular items in that return which you think would lead to that opinion?—I would respectfully suggest to the Committee, as the question is one of great importance, their obtaining from the departments minute information upon each of the heads, with a view to the explanation of the subject, and enabling the Committee to distinguish accurately between what is paid in relief of the British Exchequer and what is not. My meaning is this:

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that a considerable portion of the sum paid is not paid at all in relief of the British Exchequer, but simply by way of addition to the regular pay and allowances of the forces, which continue to be discharged in full, or nearly so, but I believe in full by the British Exchequer. I take the two important Colonies of New South Wales and Victoria. Against the Colony of New South Wales I find the sum for Colonial expenditure, 29,000*l.*, and against the Colony of Victoria I find 40,000 *l.* The great bulk, I take it, of both those amounts, at any rate a considerable share of both of them, consists of monies that are paid by way of allowances to the troops, in which the British Exchequer may be said to have no concern whatever, because they are an addition to the regular charge borne by the British Exchequer.

3771. Mr. *Ellice.*] That is, they are Colonial allowances, not payments directed by any of the warrants of the War Office?—They are Colonial allowances as correctly described in the question, and have not the effect of relieving the British Exchequer of anything which, if those allowances did not exist, it would be liable to pay.

3772. *Chairman.*] Do you think that those payments which have been known by the name of Colonial Allowances somewhat resemble the extra pay given to troops serving in India?—Yes, I apprehend there is an analogy in principle between them, and they are attended with some obvious, and I should suppose serious inconveniences, although it is not my business to speak particularly of those inconveniences. I apprehend the removal of troops from a Colony where they receive these extra allowances to another not materially different in their view, in climate or circumstances, or conditions of living, is a very sharp trial to the fidelity of the soldiers, and is open to objection on that score.

3773. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Is not the origin of that addition of pay that they are called upon to perform police services as well as military services?—If they are called upon to perform police services in these particular Colonies, in a sense in which they are not liable to perform them in other Colonies, that is a circumstance not within my knowledge. I apprehend that what may be called police services are incident, in a considerable degree, to the whole of our present system of Colonial military defence.

3774. Mr. *Ellice.*] Are you not of opinion that the greatest possible inconvenience arises from those different allowances being made to our troops in different Colonies. For instance, whilst no Colonial allowances are made in Canada, they are made in Australia and in other Colonies where the climate and circumstances are nearly similar?—I do not consider myself entitled to give an official opinion in answer to that question; but, undoubtedly, I entirely agree with the sentiment expressed in the question; and I believe, if I am correctly informed, it might be illustrated yet more vividly by the circumstance that it is not merely between Colonies remote from one another, such as Victoria and Canada, that the discrepancy prevails, but also between Colonies which, although geographically distant, yet, in the British eye are, for the present purpose, almost one and the same, namely, Victoria and Western Australia.

3775. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Is not the difference between Western Australia the existence of gold fields in the one, which imposes upon the Government the duty of maintaining peace, and it is not for the purpose of maintaining peace that the soldiers are stationed there?—That may be a consideration of some weight, but I do not know that it is one that the soldier could be expected to recognise; he might say, that in passing from Victoria to New South Wales, his duty in Western Australia would be less irksome to him than his duty in New South Wales or Victoria, and that he would rather be employed in keeping order amongst the gold diggers than amongst the convicts. I have not yet stated, but I believe it to be the case, that an allowance is now made to the troops in Western Australia; that it is made at the cost of the British Exchequer; and, if I am correctly informed, it was made upon that very ground that great discontent existed upon the removal of troops from New South Wales or Victoria to Western Australia; so that, in point of fact, in that particular case, the local allowance made by the Colony of New South Wales to troops when serving within their limits, instead of being a relief to the British Exchequer, seems rather to have been a burden upon the British Exchequer, because it has compelled us to do something beyond that which we had previously undertaken.

3776. Mr. *Ellice.*] I believe there is no similar allowance made in the Colonies

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Colonies where the climate is much worse than in either of them, namely, in the West Indies?—I am not aware of it.

3777. *Chairman.*] It has been stated in evidence, I think, that there are five Colonies in which allowances are given from the Imperial Exchequer; and, if I understand your view aright, it is this, that we have been possibly, even probably, compelled to pay those allowances out of the Imperial Exchequer in order to avoid the discontent which might arise among our soldiers there, finding that in one Colony they received allowances and in another they did not?—That is what I have understood to be the case; at the same time I hope the Committee will seek further and more correct information upon the subject from the proper department.

3778. Mr. *Ellice.*] It is very similar, is it not, to the extra allowances which we have been obliged to pay to the whole of the troops in China, in consequence of the Indian forces having been employed there?—Very much so.

3779. *Chairman.*] In estimating your ways and means for the year, have you any data to go upon with respect to any probable contributions from the Colonies?—I am sorry to say that the amount in question when compared with the total charge to this country is so small that it has no very sensible influence upon the result; but I hope it will be understood that I am not here to make complaint of the Colonies with regard to the fulfilment of their engagements; I believe that such as they enter into are fulfilled in the most exemplary manner; but there are various questions pending; and I believe, with respect to a portion of the charge to be borne by the Colonies of New South Wales and Victoria, that from some circumstances, of the nature of which I am not perfectly aware, there is a Colonial liability at present unfulfilled. I believe that those Colonies are under arrangements to bear the charge of troops of the line, above four companies for each, and that, not owing, so far as I know, to any fault on their part, but owing to the matter having been overlooked, or from some other cause, that payment has not actually been made, but has recently been claimed. So far as any payment of that kind is concerned, or the payments made by New South Wales, for one battery of artillery, that is in relief, of course, of the British Exchequer. But I only mention these things as illustrations of my remark, that it would be material, as to the number of Imperial troops, to verify in detail the account presented to Parliament, and to distinguish between those Colonial payments which go in relief of the British Exchequer and those which do not.

3780. It has been stated in evidence that the Colonial military expenditure is something between three and four millions a year, about nine-tenths of which is borne by British taxpayers, and one-tenth is provided for by Colonial contribution. With a view to reduce this expenditure, it has been suggested that the primary responsibility of self-defence should be thrown upon the Colonies, and that the mother country should only contribute within certain limits. Do you think that the adoption of any such plan with regard to the British Colonies, would have a beneficial effect upon the revenue of Great Britain, and advantageous in other respects?—I think that to arrive at a system under which the primary responsibility of self-defence by land should be thrown upon the Colonists themselves, speaking, of course of those Colonies which are, so to say, normally constituted, would be not only an immense advantage to the British Exchequer, but would have, I think, many still more important and higher recommendations independently of the question of cost.

3781. You think that any such arrangement, by which the primary responsibility should be thrown upon the Colonies, would be advantageous to communities circumstanced as the British Colonies are?—I would almost venture to say, without speaking of cases in which the circumstances are altogether peculiar, that no community which is not primarily charged with the ordinary business of its own defence is really, or can be, in the full sense of the word, a free community. The privileges of freedom and the burdens of freedom are absolutely associated together; to bear the burdens is as necessary as to enjoy the privilege, in order to form that character which is the great ornament of all freedom itself.

3782. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Does not the relation of the mother country to a Colony impose upon the mother country the obligation of defending the Colony from external attack?—I should rather look back in order to answer that question. I should say that the obligation of the mother country cannot be overlooked, and I do not say that she is not bound to defend her Colonies under whatever system,

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if they do not defend themselves; but what I venture to say is, that the system under which a Colonial community itself is primarily charged with the duty of her own defence is by far the best, both for the mother country and for the Colony itself. I am aware that we are at present far from the system, and if we are to arrive at it, it must be by patient effort, and, perhaps, after a long course of time. I do not mean to point at anything which is impossible in its character, because I mean such a system as, under different circumstances, did exist for a great length of time in the case of the old American Colonies.

3783. Were they not, in fact, independent States, and did we not take possession of them by a strong hand, and impose our power upon them?—I do not think that the old American Colonies, previous to the war of the Revolution, were independent States, any further or in any other sense than in a sense in which it is extremely desirable that all our principal Colonies should be independent States.

3784. *Chairman.*] Is it not the case that, in respect of our early North American Colonies, the parent State retained the arbitrament of peace and war, the retention of which is the main ground upon which the claim for defence of the Colonies by the mother country is rested?—It is so; and it is more than true, if I may say so, because the power of making peace or war was retained by the mother country, and the primary responsibility of self-defence borne by these Colonies at a period and under circumstances when they were almost certain to be drawn into entirely English quarrels, and to be made directly the subject of contest amongst European powers; a state of things to which, with the present ideas that prevail in the world in regard to Colonial dependencies, we can hardly have a parallel.

3785. Mr. *Ellice.*] Were those Colonies at any time in a greater state of independence than our North American Colonies and Australia are now?—I would say they were in a state of much less dependence, because undoubtedly it would not have been permitted to those Colonies to exercise any power to legislate adversely to the mother country, whereas we have observed that even that power may be exercised with a view of raising up a protected interest against the commerce of the mother country, and no such case could have existed in the North American Colonies.

3786. I need not ask you whether you consider the old system much better than the new one?—I think the new system much better than the old one so far as regards the general freedom now established in the commercial relations between the mother country and the Colony; but as regards the relation with respect to the responsibility for defence, I cannot express what I think of the difference in point of advantage in the old system over the new, not merely upon financial grounds, but with a view to the real strength and tone of feeling in the Colonial community. I am satisfied that they never can be altogether what they ought to be until they learn, and desire, to bear a principal part of the burden of their own defence.

3787. Mr. *Roebuck.*] When a State is allowed to do what it likes with its internal regulations, and to protect itself against external aggression, what is the difference between that and independence?—My opinion is that the difference between that and independence would still be a very important one; because, for a variety of causes it would still, I have no doubt, remain the case, that a large part of the work of military defence would have to be borne, and gladly, I should say proudly borne by this country, and therefore a very important portion even of the military charge of the defence would remain with us, and that would at all times be a strong political tie; but the really valuable tie with a Colony in my view is the moral and social tie, and I do not think that that is stronger now than it was in the case of the old American Colonies, even if it be as strong.

3788. You think that the moral and social tie overbalances the cost we incur by protecting them?—I am reluctant to endeavour to measure the one against the other; the subject matter is entirely different.

3789. When our manufactures are shut out of a Colony as they are out of Canada, what possible benefit would accrue to England from the existence of a tie between her and the Colony?—I do not wish to be responsible for the assertion that the manufactures of England are shut out of Canada. I only remark upon the recent legislation of Canada as being a very singular illustration of the operation of the present system, and I say that, if it really be true, as is implied in the question, that there would be no benefit to England resulting from the connexion with Canada, unless we have the cost of defending her, then there is no

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benefit now: I cannot view any portion of the benefit as consisting in the cost of defence.

3790. Part of the loss would accrue from the fact of her putting exclusive duties upon our goods?—I look upon that case of commercial legislation as one which is exceptional, and one which I should hope is not likely to be permanent. I think it is so adverse in point of feeling and propriety to the relations between the mother country and the Colony, that I earnestly trust as a matter of propriety, of decency almost, it will in some manner disappear.

3791. *Chairman.*] I understand your view to be, that the fact of the defence of the Colonies being undertaken by the parent state, has rather an enervating effect upon those Colonies, and therefore a mischievous one?—That is my strong opinion. I think that, whether it be in the case of Ireland, or in the case of Colonies, the principle of conjoining burden and benefit is a sound principle, and is equally advantageous to those upon whom the burden is imposed, within just limits, and to those from whose shoulders the burden is removed.

3792. As an illustration of your view, not only with reference to Colonies, but generally; do you consider that if from any cause the defence of Great Britain could be undertaken by any power from without, it would be a calamity to Great Britain?—The case being an impossible one, is put of course by way of illustration and argument, but, so regarding it, I do not hesitate to answer it in the affirmative.

3793. Sir *James Fergusson.*] If you cast upon the Colonies the responsibility of their own defence, could you deny them the right to hold aloof from the consequences of any war in which the Home Government of this country might engage?—I do not propose to throw upon the Colonies the responsibility of their own defence by way of any sudden steps; I only venture to say that the old state of things, the old Colonial relation between England and her dependencies, was sound in principle; the present one I think unsound in principle; but I am fully sensible of all the difficulties of the transition, and I do not presume for one moment, especially as it has not been in my power for many years to follow minutely the state and the course of Colonial affairs, to determine either the rate or the mode in which we are to aim at effecting that transition. I think it is important to keep that in view, and to prosecute it with great steadiness as opportunities shall offer, and in the meantime to endeavour to bring it before the public mind in this country, in order that it may take, in the public mind, a place in some degree adequate to its importance.

3794. You mention as somewhat similar cases the position of Ireland and Canada; but is there not this important difference, that Ireland, through her representatives in Parliament, exercises a direct influence over the foreign policy of this country, which Canada does not?—There is that difference, no doubt; and I mentioned the case of Ireland only in the single view of its having enjoyed to a large extent till recently, and to its still enjoying to an extent comparatively small, the privilege as it is termed of exceptional exemption from taxation.

3795. In the event of this country being brought into collision with the United States of America in the present crisis, and Canada being involved in the consequences of such a quarrel, would not the responsibility thrown upon her make it necessary for her to separate herself from the mother country?—No, I think not; I think that the interest and the feelings of Canada would form an important element in the proceedings of the mother country. I think that Canada would retain her own rights and powers; and I have not the slightest doubt that if she thought herself unjustly involved in the consequences of a British war, she would separate. If she found that war inconvenient she would separate, whether we undertook the defence or not; nor do I think that our undertaking the cost of defending her would make the difference. If her feelings are with us, she will go along with us; but if her feelings are not with us, I do not think that she will remain with us because we charge ourselves with the burden of her defence. At the same time, I have not the least doubt that if Canada were involved in the consequences of a war between us and the United States, we should have to bear a large portion of the cost. I am not thinking of the mere proportions of the cost, but of the seat of responsibility.

3796. From the general principle which you lay down, extraordinary cases, such as the possibility of an outbreak with the United States, must be excepted?—No, I do not think it makes an exception, properly so called, but it introduces

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a great number of important limiting considerations as to the time and mode of proceeding to the establishment of general principles.

3797. Mr. *Adderley.*] So far from self-depending Colonies holding aloof from contribution, is it not the fact that self-depending Colonies are the only Colonies which have ever contributed to Imperial wars?—I have not followed the question minutely for a long time, but I believe that is so. I have not the smallest doubt that in the proportion that responsibilities are accepted by communities they will be more disposed to go beyond the bare idea of self-defence, and to render loyal and effective assistance in the struggles of the empire.

3798. *Chairman.*] We hear from Sir John Burgoyne, Admiral Erskine, and Admiral Elliot, that notwithstanding the great cost of defence in the Colonies, a large number of them are not defensible. Sir John Burgoyne went on to say that a million sterling, over and above the sum already voted, would be required, in order to put those various fortifications in a proper state. Do you think that that state of things may be said to result from the circumstance that we have undertaken a task which we have not the means of fulfilling, and have thereby discouraged local efforts?—I should like to divide my answer by distinguishing between the Mediterranean Colonies and Colonies generally. As regards the Colonies generally, I agree with the evidence given, I think, by Lord Herbert before this Committee, that the whole question is a question of supremacy at sea, and that the maintenance of our supremacy at sea is absolutely vital to our existence, I mean to our present place in the world. England would no longer be England the moment she lost it. If she has supremacy at sea, her Colonial empire is virtually safe, and the fortifications and the Colonial garrisons in the West Indies, and many others, are little if at all required. If, on the other hand, she has not the supremacy at sea, it is impossible to make effective defence, and you are only making victims of those garrisons, with great disparagement to the national honour. Then as to the Mediterranean Colonies, I must again distinguish between Malta and Gibraltar, which I hold as excluded from my answers I have given, and the Ionian Islands. Of course those two garrisons must be considered as garrisons rather than as Colonies, and their political importance, I presume, is hardly a matter of discussion before this Committee. With regard to the Ionian Islands, which I had an opportunity not long ago of visiting, I should question very much the sense in which they could be said to be defensible, even at the present very heavy charge at which we hold the military occupation of them.

3799. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Do you consider them Colonies?—Not in any sense of the term, except that they are involved in our Colonial administration, and may, I presume, be considered to come within the scope of the inquiry of this Committee.

3800. Lord *Stanley.*] Is there not a stipulation of treaty that the Ionian Islands shall contribute a certain sum only towards their own defence?—I believe there is.

3801. The amount, I think, is 25,000 *l.* a year?—I think they did contribute 35,000 *l.*, but it is now 25,000 *l.*, the extra 10,000 *l.* having been remitted by this country. That contribution of 25,000 *l.* is a good deal complained of by the people of the Ionian Islands, or rather by their politicians, whom I should a good deal distinguish from the people, but I think without any reason whatever. It is a very limited sum, and does not exceed one-tenth part of our own charges, and I do not think it possible to conceive that in any political condition they would be subject to a lower charge than 25,000 *l.* for their defences.

3802. There are extensive fortifications, are there not?—The case of the Ionian Islands is a very peculiar one, and I would begin with the smallest of them; namely, Paxo, Ithaca, and Cerigo. In those there are a very small number of men, I think merely a handful kept for honorary purposes, and not for police purposes, because there is a good police in the islands. As to the principle of keeping a small handful of men apart from the regiment to which they belong, sometimes not even under a commissioned officer, for honorary purposes and purposes of compliment and ceremony, I doubt whether it is wise. Then passing on to two of the more considerable islands, Zante and Cephalonia, I can hardly consider anything more difficult to justify than our military system with regard to those islands. When I visited them, there was a considerable force in Cephalonia, I think between 600 and 800 men, and in Zante about half that number; the men in Cephalonia are kept in open barracks; they have no means of defence; there is

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an old fort a few miles from Argostoli, the capital of the island, but I believe it is perfectly worthless. In Zante there is a sort of fort close to the town, but that I believe is not considered defensible, nor was it proposed to be made so.

3803. Upon what principle are those forces kept up?—I do not know; I do not think that they are in the smallest degree necessary to maintain order; I think it is more likely that disorder would arise from their presence; generally speaking nothing can be better than the relations of the Ionian population of those islands with the British soldier, but at the same time there was lately an uproar in Zante, probably the consequence of some drunken broil. Excepting casualties of that kind, likely to arise from the presence of the soldiers more than from their absence, I cannot see any reason for maintaining those forces. With regard to the question of Corfu, there, and there alone, we have extensive fortifications, of a class that are termed defensible; but although they are termed defensible I am extremely sceptical as to the question whether they can be defended. A very large outlay has been incurred in Corfu, and a very considerable garrison is ordinarily kept there. In the first place, I am bound to say that I do not think anything can be more creditable to both parties than the state of feeling which prevails between the garrison and the population; there is a most agreeable illustration of it which meets the eye of every visitor, for frequently throughout the winter in Corfu there is or was an open game of foot-ball in the open space between the citadel and the town, carried on promiscuously by the British officers, British soldiers, and the population of the town. Now it is impossible, I think, to conceive any more distinct proof of the good feeling which prevails between them than this, because the game of foot-ball is essentially of a nature which, if good feeling did not prevail, would give opportunities for showing the absence of it. With respect to the fortifications of Corfu, I confess it appears to me, without presuming to give an authoritative opinion, that there must be the greatest difficulties arising out of the possession of these fortifications, in the event of a war. We may look at our connexion with the Ionian Islands in the light of an obligation or duty which we have to fulfil, and we should also consider the difficulties which might arise in disposing of the fortifications of Corfu, if we were to quit them. But setting aside these considerations, I conceive that the perfectly distinct and separate idea that Corfu is of military value to us is entirely without ground, and is a superstition founded partly upon the ideas of the great Napoleon, who had other views and other purposes than ours, and partly founded upon the circumstances of a period when we were entirely dependent upon sailing vessels; and I think that Corfu and the Ionian Islands generally, in the event of a war, instead of being a military advantage to us, would be a military burden of such a nature as we might perhaps find almost intolerable.

3804. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you recollect what sum has been expended in the fortifications of Corfu?—I should not like to state it in figures, but as far as I can remember, a good many hundred thousand pounds.

3805. Do you recollect what was the expense of fortifying the Island of Vido?—That, I believe, was the larger share of the entire expenses; and I imagine those fortifications to be entirely insufficient for the purpose of protecting the citadel, or for the purpose of preventing the landing of an enemy.

3806. But did not the erection of those fortifications necessarily entail upon us the expense of a garrison to man them?—No doubt, and a considerable force.

3807. So that we not only threw away all the money which has been expended upon the fortifications, but have entailed upon ourselves the consequent expense of maintaining a considerable garrison in the fortifications?—Yes; that is a consequence of the erection of fortifications, which, of course, should be always kept in view.

3808. I see that there is, this year, 5,000 *l.* still to be paid, for improving the fortifications of Corfu?—I am assured by the Secretary of State for War that that is intended for necessary reparations in detail; that expense, small as it is, I view with the greatest jealousy. At the same time I know the views of Lord Herbert with respect to these Colonial fortifications; and I should have the utmost disposition to acquiesce in any small charge of this kind of which he had satisfied himself, because I think, in principle, nothing can be more correct than his views of such subjects.

3809. This additional charge which we are called upon now to incur is in consequence of our original folly?—It is one of those consequences of the original

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folly which it is difficult altogether to shake off; but I confess that any plan whatever for the extension of the fortifications of Corfu, or for their general improvement, I should look upon with the greatest aversion, because, in the first place, I believe it is extremely doubtful whether, with modern artillery, from its situation, it is possible to make Corfu defensible by any outlay whatever; and in the second place, the amount of force that must be required to hold Corfu would be an intolerable burden; I am not speaking of money, but with regard to the resources of this country in men, in time of any war of an extensive character; and in the third place, we must take into view the great difficulty of defending Corfu against an enemy in consequence of the sacrifices which would have to be imposed upon the town, which would be most serious. It would be impossible to expect that 20,000 or 25,000 people inhabiting that town should be prepared to suffer all the extremities which they must undergo from the fact of their lying between the citadel and the attacking force, and that not for the sake of their own government, but for the sake of a foreign government, which has a military occupation of their country.

3810. *Chairman.*] I think I understood you to say, that apart from the question of cost, you think that the drain of men required for the fortifications would probably be a serious consideration. I wish to ask you this question, whether you do not think, considering the very large number of men now required or supposed to be required for the defence of our dependencies generally, including the portion of the Imperial force now in India, about 110,000 men, that that is a very serious drain upon our population for the purpose of the military defences of our Colonies?—I should think it a very serious drain; while of course it must be estimated with reference to the importance of the object in view. But what I have in my eye is this: the defence of Corfu would require a force variously estimated, I think, at between 6,000 and 10,000 men, which must be, of course, considered with reference also to the reserve at home necessary for keeping it up; and the idea of bestowing such a force in the case of a great struggle in the Mediterranean for a purpose which does nothing whatever, when it is accomplished, to secure or extend the real strength of England, is an idea which I contemplate with the greatest apprehension and alarm. I may say, that even with regard to the ideas of Napoleon, although it would seem very hazardous indeed to question any opinion of his upon a military subject, yet this stands upon record, that Napoleon kept for a great many years a large force in the Ionian Islands, I do not know whether exclusively in Corfu, but mainly in Corfu, of about 8,000 men, if it was not more, and that force was completely neutralised by two English sailing vessels, when in the hour of his extremest need he wanted its assistance. He abdicated in 1814, and that force went back immediately to France. France having thus lost the Ionian Islands, that force was ready to join Napoleon when he left the Island of Elba; and I always understood that it constituted a very large portion of the nucleus of his army in the Hundred days.

3811. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not the case, that any expense which may now be proposed or incurred for fortifications in Corfu, would be in consequence of our having a few years ago pulled down a great portion of those fortifications, also at a large expense?—One difficulty in which we get involved from the nature of our policy is, that it fluctuates exceedingly. Different Commissioners and different military authorities have held very different views indeed, both as to the mode and as to the practicability of defending Corfu. With respect to the fortifications which were pulled down a short time ago, I should not have supposed that this charge of 5,000 *l.*, which is now upon the Estimates, could have had anything to do with the general restoration of those fortifications. I should have supposed, that in order to remove the consequences of that destruction a larger sum would be required; and I believe that there are plans in the pigeon-holes of the War Department of a much more extended description. I have seen such plans myself in the hands of the engineer officers in Corfu, which may, in point of fact, be expanded to almost any extent that you please. But it so happens that the town of Corfu is commanded by a series of eminences rising one after another into the country, and I should imagine that we might, if so disposed, extend our plans of defence in Corfu to any amount we liked.

3812. Mr. *Roebuck.*] I suppose your mind has been and is now directed to the conclusion that is to be drawn from all that you have said about the Ionian Islands, namely, that the sooner we give them up the better?—Both here and elsewhere

elsewhere I have always treated our relations with the Ionian Islands as a case in which we have undertaken, in the face of Europe, an important obligation, I think when a good opportunity arises of divesting ourselves of that obligation, or surrendering it, it would be very desirable, but I do not see any present likelihood of such an opportunity.

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3813. Mr. *Ellice.*] To proceed to the next item connected with this subject of fortifications in the Army Estimates, I find a large sum of money voted for the fortifications and improvement in the defences of the Mauritius. Do you think it is of such essential importance, looking to the present state of steam navigation, and the difficulty which any enemy would have in approaching the Mauritius, that it is expedient to incur more expenses in the fortifications of the Mauritius?—I confess I should be very averse to any measure of that kind; but of course I give that answer with the reservation that, as Minister of Finance, I do not feel myself entitled to give a conclusive opinion, as I might feel it my duty to yield to authority; as far as I can at present form an opinion, I should say it is not.

3814. We have evidence before us from Sir John Burgoyne, the chief authority among engineers, that even the money we have already expended upon the Mauritius would be by no means sufficient to complete the defences of the island, but a much larger sum is, in his opinion, necessary. Would you be of opinion that it would be wise to continue this system of fortifying a possession like the island of Mauritius, at a great expense to the taxpayers of this country?—No, I should say the proper mode of defending the Mauritius is by our fleet, and that the mere fortifying it to prevent the landing of an enemy, if that be the idea referred to, is an idea that ought not to be entertained.

3815. I believe there is a committee of engineers, called a committee on defences, which has been making the circuit of our Colonies to ascertain where defences would be expedient; and that it is in consequence of some report from that committee that the expenses have been so far incurred in the Mauritius. Are you aware of that report?—Yes, I presumed it had been from professional authority of that kind; at the same time, if there be blame, the blame rests not with the professional authorities so much as it does with those who set them about the work; because, of course, if they are desired to say what is necessary for the defence of an island, they would give a purely professional answer.

3816. A great change has taken place in this respect since the application of steam to navigation. No sudden attack could be made upon any of these Colonies, by a foreign force making its appearance without notice, in any of these seas?—I think the change is enormous, and that, in point of fact, our present system is one founded upon a state of things and a condition of this empire relatively to other powers which has entirely passed away. In former times, our communications with our Colonies were rare, slow, and uncertain, and it would have been very dangerous indeed to trust to the principle of supporting them from the centre; but now, on the contrary, the communications with the world in general are constant, rapid, and certain, and England is the very centre of those communications. We have enormous advantages for supporting them upon the principle of keeping our great mass of force at home, and supplying them as they may require.

3817. Then, seeing that in these Army Estimates it is likely that a further demand is to be made upon us for the fortifications of the Mauritius of 64,000*l.*, would you be of opinion that it would be desirable to review that policy before the country is called upon to make further advances?—Always speaking with reserve and the respect that I should be bound to pay to the opinion of persons more immediately responsible, that is the disposition with which I should approach the question.

3818. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] Have you examined the plans of the mode in which the money is proposed to be laid out in the Mauritius?—No, I have not seen the plans.

3819. Sir *George Grey.*] You are probably aware that the estimate for the future expenditure in Colonial fortifications, given to the Committee by Sir John Burgoyne, has been stated by Lord Herbert to have been made without his authority, and is merely the expression of Sir John Burgoyne's private opinion, and has received no sanction from the Government?—That is so; and I may say, I concur generally in Lord Herbert's views.

3820. Mr. *Ellice.*] It has received the sanction of the Government so far as the sum of 2,200*l.*, the amount inserted in the War Estimates, is concerned?—

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I have not the figures before me, but no doubt it has received the sanction of the Government so far as the sums now asked for are concerned.

3821. Sir *George Grey.*] Is the principle which you recommend as generally applicable to Colonial defences, limited to land defences, exclusive of naval defences?—Yes, I think it is; at least, if it be not, the case would be wholly exceptional.

3822. Mr. *Marsh.*] You were asked about the extra allowances to the troops in Australia, and you were asked what was the cause of it; was not the cause of it the expense of living with reference to the gold discoveries?—I presume that has had something to do with it, but I am not able to say whether that is to be considered as mainly, or in what degree, the cause.

3823. Are you not aware that the salaries of all the Government officers and of the police were also raised at the same time?—Yes; but as the expense of living is mainly the charge of the British Government, and borne by them with a certain fixed deduction, I do not know that that enters very greatly into the question.

3824. Now with reference to the cost of the defence of the Colonies, supposing that we had the same commerce which we have now with our Colonies, and that they were wholly independent, would not the defence of that commerce probably be more costly than the defence of the Colonies under existing circumstances?—No, I think not. The defence of the commerce would be by naval means; I do not think that our Colonial military expenditure is of any considerable avail for the defence of our commerce.

3825. You were asked about the advantage which the mother country gained by having a Colony; now is not the trade of a Colony much greater in proportion to its means, and its population than if that Colony were a foreign country; take, for instance, the case of Australia and California?—I think that is true; I think that when one political community has been founded from a particular country, the relations of trade are very close, and also very extended, and moreover those relations continue to be close and extended, even after the separation of a Colony from its mother country, in a degree somewhat beyond perhaps what the principles of supply and demand would alone produce. I believe, for example, that between Brazil and Portugal there are, from the effects of taste and habit and old association, more extended relations of trade, or at least there were a very short time ago, than would ever have sprung up between them, if it had not been for the previous political relations.

3826. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Then the existence of the relation does not increase the trade between the two countries; but, supposing one country has been made by another, does the trade at all diminish in consequence of that country becoming free?—In the case of the United States, I have no doubt it did diminish to a considerable extent in consequence of the violence of the separation; but if we can suppose such a case as a perfectly amicable separation, I confess my own opinion is, that the commercial relations would continue much as they were before.

3827. Then that relation of mother country and colony is not requisite to the maintenance of the commercial relation?—It is not in my opinion absolutely requisite, if we are to presume a case of amicable separation.

3828. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given before us by Mr. Lowe as to the possible, and, in his opinion, probable, effect of the presence of troops in certain Colonies, upon the amicable or other quality of the character of separation. He expressed an opinion that some risk was involved in the presence of troops in Colonies, where there might be some dispute about the allegiance, and some insult might be offered to the British flag, which would be resented by this country, and so cause considerable difficulty when the time for separation might arise. Do you think there would be any such risk occasioned by the presence of troops?—Yes; I am cognisant of that evidence given before the Committee, and I confess I think there is great force in it. Also I think that the presence of British troops might very seriously entangle and embroil the beginning of the controversy, and might in that way have a determining influence upon the question, whether the separation was to be peacefully or violently effected. At the same time, I am bound to say that my belief is, that what may be called the old principles of our Colonial system do not of themselves tend to separation, but are powerfully conducive to perpetually keeping up the connexion between the mother country and the Colonies.

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3829. I think the drift of Mr. Lowe's evidence was, that the allegiance and loyal feeling of those Colonies with which he was connected did not depend in any material degree upon the presence or absence of Imperial troops?—I am afraid that we by our own practice have somewhat, but I hope not extensively, perverted the feeling of the Colonial population in that respect. We have now so long maintained the system of providing for the ordinary purposes of defence, and even in a considerable degree of police, by means of a British force, and at the cost of the British Exchequer, that when we take into consideration the fact that all political modes of thought are very much connected with habit and tradition, I am not sanguine enough to believe that a sound state of opinion could be established in a day; I think it must be brought about by long discussion and much reflection in a considerable tract of time. And I still say that I do not think that a Colonial Minister can do a great deal unless he is supported by the popular feeling of this country much more strongly than any Colonial Minister has ever yet been. As long as the people of England are contented to pay quiescently that portion of their taxation which arises out of the present system of Colonial expenditure, we must not be too exacting upon the Colonial Secretary of State.

3830. Do you think that the principles of Colonial defence are clearer than the mode of applying them; we may see our way to a sound principle, although we may not be at once able to apply it?—I think it would be very presumptuous in me, not having been for a long time conversant with the details of Colonial affairs, to say in what degree they might be applied. But I am quite safe, I think, in saying that the main hope of their extensive and vigorous application must depend upon the awakening of the public mind of England. When a Colonial Minister finds himself in conflict with the popular sentiment in the Colonies, and not supported by the popular sentiment from hence, he is very weak; but a Colonial Minister supported by the popular sentiment from hence, and that popular sentiment founded upon justice and upon the ultimate and true interest of the Colonists themselves, would, I think, make a Colonial Minister very strong, and in that case I should be very sanguine of a speedy improvement.

3831. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Speaking of the extra allowances that are given to troops in certain Colonies, on account of the high price of living there, had the Colonies not been willing to pay those extra allowances, they must have fallen upon the mother country?—If you assume them to be necessary by way of compensation to the troops.

3832. If we recognise the increased cost of living in those Colonies?—I can hardly give an opinion how far they are the direct consequences of that increased cost.

3833. Referring to the opinion which you expressed, as to the policy which should be pursued in expecting each Colony to be responsible for its own defence, would you contemplate each Colony maintaining the same force which is at present thought necessary for its defence, by troops locally raised?—No, my opinion is, that the Colonists would take very different views, and probably on the whole, from the advantage of their position, much sounder views as to their real necessities than it is possible for us to take.

3834. Supposing it is possible for troops to be raised in the Colonies, sufficient for their defence, according to the matured judgment of the Colonists as to their requirements, would you contemplate, where it was necessary, a contribution from this country towards the maintenance of the troops?—I do not look with so much anxiety to the question of the amount of contribution as I do to the transfer of responsibility; that is what I really desire. I think that if the Colonists and the Colonial Government, so far as it is really Colonial, had the primary responsibility resting upon them, no difficulty would occur between the Colonies and this country upon a mere question of amount. What makes me anxious is, our being invested with a responsibility which I do not think belongs to us, or to the natural order of things, a responsibility which I think we have unduly assumed, and which we are not, I think, competent to discharge half so well as the Colonists would discharge it themselves. I should like to see the state of feeling restored to the Colonies, which induced the first American Colonists, when they revolted, to make it one of their grievances that British troops were kept in their borders without their consent. I do not speak of the arrangement itself, but of the feeling which dictated it.

3835. As some questions were asked upon matters of history with regard to

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the American Colonies, I think I am right in believing that at that period the Home Government required the American Colonies to maintain a considerable force of militia for their defence?—I should not like to answer that without having had an opportunity of refreshing my memory; but certainly my impression is, that that was not a demand forced by the Home Government upon the Colonists, but rather the free action of the Colonists themselves.

3836. But at that time, when the Colonies were left to find their own defences, and did find them, undoubtedly a much greater control was exercised by the Home Government, over their proceedings, and the manner of conducting their government, than is attempted now?—I am very doubtful about that; I am certainly speaking from rather remote recollection, but I should be disposed to question that proposition; my belief is, that they were subject to very little interference as a general rule; I am speaking now of the American Colonies.

3837. Mr. *Roebuck.*] You have very often made use of the term "primarily responsible for their own defence;" now what ideas do you attach to that?—The idea attached to the phrase is really best exemplified by the state of opinion and feeling which prevailed in the old American Colonies.

3838. At what time?—During the last century. I think they were, and they felt themselves to be, primarily responsible for their own defence; they thought it their duty to consider in the first instance what was to be done when they were attacked, and they looked for the aid of the mother country to be given to them; whereas, now the mother country either does the whole, or looks for their aid.

3839. Would you say that that was true, when Washington served under a British General in the defence of Virginia, that they felt themselves called upon primarily to defend Virginia against France?—I do not say primarily to defend Virginia against France. I mean that when danger arose, it was their duty in the first instance to consider it, and exert themselves to meet it, irrespective of the British Government; but certainly if the danger was of great magnitude, beyond their strength to cope with, I do not at all doubt that in such a case the bulk of the burden must pass into the hands of the British Government.

3840. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you propose practically the entire absence of British troops?—No, I am not prepared to say absolutely that the establishment of the principle would go so far as that, but, at the same time, I think in many cases it might come even to that.

3841. Do you think that, practically, there is much difference between the condition and spirit of Canada to-day and those North American Colonies of the last century, beyond the presence in Canada of a regiment or two of troops?—Yes, very considerable. I think that the old system of American defence was much more favourable to that very high tone of spirit and feeling, than the system we have pursued since the separation of the American Colonies, and that not by the fault of the Canadians themselves, but by the fault of what we have done for them.

3842. Is there any reason to think that Canada is wanting in a military spirit of defence in case of need?—I think it would be unjust to say it is wanting, because all these questions must be judged with reference to circumstances; and I do not know that Canada has done or omitted to do anything otherwise than might fairly have been expected under the circumstances; but, as I have said, I think the circumstances of the old American Colonies were calculated to produce and did produce a much higher tone of feeling, and a much greater sense of responsibility for defence, than has been produced and does exist in our present Colonies.

3843. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Did not the importing from across the Atlantic the passions and prejudices of hate and feeling which existed between England and France also tend to affect the Colonists?—I am not able to form a judgment whether the Colonists did or did not partake, in the last century, more largely of the feelings which prevailed at home than they do now; but, nevertheless, I do not regard that as an indication of evil. I should be very glad to see them partake, as far as possible, of the feelings which prevailed at home, always hoping that those feelings are to be in consonance with right and justice.

3844. There is not that passion and hatred between America and England that there was between France and England?—Certainly not.

3845. Therefore you cannot expect that a Canadian population should have that high tone of feeling, namely, exasperation against America, that the Americans had

had against Canada?—No; I do not wish them to have any exasperation whatever.

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3846. Mr. *Adderley.*] You said that the Colonial contributions towards Imperial expenditure or the defence of the Colonies only, did not introduce an element of uncertainty into your calculation of ways and means for the year, owing to their insignificance in amount?—I also stated that they were paid with exemplary regularity as far as they were defined, and well understood, and regularly claimed by this country.

3847. If the system of defence in the Colonies which you recommend were fully carried out, instead of Colonial contributions towards our expenses in their defence, would not the system be English contributions towards their expenses in their own defence, just the reverse?—That is certainly what I should like to see; and although it is quite true that labour is scarce and dear in the Colonies, yet I doubt very much whether there has ever existed any country where labour was too dear for self-defence, if only the community had right ideas upon the subject, and had not somebody else ready to do it for them.

3848. Do not Colonial wars, such as the present war in New Zealand, and the past Kaffir wars, depending very much upon local Colonial policy, disturb calculations as to the military expenditure of those Colonies in any year?—Certainly; the financial inconvenience of Colonial wars, such as those in Kaffraria and New Zealand, is considerable.

3849. And they depend very much upon Colonial politics, over which the Imperial Government have very little control?—In some cases they must do so; even although we may secure to a Governor of our own choice, by legislative enactment, the question of the determination of Colonial policy, he yet lives in the atmosphere of a Colony possessed of a representative system, and I think it will be Colonial opinion, and not British opinion, that really determines the policy that brings about war.

3850. Can the Imperial Government maintain the same minute control over the expenditure incurred in such wars in Colonies, as they can over wars undertaken by themselves?—With regard to control over expenditure in war, I hardly know what that means.

3851. I am alluding to such war as is now going on in New Zealand, and the great Kaffir wars during the last 10 years. Do you think that the Imperial Government had a conditional control over the expenditure at the time, or has ever had its own expenditure audited, or in any way satisfactorily investigated since?—I am not able to draw a distinction to the disadvantage of Colonial wars between Colonial wars and other wars, as regards control over expenditure. Whether "control over expenditure" in a Colonial war may have some meaning, depends in some degree upon the character of the local Colonial agents; one man may have a more lively sense of responsibility than another, or may be a better man of business than another; but as regards central control, I think the day the war begins it is absolutely ended. As far as the functions of the Treasury in a state of war go, I think it is an entire mistake to suppose that any control whatever exists. I do not speak now of the War Department, because what or how far the War Department can control war expenditure I cannot tell; but I speak of the central control of the Treasury. It is an essential and vital element in the control of the expenditure of the country, that there should be ample and abundant time for the discussion of every question; in war that wholly disappears; everything that is required to be done is of necessity required to be done without delay, which would be interposed by the scruples and objections of the Treasury; in point of fact, so far as I know, control is not only weakened, but disappears in time of war.

3852. *Chairman.*] Do you think in the case of Colonial wars that a new element of difficulty arises with respect to any Imperial control over the expenditure from the circumstances of the war arising in Colonies possessing the powers of self-government?—There is one new element of difficulty in the case of Colonial wars, which is this,—that unfortunately all wars in the conditions of modern times, are exceedingly profitable to some portion or class of the community. In England, when a great war breaks out, it is attended with immense profit to some classes of the community; but still their sense of interest as a class is traversed in some measure by the motives which belong to them as members of the community, and they likewise share the burdens. In the case of

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Colonial wars the profit of the class exists, but the restraining influences do not exist, because the community does not bear the burden.

3853. Sir *George Grey.*] As a matter of fact, have the wars that have been conducted in a Colony been more expensive than those conducted elsewhere?—I am not able to form any such opinion.

3854. Mr. *Adderley.*] You proposed that we should not harshly or roughly, but very gradually recall our Colonies to the old system of their undertaking the primary responsibility of defending themselves, did you not?—That is what I should desire as far as practicable.

3855. Do you think that as long as their doing so is made to depend upon their own willingness to do so, it is likely we shall arrive at that conclusion?—I think it would be too much to expect that after the manner in which they have been treated by us, they should of themselves return at once to a more sound state of opinion; but no doubt if public opinion is enlightened upon the subject in this country, it will follow in the Colonies.

3856. Do you think if it was put as a question to them whether they are willing to pay themselves that which we are paying for them, that they would be likely ever to say that they are so willing?—I never heard that any community would answer such questions as that in the affirmative; I do not believe that we should in their circumstances.

3857. Even if the Colonies were to undertake their own defence, and we were therefore to call the troops home, and it were possible that we should not think it wise to diminish the amount of the Imperial army, would you nevertheless contemplate much reduction in our military expenditure, from the fact of calling upon the Colonies to defend themselves?—My impression is, that there would be some not inconsiderable reduction; I think it would be very considerable, even though it might not seem very large in reference to the total of our military charge.

3858. Do you consider that an empire which extends over the whole world, would be much more safely defended upon such a system?—That is my opinion.

3859. Do you consider that our undertaking to pay for the defence of such Colonies as the Cape, New Zealand, and Canada, seems inconsistent with their possessing self-government?—I have already stated, that I do not think self-government entire and genuine in any case, where it is not connected with very large responsibility for self-defence; at the same time, the cases of the Cape and New Zealand are very much complicated by peculiar circumstances, and therefore I hope that all due reserve will be made in applying my opinion to them. The case of the Cape was a peculiar case, because this country, by the most direct interference, did destroy the system, which was a system of Colonial self-defence.

3860. With regard to what you have just said about the Cape, is it not the fact of the presence of warlike tribes upon the frontier, with the fact of our having broken down our own systems of defence against those tribes, which you think constitutes a claim against the people of England to defend the Colony?—I think so; but I by no means recognise the mere fact of the presence of warlike aboriginal tribes, as a reason for departing from the principle that the colony should be charged with its own defence; on the contrary, I think that is a case where the application of the principle, where it is not barred by antecedent circumstances, is right.

3861. Is it not historically true that our North American Colonists defended themselves against still more warlike Indian tribes, than any in our present Colonies?—It is certainly a fact that they defended themselves against very warlike Indian tribes; nor, as far as I know, do I think that the interests of humanity were worse cared for when the business of defence was in the hands of the Colony than when it is in the hands of the mother country. If the more scrupulous humanity of the mother country, by reason of our being calm and distant spectators, is in favour of the aboriginal tribes, yet on the other hand, if our system tended to produce more frequent wars, that may be more than a compensation.

3862. Do you think that our gift of self-government to Colonies recently, has increased the fair claim on the part of the country upon those Colonies for assuming their defence?—Certainly; I do not see how that claim could have been made without the gift.

3863. Do

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3863. Do you not think that the possession by Colonies such as our Australian Colonies of complete self-government and responsible government increases the danger of such government, having the use of Imperial troops to maintain their own local policy, or to put down the internal disturbance caused by their own local policy?—Yes, I am cognizant of the evidence given by Mr. Lowe upon that subject, and I concur in his opinion on the point.

3864. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would you say that the acquisition of the right of self-government by certain of our Colonies has made any change whatever in their relation to foreign powers, or in any way increased their control over the policy which may involve them in collision with foreign powers?—No, certainly not; but in what I have said bearing upon the relations with foreign powers, I have had this a great deal in view; the cases, in my opinion, in which the Colonies would now be involved in the consequences of Imperial wars, are exceptional cases; I think there is a great change since the last century in that respect. Each of the Colonies were then supposed to be separate and exclusive resources of wealth for the mother country, in consequence of the supposed value of exclusive trade; that has now disappeared, and I think now the whole application of the consequences of war to transmarine possessions is greatly changed. I think that the cases in which the Colonies would be exposed to the direct consequences of war are now exceptional cases.

3865. But do you think that the claims of our dependencies upon the mother country for assistance in case of war with foreign powers, in which they have been involved by the policy of the mother country, has been at all affected by giving them a responsible government?—No; I do not think it has; my answer was rather the converse of that; that without the gift of a responsible government, we could not have made any claim. I might say with regard to a question from the same source, a short time ago, as to whether the result of my recommendation would be the total withdrawal of the British troops; upon which I said that might frequently happen; that certainly is one of the ulterior developments of this question into which I do not feel myself well qualified to enter. I think the general result would be this; that where sound principles are acted upon, the particular form of the arrangement which they are to take would be worked out gradually by the aid of experience; I cannot anticipate what the precise form would be in each case.

3866. Mr. *Adderley.*] It would carry out your views, would it not, that even though Imperial troops remain in these Colonies, the Colonies should pay them?—It is not absolutely incompatible with them, but I think it is one of those questions which would be best determined by practice, much better than we can now foresee.

3867. I ask you, generally, whether any reason whatever occurs to your mind why the English Colonists of the present day should do less for their own defence than the English Colonists of the last century?—There may be reasons, but they do not occur to my mind. The only reasons that have occurred to my mind are, that in the other sense the Colonists of former times were not allowed an independent existence as regards the full exercise of their own industry; but we now grant absolute freedom, and that, of course, is a consideration, which, as far as it goes, would greatly increase the strength of the argument for their assuming, with the benefits of freedom, the burdens of freedom.

3868. Were not the enemies, to whom these Colonists in the last century were exposed, the French army in Canada, the Spanish army in Florida, and large hordes of Indian troops, officered and drilled by officers of the regular army, as formidable as any that can come in contact with any Colony at the present day?—No doubt.

3869. You were asked if any of the Colonies defended themselves there would be any difference in their relations with England as regards their independence; do you consider, generally, that it would be worth while for us to incur all the disadvantages of the present system, in order to keep up what remains of dependence?—I should be loath to make merchandise of the connexion, and say I would give it up because it is too expensive; that is not a point of view in which I have considered the question; it appears to me, that all the motives by which we ought to be governed in this case really run in the same direction, and that course which is financially the best is the one which likewise is morally and politically the best.

3870. Do you see no advantage in our defence which weighs against the moral

Right Hon. *W. E. Gladstone*, M. P.

6 June 1861.

moral disadvantage of our undertaking the responsibility which usually falls upon all free communities?—Certainly not.

3871. Do you think that the mere fact of calling upon the Colonies to undertake that usual liability of all free communities would incline them at all to separate themselves from us, and assume a position of independence of England, or do you think that they would still feel that their interest lay in the direction of connexion with this country?—I should think they would see that their interest lay in connexion with this country; at the same time I should be apprehensive of abrupt and harsh calls upon them to do even what is right, especially if they were thought to be in consequence of the self-will, or the particular theories of a minister.

3872. Do you think that if it were done gradually in the way that you now recommend, there would be now any such danger of breaking the connexion up, or that the feeling of self-interest would incline them to continue the connexion with this country?—I think that self-interest and feeling would alike lead them to do so.

3873. Do you think that the fact of the American Colonies governing themselves was at all the cause of the ultimate separation of those Colonies from this country?—No, on the contrary, it was an impediment to it. It required a course of great harshness and great obstinacy in us to effect that separation, but we contrived to do it at last.

3874. Do you think that if the present system were continued, and we were to attempt to carry out the old scheme of putting the Colonies in a perfect state of defence at the expense of this country, that any Chancellor of the Exchequer would have the slightest chance of inducing the House of Commons to consent to such an enormous burden?—What I should be afraid of would be our going on insidiously with minute demands upon the House of Commons. If we were boldly to present to the House of Commons any comprehensive scheme for the defence of the Colonies, it might generate a strong re-action, and probably would do so. You might entice the House of Commons by degrees into it, no doubt, though I hope no Government would pursue that course.

3875. *Chairman.*] Looking at the present distribution of power, and responsibility and charge, do you know anything analogous in the history of the world to our relation with our Colonies, as regards their defence?—No, I believe it to be a novel invention, of which up to the present time we are the patentees, and no one has shown a disposition to invade our patent.

3876. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I do not know whether you can give us a more definite account of that early military system of the American Colonies which has been so much talked of. Are you aware whether it was a system at all, or whether it consisted of anything more than the presence in time of peace of Imperial troops?—I do not think I have made use of the phrase "military system;" I have made use of the phrase "Colonial system;" but I cannot think that I stated that there was a military system in regard to the defence of those Colonies. I mean that that is not the view in which it presents itself to me.

3877. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that the profits which the Dutch Government derives from her Colonies is not from Colonial revenues, but from the possession of a vast commercial monopoly in the hands of the Government?—If your question refers to Java, my recollection of it is that, practically, it comes to very much the same thing, and that the Colonial monopoly has the effect of a direct contribution.

3878. Mr. *Marsh.*] Does not Spain receive a considerable sum from Cuba?—I believe so.

3879. As direct contribution?—It was so. I have not adverted to it lately, but I believe it is so still.

Mr. *Philip Wodehouse*, called in; and Examined.

Mr. *P. Wodehouse.*

3880. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Governor of Guiana?—I was; I have just returned.

3881. Some evidence has been given before this Committee, as to the Imperial military expenditure of Guiana, and with respect to the expenditure on what they call sea defences?—Yes.

3882. Will you state what the nature of that expenditure has been?—The principal

principal port and the town of Georgetown, in Demerara, at which all the principal military buildings are, is dependent for protection from the sea upon sea defences, the maintenance of which, as well as of the military buildings and barracks, was paid for by the Home Government, out of Imperial funds; but in 1854, the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of State, wrote to the Colony, to say that the Home Government would no longer continue to pay anything for the maintenance of those defences, and that if the Colony would not undertake it itself, the troops must be withdrawn; and from that date, 1854, up to this time, the Colony has maintained those defences.

3883. They are now maintained at the cost of the Colony?—Entirely; and immediately the Duke of Newcastle gave those orders, or very shortly afterwards, the sea broke in, and a large amount of money has been found necessary since.

3884. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean that they maintain the works, or the garrison to man the works?—They maintain the sea defences, without which the sea would break in upon them.

3885. They do not pay for the garrison that mans it?—Only in a very small degree.

3886. *Chairman.*] When you left Guiana, what troops were stationed there?—Two companies of white troops, and three companies of a West Indian regiment.

3887. Some evidence has been given as to the value of the black regiments, particularly with reference to the present mode of recruiting and organizing them. Have you a high opinion of those troops, under the present system of discipline and recruiting?—There are opinions of mine upon record in the Colonial Office, to the effect that I should be very sorry to see the Colony left entirely to the protection of the black troops. I have gone so far as to say that if it were necessary to remove the white troops, I would rather see the withdrawal of the white troops preceded by the withdrawal of the black troops.

3888. Sir *George Grey.*] The troops are stationed there for the purpose of maintaining internal order, are they not?—It is not for me to say how far they are kept there exclusively for that purpose; but troops are very essential, I think, in a Colony consisting of such a population as that.

3889. Mr. *Adderley.*] Of what otherwise can they be?—We are very close to the French settlement of Cayenne, and we might be called upon, in case of war between this country and France, to make some sort of defence.

3890. Are the defences sufficient for the purpose?—We have been trying our utmost; we have a militia of 500 men in the Colony, and the military would assist us. The force that the French keep there is of such a nature that we might perhaps make some resistance until assistance was sent us.

3891. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You think you would make a respectable defence against a moderate force?—Against a small force.

3892. *Chairman.*] Do you think that in Guiana there is any particular apprehension of disturbance, supposing the troops were withdrawn?—I look upon the interest and the feelings of the white population, and of the mass of the people, as very different. I have no belief in the possibility of the existence of a cordial feeling between the two.

3893. Looking at the present mode in which the black regiments are recruited, would you rather see the Colony left without them altogether than depending upon them?—Yes; and one reason is this, that so long as the Queen's troops are there in the shape of those regiments, of course the whole of the arms, and the whole of the ammunition and everything of that nature must be in their custody, and if they joined the population they would form an organized body in addition to the mob. If you take them away you would know what you had upon your hands, and the white people could for a time take care of themselves.

3894. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you think that they would be of any use against foreign enemies?—For a short time; the place is not able to withstand an organized French attack; but supposing sudden hostilities to break out between France and England and one or two small ships to come from Cayenne, we might give an account of them.

3895. Sir *George Grey.*] As against the black population, if the black troops were called upon to suppress internal disorder, you doubt whether they could be depended upon?—Yes.

3896. As soldiers in the field might they be depended upon as against a

Mr. *P. Wodehouse.*

6 June 1861.

foreign enemy?—I think so. They depend very much upon the character of the officers by whom they are commanded; they are too intimately connected with the class of people amongst whom they are, to render it desirable to place implicit reliance upon them.

3897. *Chairman.*] Your principal objection, as I understand, is the source from which they are recruited?—Yes; they were probably better troops when they were recruited from pure Africans.

3898. Do you think British Guiana is able to do more towards its own defences than it does now?—I should state, in justice to British Guiana, that before that could be expected there are others with whom you must begin; I believe there is no other Colony in the West Indies which has a permanent militia; it is a great drain upon the time and leisure of the people; but since 1857 the militia has been steadily maintained.

3899. Sir *George Grey.*] What is the amount of the white population?—The pure white population is very small in numbers, I should think.

3900. Mr. *Marsh.*] Is it principally of English, or of Dutch origin?—There are scarcely any Dutch; the white population is almost entirely English and Scotch.

3901. Sir *George Grey.*] What has been done by the Colony, with a view to maintaining internal order by the establishment of police?—There is a very efficient police, the composition of which is of a mixed character; it is a large establishment for the Colony, and costs from 25,000 *l.* to 30,000 *l.* a-year.

3902. Are the troops used for police purposes, or only to give confidence to the white population?—That is all; the troops perform no kind of civil duty, beyond furnishing a small guard at the Government House; all the rest is garrison duty.

3903. *Chairman.*] Have you any knowledge of any other of the West India Islands?—I have visited Jamaica, and I have been Superintendent of Honduras.

3904. So far as you know, in the other West India Islands, have the troops been employed for police purposes?—I should think not, under ordinary circumstances.

3905. Mr. *Adderley.*] What is the revenue of Demerara?—About 300,000 *l.* a-year.

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Appendix, No. 1.

RETURN showing the FORCES in the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES, borne on the Strength of the Imperial Army, on the 31st March in each Year, from 1851 to 1861.*

COLONIES.	1851.	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.
NORTH AMERICA:											
Canada	6,106	4,960	4,725	3,435	1,887	1,602	3,287	2,424	3,035	2,234	2,229
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.	2,697	2,026	1,967	1,831	1,086	1,003	2,787	1,902	1,874	1,799	1,819
Newfoundland	427	430	326	345	311	228	230	233	197	235	229
AUSTRALIA:											
New South Wales	651	476	861	1,090	1,207	562	897	917	578	718	444
Victoria	52	79	486	451	1,126	1,093	940	883	625	633	59
Tasmania	901	929	959	699	358	1,068	547	423	290	354	188
South Australia	63	85	67	60	84	85	168	178	98	88	78
West Australia	116	210	202	193	186	198	177	199	176	165	140
New Zealand	1,630	1,306	1,484	1,498	1,577	1,614	1,911	1,618	1,195	1,368	5,354
Cape of Good Hope	5,050	9,096	8,688	5,773	6,035	6,225	10,295	6,082	5,390	4,946	4,788
Bermuda	1,335	1,348	1,354	1,098	1,018	935	1,229	1,203	1,157	1,108	1,071
Bahamas	300	295	267	344	325	294	292	444	415	397	474
St. Helena	517	516	524	520	515	462	570	534	506	487	756
Falkland Islands	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	37	37	36	35
WEST INDIES:											
Jamaica	1,926	1,842	1,858	1,873	1,932	1,826	1,636	1,890	1,489	1,439	1,422
Honduras	239	227	172	195	212	234	203	254	345	355	330
Windward and Leeward Colonies.	3,854	3,851	3,720	3,221	2,518	2,534	2,297	2,550	2,439	2,506	2,388
EASTERN COLONIES:											
Ceylon	3,553	3,559	3,447	3,483	2,763	2,734	2,650	2,318	2,393	2,371	2,266
Mauritius	1,941	1,197	1,837	1,849	1,847	1,944	2,153	590	1,003	1,954	1,990
Labuan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
WEST COAST OF AFRICA:											
Sierra Leone	308	244	276	95	340	429	335	348	355	358	259
Gambia	293	269	311	446	265	315	364	345	340	331	395
Gold Coast	99	238	391	353	345	334	327	301	290	327	326
MEDITERRANEAN:											
Gibraltar	3,618	3,672	4,299	3,378	3,776	5,356	6,397	4,506	4,763	5,956	6,001
Malta	3,331	3,294	4,077	4,442	6,291	9,811	6,718	5,199	5,650	6,131	7,116
Ionian Islands	3,491	3,529	3,550	3,570	3,633	4,261	4,128	3,123	3,243	4,270	4,233
TOTAL	42,498	43,678	45,848	40,242	39,637	45,147	50,547	38,501	37,883	40,566	44,481

* This is exclusive of the Returns for Hong Kong, which are given in a separate Paper.

Adjutant General's Office,
14 May 1861.

A. Horsford,
Deputy Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 2.

RETURN showing the STRENGTH of the TROOPS in *Hong Kong*, &c., on the 31st March in each Year, from 1851 to 1861.

	1851.	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.
Hong Kong, &c.	1,052	1,068	1,068	745	546	589	731	1,484	1,400	10,818	7,979

Adjutant General's Office,
15 May 1861.

A. Horsford,
D. A. G.

Appendix, No. 3.

RETURN showing the FORCES Quartered in the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES during

COLONIES.	For the Year ending 31st March 1860.				
	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTAL.
North America:					
Canada	1,039	1,137	248	8	2,432
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	1,612	- -	177	92	1,881
Newfoundland	- -	237	1	1	239
Australia:					
New South Wales	507	- -	106	32	645
Victoria	618	- -	- -	6	624
Tasmania	324	- -	- -	2	326
South Australia	93	- -	- -	7	100
West Australia	88	- -	- -	86	174
New Zealand	1,166	- -	45	41	1,252
Cape of Good Hope	3,409	1,042	176	239	4,866
Bermuda	878	- -	159	91	1,128
Bahamas	- -	386	11	1	398
St. Helena	- -	418	77	2	497
Falkland Islands	- -	37	- -	- -	37
West Indies:					
Jamaica	534	802	94	3	1,433
Honduras	- -	329	24	2	355
Windward and Leeward Colonies	1,145	1,104	136	7	2,392
Eastern Colonies:					
Ceylon	846	1,356	135	7	2,344
Mauritius	1,449	- -	133	48	1,630
Labuan	—	—	—	—	—
West Coast of Africa:					
Sierra Leone	- -	356	- -	- -	356
Gambia	- -	334	- -	- -	334
Gold Coast	- -	306	- -	- -	306
Mediterranean:					
Gibraltar	4,537	- -	1,079	309	5,925
Malta	5,008	637	779	304	6,728
Ionian Islands	3,601	- -	487	206	4,294
TOTAL	26,854	8,481	3,867	1,494	40,696

Adjutant General's Office,
3 May 1861.

Appendix, No. 3.

the Years ending 31st March 1860 and 1861, and according to the Latest Returns.

For the Year ending 3d May 1861.					According to the Latest Returns.				
Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Total.	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Total.
874	1,143	236	7	2,260	855	1,132	227	6	2,220
1,518	- -	229	95	1,842	1,500	- -	229	90	1,819
-	225	1	1	227	- -	227	1	1	229
455	- -	66	28	549	359	- -	53	32	444
259	- -	- -	21	280	232	- -	- -	27	259
197	- -	- -	2	199	186	- -	- -	2	188
77	- -	- -	3	80	76	- -	- -	2	78
78	- -	- -	64	142	77	- -	- -	63	140
3,368	- -	183	75	3,626	4,975	- -	305	74	5,354
3,387	1,060	159	234	4,840	3,323	1,074	157	234	4,788
875	- -	129	98	1,102	853	- -	123	95	1,071
- -	413	11	- -	424	- -	464	10	- -	474
- -	543	94	39	676	- -	538	114	104	756
- -	35	- -	- -	35	- -	35	- -	- -	35
553	807	102	3	1,465	570	762	87	3	1,422
- -	307	22	2	331	- -	308	22	- -	330
1,208	1,093	123	5	2,429	1,224	1,038	120	6	2,388
869	1,315	122	7	2,313	881	1,259	120	6	2,266
1,709	- -	123	210	2,042	1,671	- -	126	193	1,990
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- -	338	- -	- -	338	- -	259	- -	- -	259
- -	332	- -	- -	332	- -	395	- -	- -	395
- -	331	- -	- -	331	- -	326	- -	- -	326
4,408	- -	1,117	328	5,913	4,396	- -	1,303	302	6,001
5,416	633	775	288	7,112	5,415	636	782	283	7,116
3,600	- -	457	199	4,256	3,585	- -	452	196	4,233
28,911	8,575	3,949	1,709	43,144	30,178	8,453	4,231	1,619	44,581

J. Yorke Scarlett,
Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPER delivered in by *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

Appendix, No. 4. TOTAL NUMBER of VOLUNTEERS or other LOCAL FORCES in the undermentioned Colonies, at the date of the latest Returns.

	Description of Force.	Numbers.	Date of Despatch or Return.
NORTH AMERICA:			
Canada	Militia and Volunteers	4,456	31 December 1859.
Nova Scotia	ditto	2,350	19 April 1860.
New Brunswick	ditto	1,850	18 March 1861.
Newfoundland	Volunteers	350	3 April 1860.
Prince Edward Island	ditto	1,000	14 May 1860.
		10,006	
AUSTRALIA:			
New South Wales	Volunteers	1,696	14 February 1861.
Victoria	ditto	4,750	21 November 1860.
South Australia	ditto	1,538	22 February 1861.
Queensland	ditto	No return.	
Western Australia	Nil	Nil.	
Tasmania	Volunteers	1,500	22 December 1860.
		9,484	
NEW ZEALAND	Militia, Auckland	1,515	21 May 1860.
	Volunteers, Taranaki	Numbers not reported.	
	Other Settlements	No return.	
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE	Mounted Police	475	Blue Book, 1859.
	Volunteers	1,219	14 November 1859.
		1,694	

Colonial Office,
22 April 1861.

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPER delivered in by Mr. *H. S. F. Whiffen.*

A RETURN showing the FORCE stationed in the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES, and the EXPENDITURE incurred for their DEFENCE, during the Year ended 31st March 1860.

STATION.	Description of Force.	Strength. Numbers.	Strength. Totals.	Pay and Allowances.	Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	Stores.	Transport. Land and Water Transport in the Colonies.	Transport. To and from the Colonies and Inter-colonial.	Barracks.	Fortifications.	Proportion of Recruiting Expenses.	Proportion of Non-Effective Services.	Proportion of Departmental Expenses.	Total of Imperial Expenditure.	Total of Colonial Expenditure.	GROSS TOTALS.	STATION.
NORTH AMERICA:				£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	
Canada	Infantry	2,176															
	Artillery	248	- -	85,706	32,498	4,935	4,138	5,954	5,943	1,595	2,232	23,440	2,005	168,446	13,393	219,657	Canada.
	Engineers	8	2,507														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	75	- -	37,818	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	37,818			
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	Infantry	1,612															
	Artillery	179	- -	58,286	16,684	10,754	2,899	5,348	13,896	1,612	1,712	18,036	1,493	130,720	198	149,693	Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
	Engineers	92	1,929														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	48	- -	18,775	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	18,775			
Newfoundland	Infantry	237															
	Artillery	1	- -	7,693	3,620	1,260	332	590	2,255	234	216	2,328	199	18,727		20,807	Newfoundland.
	Engineers	1	249														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	10	- -	2,080	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	2,080			
AUSTRALIA:																	
New South Wales	Infantry	507															
	Artillery	106	- -	15,491	7,013	506	92	8,208	2	- - -	592	6,106	523	38,533	33,806	76,845	New South Wales.
	Engineers	32	653														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	8	- -	4,506	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	4,506			
Victoria	Infantry	618															
	Artillery	-	- -	14,987	7,481	- -	113	2,685	2	- - -	560	5,900	506	32,234	72,110	108,667	Victoria.
	Engineers	6	631														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	7	- -	4,323	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	4,323			
Tasmania	Infantry	324															
	Artillery	-	- -	9,691	9,733	232	161	1,290	787	22	288	3,244	277	25,725		35,113	Tasmania.
	Engineers	2	347														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	21	- -	9,388	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	9,388			
South Australia	Infantry	93															
	Artillery	-	- -	2,753	1,444	- -	15	401	- - -	- - -	88	954	82	5,737	7,172	14,008	South Australia.
	Engineers	7	102														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	2	- -	1,099	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1,099			
West Australia	Infantry	88															
	Artillery	-	- -	6,068	7,410	120	273	2,815	125	- - -	160	1,711	146	18,828		25,946	West Australia.
	Engineers	86	183														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	9	- -	7,118	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	7,118			
NEW ZEALAND	Infantry	1,166															
	Artillery	45	- -	38,902	32,491	161	506	9,532	- - -	- - -	1,152	11,959	1,023	95,726		104,852	New Zealand.
	Engineers	41	1,279														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	27	- -	9,126	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	9,126			
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE	Infantry	4,451															
	Artillery	176	- -	159,814	110,527	4,698	24,784	32,814	11,032	155	4,448	46,572	3,985	398,829	56,176	512,834	Cape of Good Hope.
	Engineers	239	4,981														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	115	- -	57,829	- - -	- -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	57,829			
	Carried forward	12,861	12,861	551,453	228,901	22,666	33,313	69,637	34,042	3,618	11,448	120,250	10,239	1,085,567	182,855	1,268,422	

A RETURN showing the FORCE stationed in the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES, and the EXPENDITURE incurred for their DEFENCE, during the Year ended 31 March 1860—*continued*.

STATION.	Description of Force.	Strength. Numbers.	Strength. Totals.	Pay and Allowances.	Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	Stores.	Transport. Land and Water Transport in the Colonies.	Transport. To and from the Colonies and Inter-colonial.	Barracks.	Fortifications.	Proportion of Recruiting Expenses.	Proportion of Non-Effective Services.	Proportion of Departmental Expenses.	Total of Imperial Expenditure.	Total of Colonial Expenditure.	GROSS TOTALS.	STATION.
Brought forward		12,861	12,861	£. 551,453	£. 228,901	£. 22,666	£. 33,313	£. 69,637	£. 34,042	£. 3,618	£. 11,448	£. 120,250	£. 10,239	£. 1,085,567	£. 182,855	£. 1,268,422	
ISLANDS IN NORTH AND SOUTH ATLANTIC: Bermuda	Infantry	878															
	Artillery	159		35,507	15,257	1,197	1,098	9,629	1,995	95	1,024	10,790	924	77,516		87,587	Bermuda.
	Engineers	91	1,154														
	General, Civil, and Medical Staff	26		10,071										10,071			
Bahamas	Infantry	386															
	Artillery	11		12,644	7,174	1,111	120	1,655	1,108	147	352	3,754	327	28,392		32,280	Bahamas.
	Engineers	1	409														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	11		3,888										3,888			
St. Helena	Infantry	418															
	Artillery	77		16,709	7,645	651	349	1,853	1,683	96	456	4,759	406	34,607	482	38,836	St. Helena.
	Engineers	2	509														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	12		3,747										3,747			
Falklands	Infantry	37	37	1,213	435			63			32	345	29	2,117		2,117	Falklands.
WEST INDIES: Jamaica	Infantry	1,336															
	Artillery	94		46,988	25,038	3,571	2,758	3,567	3,842		1,304	13,793	1,179	102,040	1,637	119,922	Jamaica.
	Engineers	3	1,473														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	40		16,245										16,245			
Honduras	Infantry	329															
	Artillery	24		12,785	6,135	540	240	2,058	826	196	328	3,422	292	26,822		30,621	Honduras.
	Engineers	2	366														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	11		3,799										3,799			
Windward and Leeward Islands	Infantry	2,249															
	Artillery	136		80,805	49,848	5,646	1,728	8,126	13,560		2,176	23,113	1,978	186,980	29,279	243,072	Windward and Leeward Islands.
	Engineers	7	2,472														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	80		26,813										26,813			
EASTERN COLONIES: Ceylon	Infantry	2,202															
	Artillery	135		62,788	9,354	1,425	145	6,779	795		2,120	22,159	1,896	107,461	97,198	207,466	Ceylon.
	Engineers	7	2,370														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	26		2,807										2,807			
Mauritius	Infantry	1,449															
	Artillery	133		50,657	10,702	3,336	2,398	28,330	5,969	14,804	1,488	15,464	2,073	135,221	25,354	171,012	Mauritius.
	Engineers	48	1,654														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	24		10,437										10,437			
Labuan				7,329										7,329		7,329	Labuan.
WEST COAST OF AFRICA: Sierra Leone	Infantry	356															
	Artillery	-		12,460	4,560		147	1,118	542	98	320	3,469	297	23,011	562	27,864	Sierra Leone.
	Engineers	-	371														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	15		4,291										4,291			
Gambia	Infantry	334															
	Artillery	-		10,423	4,494	1,513	272	913	1,234		304	3,272	281	22,706	423	28,333	Gambia.
	Engineers	-	350														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	16		5,204										5,204			
Gold Coast	Infantry	306															
	Artillery	-		7,697	3,009	923	276	917	525		288	2,870	245	16,750	234	20,015	Gold Coast.
	Engineers	-	319														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	13		3,031										3,031			
MEDITERRANEAN: Gibraltar	Infantry	4,537															
	Artillery	1,079		175,683	87,506	19,195	6,549	16,517	11,906	12,917	5,400	55,866	4,780	396,319		420,695	Gibraltar.
	Engineers	309	5,975														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	50		24,376										24,376			
Malta	Infantry	5,645															
	Artillery	779		196,194	111,684	22,445	6,517	19,328	13,521	17,157	6,144	63,439	5,428	461,857	6,200	489,373	Malta.
	Engineers	304	6,785														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	57		21,316										21,316			
Ionian Islands	Infantry	3,601															
	Artillery	487		124,509	50,731	8,283	3,185	19,070	5,487	1,662	3,912	40,700	3,482	261,021	25,000	305,061	Ionian Islands.
	Engineers	206	4,353														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	59		19,040										19,040			
	TOTALS	41,458	41,458	1,560,909	622,473	92,502	59,095	189,560	97,035	50,790	37,096	387,465	33,856	3,130,781	369,224	3,500,005	TOTALS.

Appendix, No. 6.

RETURN of the Cost of Transport, for Military Purposes, to, from, and between each Colony, during the Year 1859-60. Appendix, No. 6.

COLONY.	To and from Great Britain and the Colonies.				Intercolonial Sea Conveyance to each Colony.			TOTAL.
	Passage of Officers in Contract Packets, and otherwise, without Troops.	Conveyance of Troops without Officers.	Freight of Stores.	Amount.	Conveyance of Officers and Troops.	Freight of Stores.	Amount.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Canada	1,904	3,394	628	5,926	14	14	28	5,954
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	1,473	1,817	1,330	4,620	698	30	728	5,348
Newfoundland	141	- -	392	533	57	- -	57	590
New South Wales	1,181	6,144	75	7,400	805	3	808	8,208
Victoria	769	594	213	1,576	1,056	53	1,109	2,685
Tasmania	225	- -	522	747	523	20	543	1,290
South Australia	201	- -	20	221	171	9	180	401
West Australia	470	1,993	345	2,808	- -	7	7	2,815
New Zealand	216	5,184	394	5,794	3,323	415	3,738	9,532
Cape of Good Hope	2,638	22,008	2,632	27,278	4,013	1,523	5,536	32,814
Bermuda	16	4,630	1,786	6,432	3,147	50	3,197	9,629
Bahamas	872	76	310	1,258	334	63	397	1,655
St. Helena	529	293	921	1,743	23	87	110	1,853
Falklands	- -	- -	63	63	- -	- -	- -	63
Jamaica	2,007	- -	597	2,604	825	138	963	3,567
Honduras	99	- -	912	1,011	1,015	32	1,047	2,058
Windward and Leeward Islands	1,481	2,897	1,058	5,436	2,374	316	2,690	8,126
Ceylon	1,542	3,518	1,709	6,769	- -	10	10	6,779
Mauritius	1,060	26,274	835	28,169	95	66	161	28,330
Labuan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone	398	- -	441	839	279	- -	279	1,118
Gambia	679	- -	94	773	132	8	140	913
Gold Coast	529	- -	331	860	53	4	57	917
Gibraltar	513	1,788	14,201	16,502	15	- -	15	16,517
Malta	871	9,009	9,400	19,280	45	3	48	19,328
Ionian Islands	776	14,174	2,864	17,814	1,016	240	1,256	19,070
Total £.	20,590	103,793	42,073	166,456	20,013	3,091	23,104	189,560

Note.—The foregoing amounts are inclusive of the estimated cost of mess, victualling, bedding, &c. for the officers, men, women, and children conveyed in Her Majesty's ships, and of the coals consumed on the voyage.

Admiralty, Somerset House,
5 June 1861.

Chas. Richards,
Comptroller of Transport Services.

Appendix, No. 7.

ROUGH ESTIMATE of the Cost of Completing Works in Progress and of New Works necessary to place the undermentioned Foreign Possessions in a reasonable State of Defence, in addition to the Sums in the Estimates for 1861-62, exclusive of Armaments and ordinary Barracks, and of such occasional Improvements as Art and Science may from time to time render necessary. Appendix, No. 7.

	£.
Gibraltar	25,000
Malta	75,000
Corfu	75,000
Mauritius	250,000
Bermuda	150,000
Halifax	75,000
St. Helena	25,000
Cape of Good Hope	25,000
Trincomalee	36,000
Hong Kong, Bahamas, Falkland Isles, Jamaica, Antigua, Kingston and Quebec, &c.	264,000
£.	1,000,000

J. F. Burgoyne, I. G. F.

Appendix, No. 8.

Appendix, No. 8.

STATEMENT of STORES issued to various COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS, showing the CONDITIONS on which the SUPPLIES were made, whether on Payment or otherwise.

		NORTH AMERICA:	
		CANADA:	
		Some arms, accoutrements, and ammunition were furnished to the Provincial Government on a guarantee of repayment.	To be paid for.
		In 1856 field batteries were lent, and were to be paid for, if not returned.	On loan.
		A number of percussion muskets and ammunition were supplied, and payment claimed by Lord Panmure's desire, but resisted by local authorities.	To be paid for.
January	1860	Gun ammunition, artillery	ditto.
16 May	„	Ditto - - - ditto	ditto.
28 May	„	Ditto - - - ditto	ditto.
		Rockets, &c.	ditto.
July & August	„	Gun ammunition for volunteer artillery in several districts.	ditto.
		NOVA SCOTIA:	
1 September	1859	3,000 rifled muskets, pattern 1853, and sets of accoutrements.	A gift.
3 May	1860	Gun ammunition	To be paid of.
3 May	„	Six 3-pounder guns, with carriages, limbers, &c. (condemned).	On loan.
June	„	Small-arm and gun ammunition	To be paid for.
16 June	„	Staff sword, belt, &c.	ditto.
July	„	Gun and small-arm ammunition	ditto.
July	„	Small-arm ammunition	ditto.
September	„	Ditto - ditto	ditto.
27 September	„	Gun ammunition, artillery	ditto.
October	„	Small-arm ammunition	ditto.
November	„	Ditto - ditto	ditto.
November	„	Gun and small-arm ammunition	ditto.
December	„	Small-arm ammunition, &c.	ditto.
January	1861	Ditto - - - ditto	ditto.
January	„	Accoutrements and sundry stores	ditto
		NEW BRUNSWICK:	
15 November	1859	1,500 riflees, pattern 1853, and sets of accoutrements.	A gift.
June	1860	Two 6-pounder guns, with limbers, stores, &c.	On loan.
August	„	Accoutrements, gun ammunition, artillery stores, &c.	To be paid for.
		NEWFOUNDLAND:	
21 October	1859	1,500 rifled muskets, pattern 1853, and sets of accoutrements.	A gift.
October	1860	Small-arm ammunition	To be paid for.
		PRINCE EDWARD'S ISLAND:	
July	1860	50 cavalry swords and sets of accoutrements	A gift.
July	„	Small arm ammunition	To be paid for.
September	„	Bugles	ditto.

STATEMENT of Stores issued to various Colonial Governments—*continued.* Appendix, No. 8.

	AUSTRALIA:	
	NEW SOUTH WALES:	
24 May - 1854	Three 32-pounder guns, with ammunition and stores complete.	To be paid for.
14 August - 1855	50 guns, with powder, shot, and stores complete, for armaments.	- ditto.
December 1859	2,000 rifles, pattern 1853, with accoutrements and ammunition.	- ditto.
	VICTORIA:	
6 June - 1854	20 32-pounder guns, with powder, shot, and stores complete.	To be paid for.
3 December 1859	Armament of colonial steamer and other stores -	- ditto.
21 May - 1860	Ditto - - - ditto - - ditto - -	- ditto.
9 July - „	1,000 rifles - - - - - - - - -	On loan.
19 July - „	600 Lancaster carbines - - - - - -	To be paid for.
19 July - „	350,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition -	- ditto.
21 September „	300 Lancaster carbiues - - - - - -	- ditto.
21 September „	500,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition - -	- ditto.
21 January - 1861	500 rifles, sea service, with accoutrements, and 800 barrels of powder.	- ditto.
	TASMANIA:	
6 November 1858	1,000 rifles, pattern 1853, second class; 500,000 rounds of ammunition.	To be paid for.
4 September 1854	10 8-inch guns, with powder, shot, and stores complete.	A gift.
May - 1860	Gun ammunition - - - - - - - -	To be paid for.
May - „	Ditto - - - - - - - -	- ditto.
August - „	Swords, bugles, &c. - - - - - -	- ditto.
	SOUTH AUSTRALIA:	
5 June - 1854	2,000 rifles, 1,000 swords, and 800,000 rounds of ammunition.	A gift.
6 June - „	Eight field-guns, with powder, shot, and stores complete.	- ditto.
August - 1860	30 percussion muskets, pattern 1851 - - -	On loan.
	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
September „	Ditto - ditto - - - - - -	- ditto.
16 May - „	Gun ammunition and shot - - - - -	- ditto.
16 August - „	400 rifles - - - - - - - -	A gift; to replace issues made to New Zealand.
10 December „	Ammunition, 500,000 rounds - - - -	- - ditto.
21 August - „	Gun and small-arm ammunition, and articles for repair of muskets.	To be paid for.
26 September „	600 rifles - - - - - - - - -	- ditto.
	NEW ZEALAND:	
April - 1860	300 muskets, pattern 1842; 300 rifles, pattern 1853; 417 sets of accoutrements, and small-arm ammunition.	To be paid for.
May - „	300 rifles, pattern 1853; 200 muskets, pattern 1842; 117 sets of accoutrements, and small-arm ammunition.	- ditto.
July - „	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	- ditto.
July - „	292 rifles, pattern 1853; 210 muskets, pattern 1842; small-arm ammunition, &c.	- ditto.
July - „	Small-arm ammunition, &c. - - - - -	- ditto.
26 July - 1860	250,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition for rifles, provided by Messrs. Hebbert and Co.	- ditto.
24 September „	550,000 ditto - - - ditto - - - ditto -	- ditto.

Appendix, No. 8.

STATEMENT of Stores issued to various Colonial Governments—*continued.*

	CAPE OF GOOD HOPE:	
	ORANGE FREE STATES:	
27 October - 1856	Two field-pieces complete, with ammunition and stores.	To be paid for.
	CAPE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT:	
29 September 1858	Arms - - - - - - - - - -	To be paid for.
20 April - 1859	Field-guns, equipment, and carbines - - -	A gift.
6 September „	Percussion muskets, accoutrements and harness -	- ditto.
12 October - „	Arms and accoutrements - - - - -	- ditto.
2 February - 1860	70 muskets, pattern 1851, and sets of accoutrements	On loan.
7 February - „	Small-arm ammunition - - - - - -	To be paid for.
5 March - „	583 rifles, pattern 1851 - - - - -	On loan.
8 March - „	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
28 March - „	Ditto - ditto - - - - -	- ditto.
22 May - „	Ditto - ditto - - - - -	- ditto.
9 August - „	240 rifles, pattern 1853 - - - - -	On loan.
30 July - „	40 ditto - ditto - - - - -	ditto.
	40 sets of accoutrements - - - - -	To be paid for.
30 July - „	Small-arm ammunition and camp equipage - -	- ditto.
10 August - „	20 muskets, pattern 1851, &c. - - - -	- ditto.
16 October - „	Gun ammunition for volunteer artillery - - -	- ditto.
15 December „	A bugle, &c. - - - - - - - -	- ditto.
July - „	50 muskets, pattern 1851, and 50 sets of accoutrements; artillery harness.	- ditto.
July - „	Ordnance carriage and limbers, artillery equipment, ammunition, and accoutrements.	- ditto.
October - „	Small-arm ammunition, &c. - - - - -	- ditto.
	ST. HELENA:	
August - 1860	600 rifles, pattern 1842 - - - - -	On loan.
	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
November „	100 rifles, pattern 1856, and appurtenances - -	- ditto.
	WEST INDIES:	
	ANTIGUA:	
4 September 1858	Arms, accoutrements, and ammunition - - -	A gift.
14 July - „	Guns, ammunition, and side-arms - - - -	- ditto.
22 August - 1859	Arms, ammunition, accoutrements, brass guns, ammunition, and side arms.	- ditto.
	BRITISH GUIANA:	
18 February - 1859	Five 8-inch guns, with powder, shot, and shells -	A gift.
13 September „	Shot, shell, cartridges, side-arms, and stores - -	- ditto.
June - 1860	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
July & Sept. „	Artillery stores and ammunition - - - -	- ditto.
21 February - „	Gun ammunition, gunpowder, and stores - -	- ditto.
	DOMINICA:	
26 October - 1857	50 rifles, pattern 1853; ammunition, and accoutrements.	A gift.
3 November 1859	Limbers, light 6-pounder gun, ammunition, 50 rifles, pattern 1853, and accoutrements.	- ditto.
12 January - 1860	50 rifles, pattern 1853 - - - - - -	On loan.

STATEMENT of Stores issued to various Colonial Governments—*continued.*

Appendix, No. 8.

	WEST INDIES—*continued.*	
	GRENADA:	
22 August - 1859	Brass guns, ammunition, and stores - - -	To be paid for.
	ST. KITTS:	
27 October - 1858	Arms, ammunition, and accoutrements - - -	A gift.
12 May - 1859		
22 August - „	Ditto - - - - ditto - - - - -	ditto.
30 September „	Ditto - - - - for police - - - -	To be paid for.
	TURK'S ISLAND:	
19 November 1855	140 rifles, pattern 1853, with accoutrements and ammunition.	A gift.
	VIRGIN ISLANDS:	
22 August - 1859	Arms, accoutrements, and ammunition - - -	A gift.
	WEST COAST OF AFRICA:	
	SIERRA LEONE:	
26 January - 1858	800 rifled muskets, pattern 1842, and ammunition -	A gift.
	GAMBIA:	
August - 1860	100 old pattern cavalry swords - - - -	A gift.
	100 sword-belts, &c. - - - - -	To be paid for.
21 February - „	Armaments of colonial steamer - - - -	- ditto.

J. Craufurd Caffin,
Director of Stores.

Appendix, No. 9.

RETURN of the AUGMENTATIONS and DIMINUTIONS in the STAFF of the

STATION.	Year ended 31 March 1857.		Year ended 31 March 1858.	
	Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.
North America:				
Canada	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general. 1 staff surgeon, 1st class.	1 Inspector general. 2 staff surgeons, 1st class. 1 staff surgeon, 2d class. 5 staff assistant surgeons.	1 Deputy inspector general.
Nova Scotia	—	—	—	1 Staff assistant surgeon.
Australia:				
New South Wales	—	—	1 Dispenser	—
Tasmania and Western Australia	—	—	1 Staff assistant surgeon.	—
New Zealand	—	—	—	—
Cape of Good Hope	1 Inspector general. 1 Dispenser.	1 Deputy inspector general. 1 Staff assistant surgeon.	1 Deputy inspector general. 1 Staff assistant surgeon. 1 Apothecary.	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class. 1 Dispenser.
West Indies:				
Jamaica, Bahamas, and Honduras	—	—	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class. 1 Dispenser of medicines.	—
Windward and Leeward Islands	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general. 1 Staff surgeon, 1st class.	1 Dispenser	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class. 2 Staff assistant surgeons.
Eastern Colonies:				
Ceylon	1 Inspector general.	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Dispenser	—
Mauritius	—	—	1 Dispenser	—
Hong Kong	—	1 Staff assistant surgeon.	1 Dispenser	—
West Coast of Africa	—	1 Surgeon	—	—
Mediterranean:				
Gibraltar	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general.	1 Staff assistant surgeon. 1 Dispenser of medicines.	—
Malta	1 Inspector general. 1 Deputy inspector general. 2 Staff surgeons, 1st class. 6 staff surgeons, 2d class. 6 Staff assistant surgeons. 1 Dispenser.	—	—	1 Deputy inspector general. 2 staff surgeons, 1st class. 6 staff surgeons, 2d class. 9 Staff assistant surgeons. 1 Dispenser.
Ionian Islands	—	—	—	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class.

Appendix, No. 9.

ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT in the COLONIES, in each of the last Five Years.

Year ended 31 March 1859.		Year ended 31 March 1860.		Year ended 31 March 1861.	
Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.
- - -	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class. 4 Staff assistant surgeons.	1 Staff assistant surgeon.	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general.
- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class.	—	
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	—	
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class.	—	
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.
- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general.	—	
- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class.	—	
2 Staff surgeons, 2d class. 2 Staff assistant surgeons.	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class. 1 Staff surgeon, 2d class.	—	
1 Staff surgeon, 2d class. 1 Staff assistant surgeon.	- - -	2 Staff assistant surgeons.	—		
- - -	- - -	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class. 1 Staff assistant surgeon.	—		

Appendix, No. 10.

RETURN of the COMMISSARIAT STAFF provided in the ESTIMATES for the Years from 1856-57 to 1860-61, for Duty in the COLONIES.

COLONIES.	1856-57. Number of Officers.	1857-58. Number of Officers.	1858-59. Number of Officers.	1859-60. Number of Officers.	1860-61. Number of Officers.	REMARKS.
North America:						
Canada	8	12	13	13	11	
Nova Scotia	7	7	9	9	8	
Newfoundland	2	2	2	2	2	
Australia:						
New South Wales and Victoria	6	6	6	5	5	
Tasmania	5	8	8	9	6	Since reduced to four, one, and six respectively.
South Australia	2	2	2	2	2	
Western Australia	7	7	11	11	9	
New Zealand	5	7	7	8	7	*Note.*—This is exclusive of the number temporarily employed during the war.
Cape of Good Hope	22	31	31	37	34	
Bermuda	7	8	8	8	7	
Bahamas	2	2	2	2	2	
St. Helena	2	2	2	2	2	
West Indies	13	15	15	16	14	
Jamaica	4	6	6	7	6	
Honduras	2	2	2	2	2	
Eastern Colonies:						
Mauritius	4	4		5	5	
Hong Kong	5	5	6	6	7	*Note.*—This is exclusive of the number temporarily employed in China during the war.
West Coast of Africa:						
Sierra Leone	4	4	4	4	4	
Gambia	2	2	2	2	2	
Gold Coast	2	2	2	2	2	
Mediterranean:						
Gibraltar	5	5	7	7	7	
Malta	8	8	8	8	8	
Ionian Islands	5	5	7	7	7	
TOTALS	129	152	165	174	159	

Memorandum.—The difference between the Commissariat Staff for 1857-58 and 1856-57 is attributable to the Colonies having been drained in the latter year to meet the exigencies of the Crimean war, the numbers employed in 1857-58 being nearly the same as before the war.

The increase in 1858-59 is caused by the employment of an additional number of Commissariat clerks, who were appointed during the war, in the place of temporary clerks.

In 1859-60 the Royal Warrant of October 1858 was in operation, and it became necessary to replace upon full pay and employ several officers who had been placed temporarily upon half-pay on reduction upon the termination of the war, these officers taking the place of temporary employés.

The numbers taken for 1860-61 represent what will probably be required for the future (except in Australia, *see* Remarks), the Commissariat Staff in the Colonies having been reduced as low as practicable, to provide for the wants at home.

W. H. Maturin, Dep. for C. G. in Chief.

Appendix, No. 11.

PAPERS delivered in by Mr. *William Henry Sharpe Whiffen*, 6 June 1861.

Colonial Contributions, as per Parliamentary Accounts.

	New South Wales. £. s. d.	Victoria. £. s. d.
Credited in Pt List, 40th Foot - - Mar. qr. 1853	- - -	3,326 18 4
Repayment by New South Wales in aid of Expenditure, 40th Foot - -	1,244 13 6	
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot - - 30 June 1853	- - -	1,667 6 1
Ditto - - 30 Sept. 1853	- - -	2,526 12 7
Ditto - - 31 Dec. 1853	- - -	2,620 5 5
£		6,814 4 1
Ditto - - 31 Mar. 1854	- - -	2,491 7 -
Ditto - - 30 June 1854	- - -	2,443 14 6
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account, 40th Foot - - - - - -	1,111 19 5	
Ditto - - ditto - -	198 13 4	
Ditto - - ditto - -	1,158 15 4	
Ditto - - ditto - -	1,355 12 11	
Credited in P. List, 12th Foot, to - 31 Dec. 1854	- - -	2,777 19 9
Ditto - - Mar. qr. 1856	- - -	3,475 8 8
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot - - Sept. qr. 1854	- - -	4,299 2 4
Ditto - - Dec. qr. 1854	- - -	4,050 18 11
£.	3,825 1 -	19,538 11 2
£.	23,363 12 2	
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account, 40th Foot - - - - - -	936 12 6	
Ditto - - ditto - -	1,689 11 10	
Ditto - - ditto - -	1,274 14 6	
£.	3,900 18 10	
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account, 40th Foot - - - - - -	1,178 - -	
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account, 11th Foot - - - - - -	1,257 9 9	
Ditto - - ditto - -	1,336 2 4	
Ditto - - ditto - -	1,225 4 -	
Ditto - - ditto - -	1,319 1 7	
Credited in P. List, 12th Foot - - 30 June 1855	- - -	3,203 16 5
Ditto - - 30 Sept. 1855	- - -	3,479 18 2
Ditto - - 31 Dec. 1855	- - -	1,949 6 0
Ditto - - 31 Mar. 1856	- - -	9 2 6
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot - - 31 Mar. 1855	- - -	3,618 - 7
Ditto - - 30 June 1855	- - -	3,817 14 3
Ditto - - 30 Sept. 1855	- - -	3,560 - 7
Ditto - - 31 Dec. 1855	- - -	5,545 11 3
Ditto - - 31 Mar. 1856	- - -	6,449 - 9
£.	6,315 17 8	31,632 11 3
£.	37,948 8 11	

	New South Wales. £. s. d.	Victoria. £. s. d.
(Exchequer.)		
Parliamentary Account, 1853-54, gives	- - -	3,776 18 4
Less transferred in 1855-56 - -	- - -	450 - -
	£.	3,326 18 4
Per Parliamentary Account, 1854-55, p. 8 - - - - - - (Exchequer.)	1,244 13 6	
Per Parliamentary Account, 1854-55, p. 8 - - - - - - (Exchequer.)	- - -	6,814 4 1
		Australian Colonies.
		£. s. d.
Parliamentary Account, 1854-55, p. 4, (appropriations in aid), Australian Colonies - - - - -	- - -	25,219 14 10
Less applicable to Tasmania - -	- - -	1,856 2 8
	£.	23,363 12 2
Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 12 (Exchequer.)	4,628 18 10	
Less transferred in 1856-57 - -	1,178 - -	
See Parliamentary Account, p. 9 -	3,450 18 10	
Add debit on account, Victoria - -	450 - -	
See above, 1853-54 - - - £.	3,900 18 10	
		Victoria.
		£. s. d.
Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 12 (Exchequer Credit.)	- - -	3,618 - 7
Neutralized in Parliamentary Account, 1856-57, p. 9.		
		Australian Colonies.
		£. s. d.
Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 6 (appropriations in aid), Australian Colonies - - - - - - -	- - -	37,948 8 11
		Victoria.
		£. s. d.
Parliamentary Account, 1856-57, p. 9 (Exchequer Debit.)	- - -	3,618 - 7
To neutralize an erroneous credit. *See* Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 12.		
Parliamentary Account, 1856-57, p. 9 (Exchequer Debit.)	1,178 -	
To neutralize an erroneous credit. *See* Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 12.		

Colonial Contributions, as per Parliamentary Accounts—*continued.*

		New South Wales.			Victoria.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	30 June 1856	-	-	-	6,267	3	4
Ditto	30 Sept. 1856	-	-	-	6,202	2	9
Ditto	31 Dec. 1856	-	-	-	7,063	13	10
Ditto	31 Mar. 1857	-	-	-	6,642	9	1
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, 11th Foot		1,225	15	7			
Ditto	ditto	1,193	19	10			
Ditto	ditto	1,267	-	3			
Ditto	ditto	1,319	7	6	Headed in Parliamentary account as "Old Stores."		
	£.	5,006	3	2	26,175	9	-
		£. 31,181. 12. 2.					

4,104 *l.* 9 *s.* 1 *d.* over-credited in this account, *see* 1858–59, but remitted by the Colony in 14,328 *l.* 5 *s.* 10 *d.*, *see* 1858–59.

	New South Wales.			Victoria.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Parliamentary Account, 1857–58, p. 8	3,686	15	8	26,175	9	-
Add,—Amount credited to Old Stores, instead of the Colony, in Parliamentary Account - - -	1,319	7	6			
£.	5,006	3	2	26,175	9	-
	£. 31,181. 12. 2.					

		New South Wales.			Victoria.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	30 June 1857	-	-	-	2,566	4	-
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account of the 40th Foot, to Dec. 1857		-	-	-	14,328	5	10
Repayment by ditto of an advance to Captain Ross, Royal Engineers, on his return to England		-	-	-	120	15	-
			£.		17,015	4	10
Less,—Amount over-credited to the Exchequer and to the Colony, in the sum of 6,642 *l.* 9 *s.* 1 *d.*, part of 26,175 *l.* 9 *s.* per Parliamentary Account 1857–58		-	-	-	4,104	9	1
			£.		12,910	15	9
Credited in P. List, 11th Foot, 1 to 23 Oct. 1857		339	11	5			
Ditto - 77th Foot, 24 Oct. to 31 Dec. 1857		996	15	1			
Ditto ditto	31 Mar. 1858	1,233	12	3*			
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer of expenditure incurred by the Commissariat Chest, to 31 Mar. 1857, for Provisions, Coals, Forage, &c., for Royal Artillery		401	9	7			
Repayment by ditto of amount advanced by Commissariat Chest, to 31 Mar. 1857, on account of 11th Foot		1,314	11	5			
Ditto	ditto	326	11	7			
Ditto	ditto	117	15	7			
Ditto	ditto for Postage and Stationery, 31 Dec. 1857	61	6	6			
	£.	4,791	13	5	12,910	15	9
		£. 17,702. 9. 2.					

*253 *l.* 4 *s.* 3 *d.* was also advanced by the Colony of New South Wales for Imperial pay of two Companies, 77th Foot, 1 to 19 April, when they embarked for India; this amount was erroneously credited to Vote for Provisions.

	New South Wales.			Victoria.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Parliamentary Account, 1858–59 (Exchequer.)	15,210	6	-	2,566	4	-
Amount erroneously returned as applicable to New South Wales instead of Victoria	10,344	11	9	10,344	11	9
£.	4,865	14	3	12,910	15	9
Amount erroneously returned as applicable to New South Wales instead of Ceylon	74	-	10	—		
£.	4,791	13	5	12,910	15	9
	£. 17,702. 9. 2.					

		New South Wales.			Victoria.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	30 Sep. 1857	-	-	-	2,495	17	4
Ditto	ditto	-	-	-	2,069	13	6
			£.		4,565	10	10
Less,—Repaid to the Colonial Treasurer by Paymaster, 40th Foot		-	-	-	2,494	2	6
			£.		2,071	8	4
Repaid by Colonial Treasurer, Apr. 1858		-	-	-	80	7	3
			£.		2,151	15	7
Credited in P. List, 11th Foot	30 June 1857	448	17	6			
Ditto	ditto	463	16	9			
Ditto	ditto	465	6	-			
Ditto	30 Sep. 1857	452	12	-			
Ditto	ditto	450	10	8			
Ditto	ditto	463	6	-			
£.		2,744	8	11	-	nil.	

	New South Wales.			Victoria.		
	£.	s.	d.			
Parliamentary Account, 1859–60 (Exchequer.)	2,151	15	7	nil.		

Returned as New South Wales instead of Victoria.

This will be returned in Parliamentary Account, 1860–61, as an Exchequer Credit.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.			Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.	
	£. s. d.			£. s. d.
1853:				
Imperial Pay, 2 Companies, 40th Foot (additional):				
s. d.	£. s. d.			
1 Major - - - 16 – per diem.	– 16 –			
2 Captains - - - 11 7 „	1 3 2			
2 Lieutenants - - 6 6 „	– 13 –			
2 Ensigns - - - 3 3 „	– 10 6			
1 Assistant Surgeon - 7 6 „	– 7 6			
Daily Pay Officers - - - -	3 10 2			
s. d.				
2 Colour Serjeants - 2 4 per diem.	– 4 8			
6 Serjeants - - 1 10 „	– 11 –			
8 Corporals - - 1 4 „	– 10 8			
3 Drummers - - 1 1½ „	– 3 5			
178 Privates - - 1 – „	8 18 –			
Additional and good conduct pay - - -	– 11 6			
		Per annum.		
Daily Pay Officers and Men - - £.	14 9 5	5,281 17 1	1853 - -	5,145 12 4
Colonial Allowances for the above Officers 5 *s.*, and Men 3½ *d.* per diem - - - - - - - - - -		1,794 11 8		
Colonial Allowances to Officers serving in the Colony, at 5 *s.*		2,781 10 –		
Ditto - - - - Non-commissioned Officers and Men, 430 at 3½ *d.* - - - - - - - - -		2,288 17 1		
Ditto - - - - Barrack Serjeants, &c. - - -		82 2 6		
Lodging Allowance:	£. s. d.			
General Staff - - - - -	600 – –			
Commissariat - - - - -	400 – –			
Medical - - - - - -	200 – –			
		1,200 – –		
	£.	13,428 18 4		
1854:				
Imperial Pay, 2 Companies, 40th Foot - - - -		5,507 17 –	1854 - -	4,904 17 10
Colonial and Military Allowances, ditto - - - -		2,308 1 11		
Contingencies - - - - - - - - -		790 4 10		
Colonial Military Allowances for General Service - -		6,424 4 8		
Lodging Allowance to Staff - - - - - -		2,400 – –		
	£.	17,430 8 5		
1855:				
Imperial Pay, 2 Companies - - - - - -		5,215 17 –	1855 - -	5,235 19 10
Colonial Allowances to the whole Force - - - -		12,788 4 5		
Contingencies - - - - - - - - - -		3,220 4 6		
	£.	21,224 5 11		
			1856 - -	5,004 3 9
1857:				
Amounts Voted for Military purposes:				
Two Companies, Line - - - - - - -		10,103 – 6	1857 - -	5,395 6 10
General Service - - - - - - - -		9,008 11 3		
Royal Artillery - - - - - - - -		7,871 14 2		
	£.	26,983 5 11		
Military, Supplementary - - - - - - -		2,253 12 4		
	£.	29,236 18 3		
1858:				
Military Establishment and Services - - - -		10,432 16 4	1858 - - (Mar. qr.)	1,238 12 3
Royal Artillery - - - - - - - -		8,224 17 –		
	£.	18,657 13 4		

NEW SOUTH WALES—*continued.*

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.	£.	s.	d.
1859:			
Military Allowance	8,179	–	–
Royal Artillery	7,398	–	–
£.	15,577	–	–
Military (supplementary)	1,289	13	10
£.	16,866	13	10
1860:			
Military Allowance	8,818	6	–
Royal Artillery	7,308	–	–
£.	16,126	6	–

Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.

RECAPITULATION.

Voted by Colony for Military Purposes.	£.	s.	d.
1853	13,428	18	4
1854	17,430	8	5
1855	21,224	5	11
Supposed 1856	21,224	5	11
1857	29,236	18	3
1858	18,657	13	4
1859	16,866	13	10
1860	16,126	6	–
£.	154,195	10	–

Paid over to Imperial Government for Military Expenditure.	£.	s.	d.
1853	5,145	12	4
1854	4,904	17	10
1855	5,235	19	10
1856	5,004	3	2
1857	5,395	6	10
1858 (1st quarter)	1,233	12	3
1859	nil.		
1860	nil.		
£.	26,919	12	3

VICTORIA.

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.	£.	s.	d.
1853:			
Imperial Pay	12,952	18	9
Colonial Allowances	12,084	10	10
Contingencies, including Provisions, Fuel and Light, Forage, Bedding, Clothing, &c.	19,000	–	–
Contingent Allowances to Non-commissioned Officers and Men	600	–	–
Hospital and Incidentals	1,500	–	–
Additional Pay to 3 Regimental and 1 Commissariat Officer, at 7 *s.* 6 *d.* per day	547	10	–
Extra Pay and Allowances to the Non-commisioned Officers and Men of 1 Company	1,400	–	–
Colonial Barrack Masters	1,766	10	–
£.	49,851	9	7
Additional Vote, 1853:			
Colonial Allowances, &c.	15,600	–	–
Passage of Head Quarters from Van Diemen's Land, 99th Foot	5,000	–	–
Pay and Allowances, ditto	20,000	–	–
£.	90,451	9	7
1854:			
Imperial and Colonial Pay and Allowances, &c., Line	55,522	2	11
Engineers and Sappers	14,133	18	5
Guard and Commissariat	2,332	12	11
£.	71,988	14	3

Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.	£.	s.	d.
1853	10,141	2	3
1854	15,763	2	6

VICTORIA—*continued.*

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.				Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.		
1855:	£.	s.	d.		£.	s. d.
Colonial Pay, Head Quarter Staff	3,913	10	5			
Staff and Regimental Contingencies	3,870	–	–			
Imperial and Colonial Pay (Line)	63,345	13	5			
£.	71,129	3	10			
Royal Engineers:						
1st Captain (3 months) Imperial, 30 *s.*, Colonial, 12 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem	191	5	–			
Sappers and Miners:						
1 Clerk of Works, Imperial, £372 15 – Colonial, 12 s. 6 d.	600	17	6			
1 Corporal – – „ – 2 3½ – „ 2 3½	83	12	10			
1 Ditto – – „ – 1 11¾ – „ 1 11¾	72	4	8			
1 Private – – „ – 1 2½ – „ 1 2½	44	2	–			
Allowance to Paymaster for Agency	2	10	–			
Allowance to Non-commissioned Officers and Men for Clothing, at 2 *d.* per diem each	9	2	6			
Provisions, Fuel, Light, &c.	217	–	–			
£.	72,349	18	4	1855	27,163	4 10
1856:						
Military Expenditure, per Balance Sheet	74,943	13	4	1856	25,532	– 8
1857:						
Head Quarter Staff	4,167	3	4			
Imperial Pay: £. s. d.						
10,495 12 6						
16,510 12 1						
	27,006	4	7			
Colonial:						
10,897 2 6						
17,177 6 3						
	28,074	8	9			
Field and Marching Allowance, Officers and Men	500	–	–			
Lodging Allowance to Officers	2,000	–	–			
Provisions	14,000	–	–			
Hospital Clothing, Forage, Bedding, Washing, Medicines, Funerals, &c.	2,810	–	–			
Fuel and Light	3,200	–	–			
Stores and Stationery	224	–	–			
Transport of Troops	7,424	–	–			
Allowances to Deputy and Deputy Assistant Commissary General	700	–	–			
£.	90,105	16	8	1857	23,829	19 9
1858:						
(Colonial Allowances.)						
Head Quarter Staff: £. s. d.						
Major General Commanding 700 – –						
Deputy Adjutant General 350 – –						
Major of Brigade 250 – –						
Assistant Military Secretary 250 – –						
Aide-de-Camp 250 – –						
Principal Medical Officer 250 – –						
Staff Surgeon 250 – –						
Deputy Commissary General 250 – –						
Purveyor 150 – –						
Medical Storekeeper 150 – –						
Clerk 150 – –						
	3,000	–	–			

VICTORIA—*continued.*

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.
1858—*continued.*			
(Colonial Allowances.) Her Majesty's Troops:			
Lieutenant Colonel	150 – –		
Command Money	100 – –		
2 Majors, at 150 *l.*	300 – –		
1 Adjutant	150 – –		
Quartermaster	150 – –		
Surgeon	150 – –		
2 Assistant Surgeons, at 150 *l.*	300 – –		
Paymaster	150 – –		
8 Captains, at 150 *l.*	1,200 – –		
16 Subalterns, at 150 *l.*	2,400 – –		
5 Senior Staff Serjeants, at 45 *l.* 12 *s.* 6 *d.*	228 2 6		
8 Staff Serjeants, at 36 *l.* 10 *s.* 0 *d.*	292 – –		
40 Serjeants, at 33 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d.*	1,338 6 8		
40 Corporals, at 24 *l.* 6 *s.* 8 *d.*	973 6 8		
781 Drummers and (1 *s.* 1 *d.*) Privates, at 19 *l.* 15 *s.* 5 *d.*	15,441 – 5		
		23,322 16 3	
Barrack Master	200 – –		
„ Serjeant	45 12 6		
„ Labourer	18 5 –		
„ Serjeant at Geelong	146 – –		
		409 17 6	
Contingencies:			
Lodging Allowance to Officers	2,000 – –		
Bedding, Hospital Clothing, Stores and Incidentals, &c.	6,000 – –		
		8,000 – –	
	£.	34,732 13 9	
Additional Colonial Allowance of 2½ *d.* per diem to the above Non-commissioned Officers and Men		3,343 – 5	
	£.	38,075 14 2	To be paid over, &c. &c. as 1859 and 1860: *see* below.
1859:			
(Colonial Allowance.)			To be paid over by four quarterly instalments to the Officer commanding Her Majesty's Troops, to be distributed by him as to Her Majesty shall seem fit.
Head Quarter Staff		7,947 9 –	
Her Majesty's Troops (4 Companies)		14,016 – –	
Contingencies		4,934 – –	
	£.	26,897 9 –	
1860:			
Colonial Allowances, as above	£.	26,897 9 –	Ditto – – ditto.

RECAPITULATION.

Voted by Colony for Military Purposes.	£. s. d.	Paid over to Imperial Government for Military Expenditure.	£. s. d.
1853	90,451 9 7	1853	10,141 2 3
1854	71,988 14 3	1854	15,763 2 6
1855	72,349 18 4	1855	27,163 4 10
1856	74,943 13 4	1856	25,532 – 8
1857	90,105 16 8	1857	23,829 19 9
1858	38,075 14 2	1858	nil.
1859	26,897 9 –	1859	nil.
1860	26,897 9 –	1860	nil.
£.	491,710 4 4	£.	102,429 10 –

STATEMENT showing the RATES of COLONIAL ALLOWANCES paid to Officers of the MILITARY and CIVIL DEPARTMENTS per Month by the under-mentioned Colonies.

	Relative Rank.	MAURITIUS. Including all Allowances.		CEYLON. Including all Allowances.	VICTORIA. In addition to Provisions, Forage, Fuel and Light.		NEW SOUTH WALES.	INDIA. Inclusive of all Allowances.
STAFF:		£. s. d.		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	Lodging. £. s. d.	£. s. d.	
Major General Commanding		80 – –		100 – –	58 6 8	62 10 –		
Assistant Military Secretary	Captain	26 4 8	Inclusive of lodging money, as these officers are not provided with public quarters	28 10 –	20 16 8	18 13 7	10 10 –	Varies according to circumstances.
Aide-de-Camp	Captain	26 4 8		28 10 –	20 16 8	18 13 7	10 10 –	
Deputy Quartermaster General	Lieut. Colonel	39 17 10		60 – –	29 3 4	28 19 4	10 10 –	
Deputy Commissary General	Lieut. Colonel	36 17 10		None at this station.	29 3 4	28 19 4		
Assistant Commissary General	Captain	23 4 8					10 10 –	
Deputy Assistant Commissary General	Lieutenant	13 11 7			12 10 –	18 13 7	8 10 –	
Commissariat and other Clerks	Ensigns	13 11 7					8 10 –	
Staff Surgeons, 1st Class	Major	32 12 10		30 – –	20 16 8	23 5 1		
Staff Surgeons, 2d Class	Captain	23 4 8		19 – –				
Clerks of Works	Ensigns	18 16 7		none.				
Ordnance Storekeeper	Major	23 17 10	In quarters	30 – –				
Barrackmaster	Major	23 17 10		none	16 13 4	18 13 7		
REGIMENTAL:					£. s. d.			£. s. d.
Colonel Commanding		30 8 3	Exclusive of lodging money, these officers being provided with public quarters	45 – –	20 16 –			101 3 1, together with off-reckonings.
Lieutenant Colonel Commanding		23 17 10		40 – –	20 16 8			83 10 4, with 40 *l.* 16 *s.* 8 *d.* per month if in Command.
Major		20 17 10		30 – –	12 10 –		10 10 –	61 18 5
Captain		13 4 8		19 – –	12 10 –		8 10 –	29 19 6 with 3 *l.* 13 *s.* per month if commanding a Company.
Lieutenant		8 11 7		12 10 –	12 10 –		7 10 –	19 19 8
Ensign		8 11 7		10 – –	12 10 –		7 10 –	15 13 –
Paymaster		13 4 8		22 – –	12 10 –		8 10 –	Varies according to length of service and other circumstances.
Adjutant		13 16 7		15 10 –	12 10 –		7 10 –	
Quartermaster		13 16 7		15 10 –	12 10 –		7 10 –	
Surgeon		16 4 8		30 – –	12 10 –		8 10 –	
Assistant Surgeon		8 11 7		12 10 –	12 10 –		7 10 –	

Agreeable to Regulations of – – – 1857 – – – 1859 – – – 1858 – – – 1858.

Appendix, No. 12.

PAPER delivered in by Rear Admiral *Erskine*, and referred to in his Evidence of 27 May 1861.

Appendix, No. 12.

THE estimate of the cost per head of troops has been arrived at by dividing the "gross total" of the expenditure for each Colony (according to a Return for March 1858) by the number of men in each; the items include:—

1. Pay and allowances, provisions, clothing, arms, &c.
2. Stores.
3. Proportion of recruiting expenses.
4. Barracks and fortifications.
5. Proportion of non-effective services.
6. Proportion of departmental expenses at home.
7. Transport and freight.
8. Colonial expenditure for military purposes in addition.

The cost of seamen is calculated as under, per head, per annum:—

	£.
1. Wages	35
2. Provisions, including freight	21
3. Wear and tear of ship and engines	20
This amounts to about 10 per cent. per annum on the ship's value, the dockyards calculating them at 8 or 9 per cent.	
4. Stores, including masts, &c.	6
5. Ordnance	2
6. Coals	5
7. Departmental expenses at home and abroad	1
8. Proportion of non-effective service	12
9. Miscellaneous	4
	£. 106

1 June 1861.

John Erskine.

Appendix, No. 13.

PAPERS delivered in by *T. F. Elliott*, Esq.

CLASSIFIED STATEMENT of MILITARY EXPENDITURE in the COLONIES, 1858.

NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES.

	Canada.	Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.	Newfoundland.	Total North American Provinces.	
Total Strength	3,118	2,196	209	5,523	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	93,144	56,571	7,213	156,928	
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	35,922	18,039	2,102	56,063	
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	29,060	14,677	3,003	46,740	
Stores	4,935	10,754	1,260	16,949	
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	163,061	100,041	13,578	276,680	276,680
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:					
Recruiting	2760	1,944	184	4,888	
Pensions, &c.	32,193	22,681	2,157	57,031	
Civil and Military Departments at Home	2,650	1,867	178	4,695	
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	37,603	26,492	2,519	66,614	66,614
Transport — Within the Colonies	5,833	3,773	257	9,863	
Transport — To and from the Colonies	19,281	4,336	298	23,915	33,778
Barracks	5,980	10,661	810	17,451	17,451
Fortifications	2,427	2,111	108	4,646	4,646
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	233,565	147,414	18,190	399,169	399,169
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	35,176	92	Nil	35,268	35,268
TOTAL £.	268,741	147,506	18,190	434,437	434,437

AUSTRALIA.

	New South Wales.	Victoria.	South Australia.	Tasmania.	Western Australia.	Total Australia.	
Total Strength	379	841	119	279	183	1,801	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	
Pay and Allowances	8,434	21,746	3,111	11,751	5,614	50,656	
Military, Civil, and Medical Staff	1,852	3,025	735	9,416	7,317	23,239	
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	4,531	10,299	2,751	9,753	8,596	35,930	
Stores	506	- - -	- - -	232	120	858	
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	15,323	35,970	6,597	31,146	21,647	110,683	110,683
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following heads:—							
Recruiting	336	760	104	240	152	1,592	
Pensions, &c.	3,913	8,683	1,229	2,881	1,889	18,595	
Civil and Military Departments at Home	322	715	101	237	156	1,531	
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	4,571	10,158	1,434	3,358	2,197	21,718	21,718
Transport — Within the Colonies	227	177	- - -	356	61	821	
Transport — To and from the Colonies	1,911	3,619	23	1,068	392	7,013	8,434
Barracks	Nil	Nil	Nil	2,114	264	2,378	2,378
Fortifications	Nil	Nil	Nil	139	Nil	139	139
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	22,032	49,924	8,054	38,781	24,561	143,352	143,352
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	29,887	40,400	5,172	Nil	Nil	75,459	75,459
TOTAL £.	51,919	90,324	13,226	38,781	24,561	218,811	218,811

NEW ZEALAND.

Total Strength	1,397	
Pay and Allowances	£. 39,522	£.
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	10,195	
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	34,989	
Stores	161	
TOTAL Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony		84,867
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army, under the following Heads:		
Recruiting	£. 1,248	
Pensions, &c.	14,424	
Civil and Military Departments at Home	1,187	
TOTAL of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army		16,859
Transport { Within the Colonies	£. 1,219	
Transport { To and from the Colonies	8,281	
		9,500
Barracks	93	93
Fortifications	20	20
TOTAL	£.	111,339

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

Total Strength	6,351	
Pay and Allowances	£. 201,112	£.
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	49,983	
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	126,448	
Stores	4,698	
TOTAL Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony		382,241
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army, under the following Heads:		
Recruiting	£. 4,704	
Pensions, &c.	55,773	
Civil and Military Departments at Home	4,503	
TOTAL of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army		64,980
Transport { Within the Colonies	£. 21,527	
Transport { To and from the Colonies	61,003	
		82,530*
Barracks	8,412	8,412
Fortifications	209	209
TOTAL (Imperial Funds)	£.	538,372
TOTAL (Colonial Funds)	£.	40,467
TOTAL	£.	578,839

* *N.B.*—This is exclusive of 887 officers and men, and 83 of their families, conveyed to the Cape in the Himalaya; the cost at 12 *l.* a head, would be about 11,640 *l.*

ISLANDS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH ATLANTIC.

	Bermuda.	Bahamas.	St. Helena.	Falklands.	Total Islands in the North and South Atlantic.
Total Strength	1,201	449	522	37	2,209
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	33,753	12,863	16,116	1,163	63,895
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	9,607	3,584	3,099	-	16,890
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	18,234	8,017	6,378	102	32,731
Stores	1,197	1,111	651	-	2,959
Total direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	62,791	25,575	26,844	1,265	116,475
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:					
Recruiting	1,064	392	464	32	1,952
Pensions, &c.	12,400	4,635	5,390	381	22,806
Civil and Military Departments at Home	1,021	382	444	31	1,878
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	14,485	5,409	6,298	444	26,636
Transport — Within the Colonies	549	117	499	-	1,165
Transport — To and from the Colonies	1,402	1,450	1,163	-	4,915
Barracks	1,217	1,575	1,310	-	4,102
Fortifications	106	67	137	-	310
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	80,550	34,193	36,251	1,709	152,703
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	Nil	96	453	Nil	549
TOTAL £.	80,550	34,289	36,704	1,709	153,252

WEST INDIES.

	Jamaica.	Honduras.	Windward and Leeward Islands.	Total West Indies.
Total Strength	1,568	413	2,591	4,572
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	48,179	12,456	70,212	139,847
Military, Civil, and Medical Staff	13,512	2,720	24,364	40,596
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	21,073	6,522	42,047	69,642
Stores	3,571	540	5,646	9,757
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	86,335	22,238	151,269	259,842
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:—				
Recruiting	1,392	360	2,304	4,056
Pensions, &c.	16,189	4,264	26,752	47,205
Civil and Military Departments at Home	1,333	351	2,202	3,886
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	18,914	4,975	31,258	55,147
Transport — Within the Colonies	2,274	1,269	1,435	4,978
Transport — To and from the Colonies	4,417	861	7,203	12,481
Barracks	5,562	857	10,746	17,165
Fortifications	-	31	24	55
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	117,502	30,231	201,935	349,668
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	182	Nil	32,481	32,663
TOTAL £.	117,684	30,231	234,416	382,331

EASTERN COLONIES.

	Ceylon.	Mauritius.	Hong Kong.	Labuan.	Total Eastern Colonies (exclusive of Hong Kong).
Total Strength	2,470	959	- - -	140 (Sepoys)	3,569*
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	67,650	28,499	—	—	—
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	7,747	7,641	—	—	—
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	10,365	4,374	—	—	—
Stores	1,425	3,336	—	—	—
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	87,187	43,850	- - -	6,897	137,934
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:					
Recruiting	2,232	848	- - -	- - -	3,080
Pensions, &c.	25,503	9,902	- - -	- - -	35,405
Civil and Military Departments at Home	2,100	815	- - -	- - -	2,915
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	29,835	11,565	- - -	- - -	41,400
Transport — Within the Colonies	19	2,632	- - -	- - -	2,651
Transport — To and from the Colonies	11,730	11,440	- - -	- - -	23,170
Barracks	736	6,422	- - -	- - -	7,158
Fortifications	- - -	9,211	- - -	- - -	9,211
Total (Imperial Funds) £.	129,507	85,120	- - -	6,897	221,524
Total (Colonial Funds) £.	85,851	22,634	- Nil -	- Nil -	108,485
TOTAL £.	215,358	107,754	- - -	6,897	330,009

* Including 140 Sepoys paid from Imperial Funds.

WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA.

	Sierra Leone.	Gambia.	Gold Coast.	Total Western Coast of Africa.
Total Strength	372	360	298	1,030
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	11,215	10,595	6,444	28,254
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	4,693	4,325	2,194	11,212
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	4,482	3,792	2,335	10,609
Stores	- - -	1,513	923	2,436
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	20,390	20,225	11,896	52,511
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:				
Recruiting	320	312	264	896
Pensions, &c.	3,841	3,717	3,078	10,636
Civil and Military Departments at Home	316	306	253	875
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	4,477	4,335	3,595	12,407
Transport — Within the Colonies	83	216	262	561
Transport — To and from the Colonies	657	667	544	1,868
Barracks	1,078	1,803	452	3,333
Fortifications	- - -	- - -	14	14
Total (Imperial Funds) £.	26,685	27,246	16,763	70,694
Total (Colonial Funds) £.	385	161	330	876
TOTAL £.	27,070	27,407	17,093	71,570

MEDITERRANEAN.

		Gibraltar.	Malta.	Ionian Islands.	Total Mediterranean.
Total Strength		4,952	5,275	3,159	13,386
		£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances		139,232	137,419	99,470	376,121
Military, Civil and Medical Staff		23,218	26,791	16,544	66,553
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.		52,434	52,843	22,712	127,989
Stores		19,195	22,445	8,283	49,923
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony	£.	234,079	239,498	147,009	620,586
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:					
Recruiting		4,488	4,776	2,832	12,096
Pensions, &c.		51,129	54,464	32,616	138,209
Civil and Military Departments at Home		4,209	4,484	2,686	11,379
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army	£.	59,826	63,724	38,134	161,684
Transport — Within the Colonies		3,523	3,688	2,236	9,447
Transport — To and from the Colonies		13,752	12,708	4,193	30,653
Barracks		5,862	6,445	5,368	17,675
Fortifications		4,972	15,457	4,969	25,398
TOTAL (Imperial Funds)	£.	322,014	341,526	201,909	865,443
TOTAL (Colonial Funds)	£.	Nil	6,200	25,000	31,200
TOTAL	£.	322,014	347,720	226,909	896,643

SUMMARY.

	Total Force.	Imperial Military Expenditure.	Colonial Military Expenditure.	TOTAL.
		£.	£.	£.
North America	5,523	399,169	35,268	434,437
Australia	1,801	143,352	75,459	218,811
New Zealand	1,397	111,339	Nil	111,339
Cape of Good Hope	6,351	538,372	40,467	578,839
Islands in North and South Atlantic	2,209	152,703	549	153,252
West Indies	4,572	349,668	32,663	382,331
Eastern Colonies (exclusive of Hong Kong)	3,569	221,524	108,485	330,009
West Coast of Africa	1,030	70,694	876	71,570
Mediterranean	13,386	865,443	31,206	896,643
TOTAL	39,838	2,852,264	324,967	3,177,231

N.B.—Of the total of Imperial Expenditure, 467,445 *l.* consists of the items distinguished in this Return by the name of "Indirect Charges." The amount of remaining Imperial Charges is 2,384,819 *l.*, making up the total Imperial Expenditure of 2,852,264 *l.*

Appendix, No. 14.

Appendix, No. 14.

STATEMENT showing the Number and Description of LOCAL FORCES in the COLONIES; and also the TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE from COLONIAL FUNDS, for the Year 1858.

	Description of Force.	Numbers.	Expenditure on British Troops.	Expenditure on Local Forces.	Forts and Barracks.	TOTAL.
North America:			£.	£.	£.	£.
Canada	Militia	* 5,584	nil	35,176	nil	35,176
Nova Scotia	ditto	Not embodied.	nil	92	nil	92
New Brunswick	ditto	ditto	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Newfoundland	ditto	ditto	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Australia:						
New South Wales		nil	23,493	nil	6,394	29,887
Victoria	Volunteers	375	35,323	3,727	1,350	40,400
Tasmania		nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
South Australia		nil	2,760	137	2,275	5,172
New Zealand		nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Cape of Good Hope	Mounted and armed Police.	433	nil	40,467	nil	40,467
Natal	Volunteers	156	nil	nil	nil	nil.
TOTALS		6,548	61,576	79,599	10,019	151,194

* These are the numbers in Canada that were embodied in this year; in the other provinces none are known to have been embodied; but in Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward's Island, every male below the age of 60 (with a few exceptions) is enrolled as a militiaman, although without being embodied or trained.

App. No.

STATEMENT showing the Number and Description of LOCAL FORCES in the COLONIES; and also the TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE from COLONIAL FUNDS, for the Year 1858.

	Description of Force.	Numbers.	Expenditure on British Troops.	Expenditure on Local Forces.	Forts and Barracks.	TOTAL.
			£.	£.	£.	£.
Bermuda	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Bahamas	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
St. Helena	Militia	322	nil	453	nil	453
Falklands	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
WEST INDIES:						
Jamaica	nil	nil	nil	*182	nil	*182
Turks Island	Militia and Volunteers.	240	nil	11	85	96
Honduras	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Windward and Leeward Islands.	Militia and Volunteers.	-	nil	409	2,812	3,221
British Guiana	Militia and Volunteers.	530	808	2,221	26,231	29,260
EASTERN COLONIES:						
Ceylon	nil	nil	75,032	nil	10,819	85,851
Mauritius	nil	nil	12,634	nil	10,000	22,634
Labuan	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
WEST COAST OF AFRICA:						
Sierra Leone	Militia	nil	nil	385	nil	385
Gambia	ditto	380	nil	161	nil	161
Gold Coast	ditto	17	nil	330	nil	330
West Australia	Volunteers	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
	TOTALS	1,489	88,474	4,152	49,947	142,573

* For custody of arms and stores.

Appendix, No. 15.

PAPER delivered in by *Thomas Frederick Elliot*, Esq.

ESTIMATES of the EXPENSE of a LOCAL REGIMENT in *New South Wales*, referred to in a Minute by Sir *William Denison*, without date, printed at page 7 of a recent Parliamentary Paper, No. 171, of 17 April 1861.

ESTIMATE for the PAY, &c. of the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, and Privates, for a Regiment consisting of Eight Companies, for One Year.

Numbers.	RANKS, &c.	Rate per Diem. Imperial.	Rate per Diem. Colonial.	Daily Rate. Imperial.	Daily Rate. Colonial.	Annual Rate. Imperial.	Annual Rate. Colonial.	Forage.	Command Money.	Non-Effective Allowance.	Contingent to Companies.	Clothing.	Deduct Rations.	Deduct Income Duty.	Difference in Cost of Rations to Public, above that Paid by each Individual.	Lodging Allowance.
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
1	Lieutenant Colonel	– 17 –	– 11 3	– 17 –	– 11 3	310 5 –	205 6 3	127 15 –	54 15 –	20 – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	6 17 7	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Major	– 16 –	– 7 –	– 16 –	– 7 –	292 – –	127 15 –	63 17 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	6 1 8	6 16 10½	– – –
8	Captains	– 11 7	– 5 8	4 12 8	2 5 4	1,691 3 4	827 6 8	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	18 5 –	35 4 7	54 15 –	– – –
8	Lieutenants	– 6 6	– 5 –	2 12 –	2 – –	949 – –	730 – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	18 5 –	29 15 5	54 15 –	– – –
8	Ensigns	– 5 3	– 5 –	2 2 –	2 – –	766 10 –	730 – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	18 5 –	15 19 4	54 15 –	– – –
	Allowance to Officer Instructor	– 2 6	– –	– 2 6	– –	45 12 6	– – –	63 17 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	– – –	– 19 –	—	– – –
1	Paymaster	– 12 6	– 5 8	– 12 6	– 5 8	228 2 6	103 8 4	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 5 7½	4 15 –	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Adjutant	– 10 –	– 5 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	182 10 –	91 5 –	63 17 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 5 7½	3 16 –	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Quartermaster	– 6 6	– 5 –	– 6 6	– 5 –	118 12 6	91 5 –	63 17 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 5 7½	2 9 5	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Surgeon	1 2 –	– 8 –	1 2 –	– 8 –	401 10 –	146 – –	63 17 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 5 7½	8 7 3	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Assistant Surgeon	– 10 –	– 7 –	– 10 –	– 7 –	182 10 –	127 15 –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 5 7½	3 16 –	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Sergeant Major	– 3 2	– 2 6	– 3 2	– 2 6	57 15 10	45 12 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
1	Quartermaster Sergeant	– 2 8	– 2 6	– 2 8	– 2 6	48 13 4	45 12 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
1	Schoolmaster	– 4 –	– 2 6	– 4 –	– 2 6	73 – –	45 12 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
1	Paymaster Sergeant	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	45 12 6	45 12 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
1	Orderly-room Clerk	– 2 6	– 1 –	– 2 6	– 1 –	45 12 6	18 5 –	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
1	Hospital Sergeant	– 2 8	– 1 –	– 2 8	– 1 –	48 13 4	18 5 –	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
1	Armourer Sergeant	– 2 –	– 1 –	– 2 –	– 1 –	36 10 –	18 5 –	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
1	Sergeant Instructor	– 2 2	– 2 6	– 2 2	– 2 6	39 10 10	45 12 6	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
1	Drum Major	– 2 –	– 1 –	– 2 –	– 1 –	36 10 –	18 5 –	– –	– –	– –	– –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– –	3 16 –½	– – –
8	Colour Sergeants	– 2 6	– 1 –	1 – –	– 8 –	365 – –	146 – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	21 12 –	42 11 8	– –	30 8 4	– – –
24	Sergeants	– 2 –	– 1 –	2 8 –	1 4 –	876 – –	438 – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	64 16 –	127 15 –	– –	92 5 –	– – –
32	Corporals	– 1 4	– 1 –	2 2 8	1 12 –	778 13 4	584 – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	60 6 –	170 6 8	– –	121 13 4	– – –
16	Drummers	– 1 1	– – 6	– 17 4	– 8 –	316 6 8	146 – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	38 8 –	85 3 4	– –	60 16 8	– – –
608	Privates	– 1 –	– – 6	30 8 –	15 4 –	11,096 – –	5,548 – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	1,155 4 –	3,236 6 8	– –	2,311 13 4	– – –
	Good Conduct Pay	– –	– –	– –	– –	392 – –	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Rewards for good Shooting	– –	– –	– –	– –	126 4 7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Provost Sergeant	– 1 –	– –	– 1 –	– –	18 5 –	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Allowance to Schoolmistress	– –	– –	– –	– –	18 – –	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Allowance to Assistant ditto	– –	– –	– –	– –	4 – –	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Officiating Clergyman	– –	– –	– –	– –	91 – –	– – –	– –	– –	—	—	– – –	– – –	1 17 11	—	—
	Allowance for apprehension of Deserters	– –	– –	– –	– –	10 – –	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Excess of Provost Expenditure	– –	– –	– –	– –	1 0 – –	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Allowance for Stationery, Orderly-room	– –	– –	– –	– –	32 – –	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Ditto – – – ditto – Paymaster	– –	– –	– –	– –	16 – –	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Contingent Allowance to 8 Companies	– –	– –	– –	– –	– – –	– – –	– –	– –	– –	292 – –	—	—	—	—	—
73	Women, ½															—
50	Children, ½ } 95 Daily Rations	– –	– –	– –	– –	– – –	– – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– – –	– – –	– –	866 17 6	—
150	Children, ¼															
	Lodging Allowance	– –	– –	– –	– –	– – –	– – –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– – –	– – –	– –	– – –	1,400 – –
	TOTAL £.	– –	– –	52 3 10	28 6 9	19,899 3 9	10,363 3 9	447 2 6	54 15 –	20 – –	292 – –	1,356 12 –	3,780 15 10	119 19 2	3,730 1 8	1,400 – –

RECAPITULATION.

	Pay and Allowances.	
	Imperial.	Colonial.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Annual pay, &c. - - - - - -	19,899 3 9	10,343 3 9
Forage allowances - - - - - -	447 2 6	
Command money - - - - - -	54 15 –	
Non-effective allowance - - - - -	20 – –	
Contingent to companies - - - - -	292 – –	
Clothing - - - - - - - - -	1,356 12 –	
Rations - - - - - - - - -	3,780 15 10	
Rations in excess paid for - - - - -	3,730 1 8	
Lodging allowance - - - - - -	1,400 – –	
Total - - - £.	30,980 10 9	10,343 3 9
Deduct rations paid for by officers and men -	3,780 15 10	
	27,199 14 11	10,343 3 9
£.	- - 37,542 18 8	
Fuel - - - - - - £. 1,003 18 –	- - 1,268 16 8	
Light - - - - - - 264 18 8		
Total - - - £.	38,811 15 4	

Number.	RANK, &c.	PEACE. Rate, per Day.	WAR. Rate, per Day.	PEACE. Amount, per Annum.	WAR. Amount, per Annum.	Clothing.	Rations.	Forage Allowance.	Fuel and Light.
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
1	Lieutenant Colonel -	1 10 –	1 10 –	547 10 –	547 10 –	- - -	720 Rations, exclusive of women and children, at 1 s. per diem, £. 13,140.	127 15 –	—
1	Major - - -	1 – –	1 – –	365 – –	365 – –	- - -		63 17 6	—
8	Captains - - -	– 15 –	– 15 –	2,190 – –	2,190 – –	—		—	—
8	Lieutenants - -	– 10 –	– 10 –	1,460 – –	1,460 – –	—		—	—
8	Ensigns - - -	– 7 6	– 7 6	1,095 – –	1,095 – –	—		—	—
	Allowance to Adjutant - - -	– 5 –	– 5 –	91 5 –	91 5 –	- - -		63 17 6	—
1	Paymaster - -	– 15 –	– 15 –	273 15 –	273 15 –	—		—	—
1	Quartermaster - -	– 10 –	– 10 –	182 10 –	182 10 –	- - -		63 17 6	—
1	Surgeon - - -	– 15 –	– 15 –	273 15 –	273 15 –	- - -		63 17 6	—
1	Sergeant Major - -	– 5 –	– 6 6	91 5 –	118 12 6	3 – –		—	—
1	Quartermaster Sergeant - - -	– 3 6	– 5 –	63 17 6	91 5 –	3 – –		—	—
8	Colour Sergeants -	– 3 6	– 5 –	511 – –	730 – –	24 – –		—	—
24	Sergeants - - -	– 3 –	– 4 6	1,314 – –	1,971 – –	72 – –		—	—
32	Corporals - - -	– 2 6	– 3 6	1,470 – –	2,044 – –	88 – –		—	—
16	Drummers - -	– 1 6	– 3 –	438 – –	976 – –	44 – –		—	—
608	Privates - - -	– 1 –	– 3 –	11,096 – –	22,192 – –	1,520 – –		—	—
	Good conduct pay, and prizes and allowances, stationery, and contingencies -	- -	- -	500 – –	500 – –	—	—	—	—
	Pensions, &c. - -	- -	- -	- - -	500 – –	—	—	—	—
	Barracks, or lodging allowances for officers - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	For men - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	TOTAL - - £.	- -	- -	21,462 17 6	35,601 12 6	1,764 – –	12,140 – –	383 5 –	1,268 16 8

PEACE.	£. s. d.	WAR. £. s. d.
Annual pay -	21,462 17 6	35,601 12 6
Clothing - -	1,754 – –	3,508 – –
Rations - -	- - -	13,140 – –
Forage - -	383 – –	—
Fuel and light -	- - -	1,268 16 8
£.	23,599 17 6	53,518 9 2

To this must be added the interest of money expended in providing barrack accommodation and lodging money for officers. This is included in the estimate for the regiment—at least a sum of 1,400 *l.* is taken for lodging allowance. In the estimate the officers' pay is put at lower rate than they are now receiving; it would, probably, have to be increased to the extent of 2,000 *l.* per annum.

Appendix, No. 16.

PAPER delivered in by *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to the Earl of *Elgin* and *Kincardine*, dated 14th March 1851, containing Instructions on the future Military Arrangements in Canada: and, Copies of further Despatches from the Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, on the same subject, in the Years 1854, 1855, and 1856. Appendix, No. 16.

"CANADA (in common with the other British provinces in North America) now possesses in the most ample and complete manner in which it is possible that she should enjoy it, the advantage of self-government in all that relates to her internal affairs. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that this advantage ought to carry with it corresponding responsibilities, and that the time is now come when the people of Canada must be called upon to take upon themselves a larger share than they have hitherto done, of expenses which are incurred on this account, and for their advantage. Of these expenses by far the heaviest charge which falls upon this country is that incurred for the military protection of the Province. Regarding Canada as a most important and valuable part of the empire, and believing the maintenance of the connexion between the mother country and the Colony to be of the highest advantage to both, it is far from being the view of Her Majesty's Government that the general military power of the empire is not to be used in the protection of this part of Her Majesty's dominions. But, looking to the rapid progress which Canada is now making in wealth and population, and to the prosperity which she at this moment enjoys, it is the conviction of Her Majesty's Government, that it is only due to the people of this country that they should now be relieved from a large proportion of the charge which has hitherto been imposed upon them for the protection of a Colony now well able to do much towards protecting itself.

In adopting this principle, I need hardly observe to you that Her Majesty's Government would merely be reverting to the former colonial policy of this country. You are well aware that up to the period of the war of the American Revolution, the then British Colonies which now form the United States, as well as the West Indian Colonies, were required to take upon themselves the principal share of the burthen of their own protection, and even to contribute to the military operations undertaken to extend the Colonial possessions of the British Crown. The North American Colonies defended themselves almost entirely from the fierce Indian tribes by which these infant communities were frequently imperilled, and furnished no inconsiderable proportion of the force by which the contest of British power with that of France was maintained on the continent of America; and the West Indian Colonies did not, in proportion to their means, make less exertions.

Her Majesty's Government would have thought it right at an earlier period to revert to this former policy of the empire, and to extend to Canada measures of the same description with those which have already been adopted as respects the Australian Colonies, had it not been that till lately there were circumstances connected with the commercial and general condition of Canada which seemed to render the time unfavourable for effecting so important a change. The difficulties under which commerce and industry laboured were of a very aggravated description, and produced their usual consequences of political excitement and discontent; nor ought it to be concealed that much of the prevailing distress was attributable to the changes which had taken place in British legislation. The combined effect of the stimulus given by the Act of 1843 to the investment of capital in preparations for supplying this country with flour from Canada, and of the subsequent general repeal of all restrictions on the importation of corn and flour into the United Kingdom, had undoubtedly been to cause very heavy losses in Canada, and till these had been recovered, it would have been inexpedient to add to the burthens of the Province.

But the season of commercial depression in Canada has now passed away: the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and the opening of the St. Lawrence Canals, which the Province has been enabled to construct by a loan raised on highly favourable terms on the credit of the British Treasury, has given a great impulse to its trade, and the remarkable increase of the Customs revenue which you have lately reported to me, affords a clear and striking proof of the return of prosperity. Under these circumstances, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that no more favourable opportunity could be found for placing the fiscal relations of the mother country and the Colony on a permanent and equitable footing. They are the more induced to adopt this view of the subject, because they are prepared to recommend to Parliament that assistance of the same kind with that which has proved so eminently useful to Canada in the construction of the St. Lawrence Canals, should be extended to her

Appendix, No. 16.

in respect of another public work, calculated to be hardly less beneficial to her than these canals. In another Despatch I will explain to your Lordship the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the means by which it is hoped that the construction of the Quebec and Halifax Railway may be accomplished. I only advert to this subject at present for the purpose of observing that, while the credit of this country is exerted to enable Canada to extend her public works and to develop her resources, I feel confident that the Parliament of Canada will readily co-operate with Her Majesty's Government in adopting measures for diminishing the charge on the British Treasury for the defence of the Province.

Having thus explained to your Lordship the principles of the policy which Her Majesty's Government propose to adopt, I will now proceed to state more particularly the measures by which it is contemplated that this policy should be carried into effect. In the first place, it is intended that, in future, with the exception of a certain number of enrolled pensioners, for whose location in the Province arrangements are in progress, the troops maintained in Canada should be confined to the garrisons of two or three fortified posts of importance, probably only Quebec and Kingston. The terms of amity upon which this country now is with the United States, and the fortunate termination of all the questions in dispute between the two nations, removes, as I trust, all risk of any attack upon Canada from the only power from which there could be any danger; and it appears to Her Majesty's Government, that if the provincial militia is maintained upon a proper footing, so long as peace continues, enough would be done to provide for the security of the Province, by maintaining garrisons of regular troops in the two important posts I have mentioned. In the unfortunate, and, I trust, improbable, contingency of a war with the United States, it is obvious that both the Colony and the mother country would be called upon to submit to great sacrifices, and to make great exertions for their defence, but I have no doubt that these would be cheerfully made by both, if the exigency should unhappily arise.

Upon the reduction of the British force in Canada to the garrisons of these fortified positions, it would become necessary that the warlike stores which are kept in the Colony should be reduced, and that the barracks and other buildings which are no longer required should be disposed of; but if the Parliament of Canada should be willing to undertake to keep up these barracks and buildings, in case of their being hereafter required, there would be no objection on the part of Her Majesty's Government to make them over to the provincial authorities; and if the maintenance of a British force at any of the posts now occupied should be desired for the preservation of internal security, such a force would be readily supplied by Her Majesty's Government, if the actual cost thus incurred were provided for by the Province.

Another charge, which Her Majesty's Government would also expect that the Province should take upon itself as part of the above arrangement, is that of maintaining the canals now in charge of the Ordnance Department. You are aware that these canals were executed at the sole expense of this country, and at a very heavy cost, chiefly with a view to the military defence of the Province. Her Majesty's Government conceive that the charge of maintaining them ought now to be undertaken by the Province, and I trust that no difficulty will arise on that head. With regard to the Indian Department, as by the arrangement lately made, the extinction of the charge (except so far as regards some payments for their lives to individuals) is provided for within five years, no further steps are required to be taken.

In conclusion I have now only to assure you, that while Her Majesty's Government consider that justice to the people of this country requires that Canada, which is now so well able to support whatever establishments are necessary for her own defence and for her own advantage, should cease to occasion so heavy a charge as formerly to the British Treasury, and that it is a fitting opportunity for introducing the change when, in consequence of proceedings which have taken place in the Province, it becomes expedient to call upon Parliament to provide for the salary of the Governor General, it must not for a moment be supposed that these measures are contemplated under any idea that the connexion between the mother country and the Colony could be dissolved without great injury to both, or that there is any probability that it will be so. On the contrary, these measures are regarded as safe, because Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that the great body of the people of Canada are so fully satisfied of the great benefits they enjoy from the system of constitutional Government, now happily established in the Province under the authority of the British Crown, that it may properly be left to themselves to take their share of the burthen of maintaining and defending an order of things from which they reap so much advantage. Under this impression, and in the earnest hope and confident belief that Canada may long continue to form an important member of the British Empire, Her Majesty's Government have adopted the conclusions which I have now explained to you."

Appendix, No. 16.

Copy of DESPATCH from His Grace the Duke of *Newcastle* to Lieutenant General *Rowan*, commanding the Troops.

Sir, Downing-street, April 1854.

IN my Despatch, dated 11th instant, announcing to you the proposed withdrawal of three regiments of infantry and three companies of Royal Artillery from Canada, I promised to communicate with you by the present mail respecting the re-distribution of the troops under your command, rendered necessary by this measure.

I now proceed to instruct you that the single regiment of infantry, which will be increased to 850 rank and file, and the two companies of Royal Artillery, which (exclusive of the Canadian Rifles, will comprise the whole force remaining in Canada after these reductions shall have been carried into effect, will have to be quartered in Quebec.

The Canadian Rifles you will station at Kingston, and two companies of that corps should be detached for service at Montreal.

This distribution of the forces under your command involves the abandonment of the several outposts which have been heretofore maintained within the Province, and you will lose no time in making the necessary preparations for this purpose.

A discretion will, however, rest with you to leave small parties at such of the outposts, Niagara for instance, as you may perhaps think right to maintain until the new arrangement be completed, and detach non-commissioned officers and soldiers in charge of Government buildings and barracks, until these shall be given up to the Colonial Government, or otherwise disposed of.

You are aware that the 16th regiment, at present in Jamaica, is to proceed to Quebec to replace the 26th regiment, which has been ordered to Bermuda.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Newcastle.*

Copy of DESPATCH from the Right Honourable Sir *G. Grey* to Governor Sir *Edmund Head.*

Sir Downing-street, August 1854.

HER Majesty's Government have long had under their consideration the necessity of establishing a clear understanding with the Government of Canada on the subject of the measures mutually to be taken for the military defence of the Province, and the subsidiary arrangements requisite to that end.

2. Although Canada is happily remote from the direct influence of those hostilities in which this country is at present engaged, it becomes now even more necessary than before, that the available military resources of the empire in general, and the purposes to which they are applicable, should be fully ascertained.

3. Relying on the loyalty and patriotism of the inhabitants of Canada, no less than on their rapid advance in all that constitutes the strength of a community, Her Majesty's Government have not scrupled to reduce the military force stationed in the Colony in time of peace much below the amount which in former times had been thought advisable; and the result of the measures thus taken has hitherto fully justified their experience. The course of events of recent years has more and more fully developed the attachment of the Canadian people to the institutions under which they live; the gratifying proofs which have been so lately acknowledged by me, of the deep interest which they take in the success of the arms of Great Britain and her allies in the present contest, have been strongly felt by all classes throughout these kingdoms; and it is with a feeling of deep satisfaction that we are enabled to congratulate ourselves on the union thus cemented between communities so far severed by local position, but joined by the ties of common freedom, and of loyal attachment to one Sovereign.

4. Her Majesty's Government propose to make no change in the principle of the relations now subsisting between this country and the Province as regards its military defence. The Imperial Government will remain charged, as before, with the supply and maintenance of military force, for the defence of Canada, as of every other part of Her Majesty's dominions, in the event of its being menaced by foreign arms. They propose also to continue to maintain the force now existing in Canada, or whatever force may be strictly required for the military occupation of the new posts of first-class importance, so as to form a nucleus for the defence of the Province.

5. For all beyond this, they propose to rely on the loyalty and military spirit of the Province itself. They are fully aware that if the contingency, now happily remote, should ever occur, of an invasion of Canada by foreign arms, the most valuable aid to the reinforcements of troops which could be supplied from this country would be afforded by the courage and numbers of an organized militia, such as her great population might now enable her to supply. And they are equally persuaded that if the tranquillity of the community should be menaced from within, the necessary force for the maintenance of order, both civil and military, if the latter should be required, will be best provided for by the Province herself.

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6. With respect to the lands now held by the British Government for military purposes, much correspondence has at different times taken place between this department and the Colonial Government; and I was in hopes to have received before this time a report from the Province, which Lord Elgin was requested to furnish, classifying these lands in such a manner as might enable Her Majesty's Government to arrive at some positive decision as to their ultimate disposal. Although this report has not yet been received, I have within the last few days been placed in possession of a printed "Report of the Commissioners appointed to investigate and report upon the best means of reorganizing the Militia of Canada," which goes far towards supplying the deficiency. Having consulted the home authorities in more immediate charge of these lands, I believe that the information in the possession of Her Majesty's Government is already nearly sufficient to settle the details of the plan, when an agreement has been established as to its outlines.

7. These Ordnance lands are by no means all of them Crown reserves; but, as I find noticed in the documents before me, many of them have been purchased at considerable cost to the Imperial treasury.

8. It is not, however, the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make any distinction between reserves and purchased lands; they wish to deal with the entire property solely with a view to the permanent interests of the Province.

9. With this view, it appears to them that the Ordnance lands at Quebec, Montreal, and Kingston should be retained, for purposes of defence, in the hands of the Imperial Government. There may, perhaps, be portions of these lands not required for present or future military use, in which case these may be the subject of future arrangement; but of this I cannot, with the information as yet before me, speak with certainty.

10. There is a second class of lands, not situated at these posts, and which will not be permanently occupied by Her Majesty's troops, but which, in the opinion of military judges, will be of importance for the defence of the Province, in case of invasion. On some of them considerable sums have been expended with this view. Lands of this class it is proposed to make over to the Canadian Government for occupation and present use, but with a stipulation that they shall be kept available for military purposes, together with any buildings really requisite for similar purposes, in case they should be required at any future time for the defence of Canada.

11. There, is lastly, a third class, comprising lands which it is not important to retain for military purposes. These it is proposed to make over at once and unconditionally to the Canadian Government.

12. Should your Government think proper to devote the funds which may arise from their sale or other use to internal defences, as proposed in the Report to which I have referred, Her Majesty's Government would regard such an appropriation of these funds with much satisfaction, but they do not wish to impose it as a condition on the transfer.

13. I have already said that Her Majesty's Government are now in possession of materials which may go a long way towards enabling them to effect this classification; but it would be more satisfactory if they had your assistance in such a manner as you may yourself, with the advice of your Executive Council, suggest towards the settlement of the details.

14. Whenever final instructions on this subject are conveyed, pending questions touching the disposal of military stores may also be arranged.

15. It is necessary to add, that any surrender of these lands by Her Majesty's Government must of course be subject to existing engagements respecting them, such as those entered into, in some few instances, with pensioners for their location.

I have, &c.
(signed) *G. Grey.*

Copy of DESPATCH from the Right Honourable *H. Labouchere,* M.P., to Governor Sir *Edmund Head.*

Sir, Downing-street, 2 May 1856.

You are aware that the Treaty of Peace provides for the prompt evacuation by Her Majesty's forces of the foreign territories at present held by them, and that among other arrangements for the distribution of the army on its return from active service, orders have been given that five regiments shall be selected to be stationed in British North America, of which three are allotted to Canada.

2. Such an amount of force is not of a character to afford much room for misconception as to the purpose of Her Majesty's Government; but still I think it better to address to you a few remarks in explanation of that purpose.

3 Earl Grey's Despatch to Lord Elgin of the 14th March 1851 laid down the principles which were then adopted by Her Majesty's Government in regard to their colonial policy, considered in a military point of view; and in reserving to the mother country

country the duty of maintaining garrisons for fortresses of chief importance, such as Quebec, invited the co-operation of the Province for the auxiliary measures of defence. The vigour with which at this moment a militia force is being organized, justifies our continuing to place, as we do place, the fullest reliance on this policy. Appendix, No. 16.

4. It is not of course to be expected that the force of the garrisons alluded to should be at all times of an unvarying strength. It may vary occasionally from military or political reasons. During the war just ended, when the chief military strength of the empire had to be concentrated for the operations in the East, regiments stationed in Canada were withdrawn; and, as my predecessor, Sir George Grey, explained in a Despatch dated 11th August 1854, increased responsibility was thrown upon the Province.

That emergency has now happily passed away; but although the regular soldiers in Canada may be more or fewer at any particular time, the policy of Her Majesty's Government continues the same, and they desire to place their main dependence on the well-proved loyalty and courage of Her Majesty's Canadian subjects to repel any hostile aggression, should the occasion ever unfortunately occur, although in that event Her Majesty's Government would not fail to give to the Province the full support of the whole power of the British Empire.

5. You will take care that no misapprehension on this subject shall exist in Canada which might produce any relaxation of the honourable exertions which the Province is now making to establish a suitable military organization. I have had the greatest satisfaction in submitting to Her Majesty the accounts which you have transmitted to me of the spirit and energy with which all classes of Her Canadian subjects have come forward to carry into effect the provisions of the new Militia Act, and I trust that the result will be that this local force will speedily be placed on a footing of permanent efficiency.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Labouchere.*

Appendix, No. 17.

PAPERS delivered in by *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

Appendix, No. 17. DESPATCHES from the Right Honourable Earl *Grey*, Secretary of State, to the Governor of New South Wales, on future Military Arrangements.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. FitzRoy*.

Sir, Downing-street, 24 November 1846.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in consequence of the information recently received from New Zealand, Her Majesty's servants have determined that an increase of the military force now in the Colony should be effected with the least possible delay. With that view, I have to instruct you to make immediate arrangements, in concert with the officer commanding the troops in New South Wales, for sending the whole of the disposable force now serving there to Wellington, with the utmost practicable despatch. It will, I calculate, be in your power, without danger, to send at least 900 men for this service, still retaining a small force at Sydney, which, under the present circumstances of New South Wales, is all that I consider indispensable. New South Wales may be regarded as being perfectly safe, for the present at least, from any attack from a foreign enemy; there are no native tribes capable of engaging in serious hostilities with the colonists; and the convict establishment is now reduced so low, while so great an increase has taken place in the numbers of the free population, that there is no longer the necessity which some years ago existed for maintaining a considerable military force to guard against the risk of an attempt to rise on the part of the convicts. Under these circumstances there is no part of Her Majesty's dominions in which there is less occasion for a large body of troops. Accordingly, I find that, with the exception of those at Sydney, the troops now serving in New South Wales are broken up into small detachments, and obviously performing duties more analogous to those of a police corps than of a part of Her Majesty's regular army. But these are duties which the heavy demands upon the services of the British army do not admit that it should be called upon any longer to undertake. Her Majesty's confidential servants will consider it their duty to take care that the naval and military forces shall afford efficient protection from the attacks of any foreign enemy to so important a part of Her dominions as New South Wales; but for the maintenance of internal order and tranquillity it is only reasonable that the colonists should themselves be called upon to provide, by the formation of an adequate force of police; or, if necessary, of militia. You will bring this subject under the immediate consideration of the Legislative Council; and under no circumstances will you consider yourself authorized to delay sending to New Zealand the force I have already named.

I do not propose that for the present there should be any alteration in the amount of force in Van Diemen's Land, including Norfolk Island, or in Southern or Western Australia; nor is the arrangement for sending the 96th regiment to India to be disturbed.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey*.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. FitzRoy*.

Sir, Downing-street, 19 October 1847.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, No. 100, of the 30th April last, with its enclosures, reporting the steps proposed to be taken by the Lieutenant General commanding Her Majesty's troops in the Australian settlements, in obedience to my instructions to yourself of the 24th November last, for increasing the force in New Zealand, and by the reduction of that in New South Wales, and also pointing out the difficulty which exists in organizing an efficient police corps for the last-named Colony.

Although the force which you propose to retain in New South Wales is somewhat larger in amount than I have directed you to keep there, it is not my intention to withhold my approval from this arrangement as one of a temporary nature. Viewed in this light, I see no sufficient reason for objecting to the arrangement, because the force which it provided for New Zealand will be raised nearly to the amount that was intended, while the restoration of tranquillity in that Colony has greatly diminished the want of troops which seemed to exist there when I addressed to you my despatch above referred to. At the time the arrangements which you now report were adopted, there was a further reason for departing in some degree from those which had been directed, in consequence of the

the demands which still continued on the services of the troops in New South Wales to keep the convicts in subjection. This demand will, however, now cease, as orders have been given for breaking up the convict establishment in that Colony. Hence, and taking also into consideration the fact that this Colony is peculiarly exempt from the danger of being attacked by a foreign enemy, I am of opinion that the amount to which I last year directed that the garrison of New South Wales should be reduced will ultimately be amply sufficient; and I cannot, accordingly, hold out to you the expectation that so considerable a force as that to which you refer will long continue to be kept there, merely for the purpose of supporting the police in the maintenance of order, this being a service for which the Colony must provide. You will do well, therefore, to bring under the consideration of the Legislative Council of your Government the propriety of taking early measures to increase the police, so as to be prepared for the further reduction in the number of regular troops maintained in the Colony, which will probably be effected at a very early period. In taking any measures for this purpose, you will suggest to the Legislative Council that it deserves to be considered whether the difficulty which is described to exist in obtaining the services of an adequate number of effective policemen might not be met by causing men to be engaged for this purpose in England. I have no doubt that men well fitted for the duty might easily be engaged here under a stipulation to serve for seven or ten years, for reasonable wages; and in order to secure their performance of the agreement, some bonus should be held out to them on the completion of their term of service, while, on the other hand, in the event of their either leaving the service voluntarily or being dismissed for misconduct before the expiration of the stipulated period, they should be made subject to a penalty equal to the probable cost of their conveyance to the Colony, for the recovery of which stringent and summary powers should be given to the Governor by the Act authorizing the measure.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey.*

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. FitzRoy.*

Sir, Downing-street, 4 March 1848.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, No. 166, of the 20th August last, with the copy therein enclosed of a report from the Commanding Royal Engineer in New South Wales, relating to the defences of Port Jackson.

I cannot coincide in the opinion which you inform me exists in New South Wales, that the circumstance that Halifax and Quebec have been fortified at the cost of this country, affords a precedent for an application being made to Parliament for a vote for the protection of Sydney. The situation of those places, by which they are so much more exposed to attack than any of the Australian cities, affords a sufficient reason for the expense incurred for their defence. You will inform the Legislative Council that, while the right of the Australian Colonies to look for their fair share of that protection which it is the object of Her Majesty's naval and military forces to extend to all parts of the British Empire is fully recognised by Her Majesty's servants, they are of opinion that these Colonies have now made so much progress in wealth and population, that their inhabitants may reasonably be expected to bear also a part of the heavy charges which, with a view to that protection, are imposed upon their fellow-subjects residing in the United Kingdom; and that the smallest contribution towards these charges which ought now to be required from the colonists is that of providing any additional means of local defence which may be required. I can, therefore, hold out no expectation whatever to the Legislative Council of New South Wales, that Her Majesty's Government will be able to render any assistance towards the erection of the works which have been suggested at Sydney, unless they think proper to vote the requisite funds for their construction, and, on that condition, Her Majesty's Government will be happy to direct the Board of Ordnance to appoint officers to plan and execute the works.

With regard to the want of an artillery force in New South Wales, adverted to by the Commanding Royal Engineer, I have to observe that as a force of this description would only be required in the very improbable event of an attempted invasion, this danger might be met at a very moderate expense by forming in Sydney a volunteer artillery corps. If some of the principal gentlemen would exert themselves in forming such a corps, I should approve of your granting them commissions. It has been found in this country that without interfering materially with their ordinary avocations, the workmen employed in our dockyards can, by devoting to this object a few hours in the week, be trained so as to form a very effective force, both of artillery and of infantry. Similar corps might be formed at Sydney and Melbourne, composed of the labouring population of these towns, and officered by the inhabitants of higher station. The only expense for which the Legislative Council would be called upon to provide would be that of uniforms for the men, and pay during the hours of training. I send you herewith, in order to assist you in the consideration of the question whether a measure of the nature above adverted to might not be adopted with advantage, a copy of the regulations respecting the dockyard battalions.

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I cannot conclude this Despatch without expressing my confidence that the inhabitants of New South Wales have too much of the spirit which has always distinguished the British nation, to be slow in coming forward to answer this invitation to organize themselves for their own defence.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey.*

Extract of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Sir *C. A. FitzRoy*; dated Downing-street, 1 June 1848.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, No. 247, of the 18th December, with the copies therein enclosed, of a report, with its annexures, of a Select Committee of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, relative to the question as to the expediency of making some addition to the police force, in consequence of the reduction in the numbers of the troops stationed in that Colony.

My Despatch, No. 11, Military, of the 4th March last, will have apprised you of the views which Her Majesty's Government entertain on the subject of the military defence of the Colony under your government. I cannot, however, assent to the remarks which have been made by the committee, that Her Majesty's Government have afforded protection to New Zealand by depriving New South Wales of the amount of protection to which it is fairly entitled. The force which was withdrawn from New South Wales was sent to New Zealand only to meet a pressing emergency, and Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate the permanent maintenance of a large regular force in the latter any more than in the former colony.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. FitzRoy.*

Sir, Downing-street, 21 November 1849.

IN my Despatch of the 24th of November 1846, No. 2, Military, I instructed you to make immediate arrangements in concert with the officer commanding the troops in New South Wales, for sending the whole of the disposable force now serving there to Wellington, with the utmost practicable despatch. I calculated that it would be in your power, without danger, to send at least 900 men for this service, still retaining a small force at Sydney, which, under the circumstances of New South Wales at that time, was all that I considered indispensable. I was of opinion that New South Wales might be regarded as being perfectly safe from any attack from a foreign enemy, there being no native tribes capable of engaging in serious hostilities with the colonists, and the convict establishment having been reduced so low, while so great an increase has taken place in the numbers of the free population, that there was no longer the necessity which some years ago existed for maintaining a considerable military force to guard against the risk of an attempt to rise on the part of the convicts; and that, under these circumstances, there was no part of Her Majesty's dominions in which there was less occasion for a large body of troops. I found that, with the exception of those at Sydney, the troops serving in New South Wales were broken up into small detachments, and were obviously performing duties more analogous to those of a police corps than of a part of Her Majesty's regular army. I considered that these were duties which the heavy demands upon the services of the British army did not admit that it should be called upon any longer to undertake. I informed you that Her Majesty's confidential servants would consider it their duty to take care that Her naval and military forces should afford efficient protection from the attack of any foreign enemy to so important a part of Her dominions as New South Wales, but that for the maintenance of internal order and tranquillity, it was only reasonable that the colonists should themselves be called upon to provide, by the formation of an adequate force of police, or, if necessary, of militia. I instructed you to bring this subject under the immediate consideration of the Legislative Council, and under no circumstances to consider yourself authorised to delay sending to New Zealand the force I had named.

In my Despatch of the 4th March 1848, No. 11, Military, I instructed you to inform the Legislative Council of New South Wales, that while the right of the Australian Colonies to look for their fair share of that protection which it is the object of Her Majesty's naval and military forces to extend to all parts of the British empire was fully recognised by Her Majesty's servants, they were of opinion that these Colonies have made so much progress in wealth and population, that their inhabitants might reasonably be expected to bear also a part of the heavy charges which, with a view to that protection, are imposed upon their fellow-subjects residing in the United Kingdom, and that the smallest contribution towards these charges, which ought now to be required from the colonists, was that of providing any additional means of local defence which might be required; and I suggested to you the propriety of inviting the principal gentlemen of the Colony to exert themselves in forming a volunteer artillery force.

In

In my Despatch of the 1st of June following, No. 16, Military, after noticing the Report of the Committee of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, on the question how far it might be expedient to make some addition to the police, in consequence of the withdrawal of a portion of the troops, I explained that the force so withdrawn was sent to New Zealand to meet a pressing emergency; and I stated that Her Majesty's Government did not contemplate the permanent maintenance of a large regular force in that Colony, any more than in New South Wales. Appendix, No. 17.

These communications will have fully prepared you for the reduction which Her Majesty's Government find it absolutely necessary to make of the military expenditure of the Australian Colonies, and I have accordingly to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government propose to transfer to the Colony of New South Wales the barracks and all military buildings and lands not immediately required for the preservation of stores, and that the charge of providing, maintaining, and repairing quarters for Her Majesty's troops in New South Wales, must in future be undertaken by the Colony, and that the force to be retained there, will be reduced to a guard in the capital of the Colony, and in the town of Melbourne, which will be the capital of the proposed province of Victoria. If a greater amount of force is required, the Local Legislature must either make provision for raising a more considerable body of police than is now maintained, or some other description of local force, or else provide for the pay and allowances of an additional number of Her Majesty's regular army, in which case there would no objection to allow additional regiments to serve there.

In adopting the policy which I am thus called upon to prescribe to you for your future guidance, Her Majesty's Government are swayed by the consideration that New South Wales already possesses representative institutions, and these will, it cannot be doubted, very speedily be extended to the other Australian Colonies, and that all the restrictions heretofore imposed on colonial trade by Imperial legislation have now been removed.

It is my duty to apprise you, that if the Colonial Legislature should not think proper to make adequate provision for the maintenance of the necessary barracks in a manner in which the health and comfort of the troops will be as well secured as at present, it will be incumbent on Her Majesty's Government to remove them altogether.

I have only further to acquaint you, that in giving to the Colony the barracks and other buildings which are to be transferred to it under the present instructions, it must be distinctly understood that Her Majesty's Government reserve to themselves the right of resuming possession, if at any future time it should in their judgment become necessary to do so; some nominal rent must therefore be reserved as a recognition of the title of the Crown to the property.

You will take an early opportunity of reporting to me the arrangements which you shall make in pursuance of the present instruction.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey.*

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. Fitz Roy.*

Sir, Downing-street, 21 June 1850.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, Military, No. 227, of the 7th of November last, with the Minute therein enclosed, of the deliberations of the Executive Council of New South Wales, on the defenceless state of Port Jackson.

Having attentively considered that Minute, I am compelled to state, that so far from finding any reason for altering my previous view of the subject, I conceive that the facts which are set out in it are calculated to confirm that view. I have no doubt that prudence does prescribe the erection of works sufficient to protect the city of Sydney from a predatory attack: but the great value of the property it contains, and the wealth and prosperity evinced by the very large sums of money stated to be in the banks, afford proof no less of the ability of the Colony to meet the expense of providing such protection, than of the necessity of doing so.

On this subject I have to remind you, that many of the great commercial cities of this country are even now not less open than Sydney to predatory attacks, while some even of our arsenals and important military stations are as yet but very imperfectly protected; and it is altogether unreasonable to suppose that Parliament could be asked to vote money from the revenue of the United Kingdom for the defence of Sydney, while there is still a want of similar works at home, more especially as it must be borne in mind how much more lightly the inhabitants of New South Wales are taxed than those of Her Majesty's subjects who remain in this country.

Her Majesty's servants are prepared to take measures for affording to the inhabitants of the Colonies their fair share of protection as a portion of the British empire. Any attack made upon New South Wales, or any injury to any inhabitant of the Colony, would be resented in the same manner as an attack upon any other part of Her Majesty's dominions, or an injury to any other of Her Majesty's subjects. But while we admit this as the rule

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to be observed, we consider that Her Majesty's subjects inhabiting the Colonies must take their fair share with their fellow-subjects at home in bearing the common burthen of providing for the safety of the empire as a whole, and that the smallest contribution which they can be expected to make towards this object is that of undertaking the local expenses which are required.

It appears to have escaped the notice of yourself and of the Executive Council, that in the earlier days of British colonization the colonists were left to depend in a far greater degree than at present on their exertions. The inhabitants of what are now the United States of America were left, up to the time of the separation, with exceedingly little assistance from the mother country to defend themselves from the numerous and warlike tribes of Indians by whom they were surrounded; nay, even during war with France, a large part of the burthen of maintaining the arduous contest with that powerful monarchy with its Indian allies, fell upon the British American provinces, and not upon the mother country. At the present time the Legislature of Jamaica has the entire charge of the fortifications of the island.

New South Wales has now advanced so far in wealth and population, that without further aid from the mother country than you will have learned from my recent Despatches it is intended to afford, the Colony is well able to do what is necessary in order to provide for its own defence.

At the same time Her Majesty's Government will be glad to afford such assistance as can be given with justice to the rest of Her Majesty's subjects in carrying into effect such measures as the Colonial Legislature may consider expedient with a view to its defence. It is not possible to comply with the request that the troops lately sent to New Zealand should be brought back, because measures have already been taken for the reduction of the force in that Colony; but if it should be considered desirable to execute any fortifications by military labour, Her Majesty's Government would willingly take steps for stationing an additional regiment in New South Wales, and also a detachment of sappers and miners, provided the Legislative Council would vote the amount required for their pay, including both their ordinary pay and the working pay to which they would be entitled. No charge would be made upon the Colony for the conveyance of the troops there, nor on account of the claims to pensions which the soldiers would acquire during their stay in the Colony; and further, whenever it became necessary to relieve a regiment so stationed in New South Wales, encouragement would be given to the soldiers belonging to it to take their discharge, thus effecting, without cost to the Colony, a useful addition, not only to its population, but to its means of defence, as men so discharged could, under the existing regulations, be called upon to serve against an enemy in case of need. Her Majesty's Government would also willingly take measures for increasing the number of enrolled pensioners in the Colony, if the Local Legislature would provide for the cost of conveying them there, and settling them in the situations where they might be most useful.

You will take an early opportunity of communicating these observations to the Executive Council; and you will concert with that body the course which it may be expedient to pursue with the view of bringing the subject under the consideration of the Legislative Council.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey*.

Appendix, No. 18.

PAPER delivered in by *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

LETTER from the Colonial Department to the Treasury, on the German Legion at the *Cape of Good Hope.* Appendix, No. 18.

Sir, Downing-street, 4 February 1859.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Bulwer Lytton to request that you will bring under the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury the following statement relative to the employment and pay of the German Legion at the Cape of Good Hope.

At the close of the war the foreign legions which had entered into the service of Great Britain were entitled, by the terms of their enlistment, to receive a certain gratuity, and to be sent to their respective countries at the public expense. This in itself required some outlay, besides which, it was found that some of the men might not meet with a favourable reception at their own homes, and that there would be difficulty in procuring the requisite authority for their transit through intermediate countries. In this position of affairs, it was suggested, so far as regarded the German Legion, that it might be advantageous to themselves, and useful to that Colony, if they were established as military settlers at the Cape of Good Hope. The Governor, Sir George Grey, was consulted, and expressed his concurrence in the scheme, which was thereupon put into course of execution.

The plan was, that such officers and men of the German Legion as would volunteer for the purpose should be settled upon land in suitable stations along the frontier of Kaffraria, upon condition of preserving their military training, and of rendering military service when required. They were, during a term of seven years, to assemble every year for a stated period of exercise, and were to receive during the first three years a commuted pay equal to about half pay, but if called out for actual service, either in support of the civil power or in defence of the country, their receipts were to be increased to full pay, the expense being defrayed in the former instance by the Colony, and in the latter by the Imperial Government.

Only a moderate part of the German Legion, amounting to 2,300 of all ranks, accepted these terms, and proceeded to the Cape. At first it was thought probable by those who sent them out that a large proportion of them would be accompanied by their families, or would marry before proceeding to the Cape; and every facility for these purposes was afforded to them by Her Majesty's Government, not merely by giving a free passage to all the women and children, but by permitting marriages of the soldiers up to the date of embarkation, and even affording a conveyance after the legion to any of their countrywomen betrothed to men of the corps, according to the customs of Germany. The result, however, was, that whilst the men of all ranks amounted, as above stated, to 2,300, the females of all ages did not exceed 330.

The force behaved very well on the voyage, and arrived in good health and order. Great disappointment, however, was expressed by Governor Sir George Grey in his Despatch of the 25th of March 1857, No. 38, at the scarcity of women, and he describes this as so unfavourable to the prospect that the men would become good settlers, and attended, in his opinion, with such risks of lawless and violent conduct, that he had thought it necessary to keep them under arms. Page 10 of P. P.

When it was pointed out to the Governor, however, by Mr. Labouchere's Despatch of 14th September 1857, No. 239, that this consideration could not, consistently with the terms of the scheme under which the Legion had been sent out, supply a valid reason for retaining them on full pay, be supplied in different Despatches, noted in the margin, explanations which placed the matter in a very different light. He produced evidence to show that at the moment when the Legion arrived, the whole Kaffir race were in a state of great excitement; that serious apprehension of imminent danger to the Colony was entertained not merely by the colonists, but by the officer in command of the troops on the frontier, and that the opportune arrival and display of the new comers as an available military force had therefore been of great importance to the security of the country and the preservation of peace. Page 40 of P. P. No. 154, 30 Oct. 1857. " 155, 31 Oct. 1857. " 173, 26 Nov. 1857. " 27, 22 Mar. 1858. (Pages 29, 32, 34, and 37, of P. P.)

Not long afterwards the outbreak of the great Indian mutiny again created a new and unexpected demand for troops. Acting in accordance with urgent exhortations from the Government at home, Sir G. Grey despatched large bodies of British troops to India, but in so doing, he was expressly reminded in one Despatch from the Secretary of State, dated 26th August 1857, that he would still have by him a force in which the German Legion was enumerated as one of the constituents; and in a subsequent Despatch, dated 5th January 1858, No. 286, he was told that, if his retaining the Germans under arms had enabled him (Page 10, P. P., of December 1857).

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to increase his succours to India, the result would have been fortunate. These instructions and statements received by Sir G. Grey from the Secretary of State certainly afford Sir G. Grey fair reasons for arguing that he had authority for reckoning on the support of Her Majesty's Government and of Parliament in continuing to keep the Legion embodied, notwithstanding prior objections, until the call and pressure occasioned by the mutiny were over. Accordingly his retention of the Legion on full pay was eventually sanctioned by Despatch, dated 5th February 1858, No. 305, up to the close of the financial year ending on the 31st March 1858; after that date it was to cease.

On receiving this intimation, however, Sir George Grey represented, in a Despatch, dated the 17th July last, that the circumstances of the Colony had changed since these instructions to him were written. The powerful Chief, Moshesh, head of the Basutos, had gained great advantages over the Orange Free State, thus threatening the security of the European races generally, and the frontier was placed in so critical a condition, that the British territory must be deemed to be threatened by hostile aggression until these disputes with the Free State could be adjusted, for which purpose Sir George Grey was about to visit the interior. As Governor of the Colony, answerable for its security, he reported his decided opinion that the breaking up of the German Legion would probably bring an enemy into the field, and he stated that for this reason he had felt himself bound to continue to keep the corps embodied for military duty, adding an assurance that it would not be kept under arms a day longer than necessary. In the month of September peace was concluded under Sir George Grey's auspices between the Orange Free State and the Basuto nation; but in the very same month urgent demands reached him from the Governments both of Calcutta and of Bombay for further reinforcements. He immediately despatched 2,500 men, including 1,000 of the German Legion, being as many of that corps as would volunteer for the purpose.

Such having been the course of events up to the date of the latest advices from the Cape, I am desired to express Sir E. Lytton's opinion that there are sufficient reasons to justify an application to Parliament to provide up to the present time, or end of the now current financial year, for the expense occasioned by keeping the German Legion on full pay. Sir E. Lytton thinks it is to be regretted that imperfect information was at first given by Sir George Grey as to his reasons for the measure, and hence that it seemed to rest upon a ground to which Her Majesty's Government justly objected. But it must be admitted that the explanations subsequently afforded by Sir George Grey establish that military necessity which is the proper justification of his conduct in keeping the corps embodied. He has shown that at the time when they arrived the peace of the Colony was in serious danger, and that in the subsequent exigencies of the Indian mutiny the presence of this corps, as an available military force, enabled him to despatch the most material succours to India, and that during the whole period of their sojourn in the Colony there has been no time at which one or the other of these demands for their services has not existed. Nor must it be forgotten that in so largely diminishing the garrison at the Cape as has been done to meet the exigencies of the service in India, a military saving must have been effected at the Cape far greater than the cost of keeping the German Legion as a substitute for part of the withdrawn troops.

On these grounds Sir E. Lytton feels himself warranted in recommending, and he does so most earnestly, and after the most careful investigation of the circumstances, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury that an estimate should be submitted to Parliament to provide for the difference between the half and the full pay of the German Legion for the period above stated. The exact amount required for the purpose could best be calculated by the War Department, to which office Sir E. Lytton would beg to refer their Lordships for the necessary information on this head.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. Merivale.*

G. A. Hamilton, Esq.,
&c. &c. &c.

Appendix, No. 19.

REMARKS on Mr. *Elliot*'s Memorandum appended to the Report of the Committee on the Military Defence of the Colonies.

THE leading feature of Mr. Elliot's Memorandum is, that while it exposes and condemns the results of the present system, it proposes no practical alteration in that system; consequently, the anomalies and abuses which General Peel points out, and for which he wishes that a remedy be provided, will continue in full force if Mr. Elliot's views be adopted. The Committee was appointed to "prepare a scheme" for the application of certain principles to each Colony; but this task Mr. Elliot, as I contend, does not perform. It is true that he expresses an abstract opinion against scattering our troops in small garrisons, and it is true also that "he prefers the plan by which Her Majesty's Government determines the amount of force which it deems reasonable to allot to different Colonies, as being required by the duties of the Sovereign State, whilst the Colonies themselves must pay for any additional number of troops which they may ask for and obtain." But practically this is nothing else than the present system put into words, inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government now "allots the amount of force which it thinks reasonable," &c.; and if it does not, it can, whenever it pleases, increase or diminish that force.

I do not deny that it would be consistent with the literal terms of Mr. Elliot's definition to throw as much of the responsibility and burden of self-defence on the Colonies as the report recommends, or even more, for the Imperial Government might say that "the duties of the Sovereign State" do not "require any force to be allotted" to any Colony, with or without the exception of the half-dozen military posts enumerated in the Report; but that is not the way in which the plan ever has been worked or will be worked; nor is it the way in which Mr. Elliot conceives its working. That I am right in supposing him not to advocate a change of system is shown by his selection of the North American Colonies as an example of the plan which he prefers. "There," he says, "it is already in operation," and consequently, "a general and intelligible principle is established." Now, it so happens that there is no group of Colonies with which the War Office has been engaged in more constant and irritating correspondence, or about which we have more inconsistent decisions, or which exhibits more marked inequality as regards the plans of defence adopted, the contributions of the various Colonies, and the assistance we have given them, than those of North America. Indeed, it is to this group that I should most naturally recur for illustrations of the present system, involving, as it does (what General Peel calls) "the absence of any fixed and recognized principle in determining questions of military expenditure." Moreover, the practical result, as exemplified in British America, of the system which Mr. Elliot desires to see in general operation is, that in Canada alone has any attempt been made at self-defence (and there it is a feeble and inadequate one); in the other Colonies, comprising, as they do, some of the oldest, most numerous, most prosperous, and most energetic of our Colonial communities, not one farthing is expended or one man raised and trained for the defence of their own lives and properties against foreign enemies. I can hardly conceive that he considers this to be a desirable state of things, or one which ought not only to continue indefinitely in British America, but to be extended over the whole empire.

Nor can I agree with Mr. Elliot that any distinction can be drawn between the system pursued in British America and that pursued at the Cape. In both his principle prevails, for (to use his own words) "the Government determines the amount of force which it deems reasonable to allot to the Colonies respectively, as being required by the duties of the Sovereign State." At the Cape, as we all know, the practical result of this has been what Mr. Elliot calls the "grave fact," and what the Report calls the "gigantic anomaly," of an expenditure in one year of 830,000 *l.*

These and similar facts lead to the conclusion that no permanent reduction of expense to this country, and no effective stimulus to Colonial exertions, will be the result of merely recommending, as Mr. Elliot has done, to Government the desirableness of reconsidering the distribution of the army in the Colonies. This has been done over and over again, and nothing has come of it. We have, with trifling exceptions, the same extravagance on our side, the same helplessness on theirs; the same confusion, inconsistency, and disputation which has prevailed more or less for the last century in our military policy towards our Colonies.

I will now proceed to consider Mr. Elliot's principal objections to the report.

His first objection is to a uniform rate of joint contribution. It will be remembered that the two main principles of the plan proposed in the report are—(1.) Colonial responsibility and management. (2.) Joint contribution at a uniform rate. Of these, the former is infinitely the more important; and, if it be admitted, the precise mode in which the mother country should assist the Colony is comparatively immaterial. It must necessarily be by a contribution of some kind either in men or money, and I feel assured that a uniform rate for such contribution will be found both more fair and more likely to answer practically than any other arrangement. If it be objected to, we must adopt a rate varying according to some other intelligible and definite principle; and I can conceive no other than one varying according either to the capacity of the different Colonies, or according to

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to their exposure to danger. Now, the application of either of these tests would lead to a result far more anomalous and unsatisfactory than the adoption of a uniform rate. It is absolutely impossible to gauge, even approximately, the comparative capacities or resources of different countries; you cannot do it according to revenue, because that depends on willingness quite as much as on ability to support taxation (for example, Austria has a larger revenue than the United States, but no one supposes she has greater means of raising one); nor can you do it according to population, because the producing power of different races, or of the same races in different circumstances, varies indefinitely; but even if you could, I see no justice in dealing with your Colonies as if they were paupers, and giving them money, or money's worth, on account of or in proportion to their poverty; nor do I think that small Colonies have any claim to get their public services performed more cheaply than large ones at other people's expense. The ground of their claim upon us is the fact of their dependence, and that applies equally to the large and the small. 'It is a matter of justice, not of charity; and Mr. Elliot, in favouring the eleemosynary principle, puts the matter, as I conceive, on a wrong basis altogether. The apportionment of contribution according to exposure to attack would be, if possible, even more impracticable, for the danger of attack which a country lies under depends on such numerous and perpetually varying circumstances, geographical, political, and military, that it may at once be discarded as a basis for any permanent arrangement. If, however, a better way of working out a scheme of joint contribution than that of a uniform rate can be devised, I, for one, should be perfectly ready to consider it; the only principle on which I desire to insist as essential, being that of a common defence under colonial management, as distinguished from that (now in force) of separation and independence, both of action and contribution, the mother country having the primary responsibility.

According to the former, which is the course recommended in the report, the whole system of defence, including the amount of force, would be decided on by the Colony, as the most competent and most interested party, and to the expense of that system the mother country would contribute. According to the latter, which is the course recommended by Mr. Elliot, neither party would have the power or the obligation to provide for the whole defence of a colony; but the mother country would provide for Imperial interests, and the Colony would either provide for colonial interests, or leave them unprovided for.

Of the latter system, the fruits are before us, in the fact that we incur an enormous outlay for what Mr. Elliot admits to be, in a military point of view, a most imperfect and inadequate result; while the Colonies do virtually nothing. Of the former system we have also had experience; and I will now endeavour to show how it worked as regards military efficiency, not insisting for the present on its more obvious recommendations of justice and economy.

For 150 years after we had colonized North America, the principle of Colonial self-defence prevailed there almost exclusively. The British colonists found themselves in contact with native nations, more numerous, more warlike, and better organized than any which modern colonists have had to deal with. They were also surrounded by and intermingled with the Colonies of several European nations, each of which separately was in the habit of meeting England in war on equal terms, both by sea and land, viz., the French, the Spaniards, and the Dutch. In all our Colonies there were "Imperial interests" to be protected, that is, there were points of great strategical and commercial importance, such as Boston, New York, Charlestown, and many others. Yet in those days it was not considered by the mother country that it was her interest to garrison her colonies, nor did it ever occur to the colonists that when for their own objects they sought, by emigrating, an asylum of freedom, or a new field of enterprise and profit, they were entitled thereby to claim immunity from the responsibility of self-defence, which devolves on the members of every other organized community in the world. On the contrary, they were content to know that with the greater advantages of a new country, they must meet greater hardships and dangers. They never thought that they were to take the former, and to be protected at other people's expense from the latter

Until the year 1754 I can only find two instances when regular soldiers were sent to British America. One was in 1664, in the case of the army which took New York; and the other in 1695, when a body of troops was sent to reinforce the colonists who were carrying on war against the French. In 1754, a change of policy occurred in this respect for the first time. Braddock was sent to America with a considerable force, the English Mutiny Act was extended for the first time to the Colonies, and they were never again without British troops till we recognized their independence.

Let us see how this system (the idea of applying which, in a modified form, and under circumstances beyond comparison more favourable, appears now so rash and ruinous) actually worked. In the first place, the British Colonies not only successfully established themselves and resisted all attacks on them, but they attacked and conquered foreign possessions, and handed them over to the British Crown; secondly, they attained great prosperity; their increase, as regards commerce and population, from the commencement of the 18th century to the declaration of independence, being as great as any recorded in history, except that of Australia and California, since the discovery of gold; thirdly, they produced and trained a race of statesmen and soldiers, who proved themselves at least equal to the greatest of their European contemporaries. What I have said is illustrated by almost every page of early Colonial history; and I know of no history more fruitful in the record of heroic deeds. For example, in 1710, the American Colonists conquered Nova Scotia

Scotia from the French without any help from England. In 1745, three New England States, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, of which the whole population at that time was only about 300,000, organized and equipped a naval and military expedition against Louisburg, a fortress described by a contemporary historian as "of prodigious strength," garrisoned by 600 regulars and 1,300 militia, and took it after a regular siege, with 49 days of open trenches, its fall involving the surrender of the whole of Cape Breton. The expense, amounting to 200,000*l.*, was defrayed in the first place by the colonists, and only repaid to them by England after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which Louisburg was restored to France. Appendix, No. 19.

It would have seemed strange to the men who executed such military operations as these to be told (as Mr. Elliot says of the people of Nova Scotia) that they "could not be expected" to provide for the defence of their own capitals. Yet the population of the three Colonies which conquered Cape Breton was not so large, collectively, as that of Nova Scotia alone, nor was their commerce so great, nor were they, like her, within eight days steaming of the aid of the mother country. If there had been a British garrison in those days at Boston, a place as "important to the general power of the empire", as Halifax is now, the people of New England would soon have found out that they too "could not be expected" even to contribute towards defending it.

I next come to the consideration of Mr. Elliot's opinion, that the dependence of the Colonies is not the only ground for our undertaking to defend them, and his argument that the interest we have in their defence constitutes alone a sufficient ground for such undertaking. This view may be perhaps best tested by considering a case where we have "interest" without "dependence." We have a strong interest in the defence of Belgium, if for no other reason, because we are bound by treaty to protect it; indeed, I think it will hardly be denied that there is no British Colony of which the security against foreign conquest is more important to us, and certainly there is not one half as much danger of being conquered. Yet it would seem very strange if Belgium proposed that we should undertake the expense of fortifying Antwerp and the maintenance of its garrison. We should of course reply that though we had an interest in the security of Belgium, that of the Belgians was so much more powerful and direct, that it was for them and not for us to provide for it. We should probably add the expression of our opinion, that the business would be better done if they managed it by themselves and in their own way than if we interfered; and this is precisely what we ought to say to the Colonies, except that, as was said in the Report, their dependence on us imposes on us an obligation to give them material assistance. I therefore propose to deal with them as we should with Belgium, only so far as is consistent with a reasonable discharge of the obligation.

Although I consider that this is a sufficient answer to the whole argument about "interest," I cannot pass by without remark the illustrations by which Mr. Elliot endeavours to show the importance to England of the political connexion with the Colonies. I do so the more willingly because the fallacy (as I conceive it to be) which he employs is one very generally received.

Mr. Elliot argues that the fact of Australia taking our exports, to the amount of "nearly 12*l.*" a head of her population, while the United States take them only at the rate of "less than 1*l.*," "shows how much larger in proportion is the commerce with countries which remain part of the empire." I might with equal justice and greater plausibility (the cases being far more analogous) argue that because the United States take, in proportion to population, a greater amount of our exports than Canada, that fact "shows how much larger is the commerce with countries which do not remain part of the empire."*

The truth is, that in neither the one case nor the other have the political conditions of the respective countries anything to do with the matter. It is governed to a certain extent, perhaps, at first, by origin, but mainly and permanently by economical conditions, *i. e.*, on the one hand by the purchasing power, and on the other by the varying productions and wants of their people respectively. In the first place, Australia, having, like all young countries, a very imperfect division of labour, produces very few kinds of articles, and, of course, imports almost everything that she consumes; while the United States, with a vast population, and a territory embracing every variety of climate, are, to a great extent, self-supplying. In the second place, Australia producing nothing analogous to British manufactures, has no temptation to enact a protective tariff, while the converse is the case with the United States, which have a powerful manufacturing interest, and therefore seek to protect it. If the Australians thought a protective tariff conducive to their interests, they would immediately enact one. This is not a mere theory: it is proved by facts, as nearly as possible to demonstration. Instead of comparing two countries so entirely dissimilar as Australia and the United States, I will adopt the more opposite course of comparing—

1. Two countries, one a colony and the other independent, of which the economical conditions are tolerably similar; and—

2. Two different periods of the same country's existence, involving different sets of political conditions.

1. The

* The population of the United States may be estimated at 28,000,000 for the year 1859, in which they imported from Great Britain to the value of 22,611,283*l.*, or about 16*s.* per head. The population of Canada was estimated by its Finance Minister at "nearly 3,000,000" in the same year, and its imports from Great Britain were 1,864,821*l.*, or somewhat more than 12*s.* per head.

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1. The difference between the tariff of the United States and that of Canada (as regards the present question) is just this, that in the former British manufactures are charged with a duty of 24 per cent., and in the latter of 20 per cent., with the exception of leather and clothes, which, on account of some special interest, are charged at 25 per cent. Such is the exact amount of the difference in the obstacles which our trade meets with in our own dependency and the neighbouring foreign State respectively, the result being, as I have shown, that we export more to the foreigner than to the colonist.

And it is further to be observed, that the present American tariff is less, the Canadian tariff more, protective than the last; showing that while the Canadians are following the old path, and protecting in proportion as the interests which demand protection grow powerful, the Americans are beginning to see the folly of restrictive tariffs, and show a tendency at least towards greater freedom of trade.

2. I have compared the statistics of our trade with the United States, before and after their independence, with the following results:* From 1760 to 1770, the last decade of their colonial dependence, the average annual exports from this country to British North America were 1,763,409 *l.* (official value). From 1783 to 1790, the first seven years after our recognition of their independence, the average annual exports, similarly calculated, were 2,349,040 *l.* From 1805 to 1808, the average annual exports were 6,479,277 *l.* These figures show that the dissolution of the connexion with England caused no appreciable injury to the commercial intercourse of the two countries, although the period to which they relate embraces a transition from a system under which the mother country had a strict monopoly of the trade with her colonies, to one under which the latter enjoyed, of course, unlimited access to all the markets of the world.

It is true, as Mr. Elliot says, that "the habit of resorting to a particular market" has a considerable effect upon commerce, but he has not explained what that has to do with the political connexion, which is the only relevant question; and I have shown, on the contrary, that in the case of the only available precedent, the habit of resorting to a particular market survived the change from dependence to independence, nor is there any ground whatever for supposing that it could cease to operate on the Australians, merely because their political connexion with England was dissolved.

Mr. Elliot concludes his memorandum by making a division of the colonies into groups; not, however, with the view of proposing specific arrangements with respect to military expenditure to suit the circumstances of each group, but merely, as I understand, in order to show the dissimilarity of the colonies *inter se*, and the consequent injustice of applying a uniform rule, as regards military expenditure, to all. "Surely," he says, "it is quite as unjust to apply a uniform rule to different cases as to apply a varying rule to cases which are alike." He supports this view by describing the local peculiarities of the various colonies, and follows up his description by saying, "It will be seen at a glance that it would be difficult to frame a general rule which shall be equally applicable to all of such dissimilar societies." Now, it is essential to bear in mind that the only point on which "uniformity of rule" is sought to be applied to these dissimilar societies is the support of the charges made necessary for their own defence. Attention to this point will, I think, lead at once to a discovery of the fallacy of Mr. Elliot's argument. It is not only British Colonies that differ from each other in almost every conceivable way. France and Java, India and Denmark, Cuba and Madagascar, differ from each other, as regards their wealth and their poverty, their dependence and their independence, their security and their insecurity, even more widely than any British colonies; yet to all of them this "uniform rule" properly and justly applies, that they provide the means, either in men or money, of defending themselves against internal anarchy and foreign aggression. What Mr. Elliot had to show for the purposes of his argument was, not that the British colonies are *unlike* each other materially and socially, but that they are *like* each other, while differing from all the rest of the world, in their exceptional right to make other people pay for protecting them. It is strange how completely in this discussion the fact is ignored that we are not proposing to apply a new and untried principle to British colonies, but merely suggesting an approach, in a gradual and modified form, to a "uniformity of rule," which has always prevailed, under infinitely varying circumstances, everywhere else, and to which they form the sole and monstrous exception.

The only group on which Mr. Elliot's observations appear to call for special remark from me is that of the West Indies. Here he deserts the ground of defence against foreign aggression, and lays down broadly our obligations to keep troops there for the purpose of preserving "the existence of society," intimating that without such a force they would be in danger of "falling into helpless and perhaps sanguinary anarchy;" and again, "that without troops these Colonies could not exist." If such were really the case, I think it would be difficult to justify our maintaining indefinitely, by the pressure of external force, a society so rotten as to be utterly incapable of holding together alone. But I entirely dissent from this gloomy view. If the negroes were slaves, or if they were, though nominally free, a down-trodden and oppressed race, there might be a danger of Jacobinical insurrection; but the converse of this is the case. The complaint is that the engroes have, under the existing arrangements of society, entirely their own way; and if so, there appears to be no temptation to alter them by violence.

At any rate, the principle laid down by the Secretary of State for War, in the letter on which the appointment of the Committee was founded (and concurred in by the Lords of

* The statistics in the text are taken from the Tables in Pitkin's "History of the Commerce of the United States."

of the Treasury and the Secretary of State for the Colonies), was, that "military expenditure for purposes of internal police should be defrayed by local funds"—a principle which would go even farther than that suggested in the Report, inasmuch as it would deprive the West Indies of any claim even for Imperial contribution towards a force kept for the purposes of preventing internal disturbance. Appendix, No. 19.

I must add, that it is difficult to understand why, upon any view of the subject, we keep black troops in the West Indies; as, in the case of a Negro insurrection (the only alleged danger to "society"), they would not only be untrustworthy, but formidable; and no one, I suppose, believes that they would be capable of meeting French or American troops in the field.

In conclusion, I wish emphatically to repeat, that the real question is not whether the arrangements which we make for the defence of our Colonies are capable or not of being improved, by re-distribution of force here or reduction of force there, but whether they are not radically wrong, *i. e.*, based on a theory fundamentally erroneous. The view which I believe to be the right one is, that when a part of the people of an old country voluntarily "swarms" to a new one, there is neither justice nor policy in permitting the emigrants to throw on those whom they leave behind the responsibility and charge of keeping the new society together, and defending it against the dangers to which its own act has exposed it. And I must again point out that, speaking generally, no colonizing country except England, and England only in comparatively modern days, has ever done so. The Colonies of all other nations, ancient and modern, and English Colonies till we quarrelled with America, have either defended themselves or paid their full share of the expenses of the common defence. Between a Greek metropolis and her Colonies there was a bond of amity, amounting virtually, though not in express terms, to an offensive and defensive alliance; but the obligation was strictly reciprocal: if Athens considered herself bound to assist the Ionian cities against the Persian king; on the other hand, the Syracusan triremes fought in a Peloponnesian quarrel, as part of the Corinthian contingent, at Ægos-Potamos. We cannot deal in this way with our Colonies, because they were formed with the understanding that they were to remain "part of the empire," and have a right, so long as they choose to assert it, to the fulfilment of this virtual compact. But it is desirable, both for our sakes and theirs, to reduce to the minimum the incidents of their dependence; for ours, because we have a right to discharge ourselves, so far as justice and honour permit, of the material burdens caused by a relation which does not bring us any corresponding material advantages; for theirs, because, in proportion as they learn to provide for their own wants, and to assert their own rights, instead of leaning on others, their national character will be elevated and strengthened, and they will be prepared for the day when their independence shall become inevitable. It is on this view that the plan of military defence suggested in the report is based, inasmuch as, by throwing on the Colonies the primary responsibility of their own defence, and confining the assistance of the mother country to a contribution or a contingent, it involves the smallest possible amount, consistently with the circumtances of the case, of interference with their freedom and independence of action.

(signed) *John Robert Godley.*

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1. *Particulars of the Military Expenditure in different Periods.*
2. *Arrangement for a Colonial Contribution: Question of Increasing the Charge.*
3. *Colonial Expenditure of* 150,000 *l. through the War.*
4. *Question of leaving to the Colonists the entire Responsibility of Dealing with the Natives.*
5. *Prospect of the continuance of Peace, without Imperial Aid, when the present War is over.*
6. *Number of Imperial Troops at different Periods.*
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2. *Precedent in the case of the early Colonies in North America.*
3. *Amount of the Imperial Force.*
4. *Militia amd Volunteers.*
5. *Project of a Railway for Imperial Purposes.*
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7. *Imperial and Colonial Expenditure respectively.*

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